FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232712. September 29, 2021.]
TSUNAMI MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and WILLIAM L. VILLAREAL, petitioners,vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND CARLOS ALAN T. YAM, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 29, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 232712 (Tsunami Management Corporation and William L. Villareal v. Office of the Ombudsman and Carlos Alan T. Yam). — Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court dated July 28, 2017 filed by Tsunami Management Corporation (petitioner), represented by Atty. F. William L. Villareal (Villareal), seeking the reversal of: (1) the Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 24, 2016, which affirmed the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman that dismissed petitioner's administrative complaint against respondent Carlos Alan T. Yam (respondent), for grave abuse of authority and oppression; and (2) the subsequent Resolution 3 by the CA dated July 4, 2017 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
We deny the petition.
It is worthy to note that petitioner sought a remedy from the Office of the Ombudsman's Decision by filing a petition for certiorari with the CA, yet failed to raise arguments on the exercise of its jurisdiction. Thus, while captioned as a petition for certiorari, it was in the nature of an appeal, raising errors of judgment.
Generally, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. In Fabian v. Desierto, the Court discussed the justifications for this mode of appeal as follows:
It is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule 43 should apply only to "ordinary" quasi-judicial agencies, but not to the Office of the Ombudsman which is a "high constitutional body." We see no reason for this distinction for, if hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule 43 even includes the Office of the President and the Civil Service Commission, although the latter is even an independent constitutional commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman which is a constitutionally-mandated but statutorily-created body.
Regarding the misgiving that the review of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman by the Court of Appeals would cover questions of law, of fact or of both, we do not perceive that as an objectionable feature. After all, factual controversies are usually involved in administrative disciplinary actions, just like those coming from the Civil Service Commission, and the Court of Appeals as a trier of fact is better prepared that this Court to resolve the same. x x x 4
Nevertheless, as clarified in Yatco v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, 5 the remedies available to a party to assail an Ombudsman ruling in administrative cases have been delineated, thus:
The corresponding remedies to assail Ombudsman rulings with respect to administrative and criminal charges are already well-settled in jurisprudence.
With respect to administrative charges, there is a delineation between appealable and unappealable Ombudsman rulings. Pursuant to Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act, any order, directive or decision of the Ombudsman "imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, [or] suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and unappealable." Case law has explained that Ombudsman rulings which exonerate the respondent from administrative liability are, by implication, also considered final and unappealable. In these instances, the Court has ruled that even though such rulings are final and unappealable, it is still subject to judicial review on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, and the correct procedure is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
In contrast, in cases where the respondent is not exonerated and the penalty imposed is not merely public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary, the Ombudsman's decision is appealable, and the proper remedy is to file an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. 6
Here, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which, nevertheless failed to substantiate allegations of grave abuse of discretion. Section 1 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. 7
Significantly, a petition for certiorari is appropriate when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. However, petitioner failed to substantiate its arguments along this standard. We are in agreement with the CA in holding as follows:
In the case at bench, petitioner assails the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, dismissing the administrative complaint for grave abuse of authority and oppression against herein private respondent, Carlos Alan T. Yam. Petitioner contends that there was sufficient evidence showing that private respondent harassed and/or oppressed TMC employee, Atty. F. William L. Villareal, during the First Monteverde Condominium Corporation (FMCC) meeting. It further avers that private respondent failed "xxx to comply with the Code of Conduct when he purposefully and maliciously took advantage of his public position and made use of the barangay's resources for his own personal use or benefit and that of his brother President Lorenzo and the other original respondents to the detriment of others. Thus, petitioner prays for the reversal of the November 27, 2015 Decision and that a new one be entered finding private respondent guilty of grave abuse of authority and oppression.
Verily, the arguments set forth by petitioner are not errors involving jurisdiction but one of judgment, which is beyond the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. 8
By presenting arguments along the line of errors in judgment rather than on the manner by which the Office of the Ombudsman arrived at its decision, it cannot be said that petitioner raised questions on the exercise of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, which is fatal to a petition for certiorari.
Even if We were to look at the substance of petitioner's repeated arguments to ascertain whether the Office of the Ombudsman's actions may be considered as "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the petition would still fail.
As it has always been, the quantum of evidence necessary for the Office of the Ombudsman to decide on petitioner's administrative complaint is substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 9 Indeed, the backbone of petitioner's complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman was a complaint-affidavit executed by Villareal, without any supporting or corroborating testimonies of the alleged acts of oppression and grave abuse of authority. 10
To be sure, the CA cannot be expected to overturn a judgment, much less find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman in its decision that was made on the basis of substantial evidence or the lack thereof. The Court has repeatedly defined grave abuse of discretion as "such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 11
In the present case, the Office of the Ombudsman sufficiently considered the facts proven and weighed it according to the rules on evidence, as seen in its Decision:
Complainant failed to substantiate his imputation that respondent curtailed his rights. He in fact managed to express his opinions, voice out his protests, engage in a heated exchange with the FMCC President, observe the proceedings, and stay until after the meeting is adjourned, despite issues on his qualification[s] to attend the meeting.
There is also no sufficient evidence that the three men shown [in] the photos submitted by complainant were barangay personnel. At least one of them turned out to be the FMCC President's personal driver and a private individual. The two other men remained unidentified but the burden to prove that they are barangay personnel belongs to complainant. It is not enough to rely on the fact that one of them appears to be "dressed in the uniform of a policeman or aide" as claimed by complainant. There is even no proof or claim that indeed that was the uniform of a barangay policeman of Barangay Greenhills.
Moreover, there is no evidence that these men were there to purposely intimidate, threaten, or harm the complainant.
Complainant's allegation that one of these alleged barangay personnel had a firearm prominently holstered at his belt is belied by the photos and video submitted to support the complaint.
The video also did not show [that] the complainant was threatened, harassed, or intimidated.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, the factual circumstances of this case do not provide enough bases to support the conclusion that respondent failed to observe the standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties. Complainant's speculations, conjectures, and surmises cannot support a finding that respondent violated RA 6713. 12
The settled rule is that, the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. Their factual findings are generally accorded with great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts, by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. 13 While this doctrine is not absolute and admits certain exceptions, such exceptions are not extant in this case.
Further, it is glaring in petitioner's Complaint-Affidavit 14 with the Office of the Ombudsman that the same was filed on April 17, 2015, despite the fact that the incident took place on April 5, 2014. This alone is a ground for the Office of the Ombudsman to dismiss the petitioner's complaint, based on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, thus:
Section 20. Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
(1) The complaint has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;
(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;
(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous or made in bad faith;
(4) The complaint has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or
(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of.15
Having been filed more than one (1) year after the incident when respondent allegedly harassed petitioner through the use and misuse of barangay resources and personnel, the Office of the Ombudsman was justified in dismissing the complaint.
The CA, therefore, did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari. As it aptly stated, a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. 16 This, petitioner failed to do.
WHEREFORE, all these premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Resolutions dated October 24, 2016 and July 4, 2017 in CA-G.R. SP No. 147389 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-20.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Pedro B. Corales concurring; id. at 30-36.
3. Penned by Associate Justice Maria Elisa Sempio Diy with Associate Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Pedro B. Corales concurring; id. at 38-41.
4. 356 Phil. 787, 804-805 (1998).
5. G.R. No. 244775, July 6, 2020.
6.Id. (Citations omitted)
7. Emphasis supplied.
8Rollo, p. 31.
9.Office of the Ombudsman v. Fetalvero, 836 Phil. 557, 567 (2018).
10.Rollo, p. 34.
11.Estrada v. Desierto, 406 Phil. 1 (2001).
12.Rollo, pp. 34-35.
13.Miro v. Vda de Eredos, et al., 721 Phil. 772, 784 (2013).
14.Rollo, pp. 44-64.
15. Emphasis supplied.
16.Rollo, p. 36.