THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 209024. September 20, 2017.]
ROGELIO G. TORRES and MANUEL C. MENDOZA, petitioners,vs. MANILA WATER COMPANY and/or MA. FIORELLA D. FABELLA and ANTONINO T. AQUINO, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated September 20, 2017, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 209024 (ROGELIO G. TORRES and MANUEL C. MENDOZA, Petitioners, v. MANILA WATER COMPANY and/or MA. FIORELLA D. FABELLA and ANTONINO T. AQUINO, Respondents.) — The petitioners appeal the decision promulgated on October 31, 2012, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the March 22, 2007 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dismissing their complaint for illegal dismissal. 2
Antecedents
This case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for backwages and exemplary damages filed by the petitioners against respondents Manila Water Company (MWC), Fiorella Fabella, as the manager of MWC's Waste Water Department, and Antonio Aquino, as MWC's President.
Petitioners Rogelio G. Torres and Manuel C. Mendoza are former employees of MWC, holding the positions of Waste Water Operative 3 and Waste Water Associate 3, respectively, as of the time of their dismissal from the service effective May 31, 2005 for allegedly stealing diesel fuel in violation of MWC's Code of Conduct.
In their position paper, 3 the petitioners averred that on December 17, 2004, while they were traversing C-5 Road en route to the disposal site, they noticed that one of their truck's tires was almost flat; that they stopped and parked the truck at a vulcanizing shop to have the tire fixed; that they were later on told at their office that a certain Pastor Uy had seen them along C-5 Road siphoning diesel fuel from the truck's fuel tank; that they immediately met with Susan Salazar, MWC's Manager for Transport Services, to explain what had really transpired; that on December 28, 2004, they received an inter-office memorandum dated December 22, 2004 directing them to show cause why they should not be penalized for the alleged act of theft; that their union advised them not to make a formal reply but proposed that MWC instead conduct a preliminary investigation; that at the preliminary investigation conducted on February 18, 2005, Salazar accused them of admitting the alleged theft, but they vehemently denied doing so; that on February 25, 2005, an ocular inspection of the place where the supposed siphoning transpired was conducted to determine whether or not said illegal trade was rampant in the area; that they agreed to meet with the management personnel at around 12:00 noon, but when they and the union representatives arrived, they were told that Pastor Uy had already left; that the inquiry made with the establishments near the ocular inspection site elicited a negative response about the existence of the illegal trade; that their union requested a copy of the Standard Operating Procedure in Waste Water Operation to determine how MWC monitored the fuel of the tanker trucks, but such request was not acceded to; and that on May 30, 2005, they received a notice from the respondents terminating their services effective May 31, 2005, which prompted them to file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The respondents gave a different version of the incident. They stated in their position paper 4 that on December 17, 2004, Pastor Uy called MWC's call center hotline to report that the fuel of MWC's tanker truck, with license plate no. SFW 394 and markings PAS-91, was being siphoned while parked along C-5 Road; that after determining that the truck was driven by petitioner Torres and assisted by petitioner Mendoza, MWC issued an Inter-office Memo dated December 22, 2004 5 informing them of the alleged siphoning incident and directing them to submit their written explanation regarding the matter; that a few days after the incident, Mendoza went to the house of Salazar and admitted his participation in the illegal trade, but persuaded her not to inform the management about his confession; that the fact of Mendoza's admission was stated in Salazar's sworn affidavit dated October 12, 2005; 6 that on January 18, 2005 7 and February 2, 2005, 8 the respondents issued two inter-office memoranda directing the petitioners to answer Pastor Uy's affidavit regarding the siphoning incident; 9 that the petitioners denied the accusation in their respective letter-replies dated February 7, 2005; 10 that on February 18, 2005, MWC conducted a hearing wherein the petitioners, assisted by their union representatives, were given an opportunity to explain their side; that on February 24, 2005, the respondents conducted an ocular inspection of the site of the illegal trade in the presence of Pastor Uy, who narrated everything he had witnessed; that the petitioners and union representatives were not able to meet Pastor Uy because they arrived an hour late; and that on May 30, 2005, MWC issued a memo informing the petitioners of their termination from employment effective May 31, 2005 due to dishonesty, fraud and willful breach of trust based on the theft of diesel fuel from the tanker truck.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On February 15, 2006, Labor Arbiter (LA) Madjayran Ajan rendered his decision 11 declaring that the petitioners had been illegally dismissed; and directing the respondents to reinstate them to their former positions without loss of benefits and seniority rights and to pay full backwages from the time of petitioners' dismissal until actual reinstatement.
The LA opined that the respondents did not establish the petitioners' act of stealing fuel from the tanker truck inasmuch as the incident was primarily based on the affidavit of Pastor Uy, which could not be admitted as evidence for being hearsay; and that there was no evidence showing substantial loss of fuel from the truck's fuel tank. 12
Ruling of the NLRC
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA, and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of respondents is GRANTED. The complaint for illegal dismissal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Labor Arbiter dated February 15, 2006 is VACATED and SET ASIDE.
The other claims are also dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 13
The NLRC held that although the proceedings before the LA and the NLRC were not strictly governed by technical rules of evidence, the petitioners were given ample opportunity to confront Pastor Uy not only during the ocular inspection but also during the hearing conducted on December 12, 2005, but they failed to avail themselves of the same; 14 and that there was no necessity to present proof of substantial loss considering that serious misconduct or fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer included theft of company-owned property. 15
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied their motion on May 24, 2007. 16
Decision of the CA
On October 31, 2012, the CA promulgated its assailed decision 17 affirming the NLRC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 22 March 2007 of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA ruled that the respondents' charge against the petitioners were sufficiently proved by substantial evidence; that the testimony of Pastor Uy was credible because he had not been shown to have any ill-motive towards the petitioners whom he did not personally know; 19 that the petitioners' claim that Pastor Uy's affidavit was inadmissible because they had not been able to cross-examine him was unmeritorious inasmuch as the proceedings before the LA were non-litigious in nature, and the technicalities of law and procedure obtaining in the courts of law were not applicable; 20 and that granting arguendo that technical rules were applicable, the affidavit of Pastor Uy was still admissible because the records show that the petitioners had been given ample time to cross-examine him.
On March 13, 2013, the CA denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 21
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERLOOKING THE FACT THE NO AMOUNT OF GASOLINE WAS FOUND MISSING IN THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS['] TANKER TRUCK AFTER IT WAS CHECK (sic) AT THE RESPONDENTS MOTORPOOL IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE REPORT THAT PETITIONERS WAS (sic) INVOLVED IN "PILFERAGE OF GASOLINE" WHICH WOULD WARRANT THEIR TERMINATION.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PASTOR UY'S AFFIDAVIT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. 22
The petitioners submit that the respondents did not establish the theft of diesel fuel considering that no substantial amount of fuel was found missing by the respondents' officer when the truck was inspected immediately after; 23 and that Pastor Uy's affidavit was inadmissible in evidence because he had not been cross-examined by them. 24
The respondents counter that the level of fuel in the truck's fuel tank was irrelevant considering that such level would neither prove nor disprove the fact of theft; 25 and that they presented substantial evidence to prove the petitioners' culpability through Pastor Uy's affidavit, Mendoza's admission of guilt as detailed in Salazar's affidavit, and the petitioners' own conduct after the siphoning incident had been reported to the company. 26
Ruling of the Court
The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit.
The petitioners' insistence that the respondents did not establish by substantial evidence the fact of theft requires the Court to consider and review factual issues. As such, the appeal by petition for review on certiorari cannot succeed because the Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot determine issues of fact. The Court is not duty-bound to reexamine the evidence presented by the parties. Correspondingly, the findings of fact by the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. 27
Both the NLRC and the CA declared that the respondents had shown the validity of the petitioners' dismissal by substantial evidence, which is the requisite quantum of proof required in labor cases.
We agree with the declaration by the CA and the NLRC. The petitioners' act of dishonesty or fraud consisting in the stealing of diesel fuel from the company's tanker truck was sufficiently established by the affidavit of Pastor Uy, and by the corroboration of that fact by Salazar in her own affidavit stating that Mendoza had admitted his involvement in the illegal act. The petitioners did not deny the accusation, for instead of presenting their counter-affidavits they only objected to the admission of Pastor Uy's affidavit for being hearsay due to his not having been subjected to cross-examination. CAIHTE
We cannot side with the petitioners.
The proceedings before the LA are non-litigious in nature. The technicalities of law and procedure, and the rules obtaining in the courts of law for rendering proof in case of disputed facts are not strictly applicable. The Labor Code and the implementing rules permit the admission of affidavits as evidence before the LA, and the affiants need not be presented for cross-examination by the adverse party. 28
Nonetheless, even if the technical rules of procedure obtaining in judicial trials were applicable, the petitioners' insistence on the inadmissibility of the affidavits must still fail. The CA correctly held that the petitioners had been given the ample opportunity to cross-examine Pastor Uy but they wasted the opportunity to do so. The CA elaborated as follows:
Upon receipt of Pastor Uy's affidavit, respondents issued an Inter-office Memo advising petitioners to submit a written explanation regarding the matter within seventy-two (72) hours. An ocular inspection was even conducted on 24 February 2005 where Pastor Uy was present. But because of the tardiness of the petitioners, they were not able to meet him as he already left on account of other commitments. They were also given another chance to confront and cross-examine Pastor Uy during the hearing before the Labor Arbiter on 12 December 2005. However, petitioners wasted this opportunity. In view of these instances, petitioners have no right to claim denial when they were the ones who let the opportunity pass by. 29
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that the petitioners' complaint for illegal dismissal had been validly dismissed. Indeed, the respondents showed that the termination of the petitioners had been for a lawful cause and after compliance with the requirements of due process.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 31, 2012 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 36-50; penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez, with Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Associate Justice Isabel A. Paredes concurring.
2.Id. at 87-98; penned by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier, with Commissioner Tito F. Genilo and Commissioner Gregorio O. Bilog concurring.
3.Id. at 230-246.
4.Id. at 376-392.
5.Id. at 173.
6.Id. at 171-172.
7.Id. at 198.
8.Id. at 199-200.
9.Id. at 197.
10.Id. at 201-204.
11.Id. at 340-352.
12.Id. at 41.
13.Id. at 98.
14.Id. at 44.
15.Id.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 36-49.
18.Id. at 49.
19.Id. at 46.
20.Id. at 47.
21.Id. at 14.
22.Id. at 20.
23.Id. at 21.
24.Id. at 25.
25.Rollo, Vol. II, p. 727.
26.Id. at 731.
27.Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation, G.R. No. 156448, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 1, 8-9.
28.Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. v. Bastol, G.R. No. 186289, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 352, 376.
29.Rollo, Vol. I, p. 48.