THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 206659. January 23, 2019.]
NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., petitioner, vs.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND LUIS G. YBIERNAS, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated January 23, 2019, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 206659 (NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND LUIS G. YBIERNAS, respondents). — For this Court's resolution is the Petition for Certiorari 1 filed by Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (Tupas), assailing the Office of the Ombudsman's December 26, 2011 Resolution 2 and January 28, 2013 Resolution 3 in OMB-V-C-09-0389-K. The Office of the Ombudsman approved Assistant Special Prosecutor III Karen E. Funelas' (Assistant Special Prosecutor Funelas) recommendation to drop Luis G. Ybiernas (Ybiernas) from the Information charging him with violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
Ybiernas is the owner of Sara Caltex Station in Sara, Iloilo. 4
Tupas is a member of the House of Representatives, representing the Fifth District of Iloilo Province, which includes the Municipality of Sara. 5 Acting on information that public funds allocated by the Iloilo Province for projects in Sara were not devoted to their specific purpose, he requested from the Commission on Audit a post-audit of the various projects in the municipality. 6
In its Special Audit Report, the Commission on Audit found, among others, that in the construction of farm-to-market roads, the municipal government paid Sara Caltex Station an excess of P153,721.60. 7 The actual cost of fuel, oil, and lubricants it supplied was P846,280.00, 8 not P1,000,000.00, the amount allegedly paid to the gasoline station. 9
In an Information filed before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as SB-11-CRM-0226, Ybiernas was charged as a co-conspirator with public officers at that time, Neptali P. Salcedo (Neptali), Edna A. Pacrim (Pacrim), Edgar V. Beatingo (Beatingo), and Roel C. Salcedo (Roel), for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. The accusatory portion of the Information read:
That on or about [the] 27th day of December 2005, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused NEPTALI P. SALCEDO, EDNA A. PACRIM, EDGAR V. BEATINGO and ROEL C. SALCEDO, public officers, being the Municipal Mayor (SG-27), Municipal Treasurer (SG-24), Municipal Accountant (SG-24), and Municipal Engineer, respectively, of Sara, Iloilo, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with manifest partiality or evident bad faith, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with one another, and with accused LUIS G. YBIERNAS, a private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the payment of the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, to Sara Caltex Station, Sara, Iloilo, for fuel and lubricant used in several road-repair and maintenance projects in Sara, Iloilo, despite the fact that the cost of fuel and lubricant actually used in the implementation of the projects, according to the corresponding Trip Tickets, amounted to only Eight Hundred Forty-Six Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-Nine Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P846,279.20), Philippine Currency, thereby making the Municipality of Sara, Iloilo, pay an excess amount of more or less ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY-ONE PESOS (P153,721.00), Philippine Currency, and causing undue injury upon the said Municipality in such amount. 10 (Citation omitted) CAIHTE
On June 29, 2011, Ybiernas, Neptali, Pacrim, Beatingo, and Roel (collectively, the accused) jointly filed a Motion for Reconsideration 11 assailing the finding of probable cause against them. 12 Ybiernas then filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 13
In her December 26, 2011 Memorandum, 14 Assistant Special Prosecutor Funelas recommended, among others, granting Ybiernas' prayer to be dropped from the Information. She found merit in Ybiernas' assertion that his inclusion in the charge was based on speculation. 15 Moreover, nothing on record proved that Ybiernas agreed with his co-accused to defraud the government. 16
The dispositive portion of her Memorandum read:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that: 1) the Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 June 2011 be DENIED for lack of merit insofar as accused Neptali Salcedo, Edna Pacrim, Roel Salcedo and Edgar Beatingo are concerned; 2) the Supplemental Motion of accused Ybiernas, praying that he be dropped from the Information be GRANTED; 3) the Information in SB-11-CRM-0226 be WITHDRAWN; and 4) the attached ten (10) Informations be APPROVED and FILED with the Sandiganbayan. 17 (Emphasis in the original)
Prosecution Bureau III Acting Director Manuel Soriano, Jr. (Acting Director Soriano) concurred with Assistant Special Prosecutor Funelas' recommendation. He explained in his January 6, 2012 Memorandum that the signature of Sara Caltex Station's representative — which appeared in the Official Receipts, Disbursement Vouchers, Notices of Award, and Bidder's Tenders — is different from Ybiernas' signature in his Counter-Affidavit. He surmised that Ybiernas did not represent Sara Caltex Station in the questioned transactions, and that there is no strong evidence linking him to the case. 18
Tupas filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that there is unity of purpose and intention among all the accused, including Ybiernas, in "entering into a transaction grossly disadvantageous to the government[.]" 19 Moreover, he claimed that Ybiernas' specific acts as a co-conspirator were evidentiary matters to be ventilated on trial. 20
Assistant Special Prosecutor Funelas denied the Motion in her January 28, 2013 Memorandum. 21 She maintained that Ybiernas was properly dropped as an accused in the case, since no evidence showed that he participated in defrauding the Municipality of Sara. 22 The dispositive portion of her Memorandum read:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that complainant's Motion for Reconsideration dated September 23, 2012 be DENIED, and the duly approved Memorandum dated December 26, 2011 of this Office be MAINTAINED. 23 (Emphasis in the original)
Thus, Tupas filed this Petition for Certiorari24 before this Court. Petitioner argues that public respondent Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in approving Assistant Special Prosecutor Funelas' recommendation to drop private respondent Luis G. Ybiernas from the Information filed against him, despite the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman's finding of probable cause. 25
In his Memorandum 26 dated November 5, 2014, petitioner contends that respondents' objections to his Petition on technical grounds are baseless. 27 He further reiterates, "[t]here is unity of intent and action among all the accused, including private respondent Ybiernas, in committing the crime for which they are charged." 28 He states that the excess payment to the gasoline station was effectively paid to private respondent as its sole owner who has no separate juridical personality. 29
Moreover, petitioner maintains that evidence on private respondent's specific acts as a co-conspirator "are evidentiary matters properly ventilated during trial and not during preliminary investigation[.]" 30
Private respondent, in his Memorandum 31 dated September 26, 2014, counters that the Petition must be dismissed for petitioner's failure to attach certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions and pertinent pleadings. 32 Further, the questions raised are too unsubstantial to require consideration. 33
Private respondent avers that the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not cover errors of judgment 34 but only jurisdictional errors, which were not raised in the Petition. 35 He insists that there is no proof that he agreed with the rest of the accused in defrauding the Municipality of Sara of P153,721.60. 36 He argues that conspiracy must be based on facts, and cannot be presumed. 37 DETACa
For its part, public respondent in its Memorandum 38 dated October 23, 2014 argues that it did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It posits that without proof that private respondent had known of the excess payment, then a mere receipt of payment does not make him a co-conspirator. 39
For this Court's resolution are the following issues:
First, whether or not the Petition must be dismissed for failure to attach certain pleadings and documents, as required by the Rules of Court;
Second, whether or not public respondent Office of the Ombudsman acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in withdrawing the Information against private respondent Luis G. Ybiernas.
This Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
I
Rule 65, Section 1 of the Rules of Court requires that a petition for certiorari "shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto[.]" 40 Private respondent seeks the dismissal of the Petition for petitioner's failure to attach relevant and pertinent pleadings and documents, specifically: (1) petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration; (2) private respondent's Opposition to the Motion; and (3) Acting Director Soriano's Memorandum, which petitioner quoted in his Memorandum. 41
This issue is not novel.
Cortal, et al. v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises42 explained the import of Quintano v. NLRC43 on this matter:
In Quintano v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court faulted the Court of Appeals for dismissing a Rule 65 petition on account of failure to include in the petition a copy of the Complaint initially brought before the Labor Arbiter. Referencing Rule 65's own requirement that the petition shall be "accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping," this Court explained that appending a copy of an original complaint is not even required:
The Rules do not specify the precise documents, pleadings or parts of the records that should be appended to the petition other than the judgment, final order, or resolution being assailed. The Rules only state that such documents, pleadings or records should be relevant or pertinent to the assailed resolution, judgment or orders; as such, the initial determination of which pleading, document or parts of the records are relevant to the assailed order, resolution, or judgment, falls upon the petitioner.
Given this Rule's generic reference to "copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto," this Court explained that:
The [Court of Appeals] will ultimately determine if the supporting documents are sufficient to even make out a prima facie case. If the [Court of Appeals] was of the view that the petitioner should have submitted other pleadings, documents or portions of the records to enable it to determine whether the petition was sufficient in substance, it should have accorded the petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice, a chance to submit the same instead of dismissing the petition outright. Clearly, this is the better policy.
Quintano was echoed in Panaga v. Court of Appeals. There, a petition for certiorari was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failure to include an affidavit of proof of service and after appending only the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission. This Court explained that the petition's annexes sufficed as the Labor Arbiter's decision already recounted the material allegations in the pleadings of the parties and would have been enough for the Court of Appeals to determine whether there was a prima facie case.
Quintano was further echoed in Valenzuela v. Caltex Philippines, Inc., where this Court stated that "the failure to submit certain documents, assuming there was such a failure on respondent's part, does not automatically warrant outright dismissal of its petition." 44 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) ATICcS
Failure to attach pertinent documents is not at once fatal to the petitioner's cause. It must be determined whether the omitted documents are sufficiently relevant and pertinent to require their inclusion in the records. Even then, as Quintano instructs, courts should accord the petitioner the opportunity to submit the relevant documents, instead of dismissing the petition outright.
Relevance may be measured by determining "whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition." 45
Acting Director Soriano's Memorandum is where he justified his concurrence with Assistant Special Prosecutor Funelas' December 26, 2011 Memorandum, which is the Office of the Ombudsman's Resolution that is being assailed in this case. Acting Director Soriano's Memorandum is not the assailed judgment, order, or resolution explicitly required by the Rules of Court to be appended to the Petition for Certiorari.
Besides, public respondent has quoted a substantial portion of Acting Director Soriano's Memorandum in the assailed December 26, 2011 Resolution. 46 There appears to be no need for the certified copy of his Memorandum itself.
Likewise, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration and private respondent's Opposition to the Motion are not the relevant or pertinent documents that must be submitted with the Petition. Private respondent himself admitted that petitioner filed a Motion, which is generally a jurisdictional matter in a petition for certiorari. Further, the arguments raised in both pleadings were reproduced in the assailed Resolutions. 47 This Court may excuse the lack of copies of these documents in the records.
There is no need for these documents to resolve the issues raised in this Petition; the supporting documents filed before this Court suffice. Thus, this Petition cannot be dismissed on procedural grounds alone.
II
Dichaves v. Office of the Ombudsman48 discussed this Court's policy of non-interference on the Office of the Ombudsman's determination of probable cause:
As a general rule, this Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutional mandate. Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) give the Ombudsman wide latitude to act on criminal complaints against public officials and government employees. The rule on non-interference is based on the "respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman[.]"
An independent constitutional body, the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people[,] and [is] the preserver of the integrity of the public service." Thus, it has the sole power to determine whether there is probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal case against an accused. This function is executive in nature.
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The Office of the Ombudsman is armed with the power to investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to assess the strengths or weaknesses of the evidence on hand needed to make a finding of probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the Ombudsman. 49 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
Public respondent's determination of probable cause may be reviewed by this Court in a petition for certiorari, upon a clear showing that it gravely abused its discretion. 50 There is grave abuse of discretion when "power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical[,] or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law." 51
Thus, for this Petition to be given due course, petitioner must show that in approving the recommendation to withdraw the Information against private respondent, public respondent exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner.
III
Probable cause is explained as: TIADCc
[T]he existence of such facts and circumstances as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being based merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence which would justify a conviction. 52
Private respondent was initially charged in the Information as a co-conspirator for violation of Section 3, Paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019:
SECTION 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
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(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Petitioner cites a string of this Court's rulings, which state that private individuals may be charged under Republic Act No. 3019. However, this has long been settled and is not an issue in this Petition. Instead, the issue for resolution here is whether private respondent should have been indicted for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
In subsequently withdrawing the Information against private respondent as a co-conspirator, public respondent found that:
In the present case, complainant did not adduce any new evidence to refute the finding of this Office that there is nothing which will prove that respondent Ybiernas agreed with the rest of the accused to commit the act of defrauding the municipality of Sara in the amount of P153,721.60. Moreover, complainant failed to show that this Office committed errors of law, or even of fact, in finding that there is no basis to charge respondent Ybiernas in this case.
Complainant argues that the rule is that a sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality of the owner of the enterprise, hence, all acts done in behalf of Sara Caltex Station, including the receipt of excess payment, are attributable to respondent Ybiernas. Jurisprudence however say that conspiracy is not presumed. While it need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during[,] and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal design. Here, although respondent Ybiernas is the proprietor of Sara Caltex Station, there appears no evidence that he agreed with his co-respondents to defraud the municipality of Sara. Mere receipt by said gasoline station of payment is not enough to make respondent Ybiernas a co-conspirator of the other respondents, sans evidence showing that he was aware of the excess payment at the time that the gasoline station accepted the payment.
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. . . Having not seen an iota of evidence to show that respondent Ybiernas actually participated in the act of cheating the municipality of Sara other than his gasoline station's receipt of the amount of P153,721.60, it is but justified that he be dropped as accused in this case. 53 (Citation omitted)
Based on opinion, reasonable belief, and the pleadings filed and evidence submitted by the parties, public respondent found that there is nothing that would link private respondent to the anomalous transactions. Its finding is supported by the records; this Court finds no misapprehension on its part. However, petitioner insists that private respondent, as the sole owner, accepted the excess payment that he has since retained, causing undue injury to the Municipality of Sara. Essentially, petitioner contends that private respondent received the "unwarranted benefits, advantage[,] or preference in the discharge of his [co-accused public officials'] functions." 54 AIDSTE
Uriarte v. People55 defined the terms "unwarranted," "advantage," and "preference":
[U]nwarranted means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized; or without justification or adequate reasons. Advantage means a more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit or gain of any kind; benefit from course of action. Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. 56 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
Well-settled is the principle that "conspiracy cannot be presumed. Conspiracy must be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before, during[,] and after the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common design." 57 Petitioner's allegation that private respondent conspired with the public officials in the anomalous transaction was unsubstantiated. Apart from private respondent's ownership of the gas station, petitioner did not present evidence to show his complicity in the crime charged. A mere conjecture that he benefited as the sole proprietor of the business where the alleged overpriced fuel was bought is insufficient to sustain a finding that he was a co-conspirator. In Sabiniano v. Court of Appeals: 58
Proof, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proffered to indicate that the accused had taken part in . . . the "planning, preparation and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government" for, otherwise, any "careless use of the conspiracy theory (can) sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have (only) been made unwitting tools by the criminal minds" really responsible for that irregularity. 59 (Citation omitted)
Public respondent properly dismissed the Complaint for lack of palpable merit, in conformity with Rule II, Section 2 60 and Rule III, Section 4 61 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Thus, without proof that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding no probable cause to indict private respondent, this Court defers to its policy of non-interference in the Office of the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutionally-mandated powers. This Petition is dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and the December 26, 2011 and January 28, 2013 Resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-V-C-09-0389-K are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-19.
2.Id. at 20-29. The Resolution, through a Memorandum, was penned by Assistant Special Prosecutor III Karen E. Funelas and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Wendell E. Barreras-Sulit. It was approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales, with the recommendation of Prosecution Bureau III Acting Director Manuel T. Soriano, Jr. and Deputy Special Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael.
3.Id. at 30-41. The Resolution, through a Memorandum, was penned by Assistant Special Prosecutor III Karen E. Funelas and concurred in by Special Prosecutor Wendell E. Barreras-Sulit. It was approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales, with the recommendation of Prosecution Bureau III Acting Director Manuel T. Soriano, Jr. and Deputy Special Prosecutor Jesus A. Micael.
4.Id. at 37.
5.Id. at 538.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 70. The heading stated that the excess payment to Sara was in the amount of P153,722.00. On the same page, a table stating that the difference between the Fuel Consumption Report prepared by the Municipal Engineer and trip tickets prepared by the drivers amounted to P153,721.60. Meanwhile, the Information reported the difference of P153,721.00.
8.Id. This amount was stated in the body of the Report as the actual cost of fuel, oil, and lubricant issued. However, on the same page was a table stating that the trip tickets prepared by the drivers amounted to P846,279.20, the same amount alleged in the Information.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 31-32.
11Id. at 261-273.
12.Id. at 32.
13.Id.
14.Id. at 20-29.
15.Id. at 26.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 27.
18.Id. at 33-34.
19.Id. at 35.
20.Id.
21.Id. at 30-41.
22.Id. at 40.
23.Id.
24.Id. at 3-19.
25.Id. at 10 and 21.
26.Id. at 536-566.
27.Id. at 544.
28. Id. at 549.
29. Id. at 550.
30. Id. at 545.
31. Id. at 503-529.
32. Id. at 508.
33. Id. at 511-512.
34. Id. at 512.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 516.
37. Id. at 519.
38. Id. at 567-582.
39. Id. at 574-577.
40. RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, sec. 1:
SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. —
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The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
41. Rollo, p. 510.
42. G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017, 838 SCRA 255 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
43. 487 Phil. 412, 424 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
44. Cortal, et al. v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017, 838 SCRA 255, 281-283 [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
45. Id. at 283.
46. Rollo, p. 34.
47. Id. at 35.
48. G.R. Nos. 206310-11, December 7, 2016, 813 SCRA 273 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
49. Id. at 297-299.
50. Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435, August 9, 2017, 836 SCRA 252 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
51. Id. at 286, citing Tetangco v. Office of the Ombudsman, 515 Phil. 230, 234 (2006) [Per J. Quisumbing, Third Division].
52. Ornales v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 214312, September 5, 2018, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2018/september2018/214312.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, Third Division], citing Chan v. Formaran III, et al., 572 Phil. 118, 132 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
53. Rollo, pp. 36-40.
54. Republic Act No. 3019 (1960), sec. 3, par. e.
55. 540 Phil. 477 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division].
56. Id. at 497.
57. Antonino v. Hon. Ombudsman Desierto, et al., 595 Phil. 18, 43 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
58. 319 Phil. 92 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].
59. Id. at 98.
60. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Rule II, sec. 2 provides:
SECTION 2. Evaluation. — Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be:
a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
b) referred to respondent for comment;
c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case;
d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation;
e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. (Emphasis supplied)
61. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Rule III, sec. 4, as amended by the Office of the Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 17-03, provides:
SECTION 4. Evaluation. — Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated to determine whether the same may be:
a) dismissed outright for any of the grounds stated under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6770, provided, however, that the dismissal thereof is not mandatory and shall be discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman concerned;
b) treated as a grievance/request for assistance which may be referred to the Public Assistance Bureau, this Office, for appropriate action under Section 2, Rule IV of this Rules;
c) referred to other disciplinary authorities under paragraph 2, Section 23, R.A. 6770 for the taking of appropriate administrative proceedings;
d) referred to the appropriate office/agency or official for the conduct of further fact-finding investigation; or
e) docketed as an administrative case for the purpose of administrative adjudication by the Office of the Ombudsman. (Emphasis supplied)