Temporal v. People

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 228693. October 6, 2021.]

JUAN FRANCISCO N. TEMPORAL, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 6, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 228693 (Juan Francisco N. Temporal, Petitioner, v.People of the Philippines, Respondent.) — This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 dated 18 December 2015 and Resolution 3 dated 12 December 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 140064. The CA convicted petitioner Juan Francisco N. Temporal (petitioner) of thirty-six (36) counts of qualified theft and reversed the Decision 4 dated 18 February 2015 of Branch 11, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Criminal Case Nos. CR-08-262444 to CR-08-262479.

Antecedents

Petitioner was charged with qualified theft under thirty-six (36) separate Informations. 5 The accusatory portions of the Informations only differ on the dates of commission of the crimes and the amounts involved, thus:

That on or about June 4, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away cash money in the amount of Php180,000.00, belonging to PETRON CORPORATION, represented by Antonio S. Santos, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of Php180,000.00, Philippine Currency. aDSIHc

That in the commission of the said offense, said accused acted with grave abuse of trust and confidence, he then being hired as Metro Industrial Account Sales Executive (ASE) of the latter whose duty and responsibility among others is to collect and remit to said PETRON CORPORATION payments for purchases of petroleum products by the latter's customers, and as such, he had free access to the stolen property.

Contrary to law. 6

The following are the case numbers with the corresponding dates and amounts alleged:

1. Crim. Case No. 82-62444 committed on June 4, 2004 involving P180,000.00;

2. Crim. Case No. 82-62445 committed on June 4, 2004 involving P120,300.00;

3. Crim. Case No. 82-62446 committed on June 8, 2004 involving P128,000.00;

4. Crim. Case No. 82-62447 committed on June 11, 2004 involving P128,000.00;

5. Crim. Case No. 82-62448 committed on June 22, 2004 involving P128,000.00;

6. Crim. Case No. 82-62449 committed on July 13, 2004 involving P126,000.00;

7. Crim. Case No. 82-62450 committed on July 19, 2004 involving P126,000.00;

8. Crim. Case No. 82-62451 committed on August 27, 2004 involving P324,000.00;

9. Crim. Case No. 82-62452 committed on September 2, 2004 involving P125,000.00;

10. Crim. Case No. 82-62453 committed on September 14, 2004 involving P129,000.00;

11. Crim. Case No. 82-62454 committed on September 24, 2004 involving P129,000.00;

12. Crim. Case No. 82-62455 committed on October 8, 2004 involving P129,000.00;

13. Crim. Case No. 82-62456 committed on October 15, 2004 involving P339,000.00;

14. Crim. Case No. 82-62457 committed on October 29, 2004 involving P127,500.00;

15. Crim. Case No. 82-62458 committed on December 21, 2004 involving P393,000.00;

16. Crim. Case No. 82-62459 committed on January 5, 2004 involving P131,000.00;

17. Crim. Case No. 82-62460 committed on January 12, 2005 involving P131,000.00;

18. Crim. Case No. 82-62461 committed on March 9, 2005 involving P225,000.00;

19. Crim. Case No. 82-62462 committed on March 9, 2005 involving P258,000.00;

20. Crim. Case No. 82-62463 committed on March 17, 2005 involving P325,617.76;

21. Crim. Case No. 82-62464 committed on April 11, 2005 involving P363,300.00;

22. Crim. Case No. 82-62465 committed on April 18, 2005 involving P224,434.00;

23. Crim. Case No. 82-62466 committed on May 24, 2005 involving P377,808.20;

24. Crim. Case No. 82-62467 committed on July 1, 2005 involving P268,000.00;

25. Crim. Case No. 82-62468 committed on July 19, 2005 involving P285,000.00;

26. Crim. Case No. 82-62469 committed on August 6, 2005 involving P173,500.00;

27. Crim. Case No. 82-62470 committed on August 27, 2005 involving P173,500.00;

28. Crim. Case No. 82-62471 committed on September 8, 2005 involving P184,000.00;

29. Crim. Case No. 82-62472 committed on September 13, 2005 involving P184,000,00;

30. Crim. Case No. 82-62473 committed on September 16, 2005 involving P184,000.00;

31. Crim. Case No. 82-62474 committed on September 26, 2005 involving P184,000.00;

32. Crim. Case No. 82-62475 committed on October 3, 2005 involving P368,000.00;

33. Crim. Case No. 82-62476 committed on October 17, 2005 involving P193,500.00;

34. Crim. Case No. 82-62477 committed on October 24, 2005 involving P203,500.00;

35. Crim. Case No. 82-62478 committed on October 29, 2005 involving P203,500.00; and TIADCc

36. Crim. Case No. 82-62479 committed on November 3, 2005 involving P203,500.00. 7

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then ensued after the pre-trial conference.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses: (1) Antonio Santos, Petron Corporation's (Petron's) former Regional Manager of Luzon Industrial Sales; (2) Efren Lapus, Petron's former Manager for Metro Manila Industrial Sales; (3) John Calvin Collado (Collado), Philippine Fishing Gear Industries's (PFGI's) Assistant Purchasing Manager; (4) Ma. Christina Andal, Petron's Receivables Analyst; and (5) Mark Tristan Caparas (Caparas), Petron's Finance Manager. 8

According to the prosecution, petitioner worked as a Metro-Industrial Account Sales Executive (ASE) for Petron. 9 As ASE, his duties included taking purchase orders from customers, ensuring the delivery of products ordered, and collecting and remitting purchase payments. 10 Petitioner was assigned to handle Petron's industrial accounts in Metro Manila. 11

In 2004, PFGI requested petitioner to supply it with Petron petroleum products. 12 At that time, PFGI did not have a sales account with Petron. 13 As a temporary arrangement, petitioner and PFGI agreed to create a "ship-to" account for PFGI through the accommodation of Lunar Steel Corporation (Lunar Steel), a regular customer of Petron. 14 PFGI's purchases were to be recorded in Lunar Steel's sales account, but delivered to PFGI. 15 The "ship-to" arrangement was approved by Petron upon Lunar Steel's request. 16

Starting May 2004, fuel and petroleum products were delivered to PFGI as a "ship-to" account of Lunar Steel. 17 In June 2005, Petron issued a separate sales account to PFGI. 18 Petitioner knew of the account's creation, but he continued the "ship-to" deliveries up to October 2005. 19

During the material period from 2004 to 2005, petitioner coaxed PFGI to pay for all its purchases in cash, when he was only authorized to receive checks. 20 He accomplished this scheme by granting unauthorized discounts for cash payments. 21

Petitioner did not remit the cash to Petron. 22 He appropriated the money, then manipulated entries in Petron's accounting system to make it appear that PFGI had already paid. 23 Thereafter, he applied payments and unapplied credits 24 of Lunar Steel and other Petron customers against PFGIs purchases. 25 Through this scheme, petitioner pocketed cash collections amounting to Php6,621,959.96.

Version of the Defense

The narration of facts in petitioner's pleadings was substantially identical with that of the prosecution. 26 He did not present any evidence refuting the People's version of events. Rather, petitioner's defenses were anchored on the nature and character of the crimes committed. AIDSTE

After the prosecution formally offered its evidence, petitioner moved for leave of court to file a demurrer, then filed a demurrer to evidence. 27 He claimed that the element of grave abuse of confidence was not present because the offended party was PFGI and not Petron. 28 The money was still owned by PFGI since Petron and PFGI did not have a buyer-seller relationship, and there were no official receipts evincing Petron's receipt of the money. 29

Petitioner also argued that there was no unlawful asportation because, as Petron's agent, he had juridical possession over the money. 30 Thus, assuming that a crime was committed, it was estafa and not qualified theft. 31 Petitioner further claimed that none of the witnesses saw him take the money. 32

On 24 March 2014, the RTC issued an Order 33 denying the demurrer to evidence. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but it was denied. 34 However, he waived the presentation of his evidence and moved to submit the case for decision. 35

Ruling of the RTC

In a Decision dated 18 February 2015, the RTC, through Presiding Judge Cicero D. Jurado, Jr. (Judge Jurado, Jr.), acquitted petitioner of all the crimes charged:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court in Criminal Case Nos. 08-262444 to 08-262479 finds accused Juan Francisco Temporal NOT GUILTY and ACQUITS him for the crime of Qualified Theft penalized under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code. 36

The RTC adopted petitioner's arguments in his demurrer to evidence. According to the RTC, the money entrusted to petitioner belonged to PFGI. 37 There was no grave abuse of confidence, and no property was unlawfully taken from Petron. 38

The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Ruling of the CA

The CA reversed the RTC and adjudged petitioner guilty of thirty-six (36) counts of qualified theft, thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accused-respondent Juan Francisco N. Temporal is convicted of thirty-six (36) counts of qualified theft and sentenced to serve thirty-six (36) penalties of reclusion perpetua. But with the application of Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-respondent shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period not exceeding 40 years.

SO ORDERED. 39

The CA found that Judge Jurado, Jr., gravely abused his discretion when he acquitted petitioner after denying his demurrer to evidence. 40 Petitioner did not present any proof; thus, there was no reason to depart from the RTC's earlier finding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charge of qualified theft. 41 AaCTcI

Moreover, the CA found that the prosecution proved all the elements of qualified theft. Petitioner took cash he was obliged to remit to Petron. As ASE, petitioner had access to funds collected from Petron's clients; hence, he gravely abused the confidence reposed in him by Petron. 42

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in a Resolution 43 dated 12 December 2016. Hence, this petition.

Issues

The issues for resolution are:

1. Whether the CA exceeded its authority when it set aside the RTC Decision and convicted petitioner of thirty-six (36) counts of qualified theft; and

2. Whether the CA erred in ruling that Judge Jurado, Jr., gravely abused his discretion.

Ruling of the Court

A judgment of acquittal may be

Petitioner argues that the CA reevaluated the evidence, on record and overstepped the bounds of permissible review. 44 He claims that the CA violated his right against double jeopardy when it substituted its own findings for those of the RTC and reversed the latter's judgment of acquittal. 45 The People counters that the State may challenge an acquittal when there is grave abuse of discretion, which the CA correctly found to be present. 46

It is true that, as a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a final and executory judgment of acquittal. 47 This proscription safeguards against double jeopardy. 48 However, double jeopardy does not attach when the judgment of acquittal is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due process; in such case, the assailed judgment is void. 49 The limited exceptions may he invoked in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 50

In certiorari proceedings, the reviewing court determines whether the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the latter of its very power to dispense justice. 51 Should the reviewing court find grave abuse its discretion, it may annul or modify the decision or proceedings, then grant such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. 52

Thus, apart from setting aside the void judgment or order, the reviewing court may remand the case for further proceedings, 53 reinstate a prior decision, 54 direct the conduct of a new trial, 55 render a new or modified judgment of conviction, 56 or issue such other decision or order as may be lawful and just under the circumstances.

In this case, the remedy availed of by the People and the CA's actions fall within the bounds of permissible review. The People's Rule 65 petition alleged grave abuse of discretion, as shown by Judge Jurado, Jr.'s sharp and sudden turnaround in his findings and total disregard of the evidence on record. Further, contrary to petitioner's claim, the CA did not reevaluate the evidence. Rather, the CA confined itself to an examination of the actuations of Judge Jurado, Jr., in the course of the proceedings: EcTCAD

The trial court denied Temporal's demurrer to evidence and found that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the charge of qualified theft. In its March 24, 2014 Order, the trial court declared that Petron is the offended party and that Temporal, who took PFGI's payments to Petron, gravely abused his employer's confidence. Although this should not be construed as a pronouncement of Temporal's guilt, the denial of demurrer meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that Temporal had committed the offense of qualified theft, and unless he presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the conclusion. In this case, however, Temporal waived his right to present evidence and moved to submit the case for decision. Despite the paucity of defense evidence and the prima facie finding that Temporal committed the offense of qualified theft, the trial court inexplicably contradicted itself and acquitted Temporal. This disposition of the court is capricious and whimsical constituting grave abuse of discretion. 57

Finding that the RTC Decision should be set aside, the CA went over the records to determine the appropriate judgment. It rebuffed the defenses raised by petitioner, which are legal in nature. There were no factual issues to be resolved since petitioner neither refuted nor denied the prosecution's version of events. He did not present any countervailing evidence.

In rendering a judgment of conviction, therefore, the CA merely applied the undisputed facts to the elements of the crime. From all indications, the CA's scope of review was consistent with jurisprudential doctrine.

As to petitioner's invocation of double jeopardy, the issue turns on whether the CA correctly found grave abuse of discretion.

Whimsical flip-flopping and total

Petitioner claims that no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the trial court since it merely exercised its inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders. 58 To support the RTC's judgment of acquittal, he further reiterates the arguments raised in his demurrer to evidence. 59

We affirm the findings of the CA.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. 60 In this case, the baffling self-contradictions of Judge Jurado, Jr. are patent on the records. Petitioner's defenses had all been categorically rejected in the RTC's Order dated 24 March 2014 denying his demurrer to evidence, thus:

The Court finds no merit to accused's contention that the money subject of the charge is owned by PFGI and thus, PFGI should be considered as the offended party, not Petron. The evidence consisting of the various sales invoices shows the fact of deliveries made by Petron to PFGI. As a consequence of these deliveries of Petron to PFGI, PFGI pays Petron for the said deliveries as evidenced by the cash vouchers bearing the name of Petron in the "paid to" portion.

xxx xxx xxx

It appears however that the cash payments by PFGI and collected by accused never found its way to Petron which then initiated the herein charge for qualified theft against accused. If PFGI were in fact damaged and prejudiced by the acts of the accused, PFGI would then have filed the charges against the accused. But PFGI did not initiate any charge and instead, it was Petron which pursued the indictment against the accused who collected the cash payments by PFGI and did not turn over his cash collections to Petron. As accused appears to be an employee of Petron, his receipt of cash from PFGI is only considered material possession thereof and cannot be juridical possession.

Considering both the testimonial and documentary evidence by the prosecution, the Court finds the same as sufficient to sustain the charge for qualified theft against the accused. 61 HSAcaE

Judge Jurado, Jr., denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and no petition for certiorari was filed. Petitioner did not present any evidence or new argument; the allegations in his memorandum were virtually identical with those in his demurrer.

Inexplicably, in the judgment of acquittal, Judge Jurado, Jr., adopted petitioner's defenses hook, line, and sinker. The lone paragraph supporting the acquittal reads:

The Court, meticulously scrutinized the evidence for the prosecution and of the testimony of the witnesses. It appears to the mind of the court that the Philippine Fishing Gear Incorporation (PFGI) was the one who entrusted the money to Temporal. Further, prosecution's witness, Ma. Cristina Andal, testified that Petron did not have a seller-buyer relationship with Philippine Fishing Gear (PFGI), * hence, the money still belongs to PFGI. Furthermore, there was no official receipt issued by the accused evidencing payment in favor of Petron and neither was the prosecution able to produce a receipt because there really was none. And it is basic that an official receipt is evidence of receipt of money. The circumstances depicted by the evidence and the testimony of the said witness therefore show that there was no grave abuse of confidence. There was no property unlawfully taken from complainant Petron. Consequently, there is no crime of qualified the theft. 62

* Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from official document. "Philippine Fishing Gear (PFGI)" should be "Philippine Fishing Gear Incorporation (PFGI)".

When a demurrer is filed, the court evaluates whether the evidence is sufficient to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 63 Hence, as aptly ruled by the CA, the denial of the demurrer meant that the prosecution's evidence would sustain a verdict of guilt, unless the accused presents evidence to rebut the same. 64 Since petitioner did not present any new argument or evidence, it stands to reason that he should have been convicted of the crime charged.

While the court has the inherent power to reverse itself, 65 this power should be exercised conscientiously. It must he shown that the reversal is necessary to make the decision conform to law and justice, to correct an error or mistake, or to prevent injustice to a litigant. 66 Unjustified flip-flopping unduly impairs the credibility and reliability of the courts.

Here, Judge Jurado, Jr., did not cite any compelling reason to reverse his earlier ruling. His volte-face is whimsical and amounts to grave abuse of discretion.

Moreover, although the RTC Decision enumerated the pieces of evidence offered by the prosecution, these were not considered in the judgment. The lower court fully adopted petitioner's arguments and only relied on the portions of the record cited by petitioner. Judge Jurado, Jr., ignored the testimonies and documents contradicting petitioner's defenses. Blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of the People's right to due process. 67

The CA correctly found petitioner

The conclusions arrived at by Judge Jurado, Jr., starkly contrast with the undisputed facts on record, all of which point to a conviction for qualified theft.

For qualified theft to be committed, the following elements must concur: (1) taking of personal property; (2) that the said property belongs to another; (3) that the said taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that it be done without the owner's consent; (5) that it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (6) that it be done with grave abuse of confidence. 68

As to the first element, petitioner never denied that he took the money. The cash payments were personally handed to petitioner by prosecution witness Collado. 69 In Collado's presence, petitioner signed cash vouchers acknowledging receipt of the amounts indicated. 70 Thus, petitioner's claim. that no one saw him take the money was controverted by Collado's testimony. When his superior questioned him about the anomalous transactions, petitioner admitted that he took the money. 71

Further, in two letters sent by petitioner to Petron, 72 he admitted that he appropriated cash collections from PFGI. These letters were admitted by the RTC over petitioner's objection due to confidentiality. 73 Petitioner no longer challenged this ruling. At any rate, a voluntary party admission in a letter, made spontaneously and outside the context of a custodial investigation, is not an extrajudicial confession requiring assistance of counsel and execution under oath. 74 HESIcT

Regarding the second element, the cash belonged to Petron. The cash vouchers reference the corresponding sales invoices and purchases from Petron. 75 The vouchers indicate that they were "paid to" Petron for the delivery of petroleum products. 76

Petitioner claims that the money was PFGI's because of the "ship-to" arrangement; there was no privity of contract between Petron and PFGI. 77 This argument is untenable. The absence of a separate PFGI sales account in Petron's internal system is not determinative of the contract between PFGI and Petron. The unrefuted fact is Petron agreed to supply products to PFGI, which undertook to pay for these deliveries. Regardless of who has a sales account with or obligation to pay Petron — Lunar Steel or PFGI — it was undeniable that the money was payable to no other entity than Petron.

It was also absurd to anchor the acquittal on the absence of official receipts showing the remittance of money to Petron, 78 when it was established that the cash was never received by Petron. This is precisely the reason why Petron filed a criminal complaint against petitioner.

Relatedly, petitioner's claim that he had juridical possession of the money is unmeritorious. 79 He received the cash as Petron's ASE. Money received by an employee on behalf of the employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. 80

The third, fourth, and fifth elements were likewise present. Petitioner's intent to gain was proved through witness Collado, who testified that petitioner persuaded PFGI to pay in cash. This scheme enabled petitioner to pocket the money and conceal the taking. The taking was done without Petron's consent, and no violence, intimidation, or force attended the taking, because the payments were voluntarily given by witness Collado.

Lastly, petitioner committed the crime with grave abuse of confidence. As Petron's ASE, petitioner was tasked to collect and remit payments to Petron; thus, be bad access to the funds of Petron's clients. 81 Petitioner argues that he had no free access to the money since be bad no authority to receive cash payments. This defense is unmeritorious and seeks to incentivize wrongdoing. Regardless of whether he bad authority to receive cash or not, it was clear that petitioner was able to take and appropriate cash because of his position as ASE.

Given the foregoing, We find that the judgment of acquittal is contradicted by the records and tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is inapplicable.

Nonetheless, We rule that petitioner may only be held liable for thirty-two (32) counts of qualified theft. There is a variance between the total sum of money alleged in the Informations (Php7,475,959.96) and the amount alleged and proved during trial (Php6,621,959.96). Based on the reconciliation report prepared by prosecution witness Caparas, 82 the amounts subject of Criminal Case Nos. 08-262457, 08-262467, 08-262468, and 08262470 83 were paid by checks, remitted to Petron, or cannot be traced in Petron's system. 84 There is no evidence that petitioner took these sums of money. Deducting the four (4) amounts would yield the total of Php6,621,959.96. This is consistent with the allegations and evidence of the prosecution that the amount not remitted by petitioner was Php6,621,959.96. 85 Hence, petitioner is only liable for thirty-two (32) counts of qualified theft.

Penalties and monetary awards

The CA imposed thirty-six (36) penalties of reclusion perpetua for thirty-six (36) counts of qualified theft. 86 It then applied Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code and ruled that the maximum period of imprisonment should be forty (40) years.

We modify the computation of penalties.

In theft, the penalty depends on the value of the stolen property. 87 As amended by Republic Act No. 10951, Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods if the value of the stolen property is more than Php20,000.00 but does not exceed Php600,000.00. All the amounts involved in this case fall within said range. In view of Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, each count of qualified theft has a penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be prision correccional in its maximum. period to prision mayor in its minimum period, or four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day to eight (8) years. The maximum term of the penalty is prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods, or eight (8) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Since there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. 88 Thus, for each count of qualified theft, petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, as maximum. In the service of his sentences, petitioner shall be entitled to the benefit of the three (3)-fold rule and the forty (40)-year limit in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

The CA's Decision is further modified to include an award of actual damages in the amount of Php6,621,959.96, representing the amounts proved to have been taken by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 December 2015 and Resolution dated 12 December 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 140064 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Juan Francisco N. Temporal is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of thirty-two (32) counts of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code. For each count, petitioner is SENTENCED to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, as maximum. The penalties shall be served by petitioner successively, subject to the three (3)-fold rule and the forty (40)-year limit under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accordingly, petitioner is ORDERED to pay private complainant Petron Corporation Six Million Six Hundred Twenty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-Nine Pesos and Ninety-Six Centavos (Php6,621,959.96) as actual damages, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) 89 per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.

On the other hand, petitioner is ACQUITTED of the charges in Criminal Case Nos. 08-262457, 08-262467, 08-262468, and 08-262470 for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED." (Carandang, J., no part, due to her prior participation in the Court of Appeals; Hernando, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated September 29, 2021.) ICHDca

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 9-47.

2. Id. at 49-64; penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez (now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (now also a Member of this Court) and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez of the Third Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3. Id. at 67-73.

4. Id. at 83-95; penned by Presiding Judge Cicero D. Jurado, Jr.

5. Id. at 126-197.

6. Id. at 196.

7. Id. at 50-51.

8. Id. at 784.

9. Id. at 780.

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. Id. at 780-781.

13. Id. at 781.

14. Id.

15. Id.

16. Id.

17. Id.

18. Id.

19. Id.

20. Id.

21. Id. at 96.

22. Id. at 782.

23. Id.

24. Id. at 782; Unapplied credits were defined as account pre-payments, sales discounts, or overpayments that have not yet been applied against any particular invoice. By Petron's policy, unapplied credits may only be used and applied by a customer for its own purchases.

25. Id.

26. Id. at 11-21, 737-749.

27. Id. at 18.

28. Id. at 561.

29. Id. at 559-561.

30. Id. at 562-563.

31. Id. at 563.

32. Id. at 564.

33. Id. at 571-573.

34. Id. at 586.

35. Id. at 587-589.

36. Id. at 95.

37. Id.

38. Id.

39. Id. at 64.

40. Id. at 59.

41. Id. at 61.

42. Id. at 63.

43. Id. at 67-73.

44. Id. at 751.

45. Id. at 754.

46. Id. at 789-794.

47. Gomez v. People, G.R. No. 216824, 10 November 2020 [Per J. Gesmundo].

48. Id.

49. People v. De Grano, 606 Phil. 547 (2009), G.R. No. 167710, 05 June 2009 [Per J. Peralta]; See Gomez v. People, G.R. No. 216824, 10 November 2020 [Per J. Gesmundo].

50. Gomez v. People, id.

51. People v. Sandiganbayan, 426 Phil. 453 (2002), G.R. No. 140633, 04 February 2002 [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez]; People v. De Grano, supra note 49.

52. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

53. See People v. Uy, 508 Phil. 637 (2005), G.R. No. 158157, 30 September 2005 [Per J. Carpio-Morales]; Gomez v. People, supra note 48; People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 233557-67, 19 June 2019 [Per J. Reyes, Jr.].

54. See People v. De Grano, supra note 49.

55. See Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670, 12 September 1986 [Per J. Teehankee].

56. See People v. Court of Appeals, 755 Phil. 80 (2015), G.R. No. 183652, 25 February 2015 [Per J. Peralta].

57. Rollo, p. 61.

58. Id. at 757.

59. Id. at 764-770.

60. Cruz v. People, 812 Phil. 166 (2017), G.R. No. 224974, 03 July 2017 [Per J. Leonen].

61. Rollo, p. 572.

62. Id. at 95.

63. People v. Go, 740 Phil. 583 (2014), G.R. No. 191015, 06 August 2014 [Per J. Del Castillo].

64. Te v. Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 127 (2000), G.R. No. 126746, 29 November 2000 [Per J. Kapunan].

65. Republic v. Gingoyon, 514 Phil. 657 (2005), G.R. No. 166429, 19 December 2005 [Per J. Tinga].

66. See Astraquillo v. Javier, 121 Phil. 138 (1965), G.R. No. L-20034, 30 January 1965 [Per J. Reyes, J.B.L.].

67. People v. Court of Appeals, 755 Phil. 80 (2015), G.R. No. 183652, 25 February 2015 [Per J. Peralta].

68. People v. Mejares, 823 Phil. 459 (2018), G.R. No. 225735, 10 January 2018 [Per J. Leonen].

69. Rollo, p. 340; TSN dated 23 February 2012, p. 21.

70. Id. at 479-555; Exhs. "A-44-2" to "A-79-2-A."

71. Id. at 263-265; TSN dated 10 January 2011, pp. 13-15.

72. Id. at 472-473; The pertinent portions of the 07 June 2007 letter read:

This letter shall be held in strictest confidence and shall not be used other than to serve as basis for settlement of my unremitted collections with Petron Corporation. This is to admit that I have failed to remit an estimated MMP8 to MMP10 worth of payments by Philippine Fishing Gear, Inc. (PFGI) intended for its purchases of fuel from Petron Corporation.

x x x In January 2005, PFGI made an offer to pay its purchases on cold cash and would not want to be issued Cash Receipts for tax purposes. Since the amount would immediately soften my financial difficulties at that time. I decided not to remit these payments. Within that same period, my marriage was shaky and in order to save the marriage, I used the money. This proved to be a futile exercise as we parted ways later that year. By that time, the damage was already too big for me to overcome (around MMP6).

In October 2006, another disaster hit us. A fire broke out in the apartment next to ours. All our things were damaged. At the same time, one of my colleagues resigned and I took over Sales Area 1-03. Business ties with PFGI resumed at this time, with the immediate need for a shelter for my family, I again fell into the temptation of not remitting PFGI payments. I managed to buy and build a house in Novaliches Q.C. with these payments. Again, to cover up these non-payments, I transferred legitimate credit balances of various customers to offset the non-payments.

My conscience has bothered me for almost two years now and I could no longer bear it. My son is growing up fast and is beginning to idolize me as a father and I could not stomach the fact that the money used for our daily sustenance was made out of bad intentions. I deeply regret having to do all these inconveniences. I plan to sell the properties, assets I have bought and the proceeds giving it back to Petron where it really belongs. I know it may take some time to fully settle all the money I took but I am willing to correct my mistakes by returning it all back in the most realistic way possible.

I deeply apologize for the wrong-doings I have done. My weakest state in life came at a point wherein the opportunity for temptation was great. I chose to be tempted and I know that the right thing to do is to admit these mistakes and face its consequences. x x x

Id. at 474; The pertinent portions of the 19 June 2007 letter read:

This letter is in response to the EM300 served to me last June 15, 2007. First and foremost, again, I would like to apologize for the wrongdoings I have done over the span of three years. I know that my apologies would not be enough to repay the damage brought about to Petron Corporation but then again, my sincerest apologies.

xxx xxx xxx

As part of the reconciliation process, I have come forward regarding these anomalies because I firmly believe that this is the right thing to do. The process of settling the arrears is my utmost priority right now for this would give back to Petron what is due to them. I have no plans of going away nor creating things that would further subject Petron regarding this case. I plan and eager to settle Petron up to the last centavo of the money I took. x x x

73. Id. at 94.

74. See People v. Garcia Cristobal, 662 Phil. 164 (2011), G.R. No. 159450, 30 March 2011 [Per J. Bersamin].

75. Rollo, pp. 417-418; TSN dated 25 October 2012, pp. 22-23.

76. Id. at 479-555; Exhs. "A-44-2" to "A-79-2-A."

77. Id. at 765.

78. Id. at 95.

79. Id. at 768.

80. Libunao v. People, G.R. No. 194359, 02 September 2020 [Per J. Carandang].

81. Cariaga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143561, 06 June 2001 [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes].

82. Rollo, pp. 470-471; Exhibit "B."

83. The total is Php854,000.00.

84. Rollo, p. 414; TSN dated 25 October 2012, pp. 19-20.

85. Rollo, pp. 422-423.

86. Id. at 64.

87. People v. Mejares, 823 Phil. 459 (2018), G.R. No. 225753, 10 January 2018 [Per J. Leonen].

88. Paragraph 1, Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.

89. Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta].