FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 208245. July 30, 2019.]
ARNOLD G. TECSON, petitioner, vs.BOOTS O. PRESTADO-TECSON, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 30, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 208245 (Arnold G. Tecson v. Boots O. Prestado-Tecson). — We resolve this petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions dated February 6, 2013 1 and April 29, 2013 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 128199 which denied due course and dismissed Arnold G. Tecson's (petitioner) petition to nullify the Order 3 dated January 2, 2013 of Branch 23, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Trece Martires City in Criminal Case No. TMCR-038-08. The RTC denied petitioner's twin motions to be allowed to temporarily leave the country and return to his overseas contractual work in the Middle East in view of the pendency of the criminal case against him and his required presence during the promulgation of the decision of the case.
In this case, We restate the rule that a pleading filed by ordinary mail or by private messengerial service is deemed filed on the day it is actually received by the court. 4
Petitioner and Boots O. Prestado-Tecson (respondent) are husband and wife. Respondent charged petitioner of physical abuse under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence against Women and their Children Act of 2004 before the RTC. The information stated that petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, pull the hair and squeeze the face of his wife x x x, thereby causing multiple hematoma and multiple abrasion in the different parts of her body that required medical attendance for a period of not less than fifteen (15) days and incapacitated her from customary labor for the same period of time." 5 The RTC issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner, which was recalled after he voluntarily surrendered and paid the necessary cash bond for his provisional liberty. It set petitioner's arraignment on April 14, 2008. 6 However, petitioner moved to set his arraignment on an earlier date, alleging that he has to return to his work as a CAD designer in Doha, Qatar by the fourth week of March 2008. 7 The RTC granted the motion. Petitioner was arraigned on March 17, 2008, to which he entered a plea of not guilty. 8 He left the Philippines for Qatar on March 28, 2008 via Gulf Airways. 9
Respondent filed a motion for issuance of hold departure order against petitioner. She prayed that a warrant of arrest be issued against petitioner for failure to inform the court of his departure from the country. In turn, petitioner's counsel argued that his client was already in Qatar, thus, the motion for issuance of hold departure order is already moot and academic. The RTC granted the motion in its Order dated May 5, 2008. 10 Accordingly, the Bureau of Immigration issued a Hold Departure Order against petitioner. 11
Meanwhile, the trial of the case ensued despite petitioner's absence. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense started the presentation of its evidence. Petitioner, on leave from his work in Qatar, testified during the October 12, 2012 hearing of the case. Prior to his appearance in court, he posted another cash bail bond upon his arrival in the Philippines. Consequently, the bench warrant for his arrest was lifted. Petitioner also filed an urgent motion for issuance of allow-departure order asking the RTC to allow him to depart and report back to his work after he testifies because his approved leave of absence from work is only until October 16, 2012. 12
Without resolving petitioner's motion, the RTC ordered that petitioner's cross-examination be set on December 10, 2012, the available date in the calendars of the court and the prosecutors. 13 This prompted petitioner to file a motion for leave and temporarily be out of the country until the next hearing to attend to his contractual commitment as senior designer in the infrastructure department of Qatar Petroleum. He stated that his failure to return to work within his approved leave of absence could result in the termination of his employment contract. He committed to regularly report his whereabouts while out of the Philippines. He further urged the court to impose such conditions allowed under the Rules of Court to assure his return in the country and his appearance in the trial of the case. 14
During the December 10, 2012 trial, the defense manifested that it had no other witness to present. It filed its formal offer of evidence on December 21, 2012.
On January 2, 2013, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's twin motions for allow-departure order and leave to temporarily be out of the country, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the pendency of the case and the required presence of the accused during promulgation of the decision, the Court hereby DENY the two (2) motions allowing the accused to depart from the country.
SO ORDERED. 15
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. In its first assailed Resolution, the CA denied to give due course to the petition and dismissed the case. The CA, quoting Silverio v. Court of Appeals (Silverio), 16 stated that the condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. 17 The CA held that petitioner's invocation of his right to travel and his right to property or means of livelihood cannot defeat the RTC's inherent authority to exercise jurisdiction over his person and to issue such orders necessary to keep such jurisdiction in full force and effect pending final termination of the case. Also, petitioner's right to be presumed innocent subsists and does not collide with the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over his person. 18
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA noted without any action. The CA found that the motion was filed six days beyond the reglementary period. Thus, in its second assailed Resolution, the CA declared that its earlier Resolution, dismissing the petition, is already final and executory; therefore, the case is deemed closed and terminated. 19
Petitioner is now before Us faulting the CA for applying Silverio in the case. He argues that in Silverio, the RTC granted the motion for issuance of a hold departure order because the accused had not yet been arraigned for more than two years since the filing of the information due to his non-appearance on the scheduled dates of arraignment; while in his case, he had already completed his testimony on direct and cross-examination and the defense had already formally offered its evidence. Petitioner stresses that he made a commitment under oath to return when ordered by the court, and that he is amenable to an increase of his bail bond. He insists that Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan20 should govern, where We held that to justify the continued restriction of the right of the accused to travel, there must be strong and compelling reasons for the same. He alleges that his presence during the promulgation of the decision does not qualify as a strong and compelling reason. More, for him to wait for the promulgation of the case indefinitely will result to the loss of his contractual employment, which is an infringement of his right to livelihood. 21
As regard the timeliness of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner avers that he filed it within the 15-day reglementary period.
We deny the petition.
The challenged Resolution dated February 6, 2013 of the CA had already attained finality in view of petitioner's belated filing of the motion for reconsideration. In his petition, petitioner alleged that he received the Resolution dated February 6, 2013 on March 11, 2013, thus, he had 15 days or until March 26, 2013 to move for reconsideration. He sent the motion for reconsideration to the CA on March 26, 2013 through commercial courier, LBC Express, Inc. (LBC). The CA received it the following day or on March 27, 2013 as evidenced by LBC's official receipt and certification. 22
Though filing of pleadings thru a private courier is not prohibited by the Rules of Court, it is established in jurisprudence that the date of actual receipt of pleadings by the court is deemed the date of filing of such pleadings, and not the date of delivery thereof to a private letter-forwarding agency. 23 Evidently, the motion for reconsideration in this case is considered filed in court only on March 27, 2013 — one day after the lapse of the reglementary period.
Further, the petition before Us is also rendered moot and academic by the conviction of the petitioner of the crime charged. In its Decision 24 dated October 10, 2013, the RTC sentenced the petitioner to the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period of six months and one day to two years and four months. Unless he is admitted to bail, petitioner must begin to serve his sentence immediately. 25
In any event, We rule that contrary to petitioner's claim, Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan26 does not apply in this case. There, we required strong and compelling reasons to justify the continued restriction on Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.'s right to travel abroad because the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him was invalid. Not so in the case of petitioner. The validity of the warrant of arrest against him was not put into issue. In fact, the Order for his arrest was merely lifted upon his posting of a cash bail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated February 6, 2013 and April 29, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 128199 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 9-11; penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles.
2.Id. at 13; penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and Zenaida T. Galapate-Laguilles.
3.Id. at 55; penned by Executive Judge Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr.
4.Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 172458, December 14, 2011, 662 SCRA 424, 433.
5.Rollo, p. 69.
6.Id. at 40.
7.Id. at 41-42.
8.Id. at 43.
9.Id. at 45. Note that per certification of the Bureau of Immigration, petitioner departed on March 28, 2008. However, in the petition for review on certiorari filed before us, petitioner stated that he left on March 18, 2008 (Id. at 23).
10.Id. at 46.
11.Id. at 47.
12.Id. at 25.
13.Id.
14.Rollo, pp. 50-53.
15.Id. at 55.
16. G.R. No. 94284, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 760.
17.Id. at 764.
18.Rollo, pp. 10-11.
19.Id. at 13.
20. G.R. No. 134307, December 21, 1998, 300 SCRA 367.
21.Rollo, pp. 30-31.
22.Id. at 32-33, 62-63.
23.Bautista v. Bautista, G.R. No. 202088, March 8, 2017, 820 SCRA 40, 49, citing Heirs of Numeriano Miranda, Sr. v. Miranda, July 8, 2013, 700 SCRA 746, 755 and Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra note 4 at 433-434.
24.Rollo, pp. 69-75.
25.Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615 SCRA 619, 628.
26.Supra note 20.