Torres y David v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 255262. September 14, 2021.]

ALDRIN TORRES y DAVID, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 14, 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 255262 (Aldrin Torres y David, petitioner v. People of the Philippines, respondent).

After review of the records, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in its October 4, 2019 Decision 1 and January 15, 2021 Resolution, 2 in CA-G.R. CR No. 41989 as to warrant the exercise of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.

On May 6, 2015, Aldrin Torres y David (petitioner) was charged with violation of Section 9 (f) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8484 (Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998) in an Information, 3 which reads:

On the 4th of May 2015, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused[,] not being in the business or employment that deals with the manufacture, issuance or distribution of access device-making or altering equipment, with intent to defraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without authority of law, possess[,] have in his custody and control one piece of an unauthorized pin pad cover with improvised camera and unauthorized card reader slot, a skimming device containing a card reader with memory storage capability, with intent to defraud, in violation of the aforesaid law and to the damage and prejudice of complainant Bank of the Philippine Islands.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Indeed, petitioner is guilty of violating Sec. 9 (f) of R.A. No. 8484. As aptly observed by the CA, the card reader slot and personal identification number (PIN) pad cover with an attached camera which were in the possession of petitioner and subsequently seized from him, were intended to be used to retain data contained in access devices, i.e., the automated teller machine (ATM) cards of unwary bank customers, and to record and secure the ATM PINs without authority. These illegally obtained data and information would make possible the creation of counterfeit access devices, such as fake ATM cards, 5 which R.A. No. 8484 seeks to prevent.

To escape liability, petitioner proffers his defense of denial. He claims that the skimming devices did not belong to him and that he had no intent to possess the same as he only took them to turn over to the security guard. The trial court had aptly observed that considering the nature of petitioner's work as a software quality analyst, he should have, at the first instance, hesitated from transacting at the ATM when he allegedly noticed that the pad reader was already moving. Yet, based on his version of the incident, he proceeded with the transaction and even picked up the skimming devices to turn over the same to the security guard. Indeed, petitioner's background and knowledge in computer systems and peripherals betray his claim of innocence. Evidently, petitioner failed to rebut the presumption under Sec. 14 (e) of R.A. No. 8484 which provides that possession of an access device-making scheme or altering equipment is prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. HSAcaE

In this light, We do not find error on the part of the CA in concluding that intent is immaterial in crimes involving special laws. Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts which are wrong in themselves called "acts mala in se," and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called "acts mala prohibita." This distinction determines whether proof of intent to commit a wrongful act is necessary. In acts mala in se, intent governs, while in acts mala prohibita, the only question is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal per se, the intent of the offender is immaterial. 6

In this case, it is incumbent upon petitioner to overthrow the presumption of intent to defraud by sufficient and convincing evidence, but he failed to do so. Petitioner could only offer a mere denial. Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on one hand, and the bare denial of the petitioner, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially when given by a credible witness who was not shown to have any ill motive to testify against the appellant. 7

The Court likewise rejects petitioner's assertion that the prosecution had willfully suppressed evidence by withholding presentation of the closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage of the incident. Private complainant Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI) had sufficiently explained that it could not produce the said recording because the CCTV cameras at the premises of the ATM booth were not functioning during the incident. As such, there cannot be any deliberate and willful suppression of evidence, if the CCTV footage does not even exist. Notably, aside from his bare allegations of willful suppression, herein petitioner failed to establish that the said footage existed and that the prosecution's failure to present the CCTV footage was deliberate and tainted with malice, bad faith or ill motive.

Considering the foregoing, the Court concurs with the findings of the courts a quo that the prosecution has proven petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt based on the positive testimonies of its witnesses. Hence, there is no cogent reason to reverse, alter, or modify the common findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the CA. The Court has consistently deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the witnesses' credibility, especially when affirmed by the CA, unless the trial court is shown to have acted arbitrarily, or overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts that could alter its conclusion. 8

However, the Court deems it proper to modify the decretal portion of the decision by the RTC which was worded as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Aldrin Torres is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of R.A. 8484 (f) (sic) otherwise known [as] the "Access Device[s] Regulations Act of 1998" and is hereby directed to suffer imprisonment of ten (10) years as minimum and eleven (11) years as maximum of[prision mayor] with a fine of ten thousand pesos [(Php10,000.00)].

SO ORDERED. 9 (emphasis supplied)

In fixing the prison term, the RTC applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL) or Act No. 4103, 10 as amended. However, Sec. 10 of R.A. No. 8484 which specifies the penalty for violation of Sec. 9 (f), reads:

Section 10. Penalties. — Any person committing any of the acts constituting access device fraud enumerated in the immediately preceding section shall be punished with:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or twice the value obtained by the offense, and imprisonment for not less than ten (10) years and for not more than twelve (12) years, in the case of an offense under Section 9(a), and (f) of the foregoing section, which does not occur after a conviction for another offense under Section 9[.] (emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the prison term for violation of Sec. 9 (f) under Sec. 10 of R.A. No. 8484, has a duration of not less than 10 years but not more than 12 years. Although the penalty is within the range of prision mayor under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), Sec. 10 of R.A. No. 8484 did not adopt or make reference to the said period as provided by the RPC. It is only when the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of penalties under the RPC that the ISL rules on ascertaining the indeterminate sentence for offenses punishable under the RPC applies. 11 This is not so in the instant case.

Hence, while the RTC correctly applied Sec. 1 12 of the ISL in imposing the indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years as minimum and eleven (11) years as maximum, it had improperly added the period ''prision mayor." Accordingly, the term ''prision mayor" should be deleted.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 4, 2019 Decision and January 15, 2021 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 41989 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Aldrin Torres y David is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 9 (f) of Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, and is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) years as minimum to eleven (11) years as maximum. He is likewise ORDERED to PAY a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). HESIcT

The petitioner's counsel is hereby required to SUBMIT, within five (5) days from notice hereof, an updated MCLE Compliance number and date of its issuance, the date of issuance of compliance submitted having been dated December 8, 2017.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

by:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 26-49; penned by Associate Justice Louis P. Acosta with Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Associate Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring.

2.Id. at 51-52.

3.Id. at 53.

4.Id.

5.Id. at 42.

6.Estrella v. People, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020.

7.People v. Bringcula, 824 Phil. 585, 596 (2018).

8. See Medina, Jr. v. People, 724 Phil. 226, 234 (2014).

9.Rollo, p. 61.

10. An Act to Provide for an Indeterminate Sentence and Parole for All Persons Convicted of Certain Crimes by the Courts of the Philippine Islands; To Create a Board of Indeterminate Sentence and to Provide Funds Therefor; and for Other Purposes.

11.People v. XXX, G.R. No. 233661, November 6, 2019; see also Peralta v. People, 817 Phil. 554, 568 (2011).

12. Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (emphasis supplied)