Truya v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 193222. July 6, 2021.]

CRISPULO R. TRUYA, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 6, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 193222 — CRISPULO R. TRUYA, petitioner,versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.

The instant Petition for Review (With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction) 1 assails the Decision 2 dated June 2, 2010 and Order 3 dated June 25, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division in Crim. Case No. 24891, finding herein petitioner Crispulo R. Truya (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 4 (RA 3019), otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and imposing the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office. 5

Facts

Petitioner was charged for violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019, as amended in an Information dated July 20, 1998, which reads, to wit:

That in or about the month of October, 1991, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public officer, being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Cebu Provincial Prosecution's Office, Cebu City, and as such assigned to handle the case involving a detention prisoner named Jesus Gelig, Sr. for Direct Assault with Attempted Homicide in October 1991, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there fail to file the required Information before the Regional Trial Court of said case filed against Jesus Gelig, Sr. within the reglementary period, thus resulting to the detention of said Jesus Gelig, Sr. at the Cebu Provincial Detention and Rehabilitation Center (CPDRC), for almost five (5) years without a formal charge filed before the court, as said accused filed the Information in court only on February 1, 1996, thus accused in the performance of his official functions had caused damage and injury to Jesus Gelig, Sr. and detriment of public service and interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 7 Petitioner was subsequently suspended for a period of ninety (90) days. However, the suspension order was set aside for being moot and academic as petitioner had already retired from service effective August 1, 2004. 8

Pre-trial was conducted on April 26, 2005. A Pre-Trial Order 9 was then issued with the following stipulations:

I. STIPULATION OF FACTS

1. That at all times relevant to the above-entitled case, accused Crispulo R. Truya was a public officer occupying the position of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor at the Cebu Provincial Prosecution's Office, Cebu City;

2. That sometime in October 1991, accused Crispulo R. Truya was assigned to take appropriate action on a case docketed by the Provincial Prosecution Office of Cebu as Criminal Case No. 4765-M entitled "People of the Philippine vs. Jesus Gelig, Sr." for Direct Assault with Attempted Homicide;

3. That Criminal Case No. 4765-M against Jesus Gelig, Sr. emanated from the 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Medellin, Cebu. 10

Thereafter, trial ensued. HTcADC

The testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses were summarized by the Sandiganbayan as follows:

The first witness for the prosecution was the Acting Provincial Jail Warden of the Cebu Provincial Detention and Rehabilitation Center (CPDRC) Alfredo Abella. Abella testified that he is the custodian of inmates' records at the CPDRC. He brought with him the Commitment Order of Detention and Certificate of Discharge showing that Jesus Gelig, Sr. was detained at the CPDRC effective October 3, 1991 and discharged only on February 15, 1996. Abella also brought a copy of an Order of Release dated February 14, 1996 issued by the RTC, Branch 16 of Cebu City showing that said court ordered the release of Jesus Gelig, Sr. for the reason that Jesus Gelig, Sr. had been detained for almost five (5) years and had practically served the imposable penalty of prision correccional for Direct Assault with Attempted Homicide, the crime he was charged with.

The second witness for the prosecution was Glynda B. Lupian, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 16, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Daanbantayan-Medellin, Cebu and official custodian of the original records of the case of private complainant Jesus Gelig, Sr. She identified the record of proceedings of the MCTC of Daanbantayan-Medellin, Cebu in Criminal Case No. 4765-M titled People v. Jesus Gelig, Sr., the Information dated September 30, 1995 against Jesus Gelig, Sr., and the Order dated February 14, 1996 issued by the RTC, Branch 16, Cebu City dismissing the case of People v. Jesus Gelig, Sr. because of the long delay in the filing of the Information against Gelig, Sr.

The third witness Muarito Fortich, Jr., Records Custodian of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cebu, brought with him pages 130-131 of the logbook showing the date when the records of Criminal Case No. 4765-M was assigned to the accused. He testified that the folders of Criminal Case No. 4765-M were received by the accused on October 7, 1991. During cross-examination, he admitted that he was not the one who personally made the entries in the logbook when the case of Jesus Gelig, Sr. was assigned to the accused as he was not yet the Records Custodian at that time. He also does not know the signatory who received the records of Criminal Case No. 4765-M.

The fourth witness, Rosario Trocio, the Stenographic Reporter assigned to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu at the time relevant to the case, testified that she was one of the workers assigned to receive cases for the accused. She further testified that the records of Criminal Case No. 4765-M, which had been assigned to the accused, were received by her co-worker, Candelaria Gadrinab, on October 7, 1991. She was able to identify the initials of Candelaria opposite the name of the accused on pages 130-131 of the logbook as Candelaria was her officemate and she usually received documents together with Candelaria. She admitted during cross-examination, however, that she was only familiar with the initials of Candelaria but she did not actually see Candelaria receive the case records of Jesus Gelig, Sr. and affix her initials on the logbook. Rosario also admitted that during the time Candelaria received the records of the case in 1991, she was not the stenographer of the accused in October 1991 as she was still assigned [to] another prosecutor. 11 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

On the other hand, the summary of the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense are as follows:

The first witness for the defense was Sarsi Gadrinab, the son of Candelaria Gadrinab, the stenographer who allegedly received the records of Criminal Case No. 4765-M for the accused on October 7, 1991. At the time of his testimony, Sarsi Gadrinab was the Administrative Officer of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Cebu. He identified the signature of a document titled "Explanation" dated March 25, 1996 allegedly executed and signed by his mother, now deceased, where his mother explained to Hon. Eva A. Igot, Investigator, Regional State Prosecutor's Office, Region VII, that the Information in the case of People v. Jesus Gelig, Sr. was "accomplished on time" as shown by her draft dated February 5, 1992." During cross-examination, he testified that he did not see his mother actually prepare the document.

The second witness, retired Process Server Manuel D. Rama, testified that he received the records of People v. Jesus Gelig, Sr. for filing in court on October 23, 1995. He read in open court his Comment and Manifestation where he explained that the delay in the filing of the Information in court of the case of People v. Jesus Gelig, Sr. was due to the fact that the affidavit and supporting documents of the case were only photocopies and not original copies. He testified that he referred the matter to Administrative Officer William A. Seguerra who allegedly instructed him to await the verification of the whereabouts of the original copies of the attachments of the records. Upon learning that the originals were in the possession of the Medellin police (and in order to get hold of the originals) they exerted their efforts to relay the problem to the Medellin police but the latter failed to furnish them the original copies. In order not to incur so much delay, Rama was constrained to file the photocopies in court. On cross examination, Rama admitted that his only participation in the case of Jesus Gelig, Sr. was the filing of the Information in court sometime in February 1996.

The third witness was the accused himself, Crispulo Truya. He denied that he failed to file the required Information against Jesus Gelig, Sr. within the reglementary period required by law. He testified that there were two incidents to this case. The first incident happened in 1991 to 1992 and the second, in 1995 to 1996. The first was about the receipt by his stenographer, Candelaria Gadrinab, of the records of the case of Jesus Gelig, Sr. As per the entry in the Record Book of the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, the accused testified that Candelaria received the records of the case of Gelig, Sr. for him on October 3, 1991. Candelaria, however, forwarded the documents to the accused eight months later on June 2, 1992. The accused explained that Candelaria made a draft Information as admitted by her in her letter-explanation dated March 25, 1996 sent to Hon. Eva A. Igot of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, Region 7, explaining that she was the one who drafted the February 5, 1992 Information. After receiving the draft Information, the accused testified he made heavy corrections thereon and thereafter endorsed it back to Candelaria. He testified that it was Candelaria who usually finalized draft Informations and who placed them on his table for his signature. He stated that he placed a check mark on the draft to indicate that it was ready for a final copy. He emphasized that it was their practice that once he placed a check mark on the draft, Candelaria would get it from his table for final typing. After he signed the final copy, Candelaria would then bring the Information to the Provincial Prosecutor for approval after which she would bring the Information to the administrative section of their office where the process server would serve it for filing in court.

The accused presented the original copy of the pink rotating slip dated June 3, 1992 to prove that he gave immediate instructions to Candelaria to correct the draft Information the day after he made heavy corrections. This pink rotating slip according to the accused was attached to the draft Information he corrected with instructions to "Candy," Candelaria's nickname, "for typing."

The accused submitted a copy of the draft Information he made dated June 10, 1992. On the dorsal portion of the draft Information, an affidavit of Candido Gadrinab, Candelaria's husband, was written, indicating that the final copy of the June 10, 1992 Information had been in the possession of Candelaria. The accused emphasized that once he placed a check mark on the document, Candelaria should get the document from his table for final typing. After that she would bring it to the Provincial Prosecutor for approval. If it was duly approved, then she would bring it back to the administrative section of their office and the process server would file it in court. The accused testified that when he inquired from Candelaria about the status of the Information, she replied that "it is already filed, there's no problem." The accused relied upon her words.

As to the second incident which arose sometime in 1995, the accused narrated that when he was assigned as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor at Danao City, the lady jail guard escorting prisoners from the CPDRC told him that there was a detainee by the name of Jesus Gelig, Sr. who was awaiting arraignment. Upon learning of that report, the accused went over the record book, scanning all the records and found that the case of Jesus Gelig, Sr. from Medellin was assigned to him. Immediately, he sent a radio message to the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Court of Medellin, Cebu and asked for the certified true copy of the records of the case of Jesus Gelig, Sr. The following day, the accused again sent the same message through Judge Jaca. In response to those messages, Clerk of Court Violeta M. Pino sent duplicate copies of the records of the case on September 22, 1995 to the accused. Upon receipt thereof on September 25, 1995, the accused prepared the Information, typed it and finished it on September 30, 1995. He brought it to the Administrative Section for signature and approval of the Provincial Prosecutor. Thereafter, he brought it to the Administrative Section for filing in court by the process server.

When the accused was cross-examined, he admitted that he prepared two Informations in the case of Jesus Gelig, Sr. The first one was made sometime in 1992 and the other in 1995. He admitted that he made two draft Informations dated June 2, 1992 and June 10, 1992. The accused said he was very sure that the said Information was made final by his secretary (referring to stenographer Candelaria Gadrinab) because he made a check mark signifying that the same was ready for final copy. He admitted further that he gave the final draft Information to his secretary and he was not given a copy of this Information that he signed. After that, when he inquired about the status of the case, the secretary told him that she finished it and had filed it with the Administrative Section. However, he testified that he had no actual knowledge if this Information was filed in court by the process server. The accused offered as evidence his Certificate of Service for the months of September and October 1995 showing that during the latter months, he had no pending case for investigation or reinvestigation.

The fourth witness, Atty. Jeoffrey S. Joaquino, Clerk of Court of the RTC of Cebu, identified the signature of retired Administrative Officer Leo B. Sandalo in the latter's Comments and Manifestation where Sandalo denied that they did not receive the photocopies of the documents, as testified to by Process Server Manuel Rama. Sandalo explained that it is a ministerial duty of their Criminal Record Section to receive criminal cases and they do not question the affidavits or supporting papers filed as long as the Information is in order since it is only the court that can evaluate the validity of the supporting papers.

The last witness presented was SP04 Agapito Rosos, a retired PNP non-commissioned officer. SPO4 Rosos testified that there were no requests from Manuel D. Rama and/or William Seguerra for copies of the original records of the case of Jesus Gelig, Sr. 12 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Sandiganbayan Ruling

In the assailed Decision, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA 3019 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding public office. 13

The Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of the three (3) elements constituting a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019: 1) petitioner, being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Provincial Prosecution's Office, Cebu City, is a public officer within the contemplation of law; 2) petitioner's failure to file the proper Information against Jesus Gelig, Sr. (Gelig, Sr.) for almost five (5) years from the time the case was assigned to him constitutes gross inexcusable negligence; and 3) petitioner's failure to issue the Information in the case of People v. Jesus Gelig, Sr. resulted to undue injury to Gelig, Sr. who languished in jail without being arraigned for almost five (5) years. 14 DETACa

The Sandiganbayan held that petitioner is the primary officer responsible for the issuance of the Information; hence, petitioner cannot simply rely on the statement of his secretary-stenographer that the Information was already filed. 15

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 16 but was denied by the Sandiganbayan in the Order dated June 25, 2010.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan erred when it found that his failure to file the proper Information against Gelig, Sr. constitutes gross inexcusable negligence. 17 According to petitioner, no gross inexcusable negligence can be attributed to him because he immediately acted on the case and drafted the Information upon receiving the records thereof and when he learned that the Information had not been filed, he immediately took action and acted with dispatch to ensure that the necessary Information was filed. 18 Petitioner asserts that the delay in filing the Information cannot be attributed to him alone because the whole procedure involves various people and processes. If there is any delay on his part, it should only pertain to the period from the time he received the records of the case up until he finished the final draft of the Information in June 1992. This, according to petitioner, does not amount to gross inexcusable negligence. 19 Lastly, petitioner claims that respondent People of the Philippines (respondent) failed to prove that the alleged undue injury suffered by Gelig, Sr. is solely attributable to petitioner's inaction. 20

In its Comment (To the Petition for Review on Certiorari), 21 respondent, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, maintains that all elements of the offense for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 have been duly established through testimonial and documentary evidence showing that petitioner incurred an unreasonable length of time in taking appropriate action on Criminal Case No. 4765-M, which caused undue injury to Gelig, Sr., who languished in jail for almost five (5) years. 22 According to respondent, petitioner is duty bound to handle his cases with competence and integrity. Thus, his failure to monitor his cases regularly and file the Information on time reveal his gross inexcusable negligence. 23 Respondent further asserts that petitioner's claim that the delay could not be attributed to him alone is untenable because it is established from the records that petitioner was the one who continuously handled the case since it was assigned to him. 24

In the Resolution 25 dated February 25, 2013, the Court resolves to dispense with petitioner's reply to respondent's comment on the petition.

Issue

Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is impressed with merit. The Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioner for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

RA 3019 was enacted to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike that constitute graft or corrupt practices or may lead thereto. 26 In Martel v. People, 27 the Court En Banc highlighted the wisdom behind RA 3019:

At this juncture, the Court emphasizes the spirit that animates R.A. 3019. As its title implies, and as what can be gleaned from the deliberations of Congress, R.A. 3019 was crafted as an anti-graft and corruption measure. At the heart of the acts punishable under R.A. 3019 is corruption. As explained by one of the sponsors of the law, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, "[w]hile we are trying to penalize, the main idea of the bill is graft and corrupt practices. x x x Well, the idea of graft is the one emphasized." Graft entails the acquisition of gain in dishonest ways.28 (Emphasis supplied; italics and underscoring in the original)

In other words, what RA 3019 penalizes are acts committed by public officers done with corrupt and fraudulent intent. Seen through this lens, the Court now proceeds to assess whether petitioner's conviction for violation of RA 3019 should be reversed and set aside.

Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, under which petitioner was charged and found guilty by the Sandiganbayan, defines "corrupt practices of public officers" as follows:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: aDSIHc

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

In order to convict an accused for violation of the foregoing provision, the prosecution must be able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the confluence of the following elements: 1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; 2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, or evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3) his action caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions. 29

Unlike in the commission of ordinary felonies, RA 3019 requires that the intent or negligence, which must attend the commission of the prohibited acts under the afore-quoted section, should meet the gravity required by law. 30 Thus, the Court has consistently emphasized that "mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or manifest, respectively, while the negligent deed should both be gross and inexcusable." 31

The first element is undisputed in this case. As for the second and third elements, the prohibited act that either causes undue injury or gives unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference may be committed in three ways — that is, through evident bad faith, manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence. Each modality is distinct and different from the others 32 and must be sufficiently alleged in the Information as basis for conviction. 33

Here, as can be read in the Information, petitioner is charged with violating Section 3 (e) through gross inexcusable negligence, when he failed to file the required Information within the reglementary period.

Gross inexcusable negligence has been defined as "negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected." 34 It does not refer to a mere omission of duty or to an exercise of less than the standard degree of prudence. 35 Gross inexcusable negligence, as contemplated under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, entails the omission of care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property, and in cases involving public officials,it takes place only when breach of duty is flagrant and devious. 36

In proving that petitioner acted with gross inexcusable negligence, the prosecution presented the following documents: 1) Commitment Order of Detention, Certificate of Discharge from Prison dated February 15, 1996 and Order of Release dated February 15, 1996, showing that Gelig, Sr. was detained at the Cebu Provincial Detention and Rehabilitation Center on October 3, 1991 and was released on February 15, 1996; 37 2) Information 38 dated September 30, 1995 and the Order dated February 14, 1996 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Cebu City dismissing the case of People v. Jesus Gelig, Sr., because of the delay in the filing of the Information against Gelig, Sr.; 39 3) logbook entries showing that the records of Criminal Case No. 4765-M were assigned to petitioner and were received by his co-worker, Candelaria Gadrinab (Candelaria) on October 7, 1991; 40 and 4) draft Informations made by petitioner in relation to Criminal Case No. 4765-M dated February 5, 1992, June 2, 1992 and June 10, 1992. 41

The Court, however, finds these pieces of evidence insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner acted with gross inexcusable negligence required under the law.

Indeed, the prosecution's evidence was able to establish that petitioner committed a neglect of duty — as he failed to timely file the corresponding Information against Gelig, Sr. However, that was all the evidence proved. There was no evidence presented to prove that petitioner's failure was willful and intentional, with conscious indifference as to whatever injury or damage it may cause Gelig, Sr. No evidence exists that would show that petitioner's mistake was motivated with malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. 42On the contrary, there is an abundance of evidence on record negating the presence of gross inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner.

The absence of gross inexcusable negligence may be inferred from the several draft Informations presented by the prosecution, which indicate that petitioner acted on the case as soon as it was forwarded to him by Candelaria. 43 Also, after making the final draft of the Information dated June 10, 1992, petitioner instructed Candelaria to finalize and file the same. 44 These acts of petitioner negate the element of want of slightest care necessary for gross inexcusable negligence to exist.

Furthermore, petitioner's reliance on Candelaria's assurances that the draft Information was finalized and filed accordingly and his supposed failure to subsequently follow up on the status of the case or conduct an inventory of the cases assigned to him, while these may be suggestive of neglect of duty, are insufficient to hold petitioner criminally liable for RA 3019. These acts of negligence fall short of the gravity required by law — that they must be motivated by fraudulent and corrupt intent.

Records in fact show that petitioner, upon learning that the draft Information dated June 10, 1992 was not filed, took immediate action to ensure that the Information would accordingly be filed with the court. 45 As mentioned in the petition:

It also showed, that upon learning that no Information was filed in Court [four (4)] years later, accused took it upon himself to take the extra effort of utilizing the facilities of another government facility, the telegraph of the Crime Suppression Unit at Capitol Building and sent telegraph to Medellin which is more than 100 kilometers North from the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Cebu City, to forward the original records to Cebu City so the necessary Information can be made. Two radio messages were made, one on September 18, 1995 and the other on September 19, 1995. The earnest effort the accused took to initiate the drafting of the Information and his spontaneous and immediate reaction to act with dispatch in asking for the records [of the case], are matters and fact that are not given consideration by [the Sandiganbayan] in negating "gross inexcusable negligence."

If accused has not the slightest care and wanton indifference to the fate of Jesus Gelig Sr., [he] would not have acted with dispatch when informed that no information yet has been filed against the latter. If accused has not the slightest care of the fate of Jesus Gelig Sr., [he] would not have spen[t] money from his own pocket in sending telegraph asking [the] Clerk of Court of the Municipal Court of Medellin, Cebu x x x for the records of the case. 46

As can be gleaned above, it cannot be said that petitioner purposely delayed the filing of the Information against Gelig, Sr. to cause injury to the latter. In fact, that petitioner later on rectified his mistake or inadvertence only demonstrates that his initial failure to file the corresponding Information on time was not willful or intentional. His breach of duty therefore cannot be characterized as flagrant and devious so as to hold him liable for the crime charged.

The foregoing pieces of evidence cast serious doubt on the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence and should have led the Sandiganbayan to question the veracity of the prosecution's accusation that petitioner violated Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 through gross inexcusable negligence. Indeed, jurisprudence teaches that the evidence adduced must be closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope such that conviction must rest no less than on hard evidence showing that the accused, with moral certainty, is guilty of the crime charged. 47 Any doubt on the allegations and evidence of the State must be resolved in favor of the accused. 48

In should be borne in mind, however, that in finding for petitioner, the Court does not in any way condone petitioner's neglect of duty. It must be remembered that what is involved here is a criminal case. Hence, the requirements of the law and the requisite quantum of proof must be met. To emphasize, to be criminally liable for violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 it is "essential to prove [beyond reasonable doubt] that the breach of duty [as contemplated by law] borders on malice and is characterized by flagrant, palpable and willful indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected" 49 which, the prosecution fell short of doing in this case. ETHIDa

In fine, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime charged, there is no more reason for the Court to discuss the third element. The absence of the second element for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is enough to acquit petitioner. 50

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 2, 2010 and Order dated June 25, 2010 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division in Crim. Case No. 24891 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, petitioner Crispulo R. Truya is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Let the corresponding entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 11-32.

2.Id. at 33-53. Penned by Associate Justice Alex L. Quiroz with Associate Justices Francisco H. Villaruz and Efren N. Dela Cruz, concurring.

3.Id. at 64. Penned by Associate Justices Samuel R. Martires, Alex L. Quiroz and Napoleon E. Inoturan.

4. Approved on August 17, 1960.

5.Rollo, p. 52.

6.Id. at 34.

7.Id. at 35.

8.Id.

9.Id. at 95-100. Penned by Associate Justices Godofredo L. Legaspi, Efren N. Dela Cruz and Norberto Y. Geraldez.

10.Id. at 95, see also id. at 35.

11.Id. at 36-38.

12.Id. at 39-43.

13.Id. at 52.

14.Id. at 44-52.

15.Id. at 51.

16.Id. at 54-63.

17.Id. at 21.

18.Id. at 22.

19. See id. at 24-25.

20. See id. at 19-21.

21.Id. at 80-94.

22.Id. at 85-87, 92.

23.Id. at 89-90.

24.Id. at 91-92.

25.Id. at 153.

26.Reyes v. People, G.R. Nos. 177105-06, August 4, 2010, 626 SCRA 782, 792-793.

27. G.R. Nos. 224720-23 & 224765-68, February 2, 2021.

28.Id. at 29.

29.Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 228154, October 16, 2019, pp. 6-7.

30.Jaca v. People, G.R. Nos. 166967, 166974 & 167167, January 28, 2013, 689 SCRA 270, 296.

31.Sistoza v. Desierto, G.R. No. 144784, September 3, 2002, 388 SCRA 307, 324; italics in the original.

32. See Villarosa v. People, G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020, p. 12.

33.Id.

34.Sistoza v. Desierto, supra note 31, at 326; emphasis supplied.

35.Id.

36.Id.

37.Rollo, p. 36.

38.Id. at 107 and 111.

39.Id. at 37.

40.Id.

41.Id. at 38, 103 (Exhibit B), 104-105 (Exhibit C), 106 (Exhibit D).

42. See Suba v. Sandiganbayan,First Division, G.R. No. 235418, March 3, 2021, p. 9, citing Collantes v. Marcelo, G.R. Nos. 167006-07, August 14, 2007, 530 SCRA 142, 155.

43.Rollo, pp. 38, 40.

44.Id. at 40-41.

45. See id. at 42.

46.Id. at 22.

47.Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 144760-61, 167311-12, 167316-17 & 167625-26, August 2, 2017, 833 SCRA 614, 648.

48. See People v. Arellano, G.R. No. 231839, July 10, 2019, 908 SCRA 483, 486.

49.Sistoza v. Desierto, supra note 31, at 316.

50. See Martel v. People, supra note 27, at 29; People v. Bacaltos, G.R. No. 248701, July 28, 2020.