Tuazon v. Tuazon

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 200115. August 1, 2018.]

ADELAIDA TUAZON AND THE HEIRS OF GERONIMO TUAZON, NAMELY: MARY ANN J. TUAZON, FERDINAND J. TUAZON, MADONA J. TUAZON AND EDWIN TUAZON, petitioners,vs. LYDIA TUAZON AND ANUNCIACION TUAZON, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 1, 2018which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 200115 (Adelaida Tuazon and the Heirs of Geronimo Tuazon, namely: Mary Ann J. Tuazon, Ferdinand J. Tuazon, Madona J. Tuazon and Edwin Tuazon v. Lydia Tuazon and Anunciacion Tuazon). — This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals' (CA) August 19, 2011 Decision 2 and January 10, 2012 Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 91498. The CA reversed the June 25, 2007 Decision 4 of Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 476-0-03 and dismissed the complaint for accion reivindicatoria filed by Spouses Adelaida and Geronimo Tuazon (petitioners). 5

The dispute arose from the complaint captioned as an accion reivindicatoria filed by petitioners on October 14, 2003 with the RTC. 6 They alleged in the complaint that: (1) they were the prior and actual lawful possessors and bonafide claimants of a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 165, Ts-308 situated at No. 83-18th Street, East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City from 1968 up to the present; (2) they also averred that Lydia Tuazon (Lydia) and Anunciacion 7 Tuazon (respondents) unlawfully occupied and withheld physical possession of a portion of Lot No. 165 containing an area of more or less 73 square meters (property); (3) despite repeated demands to vacate the premises, of which the last demand was made on December 1998, respondents refused to do so, forcing petitioners to refer the matter to the barangay for resolution; and (4) the parties failed to amicably settle the matter which led to the issuance of a "certification to file" on February 18, 1999. 8 cHECAS

Respondents denied the allegations. By way of affirmative defense, they alleged that Lydia and her three sisters, now deceased, owned the subject parcel of land in common, having purchased it using their own funds sometime in 1965. 9

After pre-trial, petitioners waived their right to present testimonial evidence. Instead, they formally offered their documentary evidence which were all admitted by the RTC, subject to their probative value. 10 These consisted of several decisions on cases between the parties since 1974:

(1) Civil Case No. 1558-0 — an action for conveyance of property with damages filed by respondents against petitioners on October 1, 1974. This was dismissed by the trial court on October 1, 1979, which declared petitioners as the sole purchasers of the possessory right over the property; 11

(2) Civil Case No. 2296 — an action for unlawful detainer and damages filed by petitioners against respondents on May 17, 1983. The trial court dismissed the case on May 21, 1986 due to the pendency of Civil Case No. 226-0-84 where the issue of possession is to be determined; 12

(3) Civil Case No. 226-0-84 — an action for specific performance with damages case filed by respondents against petitioners on August 2, 1984 for the enforcement of a compromise agreement between the parties. The trial court dismissed the case on February 8, 1988, on the ground that Civil Case No. 1558-0 constituted res judicata on the issue; 13

(4) Civil Case No. 4229 — an action for unlawful detainer case filed by petitioners against respondents on March 8, 1999. The trial court dismissed the case on April 10, 2000 for failure to establish a cause of action. The case was filed beyond the one year period reckoned from November 29, 1982, "when plaintiffs have formally informed defendants of their demand to vacate." 14

Respondents then moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss but the same was denied. Thereafter, respondents manifested that they were no longer presenting evidence. Thus, the parties submitted their respective memoranda. 15 AHDacC

The RTC, in its two-paged Decision, granted the complaint. It ruled that petitioners have established their possessory rights over the property:

After a careful reading of the documentary evidence submitted by the plaintiffs consisting of decisions issued by courts of law involving the subject property, this Court has come to the conclusion that indeed, the possessory rights of the plaintiffs to the lot in question have been sufficiently established. This is clear from the Decision dated October 1, 1979 rendered by the former CFI Zambales and Olongapo City, Branch 3; and the Decision in Civil Case No. 226-0-84 rendered by the RTC Branch 74, Olongapo City that was subsequently affirmed by the appellate court in CA G.R. CV No. 18985 issued on January 26, 1994. Such being so, plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession of the subject lot through an accion reinvindicatoria. Anent the argument of the defendants that the dispositive portions of the cited decisions by the plaintiff do not contain any adjudication of rights in favor of the plaintiff, the Court finds such contention misplaced considering that what is controlling is the body of the decisions that spelled out in no uncertain terms the rights of the plaintiffs over the lot in question. 16 (Italics in the original.)

The CA, however, granted respondents' appeal and dismissed the complaint. 17 It observed that while the complaint was captioned as an accion reivindicatoria, the cause of action, based on the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced, is actually one for accion publiciana or for recovery of possession. 18 It also found that: (1) petitioners are not the owners but merely holders of possessory rights; (2) more than one year has elapsed from the date of the last demand; and (3) while petitioners have established their possessory rights over the property, their cause of action has prescribed considering that more than 10 years have lapsed from the formal demand to vacate on November 29, 1982. 19

In this petition, petitioners argue that their cause of action is one for accion reivindicatoria grounded on a bonafide claim of ownership based on just title and vested interest acquired over time. This, they claim, renders the application of the 10-year prescriptive period under Article 555 of the Civil Code inapplicable as recovery of ownership of real property, being a real action, prescribes in 30 years under Article 1141 of the Civil Code. In any case, petitioners maintain that the period for extinctive prescription was interrupted by the series of litigations between the parties. 20 IDSEAH

The issue here is whether petitioners' cause of action has prescribed.

We deny the petition.

At the outset, we find that the CA correctly considered the action as one for accion publiciana, a plenary action to determine and recover, the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It is also used to refer to an ejectment suit where the cause of dispossession is not among the grounds for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, or when possession has been lost for more than one year and can no longer be maintained under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. 21 An accion reivindicatoria on the other hand, is a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. 22

The property appears to be disposable land of the public domain whose ownership belongs to the State. Petitioners do not dispute the public character of the property, having alleged that they have a pending Miscellaneous Sales Application with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 23 Under Section 4 of the Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, the authority to dispose public lands is primarily lodged with the Director of Lands (now Land Management Bureau), subject to review by the DENR Secretary. Given the public character of the property, it is the DENR which has primary jurisdiction to resolve any conflicting claims of title over it. 24

Nonetheless, we have time and again ruled that "the power and authority given to the Director of Lands to alienate and dispose of public lands does not divest the regular courts of their jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants against others to protect their respective possessions and occupations." 25 Civil courts still have the ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession. 26 Consequently, the RTC may still determine who among the parties has the better right of possession.

Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged ultimate facts constitutive of an accion publiciana. Petitioners alleged that they are holders of possessory rights over the property, and that more than one year had lapsed from the date of last demand. While they also claim ownership over the property, this allegation is a mere surplusage which may be disregarded in light of the public character of the property. 27 Hence, the only issue to be determined here is the possessory right over the property.

We agree with the RTC and CA that petitioners have established their right of possession by virtue of Civil Case No. 1558-0. Petitioners were declared therein as the sole purchasers of the possessory right over the property under a deed of transfer of possessory right executed in 1968. This became final and executory on September 11, 1981. 28 aCIHcD

However, we also agree with the CA that the action has prescribed and that petitioners have already lost their real right of possession at the time of the filing of the complaint on October 14, 2003.

To begin with, petitioners' claim that the prescriptive period for the action should be 30 years is misplaced. Article 1141 of the Civil Code explicitly states that real actions over immovables prescribe after 30 years, without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription. Since the action before us is one of accion publiciana, which seeks recovery of the real right of possession, Article 1141 must be read in relation to established rules on prescription governing the real right of possession. Article 555 (4) of the Civil Code provides that, "the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years." It is for this reason that we have time and again ruled that the remedy of accion publiciana is no longer available after the lapse of 10 years from dispossession. 29

There is also no merit in petitioners' assertion that the prescriptive period should be counted from the time of last demand in December 1998. This claim is based on the erroneous belief that respondents' possession was converted into tolerance after Civil Case No. 1558-0 became final and executory, as what petitioners advanced in the unlawful detainer cases they filed against respondents. However, for the proper claim of possession of tolerance, it is elementary that tolerance must be present at the inception of the possession. 30 As aptly noted by the trial court in Civil Case No. 4229 (the second unlawful detainer case), "[petitioners] cannot be allowed to advance their claim of tolerance on a [piecemeal] basis, taking into account that as early as May 17, 1983, when the earlier unlawful detainer case (Civil Case No. 2296) was filed, they [have already] been claiming tolerance." 31 To allow them to do so would result in the actions of ejectment and accion publiciana never being barred by prescription at the whim of petitioners.

On the contrary, we find that the prescriptive period of 10 years is to be counted from the time petitioners were dispossessed of the property in as early as 1968. Albeit the exact date of when respondents occupied the property is not shown, records disclose that at the time petitioners acquired their possessory rights by virtue of the deed of transfer of possessory rights in 1968, respondents were already adversely occupying the property since 1967. 32 This adverse occupation is further evidenced by their initiation of Civil Case No. 1558-0 against petitioners on October 1, 1974. That this adverse occupation continued despite finality of the Decision in that case is further supported by petitioners' initiation of the unlawful detainer cases in 1983 and 1999, which were both dismissed by the lower courts, as well as the present case. In which case, from the time of respondents' adverse occupation since 1967, or even on October 1, 1974, petitioners' real right of possession has been lost after the lapse of 10 years from either date.

We do not subscribe to the view that the series of litigation between the parties tolled the prescriptive period. Article 1155 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the "prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court" and this necessarily contemplates the same cause of action subject of the prescriptive period. The cases filed prior to this case referred to causes of action different from accion publiciana. It is settled that ejectment cases involve a different cause of action from an accion publiciana. 33 Also, while Civil Case No. 1558-0 is captioned as conveyance of property, the cause of action of respondents in that case is actually the enforcement of an implied trust. 34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 19, 2011 and the Resolution dated January 10, 2012 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."Leonardo-De Castro, J., designated as Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2559 dated May 11, 2018; Gesmundo, J., designated as Acting Member of the First Division per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENAActing Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 7-31.

2.Id. at 43-53. Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante with Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Antonio L. Villamor, concurring.

3.Id. at 55-56.

4.Id. at 102-103. Penned by Judge Ramon S. Caguioa.

5.Id. at 52. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:

   WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated June 25, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 476-0-03 is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint before the RTC of Olongapo City is DISMISSED.

   SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original.)

6.Id. at 14; see records, pp. 1-4.

7. Also referred to as Anunsacion in some parts of the records.

8.Rollo, pp. 43-44, 92.

9.Id. at 44.

10.Id. at 44-45.

11.Id. at 63-71.

12.Id. at 72-73, 78.

13.Id. at 74-80.

14.Id. at 90-96.

15.Id. at 45.

16.Id. at 103.

17.Supra note 2.

18.Rollo, p. 46.

19.Id. at 49-52.

20.Id. at 19-21.

21.Padilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169956, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 219, 226.

22.Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815, 824-825.

23.Rollo, p. 10.

24.Bagunu v. Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011, 655 SCRA 413, 423-425, 428-429.

25.Modesto v. Urbina, G.R. No. 189859, October 18, 2010, 633 SCRA 383, 393, citing Solis v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72486, June 19, 1991, 198 SCRA 267, 272.

26.Id.

27. See Espejo v. Malate, G.R. No. L-48612, January 27, 1983, 120 SCRA 269, 276-278.

28.Rollo, pp. 48-49.

29.Cutanda v. Heirs of Roberto Cutanda, G.R. No. 109215, July 11, 2000, 335 SCRA 418, 426-427.

30.Flores-Cruz v. Goli-Cruz, G.R. No. 172217, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 545, 551.

31.Rollo, p. 95.

32.Id. at 94.

33.Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 500, 509.

34.Rollo, p. 82.