Toledo v. Magsaysay Maritime Corp.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 210463. August 14, 2019.]

NANCY T. TOLEDO, petitioner, vs.MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION AND PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, INC., respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 14, 2019which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 210463 (Nancy T. Toledo v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and Princess Cruise Lines, Inc.). — In resolving the issue of whether a disease acquired by a seafarer during the term of his contract was work-related and therefore compensable, petitioner must only show a reasonable connection between the disease and the seafarer's work that would lead a rational mind to conclude that the latter's work may have contributed to the establishment of the disease or aggravation of any pre-existing condition. Direct causal relation or ultimate degree of certainty is not required.

On March 19, 2009, John T. Toledo (John) entered into a contract of employment 1 with respondent Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, the agent of Princess Cruise Lines, Inc. (collectively, respondents). He was to perform the functions of a waste disposal operator on board M/V Royal Princess for a period of 10 months. Prior to the signing of the contract, or on March 4, 2009, he underwent medical examination and was declared fit for sea service. 2 On May 1, 2009, he boarded M/V Royal Princess at Hamilton, Bermuda. 3

On February 23, 2010, John disembarked from M/V Royal Princess, due to initial complaints of tuberculosis. He was hospitalized and treated in Castries, Saint Lucia. 4 Unfortunately, he died on March 26, 2010 due to metastatic carcinoma or lung cancer. 5 John's remains and effects were transported back to the Philippines at respondents' expense. Respondents likewise gave burial allowance of US$1,000.00 to John's heirs. 6

John's heirs further demanded death compensation and other benefits from respondents. The latter denied the claim on the basis of the company-designated physician's opinion stating that John's illness was not work-related but could have been the result of other factors such as smoking. 7 Consequently, petitioner Nancy T. Toledo (Petitioner), surviving spouse of John, filed a complaint against respondents on December 9, 2010, claiming death benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. 8 CAIHTE

On March 30, 2011, Labor Arbiter Roderick Joseph B. Calanza (LA Calanza) rendered a Decision 9 in favor of petitioner, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION AND PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, INC., are hereby Ordered to pay complainant jointly and solidarily the following amounts:

 

1.  Death Compensation Benefits	-	US$50,000.00
2.  Monetary awards for 2 Minor Children	-	US$14,000.00
		––––––––––––
		(i.e., US$7,000 x 2)
TOTAL		US$64,000.00
3.  10% Attorney's Fees		US$6,400.00
		––––––––––––
GRAND TOTAL		US$70,400.00

 

The respondents shall pay the total amount in Philippine Currency at [the] exchange rate prevailing during the time of actual payment and shall deposit the same to the Cashier of this Office within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.

The rest of the claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.10

LA Calanza held that in order for John's death to be compensable, the following requisites must concur: 1) his death occurred during the term of his employment; and 2) his illness is work-related. There is no dispute that John died during the term of his contract. As to the second requisite, LA Calanza held that John's work as waste disposal operator "is a thing that speaks for itself (res ipsa loquitur)." Such kind of job is not limited to the disposal of human waste but also various kinds of waste materials like paints and fumes which cause damage to the lungs. A cruise ship produces plenty of solid waste products from passengers which need to be diffused frequently through incineration. The smoke emitted by the incinerator is hazardous to human health. As an operator, John was not only exposed to the smell of waste products but also to the smoke that he often inhaled from the incinerator which placed him at a high risk of acquiring a disease. 11

LA Calanza also rejected respondents' argument that John's death was caused by his smoking and thus not work-related. According to him, there is no evidence that John was subjected to medical treatment for an illness caused by smoking. Even if smoking could have been the cause of his death, it cannot be denied that his exposure to the fumes and smoke emitted by the vessel's incinerator contributed to the deterioration of his lungs and caused cancer. Moreover, John had been in the employ of respondents as waste disposal operator since November 9, 2007. His employment contributed even in a small degree to the development of the disease and in bringing about his death. Hence, his death is unquestionably work-related. 12

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) rendered a Decision 13 dated August 31, 2011, reversing LA Calanza. It held that Section 32 (A) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (2000 POEA-SEC) lists only two types of cancers that are considered occupational diseases. Metastatic carcinoma or lung cancer is not one of them. Illnesses not listed under Section 32 (A) are disputably presumed work-related. However, the following conditions must be satisfied: 1) the seafarer's work must involve the risk described; 2) the disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; 3) the disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and 4) there was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. 14 DETACa

The NLRC found the fourth requisite wanting as John was a self-confessed smoker three years prior to his death, smoking at least 10 cigarette sticks per day. He had also been treated for pulmonary tuberculosis for a period of six months in 2008 before he embarked on his employment in M/V Royal Princess in 2009. 15 The main cause of lung cancer is tobacco use, including smoking cigarettes, cigars, or pipes. While there are other risk factors, their effect on lung cancer is very small compared to that of tobacco smoking. The NLRC concluded that petitioner failed to prove how John contracted lung cancer and how and why his working conditions increased the risk of contracting this illness. In other words, there is no substantial evidence showing that the nature of John's work caused his illness or aggravated a pre-existing condition that he might have had. 16

After an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari 17 with the Court of Appeals (CA). On November 6, 2013, the CA rendered a Decision 18 which essentially echoes the findings of the NLRC. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, she filed the present petition to finally settle the issue of whether or not John's heirs are entitled to death compensation benefits from respondents.

We grant the petition.

As a general rule, only questions of law raised via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are reviewable by this Court. We accord much respect to the factual findings of the administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, including labor tribunals, which are specialized agencies that decide on matters falling within their jurisdiction on the basis of substantial evidence. However, We allow a relaxation of this rule whenever findings of fact are conflicting. The issue of whether or not the seafarer's illness is compensable is essentially a factual one, but the Court is justified in looking into the facts of this case because of the conflicting views of LA Calanza on one hand, and the NLRC and the CA on the other. 19

There are only two types of cancer that are considered occupational diseases under Section 32 (A) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, namely: cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder, and cancer, epitheliomatous or ulceration of the skin or of the corneal surface of the eye due to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral oil or paraffin, or compound product or residue of these substances. For other illnesses such as lung cancer, Section 20 (B) (4) applies, which provides that "[t]hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related."

Notwithstanding the presumption, the Court has held that, for due process considerations, the claimant-seafarer must still prove by substantial evidence that his work conditions caused, or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease. This is so because awards of compensation cannot rest entirely on bare assertions and presumptions. 20

For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. Here, there is no dispute that the second requisite is satisfied as John died before his contract ended. What remains to be determined is whether John's illness is work-related.

The 2000 POEA-SEC defines a work-related illness as "any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32 (A) of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied." 21 Section 32 (A) in turn provides that for an occupational disease and resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied:

1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein;

2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks;

3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and

4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. 22 aDSIHc

There is in this case an inherent difficulty, but not impossibility, in determining the work that John actually performed on board M/V Royal Princess. For one, his contract of employment mentioned his position but not the job description. 23 John also died during the term of his contract, which forecloses a testimony on the nature of his work, the chores he was required to do, the shifts he needed to serve, and other duties he was obliged to fulfill. These factors work for the benefit of respondents. But it is exactly in these circumstances that the law should step in to level the playing field and prevent a lopsided appreciation of the case wrought by an apparent deficiency in evidence. As mentioned, difficulty is not the same as impossibility. The Court here finds sufficient basis to rule that John's illness was work-related.

In the first place, John's title is specific enough and in itself indicates the nature of his responsibilities. A waste disposal operator is typically exposed to all kinds of waste materials, disease-causing organisms, harmful substances, dust, and fumes, among others. The book Guide to Ship Sanitation published by the World Health Organization 24 states that waste can contain hazardous microbial, chemical or physical agents. Direct human exposure to waste and environmental transfer of disease-causing organisms or harmful substances can readily lead to adverse health consequences with unsafe management and disposal of ship wastes. Moreover, the process of packaging and storing hazardous wastes in ships is in itself hazardous to the crew. The storage of hazardous wastes leads to the risk of harm arising should spills or leaks occur. 25 In essence, John's work inherently involves certain risks that can lead to serious health consequences.

Second, there is no showing that John was suffering from a disease at the time he boarded the ship M/V Royal Princess. His mandatory medical examination revealed that he underwent treatment for pulmonary tuberculosis in 2008. 26 His x-ray result showed an abnormality reported as "stable granuloma, right base, with clearance." 27 However, while granuloma can be a part of a condition, it is not a disease. 28 There is no evidence on record that John was diagnosed with any disease prior to his stint as waste disposal operator with respondents, aside from tuberculosis which had been treated. In fact, he appears to have been in good health and was even found fit to work on unrestricted sea service. 29 It was only while rendering duty that he experienced symptoms — initially thought to be tuberculosis 30 — for which he disembarked from the ship to seek medical treatment. In light of these circumstances, We cannot negate the possibility that John's work conditions contributed, even to a small degree, in the development or aggravation of his illness.

At this point it must be stressed that in order to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof of work-connection is sufficient — direct causal relation is not required. Thus, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceeding. 31 In other words, it is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had. 32

As discussed, concomitant with the presumption of compensability under Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC is the burden on the part of petitioner to present substantial evidence that John's illness was work-related, i.e., his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease using only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation, to establish compensability. 33 We hold that petitioner was able to discharge this burden. She was able to establish a causal link between John's employment and his illness. Hence, the presumption now operates in his favor and the burden is shifted to respondents to overcome the presumption. 34 Unfortunately, respondents failed to discharge this burden.

First, respondents presented two reports from different physicians which they claim to have pronounced that John's illness was not work-related. The first report 35 rendered by Dr. Mylene Cruz-Balbon pertinently states:

This is with regards to your query regarding the death of Waste Disposal Operator John T. Toledo who died due to Metastatic Carcinoma.

The etiology for lung carcinoma are smoking, exposure to Asbestos, Radon, Bis (Chloromethyl) ether, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, chromium, nickel and inorganic arsenic compounds. Work-relatedness will depend on exposure to the mentioned factors.

Another physician, Dr. Tommy U. Reyes, opined:

I don't think he was exposed to the previously mentioned chemicals. If there was indeed no history of exposure onboard it is not work-related. Smoking could be a probable cause of death if patient is a smoker. 36 ETHIDa

However, the Court cannot give probative value to these self-serving declarations. The reports are also too general, non-categorical and non-committal. They reveal the physicians' lack of sufficient information to make a definitive conclusion on whether or not John's disease was work-related, and understandably so since neither of them was able to examine the seafarer and given the opportunity to assess the effects of the latter's duties and work environment on his health.

Respondents cannot make useful defense of the ruling in Ortega v. CA, 37 where the Court held that the main cause of lung cancer is tobacco use and that the seafarer's acquisition of the disease was not work-related. The facts of that case are not on all fours with the facts of this case. First, the seafarer involved in that case, Posedio Ortega (Ortega), was hired as second engineer and not a waste disposal operator. Second, he got sick barely two weeks of boarding the ship, and diagnosed with lung cancer barely a month after boarding the vessel. In this case, John had worked as waste disposal operator for another vessel for nine months, and for respondent ship company for another nine months before he disembarked for medical reasons. Thus, John was exposed to the risks of his job for a longer period than Ortega was to his. Third, Ortega's attending physician declared that his lung cancer is related to his smoking habits. In this case, John had not been diagnosed with lung cancer. Moreover, while he declared in his medical examination that he had smoked for three years using 10 cigarette sticks per day, there is no indication in the medical exam report of the period in which he did so. Nor is there evidence that John continued smoking up to the time he boarded M/V Royal Princess. Further, as found by LA Calanza, John had no history of a previous medical treatment for an illness caused by smoking. 38 Even if smoking probably caused John's illness and eventual death, that does not erase the fact that there is a reasonable connection between his work and illness that probably contributed to the deterioration of his health. Finally, Ortega did not contest the finding that his lung cancer was not work-related.

It cannot be overemphasized that the 2000 POEA-SEC is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Its provisions must, therefore, be construed and applied fairly, reasonably and liberally in favor of the seamen and their dependents. Only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect. 39

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 6, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 06650 is HEREBY REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 30, 2011 Decision of the Labor Arbiter in SRAB VI OFW Case No. (M)10-12-0065 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA

Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, p. 40.

2. CA rollo, p. 125.

3.Rollo, p. 27.

4.Id. at 28.

5.Id. at 42-43, 45.

6.Id. at 28.

7.Id.

8.Rollo, p. 51; CA rollo, p. 121.

9.Rollo, pp. 44-48.

10.Id. at 48.

11.Id. at 45-46.

12.Id. at 46-47.

13.Id. at 50-59.

14.Id. at 56-57.

15.Id. at 57.

16.Rollo, pp. 57-58.

17.CA rollo, pp. 3-21, Nancy Toledo, Petitioner v. National Labor Relations Commission, Seventh Division, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and Princess Cruise Line, Inc., Respondents, CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 06650.

18.Id. at 25-37; penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now a Member of this Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan and Ma. Luisa C. Quijano-Padilla.

19.De Leon v. Maunlad Trans, Inc., G.R. No. 215293, February 8, 2017, 817 SCRA 263, 270.

20.Id. at 264, 268.

21.Dohle-Philman Manning Agency, Inc. v. Heirs of Gazzingan, G.R. No. 199568, June 17, 2015, 759 SCRA 209, 222.

22.Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. v. Salazar, G.R. No. 188595, August 28, 2013, 704 SCRA 233, 246.

23.Job description generally includes duties, purpose, responsibilities, scope, and working conditions of a job along with the job's title, and the name or designation of the person to whom the employee reports. <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/job-description.html> (last visited on July 18, 2019).

24.3rd Ed., 2011 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK310822> (last visited on July 19, 2019).

25.3rd Ed., 2011 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK310822> (last visited on July 19, 2019).

26.CA rollo, p. 123.

27.Id. at 125.

28.A granuloma is a tiny cluster of white blood cells and other tissue that can be found in the lungs, head, skin or other parts of the body in some people. Granulomas are not cancerous. They form as a reaction to infections, inflammation, irritants or foreign objects. Granulomas can be part of conditions such as Crohn's disease and inflammatory bowel disease and rheumatoid arthritis. <https://www.healthdirect.gov.au/granulomas> (last accessed on July 19, 2019).

29.CA rollo, p. 125.

30.Rollo, p. 28.

31.De Leon v. Maunlad Trans., Inc., G.R. No. 215293, February 8, 2017, 817 SCRA 265, 273. Italics supplied.

32.Dohle-Philman Manning Agency, Inc. v. Heirs of Gazzingan, supra note 20 at 209, 225-226.

33.De Leon v. Maunlad Trans., Inc., supra at 272.

34.Dohle-Philman Manning Agency, Inc. v. Heirs of Gazzingan, supra note 20 at 226.

35.CA rollo, p. 118.

36.Id. at 120.

37.Ortega v. CA, St. Vincent Shipping, Inc. and/or Cristobal, G.R. No. 175005, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 649.

38.Rollo, p. 46.

39.Wallem Maritime Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 130772, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA 623, 634.