Tejedo v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 162344. June 2, 2014.]

JONATHAN L. TEJEDO, petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 2, 2014 which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 162344 — JONATHAN L. TEJEDO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

On October 11, 2000, the Regional Trial Court in Baguio City (RTC) convicted petitioner of homicide for the killing of Leobert Paca-o, a 16-year old dentistry student of the University of Baguio, by hitting the victim with his taxicab. 1 On October 21, 2003, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction. 2 Hence, this appeal by petitioner.

The information filed on November 27, 1998 charged petitioner with murder, to wit:

That or on about the 22nd day of September 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the driver and person in charge of a motor vehicle bearing Plate No. UTG 783, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, with the use of a motor vehicle, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously hit and bump and run over LEOBERT PACA-O, thereby inflicting upon the latter hypovolemic shock due to massive hemorrhage; chest and abdominal crushing injury as a result of a vehicular accident, as a result of which the said Leobert Paca-o died. EcTIDA

The commission of the offense is qualified by evident premeditation and treacher(y) in that the accused attacked the deceased with the use of a motor vehicle from behind adopting the mode of attack to ensure that the deceased cannot put up a defense.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Petitioner, who was arrested only on August 10, 1999, 4 pleaded not guilty to the information on August 23, 1999. 5

Prosecution witness Harold Lising, a 19-year old student then residing at No. 32 Bokaneg Street, Baguio City, was standing at around 9:00 p.m. of September 22, 1998 on the porch on the second floor of the house that directly overlooked the intersection of Bukaneg Street and Legarda Road and its vicinity trying to relax and to breathe fresh air while waiting for the arrival of a friend when a taxicab drew near to the intersection. He saw the passenger alight and run towards the intersection, but the taxicab driver accelerated his vehicle and hit and bumped the passenger with such force that the impact threw the passenger to the ground. 6 The taxicab driver then moved his vehicle backwards and stopped near the body of the passenger already lying on the road gravely wounded with his left leg broken on top of his stomach. ScTIAH

Upon seeing the event, Harold rushed out of the house to go to the succor of the victim. He saw the driver who was standing near the victim, holding his bleeding neck with his hand. Near the victim was a knife and some paper bills and coins. The driver told Harold that he had been held up by the victim, and that he bumped the victim after he had alighted from the vehicle. Seeing that the neck of the driver was bleeding, Harold told him to board his taxicab so that he (Harold) would drive him to the hospital for treatment. With the driver on board, Harold drove the vehicle towards the direction of Baguio General Hospital on Marcos Highway passing through Legarda Road. The driver changed his mind as they neared the intersection of Legarda Road and General Lim Street, and instead told Harold to go back to the scene of the incident, explaining that the police might believe that he had run away from the scene. Harold turned the vehicle around and returned to the scene. Upon the arrival of the police investigator, the driver admitted bumping the victim, who was then still lying on the road, saying that he had done so because the victim had held him up at knifepoint and had slashed his neck after getting his money.

Meantime, a bystander picked up the knife near where the victim had fallen, and gave it to the police investigator. The responding police told the driver to have his wound in the neck treated in the hospital. The driver rode on his taxicab to the hospital driven by a certain Calderon. It was the police who brought the victim to the Baguio General Hospital in their mobile car.

While being treated, the driver admitted to Dr. Israel Yasay that the victim, who was then being attended to by the other doctors in the Emergency Room, had held him up and had slashed his neck with a knife. He declared that upon alighting from the taxicab, he had pursued the victim and bumped him with his vehicle. Ultimately, the victim expired at the hospital. The driver was soon identified as petitioner Jonathan L. Tejedo, and the victim as Leobert Paca-o.

The post-mortem examination conducted by Medico-Legal Officer Dr. John Tinoyan on the cadaver of Leobert showed that he had died from "hypovolemic shock due to massive hemorrhage. Chest and abdominal crushing injury. Vehicular accident." 7 Dr. Tinoyan attested that the abrasions and wounds of Leobert indicated that he had been bumped on the right side; 8 and that the victim had not been run over based on the absence of tire marks on his body. 9DEHaAS

The knife retrieved from the scene was submitted for serological examination to determine the presence of human blood. 10 In his report, Dr. Vladimir Villaseñor, Medico-Legal Officer and Regional Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Cordillera Administrative Region, certified that the knife gave a negative result. 11 However, he clarified that traces of blood would be negative if the knife had been cleaned or wiped, 12 or if the knife had not been properly preserved, or if the examination had been conducted six days after the incident involving the knife. 13

In his defense, petitioner denied the accusation, insisting that he had instead been the victim.

Petitioner interposed that Leobert's death had been purely accidental. He recalled that Leobert had flagged his taxicab along Magsaysay Road; that Leobert had sat in the center of the rear, directing him to go to General Luna Street, but during the trip had changed his mind and had re-directed him to General Lim Street instead, giving the instructions on the way; that upon approaching General Lim Street, he had asked Leobert where he wanted to be dropped off, but the latter had shouted back and told him to just keep driving and not to ask too many questions; that upon reaching the NS Buendia Realty compound near the intersection of General Lim Street and Legarda Road and in the ascending direction, Leobert had suddenly grabbed his neck from behind, poked a knife to the right side of his neck and announced a hold-up; that he had tried to make a distress signal to an oncoming vehicle but Leobert had threatened to kill him; that Leobert had demanded his earnings, and he had handed them to Leobert; that as he alighted from the taxicab, Leobert had slashed his neck; that to prevent Leobert from escaping, he had accelerated the taxicab and had continuously pressed his horn; that he had to briefly stop doing so and had simply pretended to be dead because Leobert had looked back towards him; that because Leobert had then disappeared from his view, he had driven his taxicab slowly towards the intersection of General Lim Street and Legarda Road when Leobert had suddenly appeared on his left side and tried to grab him from the driver's side, forcing him to steer the taxicab to the opposite direction in the direction of Bokaneg Street; that Leobert had run after the taxicab, overtaking it from the left side near the Coffee Haven because his taxicab had still been on handbrake all the time from General Lim Street; that he had then tried to maneuver his taxicab at a curve at the intersection of Legarda Road and Bokaneg Street by swerving to the left, but in doing so he had not noticed that Leobert had been also going in that direction; that he had then heard a sound (blag);that thereafter he had spotted Leobert on the ground through his side mirror; and that he had moved his taxicab back and stopped in front of the house where Lising had come from. HcSaAD

Petitioner denied telling Dr. Yasay at the Emergency Room that he had intentionally bumped Leobert, explaining that all that he had said was that he had already been put in a situation about which he could not do anything anymore (Naipit na ako sa sitwasyon, wala na akong nagawa);14 and that his statement had been taken out of context, pointing out that he had not been able to avoid hitting Leobert who had blocked his path as he was turning his vehicle back. 15

Corroborating petitioner's recollection were Regino Ortañez David and Renato Banzon who remembered that they had been on board the former's car travelling along Legarda Road bound for Cholo's when they saw a stationary taxicab with its headlight on in the ascending direction of General Lim Street; that as they passed by the taxicab from the opposite direction, they had seen petitioner's hand motioning for help, 16 and the holdupper had held his neck from behind with a knife; 17 that David had then turned back to help, but as he maneuvered the car, the holdupper had alighted from the taxicab and had hurriedly ran towards Legarda Road going down to Coffee Haven with the taxicab following him 18 in a speeding manner; 19 that they had come across the taxicab only at Bokaneg Street parked with its headlights on and facing Legarda Road; 20 that getting down from their car, they had seen the same person who had alighted from the taxicab already on the ground severely injured; 21 that petitioner had then approached telling them that he could not do anything more and had showed his wound on the neck; 22 that two taxi drivers had then stopped by and had kicked the victim; 23 and that Lising had then come down from his house in front of Bokaneg Street to see what had happened, after which David had proceeded to the police station to report the incident. 24

Ruling of the RTC

In its decision dated October 11, 2000, 25 the RTC convicted petitioner of homicide because there was no treachery and that the use of the taxicab was not a qualifying circumstance. It gave more credence to the Prosecution's version of the facts as narrated by Lising and corroborated by Dr. Tinoyan who had conducted the autopsy. It held that even in the absence of an eyewitness, petitioner's admission that his taxicab had hit and bumped Leobert was admissible against him; that the testimony of Dr. Yasay about what petitioner had told him at the Emergency Room on the night of the incident was admissible as part of res gestae;that petitioner's claim of self-defense, pointing out that the unlawful aggression had been started by Leobert, had ceased at the moment he had gotten out of the taxicab to run away; that the killing could not be accidental because petitioner's intent to retaliate had been very apparent; that petitioner had in his favor the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of Leobert; and that as to civil damages, petitioner should pay the heirs of Leobert the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death as well as actual and moral damages. It disposed as follows: ISCcAT

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Jonathan Tejedo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, instead of Murder as charged in the Information, and hereby sentence him, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal medium as maximum; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Leobert Paca-o the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death, P63,500.00 as actual damages, and P300,000.00 as moral damages for the pain and anguish suffered by the heirs as a result of his death, all indemnifications are without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The accused Jonathan Tejedo, being a detention prisoner, is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED. 26

Petitioner filed an application for bail, 27 which the RTC granted on October 24, 2000 conditioned on the posting of a bond of P100,000.00 pending his appeal. 28 He was provisionally released on October 27, 2000. 29ACcHIa

Judgment of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction but deleted the award of moral damages on the ground that petitioner had himself been the victim of the robbery perpetrated by Leobert who had also tried to kill him, viz.:

The importance of physical evidence has been emphasized by the trial court in the determination of appellant's guilt in the instant case. Noting that the physical evidence on record runs counter to appellant's version, the trial court correctly rejected the "self-defense and/or accident" theory. The victim Leobert Paca-o was thrown to a considerable distance of seven (7) meters after he was bumped by appellant's taxi cab. He sustained broken ribs and limbs as a result thereof. The physical evidence is clearly inconsistent with the allegation of appellant that he accidentally bumped Leobert Paca-o when he was to make a U-turn. It is, however, consistent with the testimony of eyewitness Harold Lising that appellant pursued and bumped the victim at full speed.

The significance of physical evidence in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused is paramount. Physical evidence are mute but eloquent manifestations of truth and they rate high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. Thus, where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, conclusions as to physical evidence should prevail.

We find no reason to reverse the trial court. Factual findings of trial courts, particularly the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, are accorded much weight and the higher respect on appeal. Trial courts have the opportunity to observe first hand the demeanor and conduct of witnesses and examine other proofs as we, thus, they are better situated to form accurate impressions and conclusions. caHASI

Appellant insists that the bumping incident that took place on that fateful night of September 22, 1998 happened accidentally in the course of his making a preparatory right-turn for a U-turn to avoid the victim who was allegedly armed with a knife in pursuit of him.

By pleading the exempting circumstance of accident, appellant had the burden to prove to the satisfaction of the court this circumstance in order to avoid criminal liability. It is incumbent upon him to show that the bumping was not intentional, relying on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's. If such evidence is of doubtful veracity, and it is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail.

In order that accident may exempt an accused from criminal liability, it must be shown that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care; the resulting injury was caused by a mere accident; and there must be no fault or intent to cause the injury on the part of the accused. Which the appellant has not shown in the instant case.

All the given facts considered, the finding of the trial court that simple homicide was committed should be affirmed, there being no proof of evident premeditation or treachery, and the use of motor vehicle was cancelled out in the information as a qualifying circumstance.

However, the award of moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00 should be deleted as it is downright farcical to hold the appellant liable for such damages when he himself was a victim of the hold-up perpetrated by the deceased who even attempted to do him in.

WHEREFORE,the Court hereby AFFIRMS the appealed decision, subject to the MODIFICATION as hereinabove indicated.

SO ORDERED.30CaSAcH

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied through the resolution promulgated on February 13, 2004. 31

Issues

In his appeal, petitioner submits that the CA erred in: (a) rendering the appealed decision by according undue credibility to the testimony of lone eyewitness, Harold Lising, and Dr. Israel Yasay as to what he had allegedly heard at the Emergency Room; (b) failing to consider certain facts and circumstances borne by evidence that negate criminal liability of the accused; and (c) finding petitioner guilty of homicide despite reasonable doubt upon considering the totality of facts and circumstances that negated the conviction. 32DcHSEa

Ruling

The petition for review lacks merit.

Petitioner harps on the credibility of the adverse witnesses, contending that their testimonies were replete with inconsistencies and were contrary to the medico-legal findings of Dr. Tinoyan; that Lising contradicted himself after initially declaring the incident to be an accident but later on concluding that petitioner had intentionally bumped Leobert; that Lising's self-contradiction was only because he had heard the screeching of the tires of the taxicab; that Dr. Yasay's testimony that petitioner told him that he had bumped and pinned Leobert to the wall as well as Lising's claim that Leobert had been bumped from behind were contrary to the findings of Dr. Tinoyan during the autopsy; and that Dr. Yasay's testimony was not credible because of his poor recollection of the incident.

The Court is not convinced.

The well-settled rule is that in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would alter the result, the Court generally defers to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses especially if such evaluation was affirmed by the CA. This is so considering that the trial court was in the better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses itself, and having observed firsthand the deportment of the witnesses and their manner of testifying under grueling examination. 33

In People vs. Escleto,34 the Court had the occasion to enunciate some guides on the assessment of credibility, as follows: HDCAaS

When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules, some of which are that "(1) the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness.

The Court considers this case as no exception to authorize a departure from the foregoing guides. Petitioner presented no proof that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have differently affected the result. The Prosecution's lone eyewitness, Lising, was frank throughout his direct examination and remained consistent on cross-examination. The inconsistencies between his testimony in open court and his sworn statement given to the investigators, if any, referred only to minor details or collateral matters, but the inconsistencies were not fatal as to justify the reversal of the conviction considering that the discrepancies did not necessarily discredit the witnesses. Indeed, a sworn statement or affidavit did not purport to contain the complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant. 35cSTDIC

Lising's testimony was consistent with the findings of Dr. Tinoyan. Although the latter's post-mortem examination revealed that Leobert had been hit on the right side and that he had been facing right while the vehicle had been perpendicular and had been possibly approaching from his right side, the divergence as to the point of impact could be attributed to Lising's location when he had witnessed the event from the veranda on the second floor of his house. Besides, such detail did not detract from the fact that petitioner had run after and bumped Leobert with his taxicab. Thus, the trial court rightly held that "there is no reason therefore not to give credence and weight to the eyewitness account of Harold Lising considering that he could really see what happened that time while on the porch of his house and his testimony is corroborated by the testimony of the doctor who conducted the autopsy." 36

Neither can the Court subscribe to petitioner's assertion that Leobert's death was accidental, and that he merely acted in self-defense. By invoking self-defense, or by claiming accident, he admitted causing the death of Leobert. The burden of evidence was then shifted to him, such that he must then prove his defense by clear and convincing evidence. 37TSCIEa

For self-defense to prosper, petitioner had to prove: (a) the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 38 Unlawful aggression by the victim was a condition sine qua non in order that self-defense could be appreciated as a justifying circumstance in his favor. However, the RTC correctly pointed out that Leobert's unlawful aggression had ceased upon Leobert's alighting from the taxicab to run away.

Petitioner did claim that the fleeing Leobert had gone back to attack him, but the CA rejected the claim as incredible and contrary to human experience, thusly:

The claim that Leobert, after he alighted from the taxi, reappeared to block the taxi with a knife is highly improbable. Leobert, outside the taxi being armed with a knife, is certainly no match against the accused who was inside the taxi driving it. A big vehicle being driven is a more powerful weapon compared to a small knife. A knife would be no match to the vehicle. The vehicle would be a bigger weapon as you can drive it to ram the person on the road as what happened here. So it is highly improbable and unbelievable that Leobert would reappear as claimed by the accused after he already alighted from the taxi and run away and disappeared. This would be contrary to human experience and unnatural. Common sense tells us that a person who has already run away from his crime and misdeed would not go back that same occasion and expose himself to being identified, apprehended and retribution. 39

Accordingly, without unlawful aggression, petitioner's claim of self-defense cannot stand. cSDIHT

Similarly, petitioner cannot relieve himself of liability by invoking accident as a defense. As an exempting circumstance under Article 12 (4) of the Revised Penal Code,accident contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor — an accidental result flowing out of a legal act. 40 Having ruled that self-defense was not present, however, the Court cannot say that petitioner was performing a lawful act when the bumping occurred.

The Court is in accord with the RTC and the CA in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of Leobert. Sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity. 41 Verily, Leobert's act could not be considered as unlawful aggression for the purpose of raising self-defense, but it can constitute sufficient provocation for the purpose of mitigating the crime. ADaSEH

Accordingly, with the Prosecution having sufficiently established the criminal responsibility of petitioner for the death of Leobert, he was properly convicted of homicide. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal,which ranges from 12 years and one day to 20 years. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation by the victim, the proper penalty is reclusion temporal in its minimum period, which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months, as maximum. Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is to be taken from prision mayor while the maximum from the minimum period of reclusion temporal. Consequently, the Court prescribes six years and one day of prision mayor,as minimum, to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This corrects the indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.

Leonila Paca-o, the mother of Leobert, submitted the service contract from the Baguio Memorial Chapels, Inc.,42 and her affidavit of expenses. 43 She averred that she had spent a total of P63,500.00 for his burial and funeral expenses, but did not present any receipts to support her averment except the service contract worth P18,500.00 for the funeral services rendered. 44 As a general rule, however, the Court awards only those actual damages duly supported by receipts. In People vs. Beltran, Jr.,45 the Court ruled that when actual damages proven by receipts during trial amounted to less than P25,000.00, like now, temperate damages of P25,000.00 were justified in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. The Court held that it would be anomalous and unfair to have the heirs of the victim who had tried and succeeded in proving actual damages get less than P25,000.00 than one who presented no receipts but would still be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages. In lieu of the actual damages, therefore, the Court grants to the heirs of Leobert P25,000.00 as temperate damages. DcaSIH

Also, the award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of allegation and proof other than the commission of the crime. Consequently, the larger amount of P75,000.00 is awarded as civil indemnity in lieu of only P50,000.00.

Although the CA deleted the moral damages awarded to the heirs of Leobert on the ground that "it is downright farcical to hold the appellant liable for such damages when he himself was a victim of the hold-up perpetrated by the deceased who even attempted to do him in," supra,the Court feels that the CA, in a desire to avoid inequity between petitioner and the departed Leobert, thereby erred upon a matter of law. The CA obviously forgot that moral damages were to be awarded to the heirs of Leobert for their mental anguish and moral sufferings by reason of his death. The injury that Leobert had himself inflicted on petitioner was not relevant except to mitigate his criminal liability. On the other hand, the heirs already held a vested right in the moral damages, from which the CA wrongly deprived them. Moral damages of P75,000.00 should be granted as the means to restore the heirs to their spiritual status quo ante.

Interest at the legal rate is imposed as part of the civil liability, 46 the reckoning being from the finality of this decision until full payment.

WHEREFORE,the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 21, 2003, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS,to wit: (a) petitioner Jonathan L. Tejedo is SENTENCED to suffer an INDETERMINATE SENTENCE OF SIX YEARS AND ONE DAY OF PRISION MAYOR,AS MINIMUM, TO 12 YEARS AND ONE DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL,AS MAXIMUM;and (b) the grant of actual damages of P63,500.00 is DELETED and, in its stead, petitioner is ORDERED to pay temperate damages of P25,000.00 to the heirs of Leobert Paca-o; (c) the amount fixed for civil indemnity is RAISED to P75,000.00; (d) the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages is GRANTED;and (e) interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment is IMPOSED on the civil liability. cITAaD

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court

Separate Opinions

SERENO, C.J.,concurring and dissenting:

With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, while I concur with the ponencia in upholding Petitioner Tejedo's conviction for the crime of homicide, I must make it of record that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of petitioner.

The ponencia opines that while Tejedo voluntarily submitted to the authorities, he did so in order to belie his guilt, as he believed he was innocent. I respectfully submit however, that the voluntariness of his submission to the authorities is not negated by the mere fact that Tejedo wanted to report the crime committed by the victim. HaSEcA

As the Court held in People v. Fontalba,1 a full-fledged confession is not an element of this mitigating circumstance, since voluntary submission to the authorities and voluntary confession of guilt before the court are two separate, independent circumstances.All that the law requires for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance are that the accused surrendered voluntarily, and he has not been actually arrested.

Records show that a prosecution witness testified that the accused immediately returned to the crime scene instead of going to the hospital because the latter "wanted to be the one to explain the incident to the police." 2 The findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) even support his claim: "Arriving back at the scene, the accused told the police that he was the one who drove the taxi that bumped the man lying on the road."3

Even more significant is that Tejedo never denied his culpability, as shown by the testimony of the attending police officer when questioned by the trial court judge, viz.:

Q: And the other one with an injury on the neck who was holding his neck, you identified him at the scene of the crime itself, correct? ACETSa

A: The person holding his neck, we asked his name, sir.

Q: And the name that he gave you was Jonathan Tejedo, correct?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And he was also telling you that the person who was lying on the road was the person who held him up earlier, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And that is also the person he bumped after the robbery hold up, correct?

A: Correct, ma'am. 4

Yet another police officer, Jose Lopez, similarly testified:

Q: And what else happened that night?

A: And according to him (accused Tejedo),after his neck was slashed, he bumped the person who is lying in the middle of the road.5 (emphasis supplied)

Even more tellingly, prosecution witness Harold Lising recounted:

Q: And you said that your hands were bloodied because you held the wound on his (Tejedo's) neck, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And he was bleeding very badly, correct?

A: Yes. cHEATI

Q: That is the reason why you asked him to board the taxicab when you drove him to the nearest hospital, correct?

A: I drove him to General Lim Street and we returned.

Q: With the intention of going to the hospital?

A: Yes.

Q: And you said that Jonathan Tejedo told you to return back to Bokaneg Street because the police might think he had killed the person lying on the ground, correct?

A: Yes.6 (emphasis supplied)

Thus, the admission of culpability satisfies the requirement for voluntary surrender to be credited as a mitigating circumstance. To rule otherwise would be to require an additional element: that the accused's state of mind was that of full acceptance of criminal liability without regard for the legal defenses that may be availed. In claiming self-defense, Tejedo was merely exercising his right as an accused in a criminal case.

This claim of self-defense, however, does not eclipse his act of voluntarily surrendering to the police. As gleaned from his own testimony: "Harold Lising came to me and said they will bring me to the hospital but I told him that I am going to wait first the policemen to come (sic) and again he insisted that I be brought to the hospital because I was bleeding." 7

In claiming self-defense, Tejedo effectively admitted committing the crime charged. The mere fact that he invoked certain circumstances that would negate his guilt should not be taken against him, as that is his right as an accused. In sum, to refuse to acknowledge the additional mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is to send the wrong message that it would have been better for Tejedo to have completely fled the scene of the crime. This is not the message that the Court should be sending. ICTaEH

Therefore, I humbly submit to my colleagues that the additional mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be credited in favour of the accused, and that a corresponding recomputation of the maximum penalty be done, so as to take into account his act of voluntary surrender.

Footnotes

1. Rollo,pp. 92-109.

2. Id. at 59-72; penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. (retired/deceased),with Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga (retired) and Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (now a Member of the Court) concurring.

3. Records, p. 1.

4. Id. at 27.

5. Id. at 33.

6. TSN, December 21, 1999, pp. 42-43.

7. Exhibit "B",Folder of Documentary Exhibits, p. 2.

8. TSN, November 15, 1999, p. 6.

9. Id. at 11-12.

10. Exhibit "L",Folder of Documentary Exhibits, p. 8.

11. Exhibit "N",id. at 9.

12. TSN, January 19, 2000, p. 6.

13. Id. at 11-12.

14. TSN, June 16, 2000, p. 6; July 6, 2000, p. 7; July 7, 2000, p. 8.

15. TSN, June 16, 2000, p. 6.

16. TSN, March 10, 2000, p. 8.

17. Id. at 10.

18. TSN, March 10, 2000, pp. 11, 13.

19. TSN, May 19, 2000, pp. 17, 19.

20. TSN, May 12, 2000, p. 14; May 19, 2000, pp. 21-23.

21. TSN, March 10, 2000, p. 16.

22. TSN, May 12, 2000, p. 16.

23. TSN, March 10, 2000, p. 20.

24. TSN, March 10, 2000, p. 22; May 12, 2000, pp. 20-22.

25. Supra note 1.

26. Id. at 108.

27. Records, pp. 213-214.

28. Id. at 218.

29. Id. at 226.

30. Supra note 2, at 69-71.

31. Rollo,pp. 78-79.

32. Id. at 25.

33. People v. Malicdem,G.R. No. 184601, November 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 193, 201.

34. G.R. No. 183706, April 25, 2012, 671 SCRA 149, 155-156.

35. Decasa v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 172184, July 10, 2007, 527 SCRA 267, 280.

36. Records, p. 203.

37. Toledo v. People,G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004, 439 SCRA 94, 104.

38. Article 11 (1), Revised Penal Code.

39. Records, pp. 205-206.

40. Talampas v. People,G.R. No. 180219, November 23, 2011, 661 SCRA 197, 202-203.

41. Gotis v. People,G.R. No. 157201, September 14, 2007, 533 SCRA 441, 449.

42. Exhibit "I",Folder of Documentary Exhibits, p. 6.

43. Exhibit "H", id. at 5.

44. Exhibit "I",id. at 6.

45. G.R. No. 168051, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 715, 740-741.

46. Article 2211, Civil Code.

SERENO, C.J.,concurring and dissenting:

1. 61 Phil. 589 (1935).

2. Testimony of Renato Banzon, TSN, 12 May 2000, p. 22.

3. Rollo,p. 64.

4. Testimony of Bernardo Pagarigan, TSN, 6 December 1999, p. 8.

5. Testimony of SPO Jose Lopez, TSN, 9 December 1999, p. 13.

6. Testimony of Harold Lising, TSN, 21 December 1999, p. 36.

7. Testimony of Jonathan Tejedo, TSN, 15 June 2000, p. 23.