Torres-Dela Cruz v. Saint Louis University, Inc.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 215125. July 7, 2021.]

MIA TORRES-DELA CRUZ, petitioner,vs. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC., respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 07 July 2021 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 215125 (Mia Torres-Dela Cruz v. Saint Louis University, Inc.). — Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated November 15, 2014 (Petition for Review) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Mia Torres-Dela Cruz (petitioner) assailing: (1) the Decision 2 dated February 13, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 124760 (CA Decision), which reversed and set aside the Decision 3 dated December 19, 2011 (NLRC Decision) and Resolution dated February 23, 2012 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-LAC No. 04-001105-11, and found that the dismissal of petitioner is valid, despite respondent Saint Louis University, Inc.'s (SLU) failure to comply with the requirements of due process; and (2) the Resolution 4 dated October 2, 2014 of the CA (CA Resolution) in the same case, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner.

The Antecedents

The relevant facts of the instant controversy, as culled from the records of this case, may be stated as follows:

Petitioner was hired by SLU as a college teacher on November 3, 1997, and, thereafter, attained permanent status on November 1, 1999. Eventually, petitioner was promoted as Professor of SLU's School of Computing and Information Sciences (SCIS). 5

On April 15, 2010, petitioner wrote to Ms. Carmen Sia (Sia), Registrar of SLU, in order to request for the change of grades of four of her students for the First (1st) and Second (2nd) semesters of Academic Years 2007 to 2008, and 2008 to 2009. 6 In requesting thus, petitioner submitted the so-called "completion forms" of said students for the relevant period. 7 Petitioner likewise noted in her letter that the four students 8 who were previously given incomplete grades were able to complete the subject, but the forms were misplaced, and that she is to blame for the error and delay in submission. 9

On April 19, 2010, Sia responded to the foregoing letter-request through a handwritten letter, which informed petitioner that she should write a letter of explanation regarding the late submission of grades, and address the same to the Office of the Dean. Petitioner, however, never sent the said letter of explanation. 10

On June 11, 2010, SCIS Dean Cecilia Mercado (Dean Mercado) sent a Notice of even date to petitioner, informing the latter that: 1) petitioner's explanation letter has not yet been received; 2) there was non-submission of completion forms and copy of grading records of one of the students; 3) there was a submission of incorrect photocopies of class records to support the request of grade completion of two other students; and 4) certain grades reflected in the grading sheets do not tally with the grades reflected in the completion forms for said two students. The notice directed petitioner to, among others, explain the foregoing discrepancies and incorrect submissions, to explain the reason for delay in grade submission, and to give justification why no administrative sanction should be imposed on her given the apparent violation on policies on grade. 11

In response to the foregoing notice from Dean Mercado, petitioner submitted her written explanation dated June 18, 2010 wherein she explained that: 1) there was no deadline given by the Registrar's office for her to respond; 2) the discrepancies noted by Dean Mercado were caused by petitioner's own inadvertence and failure to double check her submission due to her need to rush; 3) the failure to submit the completion forms of the students was not really a failure considering that petitioner already submitted such before the deadline, but then she accidentally found the completion forms among old test papers while she was cleaning out her workplace in the faculty room; and 4) petitioner had no idea how the completion forms got there and who placed them there. 12

On June 23, 2010, petitioner again sent a letter to SLU, requesting the Registrar to make corrections on the grades of four more students, 13 this time stating that said students were dropped by mistake, with two of said students dropped on the erroneous basis that they exceeded the maximum number of absences. 14

On July 9, 2010, Dean Mercado sent a letter 15 to petitioner which contained findings that the latter violated several policies. Dean Mercado likewise requested for verification of the attendance records of the students referred to in the June 23, 2010 letter of petitioner, and the result of said verification revealed no absences were reported against a number of said students. 16

On July 16, 2010, petitioner again made another request for a change of grade of one student. 17 Petitioner reasoned that she failed to find the student's project in her e-mail inbox but, upon re-checking, she discovered that it was sent to another folder. 18

In view of the foregoing events, and the observations and recommendations given by Dean Mercado, as well as the findings of the Vice President for Academic Affairs, an administrative case for academic malpractice or grave misconduct was filed against petitioner. Subsequently, in a Resolution dated August 10, 2010, SLU found petitioner guilty of the violations charged. 19

On August 12, 2010, SLU issued an Order (SLU Order) dismissing petitioner from service on the ground of academic malpractice or grave misconduct. 20

Due to the foregoing action by SLU, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch-Cordillera Administrative Region, praying for, among others, reinstatement, backwages, damages, and attorney's fees. 21

In her complaint, petitioner raised the issue of non-compliance with the requirement of notice and hearing, in addition to the propriety of the dismissal based on the grounds stated above and in the SLU Order. 22 In defending its actions, SLU argued that petitioner was grossly and habitually negligent in handling the grades of her students, considering that she processed their grades only in 2010, when the completion forms had been prepared as early as Academic Year 2008-2009. 23 SLU added that petitioner marked several students as having dropped the subject, when records show that they never did so. 24 In addition, SLU argued that they provided petitioner an opportunity to be heard when she was asked to explain the irregularities observed in relation to her students' grades. 25

The Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

After receiving the respective position papers of the parties, the Labor Arbiter (LA) assigned to the case issued a Decision 26 dated March 31, 2011 (LA Decision) which found that, while petitioner was indeed administratively liable for academic malpractice or grave misconduct, the penalty of dismissal meted out by SLU was too severe. 27 In addition, the LA found that SLU failed to observe due process in the termination of petitioner from employment. 28 The LA Decision disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the complainant's dismissal from employment as too severe a penalty hence, unjust.

The respondent Saint Louis University through Fr. Jessie Hechanova and other responsible officers are hereby ordered to reinstate complainant effective immediately without loss of seniority rights and privileges and pay the latter an aggregate amount of P271,333.34 representing backwages, 13th month pay, nominal damages and attorney's fee.

All other claims are denied for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED. 29

Notably, the LA made a crucial finding of fact that petitioner was indeed negligent in keeping school and student records — negligent to the point that a student incurred unnecessary damage when said student was forced to re-enroll the same subject, despite having actually passed the same. 30 The LA Decision stated thus:

An objective study of the reasons and justifications attached to the various requests of change of grades manifests the perversity of complainant on negligence in keeping school and student records which bring about delay in submission of the student grades. Such negligence even caused unnecessary damage on one of her students who was forced to re-enroll the same subject which was later on found out to have passed the same. Thus, it is our view that it redounded to the detriment of reputation of the respondent school. Hence, we sustain the findings of respondent school that complainant is administratively liable for Academic Malpractice or Grave Misconduct in relation to the aforementioned causes of termination under [the Manual of Regulations for Private Higher Education of 2008 (MORPHE)]. 31

Despite the foregoing finding, the LA Decision found that SLU was incorrect in dismissing petitioner, and that suspension for three (3) months is sufficient as penalty, thus:

Consequently, while we uphold that the imposition of penalty for a well founded violation is within the valid exercise of management prerogative, we rule that the penalty of dismissal is too severe to be imposed considering that all the circumstances that attended thereto. Thus, suspension of three (3) months of the school year 2010-2011 would suffice. Hence, complainant shall be reinstated effective December 1, 2010 without loss of seniority rights and privileges, and paid her backwages to date. x x x 32

Aggrieved by the ruling of the LA, both petitioner and SLU appealed to the NLRC. 33

In their appeal, SLU argued that the LA erred in finding, among others, that: 1) the dismissal of petitioner was unjust; 2) the penalty of dismissal was too severe; 3) SLU abused its discretion and management prerogative in imposing the penalty of dismissal; and 4) SLU failed to comply with procedural due process. 34

For her part, petitioner argued that the LA erred in: 1) finding her administratively liable for academic malpractice or grave misconduct; and 2) imposing upon her the penalty of suspension for a period of three months. 35

The NLRC Ruling

The NLRC found no error in the LA Decision, except for the portion on the award of nominal damages. The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision 36 dated December 19, 2011 stated thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respective appeals of complainant and respondents are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated March 31, 2011 is AFFIRMED with the exception of the award of nominal damages which is hereby deleted.

SO ORDERED. 37

Adopting the findings of fact of the LA, the NLRC gave no weight to the claim of petitioner that she turned over the grades on time, and that some personalities in the school were merely trying to discredit her. The NLRC declared that petitioner is responsible for the offense imputed against her by SLU. 38 The NLRC Decision stated thus:

Despite protestation of complainant that she turned over the grades on time and that some personalities in the school were merely trying to discredit her, We find that complainant is truly responsible for the offense imputed against her by her employer. It is clear from the letter-requests she sent to the Registrar of SLU that she has been late in submitting the completion grades of her students. She acknowledged her shortcomings and did not impute any wrongdoing to her colleagues. It was only later when the school management appeared to be making an issue out of the matter that she ascribed fault to her co-faculty, claiming that they were damaging her reputation. This is evidently a mere afterthought, an unsuccessful attempt to release her from any culpability. Such unsubstantiated allegation should not be given credit and it should not detract us from finding her liable for the transgressions she perpetrated.

Thus, We sustain the office a quo's declaration that complainant committed a misconduct.

The NLRC concluded as the LA did — that dismissal is illegal and that suspension of three (3) months is the proper penalty. The NLRC Decision reasoned that, based on the facts, the misconduct committed by petitioner is merely simple misconduct, and not serious misconduct. 39 Not being serious misconduct performed with wrongful intent, the NLRC ruled that such is not enough basis under Article 282 of the Labor Code for SLU to dismiss petitioner. 40

As with the LA Decision, the NLRC Decision found that SLU failed to observe procedural due process, in that, the SLU failed to observe the two-notice rule. 41 Unlike the LA Decision, however, the NLRC Decision ruled that the award of nominal damages is proper only when the failure to observe procedural due process coincides with a dismissal that observed substantial due process. Considering that SLU failed to observe both procedural and substantive due process, the NLRC reasoned that there is no reason to award nominal damages along with reinstatement and backwages. 42

Not contented with the decision of the NLRC, both parties sought reconsideration of the NLRC Decision. Both motions for reconsideration were denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated February 23, 2012. 43

Subsequently, SLU filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, seeking the annulment of the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC. 44

The CA Ruling

The CA granted SLU's Petition for Certiorari, thus reversing and setting aside the NLRC Decision and Resolution. The CA found that SLU, while failing to observe procedural due process, validly dismissed petitioner. The CA Decision disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision, dated December 19, 2011, and Resolution, dated February 23, 2012, issued by the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC-LAC No. 04-001105-11, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This Court finds the dismissal of private respondent Mia T. Dela Cruz VALID. Petitioner Saint Louis University, Inc., is, however, ORDERED to pay the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as nominal damages to private respondent for failure to comply with the requirements of procedural due process.

SO ORDERED. 45

In reversing the NLRC Decision, the CA noted that the findings of fact of the LA and those of the NLRC coincide with the conclusion that petitioner is guilty of academic malpractice through her negligence in keeping student records. 46 The CA highlighted the finding of the LA that petitioner is liable under the Manual of Regulations for Private Higher Education of 2008 (MORPHE), issued by the Commission on Higher Education, and that the actions of petitioner detrimentally affected her student who had to re-enroll the class despite having passed the same. The CA stated thus:

Private respondent's academic malpractice is highlighted by the fact that the delay in the submission of the completion form of the grade of one of her students, Noemi Therese Manalang, resulted in a re-enrollment of the same class despite having passed the same, an allegation which has never been denied. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Higher Education (MORPHE), in addition to the just causes enumerated in the Labor Code, as amended, the employment of personnel in a higher education institution, such as petitioner SLU, may be terminated for any of the causes enumerated in Section 121 therein, which includes negligence in keeping school or student records, including unreasonable delay in the submission of student grades.

xxx xxx xxx

x x x From the prevenient discussion, it appears that there is no evidence which may have been overlooked by both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter which would change the outcome of the case, hence, this Court is bound by the findings of fact of the labor tribunal. It has been established that private respondent was indeed guilty of academic malpractice through her negligence in keeping student records. 47

Likewise, the CA Decision echoed the conclusion of the NLRC when it found that there is no reason to believe the claims of petitioner that someone else is to blame for her actions, and that petitioner is clearly responsible for such, thus:

According to her, she found the grade sheets while she was clearing her work station in preparation for the start of the first semester of academic year 2010. It is noteworthy that the documents she found were in relation to students' grades spanning two (2) academic years. Her statement that somebody must have placed it in her desk after submitting it to the proper authorities remains uncorroborated thus, a self-serving claim. Further, her explanation that she was rushing the grades so close to the deadline and her failure to double check the same bolster the petitioner's contention of her improvidence. Another instance which reveals her lackadaisical attitude is shown by her request for the change of grades of students that she noted as absent when the records of the Associate Dean for Men reveal otherwise, as well as her failure to thoroughly check her electronic mail to confirm if her students had actually submitted their projects. 48

The CA diverged from the LA and the NLRC on the issue of whether, on the basis of the established facts, the penalty of dismissal is proper. While both the LA and the NLRC appreciated petitioner's thirteen (13) years of employment in her favor, the CA ruled that the numerous offenses committed by petitioner during a span of two (2) academic years cannot be tempered by such length of service. The CA even ruled that such length of service should have made petitioner even more aware of the ramifications of her actions. 49 Further, unlike the NLRC which focused on whether or not the misconduct committed by petitioner was simple or grave in relation to just causes of termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the CA noted that the MORPHE definitively recommends a penalty of dismissal for negligence in the keeping of student records and the unreasonable delay in the submission of the same. 50

The CA concluded that the records of the instant case clearly show that petitioner was careless in the sensitive matter of her student's final grades, which would have been detrimental to their academic careers; and that petitioner's explanations and attempts to blame others displayed her ignorance of the severity of her negligence, thus justifying a strict implementation of the provisions of the MORPHE. 51 The CA therefore ruled that there is valid ground to dismiss petitioner.

Regarding the procedural due process issue, the CA agreed with the NLRC and the LA that SLU failed to properly inform petitioner that an investigation was already being conducted, and that SLU likewise failed to properly inform petitioner of the specific provisions of the faculty rules or of the MORPHE that she was charged with. Thus, the CA returned the award of nominal damages. 52

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the CA. The CA, however, found that the motion bore no new arguments, and thus denied the same through the CA Resolution. 53

Unsatisfied with the foregoing, petitioner elevated the matter to this Court through the aforementioned Petition for Review 54 assailing the CA Decision and the CA Resolution.

In the Petition for Review, petitioner assigned the following errors:

1) the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion when it found that Section 94b of MORPHE is applicable and a valid basis for dismissal of petitioner;

2) the CA erred and misappreciated the facts when it considered the complaints from students as justification for the illegal dismissal of petitioner;

3) the CA erred when it considered alleged infractions as justification for the illegal dismissal of petitioner;

4) the CA erred and misappreciated facts when it considered and highlighted the delay in the submission of the completion form of Noemi Therese Manalang;

5) the CA erred when it did not consider the good faith of petitioner in resubmitting the completion forms which she found on her table; and

6) the CA erred when it failed to appreciate the fact that SLU allowed a facility for correction of grades, meaning such is a practice allowed and accepted within SLU. 55

In response to the foregoing Petition for Review, SLU filed its Comment dated April 28, 2015. 56 Subsequently, petitioner filed a Reply dated September 28, 2015. 57

The Issue Before the Court

The basic issue for the Court's resolution in the present petition is whether or not the CA, in issuing the CA Decision and the subsequent CA Resolution, correctly reversed the NLRC Decision.

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the CA Decision.

At the outset, this Court must reiterate the oft-repeated elementary doctrine that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 58 It has been emphatically declared that it is not a function of this Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, considering its jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. 59

The nature of questions of law is likewise clearly explained in jurisprudence. Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Bañas, 60 elucidated:

x x x A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is an appeal from a ruling of a lower tribunal on pure questions of law. It is only in exceptional circumstances that we admit and review questions of fact.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the question must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.

Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. 61

Again, in addressing Rule 45 petitions, this Court entertains only questions of law, and not questions of fact. It is only in exceptional circumstances that We admit and review questions of fact. 62

A perusal of the Petition for Review reveals that much of the issues raised by petitioner are questions of fact. In claiming that the CA misappreciated facts, or that the CA failed to consider her supposed good faith, among others, petitioner is, in fact, asking this Court to re-evaluate and review evidence. We likewise observe that petitioner is fully aware of the nature of her submissions. In her Reply, petitioner defended the issues she raised in her petition by stating that the findings of facts of the CA are contrary to the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC, thus necessitating a review of the records. 63

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the findings of fact of the CA, the NLRC, and the LA all concur. They all found that petitioner is responsible and liable for academic malpractice through her negligence in keeping student records. 64 Likewise, the CA, the NLRC and the LA all agree that petitioner is liable under the provision of MORPHE on termination. 65 There was no conflict in their factual findings. In fact, the only point where the CA disagreed with the NLRC and the LA is in the application of rules in relation to the settled facts.

From the foregoing, this Court cannot countenance petitioner's claim that there is conflict between the findings of fact of the CA and the findings of fact of the NLRC and the LA. Much more, this Court finds no reason to admit or review petitioner's questions of fact.

Petitioner should be reminded that the factual findings of administrative bodies, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court. Protective Maximum Security Agency, Inc. v. Fuentes66 explains:

Accordingly, we do not re-examine conflicting evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise in its specialized field. Nor do we substitute our 'own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible.' The factual findings of the NLRC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on this Court.

Applying these cases, the general rule is that in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari, this court will not review the factual determination of the administrative bodies governing labor, as well as the findings of fact by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals can conduct its own factual determination to ascertain whether the National Labor Relations Commission has committed grave abuse of discretion. 'In the exercise of its power of review, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding and consequently, it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.' 67

Again, the findings of fact of the LA and the NLRC in the instant case, as affirmed by the CA, must stand. With the facts settled, all that is left for determination is the remaining question of law — whether or not the CA is correct in concluding that dismissal from service is the proper penalty.

Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it found that Section 94b of the MORPHE is applicable to the instant case, and was thus a valid basis for her dismissal. 68 We note, however, that the CA Decision made no mention of such section, and instead cited Section 121 of the MORPHE, which states thus:

Section 121.  Causes of Terminating Employment. — In addition to the just causes enumerated in the Labor Code, the employment of personnel in a higher education institution, may be terminated for any of the causes as follows:

1) grave misconduct, such as, but not limited to, giving of grades to a student in a subject not based solely on scholastic performance; failure to maintain confidentiality of school records; contracting loans from students or parents; use of cruel punishment; insubordination;

2) gross inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of duties, such as, but not limited to failure to cope with the reasonable standard efficiency and competence of the institution; habitual absences and tardiness from classes, and willful neglect of employment or assignment;

3) tampering or falsification of, or negligence in keeping school or student records including unreasonable delay in the submission of student grades;

xxx xxx xxx 69

The foregoing section is clear and unambiguous. If petitioner is found liable for any of the foregoing causes, SLU may terminate her employment.

It is settled fact that there was undue delay in petitioner's submission of student grades, in that she submitted the student's completion form only in 2010, when said grades were for the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Semesters of Academic Years 2007-2008 and 2008-2009. 70 It is likewise settled fact that petitioner was unable to show any credible and acceptable reason why such submission of grades was delayed, in that the tribunals below found that her apparent excuse — that someone was attempting to sabotage her — was baseless, self-serving, or incredible. 71 As such, it is also settled fact that petitioner was found negligent. 72

The CA is therefore correct in ruling that petitioner is liable under Section 121 of the MORPHE, and that she may be meted out with the penalty of termination from service. Without even needing to go into the question of whether or not petitioner's misconduct is simple or grave, as the NLRC did in its attempt to use Article 282 of the Labor Code as a standard, it is clear that there is basis to dismiss petitioner from service because her negligence in keeping student records and her unreasonable delay in submitting the grades squarely fall under paragraph 3 of Section 121 of the MORPHE. The MORPHE, which was issued through CHED Memorandum Order No. 40, s. 2008, expands on the list of just causes for termination by adding specific instances of terminable acts that are, at the very least, analogous to those provided in the Labor Code.

Of course, We note that in our previous decision in National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino, 73 which was cited by the NLRC Decision, 74 this Court made a ruling on the wording of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which is akin to the wording of the MORPHE previously discussed, thus:

Assuming for the sake of argument that respondent had indeed violated Section 94(b) of the Manual, her dismissal from employment is still invalid. Section 94(b) uses the word 'may' and not 'shall.' In this jurisdiction, the tendency has been to interpret the word 'shall' or 'may' as the context or a reasonable construction of the statute in which they are used demands or requires. As a general rule, the word 'may' when used in statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion while the word 'shall' is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. In the case at bar, the use of the word 'may' under Section 94(b) thereof implies that petitioners are permitted and authorized to terminate the employment of respondent for tampering or falsification of school records. However, such authority is not absolute. It does not give petitioners the unlimited power to automatically terminate the employment of respondent. Such authority is merely permissive and discretionary. Such prerogative cannot be permitted by this Court if exercised arbitrarily and unfairly to defeat the constitutional protection to labor. Moreover, as heretofore pointed out, there are circumstances present in this case which mitigate the misconduct of respondent. It would be different if the word 'shall' is used or the same is phrased in a negative manner. In such a case, the dismissal of respondent is mandatory and automatic. We find no exception to deviate from this general rule of statutory construction. 75

In said case, this Court concluded that the permissive and discretionary rule was applied unfairly because the subject teacher, while committing a misconduct, did not commit the same with wrongful intent, and thus cannot be considered as serious enough to warrant dismissal from employment under paragraph (a) of Article 282 of the Labor Code. The instant case, however, is different.

While it was previously noted that petitioner committed a misconduct, this Court notes that her acts more properly fall under paragraph (b) of Article 282 of the Labor Code, instead of paragraph (a). Thus, there is no need to assess whether the said misconduct is simple or serious, considering that petitioner's negligence is gross and habitual.

Again, this Court finds that petitioner is terminable under Article 282 of the Labor Code because her acts, as borne by the records, fall under paragraph (b), which is gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties:

Art. 282. Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

xxx xxx xxx

b. Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

xxx xxx xxx

This Court has previously ruled that neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal under Article 282 of the Labor Code, must be both gross and habitual. 76 Gross negligence has been defined as want of care in the performance of one's duties, while habitual neglect must be repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending on the circumstances. 77

It is a settled fact that petitioner's negligence in failing to submit student grades and/or completion forms on time negatively affected at least one of her students, specifically one Noemi Therese Manalang who had to re-enroll a class that she had already passed. This was observed by the LA, 78 while the CA Decision stated that this allegation was never denied. 79 Of course, as settled in the tribunals below, the failure of petitioner to submit grades on time, or take proper care of student records, was not an isolated event. This negligence occurred multiple times, and in relation to multiple students, over the span of at least two years. 80 Further, it cannot be denied, and it has not been denied, that submission of grades and/or completion forms, is the duty of a teacher such as petitioner.

We rule that petitioner was grossly negligent. This Court agrees with the CA when it found that petitioner appears to be unaware of the severity of her actions when she attempted to pass the blame onto other individuals for her own failure to submit student grades on time. 81 In addition, we find that the length of time between the academic years relevant to the grades submitted, and the time when such were submitted, seems extremely long. While petitioner's requests were submitted in 2010, the grades of the students therein were for academic years 2007-2008 and 2008-2009. Such length of delay in submission implies a lack of care or concern on the part of petitioner, and it appears that she failed to exercise even slight care in the performance of this part of her duties.

We likewise rule that petitioner' negligence is habitual. This Court agrees with the findings of the CA that there were numerous offenses which spanned for two (2) academic years. 82 Counting the students involved, there were at least eight (8) students 83 whose proper and correct grades were not submitted on time, and one (1) student who was given an incorrect grade because of petitioner's failure to properly secure the student's submitted work. 84 Certainly, this Court cannot come to any conclusion other than petitioner had habitually neglected her duties.

In addition to the foregoing, this Court notes the finding of the CA, thus:

x x x It may be true that the word "may" in the pertinent provision of the MORPHE is merely a recommendation which may be followed by the private education institution but the surrounding facts of the case justify the gravity of the penalty sought by Petitioner SLU. 85

At this point, it is good to recall the oft-repeated doctrine under the labor laws of this jurisdiction that in protecting the rights of the laborer, the law authorizes neither the oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. 86 In explaining that the protection granted to labor under the fundamental law of the land is tempered with justice for the deserving, this Court said:

The law in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. Management also has its own rights, which, as such, are entitled to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined more often than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and applicable law and doctrine. 87

We must therefore never hesitate to protect the rights of an employer when such is clearly being assailed. Although the result is unfortunate for the employee, if the employer is the one in the right, then we must give the latter its due. This Court notes the finding of the LA that the acts of petitioner "redounded to the detriment of reputation of the respondent school." 88

In line with the foregoing, this Court not only finds that petitioner's acts fall under Section 121, paragraph 3 of the MORPHE, but they also fall under Article 282, paragraph (b) of the Labor Code. Thus, We agree that applying the permissive authority under Section 121, paragraph 3 of the MORPHE of terminating petitioner from employment is proper.

With regard to the issue on the failure of the SLU to observe procedural due process, which issue was a matter of contention from the LA up to the CA, this Court notes that the Petition for Review no longer addresses the same. Even SLU, in filing their Comment, no longer raises such matter. As it is, the uniform finding of the LA, NLRC, and CA on the matter must stand. SLU failed to observe the twin-notice rule; thus, it failed to observe procedural due process in terminating petitioner from employment. The CA therefore correctly awarded the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as nominal damages in favor of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 13, 2014 and the Resolution dated October 2, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124760 finding that respondent Saint Louis University, Inc. validly dismissed petitioner Mia Torres-Dela Cruz, despite failure to observe procedural due process, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." (J. Lopez, J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2822 dated April 7, 2021.)

By authority of the Court:

TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) MA. CONSOLACION GAMINDE-CRUZADADeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 16-33.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio with the concurrence of Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam (a retired Member of the Court) and Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla (also a retired Member of the Court); id. at 37-52.

3. Penned by Commissioner Napoleon M. Menese with the concurrence of Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Teresita D. Castillon-Lora; id. at 83-103.

4.Id. at 54-55.

5.Id. at 38, and 84.

6.Id. at 38.

7.Id. at 85.

8. Reynaldo R. Dulay, Jr., Medel M. Kitan, Jason G. Laranang, and Anderson L. Tamano.

9.Id. at 38.

10.Id.

11.Id. at 40.

12.Id.

13. Jennifer Deyawan, Juan Paolo Figueroa, Ruben Licuanan, and Cloyd Palistroque.

14.Id. at 42.

15.Id. at 64-69.

16.Id. at 42.

17. Mariel A. Ocampo.

18.Id.

19.Id. at 43.

20.Id.

21.Id. at 74.

22.Id. at 43-44.

23.Id. at 44.

24.Id.

25.Id.

26.Id. at 74-82.

27.Id. at 79.

28.Id. at 80.

29.Id. at 82; emphasis omitted.

30.Id. at 78.

31.Id. at 78-79.

32.Id. at 79-80.

33.Id. at 84.

34.Id. at 91.

35.Id. at 92.

36.Id. at 83-103.

37.Id. at 102-103; emphasis omitted.

38.Id. at 95.

39.Id. at 97-98.

40.Id. at 97.

41.Id. at 100.

42.Id. at 102.

43.Id. at 46.

44.Id. at 37.

45.Id. at 52; citations and emphasis omitted.

46.Id. at 49.

47.Id. at 48-49.

48.Id. at 49.

49.Id. at 50.

50.Id.

51.Id. at 50-51.

52.Id. at 51.

53.Id. at 54-55.

54.Id. at 16-33.

55.Id. at 24-25.

56.Id. at 113-168.

57.Id. at 180-186.

58.Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 785 (2013).

59.Tiongco v. De la Merced, 157 Phil. 92, 96 (1974).

60. 711 Phil. 576 (2013).

61.Id. at 585-586; citations omitted.

62.Id. at 585.

63.Rollo, p. 182.

64.Id. at 49, 78, and 95-96.

65.Id. at 50, 79, and 93.

66. 753 Phil. 482, 483 (2015).

67.Id.; citations omitted; underscoring supplied.

68.Rollo, p. 24.

69. Underscoring supplied.

70.Id. at 38.

71.Id. at 49.

72.Id.

73. 529 Phil. 355 (2006).

74.Rollo, p. 99.

75.Supra note 73 at 371-372.

76.Cavite Apparel, Inc. v. Marquez, 703 Phil. 46, 47 (2013).

77.Id.

78.Rollo, p. 78.

79.Id. at 48.

80.Id. at 49.

81.Id. at 50.

82.Id. at 50.

83.Id. at 38-41.

84.Id. at 42.

85.Id. at 50.

86.Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. v. Honrado, 652 Phil. 331, 334 (2010).

87.Mercury Drug Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 258 Phil. 384, 391 (1989).

88.Rollo, p. 78.