EN BANC
[A.M. No. RTJ-06-2016. March 23, 2009.](Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-2120-RTJ)
CORAZON R. TANJUATCO, complainant, vs. JUDGE IRENEO L. GAKO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Cebu City, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
VELASCO, JR., J p:
This administrative case stemmed from the sworn-complaint 1 dated September 24, 2004 of Corazon R. Tanjuatco filed with this Court, charging Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge Ireneo L. Gako, Jr., now retired, with Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment, Gross Partiality and/or Gross Ignorance in connection with a contract rescission case filed with respondent's court. DIHETS
By Resolution dated August 9, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the administrative complaint, which was earlier redocketed as a regular administrative matter, to Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Josefina Guevarra-Salonga for investigation, recommendation, and report. 2
From the complaint, respondent's comment thereon, with their respective annexes, and other documents on record, the Court gathers the following material facts:
Complainant's father, Vicente S. del Rosario (Vicente S.), and her brother, Pantaleon, co-owned eight (8) parcels of land located in Alumnus, Basak-San Nicolas, Cebu City, with an aggregate area of 21,000 square meters. Via a "Contract to Buy and Sell" dated August 23, 1985, 3 Vicente S. and Pantaleon, for PhP2,156,040, sold the property to the City of Cebu, for the latter's abattoir project. As agreed upon, the purchase price was to be deposited and to remain in escrow with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) until lot titles shall have been delivered to the city. Following the 1986 Edsa event, however, the newly-designated OIC-Mayor of Cebu City, John H. Osmeña, unilaterally stopped the construction of the abattoir.
On May 7, 1987, Vicente S. died, leaving behind the following heirs: his wife, Ceferina Urguiaga, and their eight (8) children, among whom are complainant, Pantaleon, and Carlos del Rosario.
Later developments saw Vicente S.'s heirs filing a petition for the partition of his estate. Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-17236 of the RTC of Cebu City, the petition, after several transfers, eventually landed in Branch 5 of the court, then presided by respondent judge. According to the respondent, he held "preliminary conferences among the heirs of Vicente S. . . . for the purpose of settling the case amicably." 4 The complainant, on the other hand, narrated that the respondent held several meetings in his chambers during the preliminary conferences. 5 Upon the heirs' motion, the respondent subsequently inhibited himself from handling the case.
At about the same time and based on the above narrated facts, Vicente B. del Rosario (Vicente B.), represented by his father, Pantaleon, filed a case against the City of Cebu for the rescission of the "Contract to Buy and Sell" covering the eight (8) lots adverted to. Docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-27334 and entitled Vicente B. del Rosario, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Pantaleon U. del Rosario v. City of Cebu, the complaint, with attachments, was raffled to the respondent's Branch 5. The complaint originally carried the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping signed by Pantaleon. The verification was subsequently replaced by another executed by Vicente B., the plaintiff, based on plaintiff's motion for leave to amend complaint. This motion recited that:
during the hearing [on] . . . July 3, 2002, this Honorable Court told this representation to amend the complaint because the verification/certification of non-forum shopping . . . should have been executed by plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario who is the real party in interest . . . and to allege that the amount deposited in escrow inclusive of interest accrued should be paid to plaintiff by way of rentals. 6
On February 26, 2003, Isidro and Michael Alain Reyes de Leon, heirs of Teresita de Leon, who in turn was Virgilio S.'s niece, moved to intervene in Civil Case No. CEB-27334, but the court denied the motion. 7
By decision dated May 28, 2004, respondent rescinded the contract in question and awarded the whole purchase price as rentals to Vicente B. The following events then transpired: (1) Carlos del Rosario interposed his own motion for intervention; (2) on August 13, 2004, the city of Cebu filed a notice of appeal with the RTC; 8 and (3) on September 8, 2004, Vicente B. moved for execution pending appeal, which the court granted conditioned upon his posting of a bond. 9
It is against the foregoing state of things that the complainant filed her complaint alleging, in gist, the following:
1. During the rescission case hearing on July 3, 2002, the respondent instructed Pantaleon's counsel to amend the complaint and to attach instead the verification of his son Vicente B., and to allege that the amount deposited on the escrow, exclusive of the interest accrued, should be paid to Vicente B. by way of rentals. Vicente B. was, therefore, made to appear as the plaintiff. By these actuations, the respondent was no longer acting as an impartial trier of facts. He was in fact lawyering for Pantaleon.
2. The respondent admitted the Amended Complaint despite the fact that Vicente B. failed to pay the appropriate filing fee for the additional relief sought in the complaint. ASHECD
3. On May 28, 2004, the respondent rendered judgment ordering contract rescission and awarding the purchase price therefor in escrow to Vicente B. as rentals, despite his knowledge that one-half of the subject property belongs to the estate of the deceased Vicente S. and was already within the jurisdiction and custody of the court handling the partition case.
4. The respondent issued an Order allowing execution pending appeal while the motion for intervention filed by Carlos del Rosario remained unresolved.
In his Comment, 10 respondent, inter alia, alleged that: his May 28, 2004 decision, far from being unjust, was based on the law and evidence and was in fact beneficial to complainant, Cebu City being ordered to return the eight (8) lots subject of the case; Carlos del Rosario's motion to intervene was filed only after the decision was rendered; he was not aware that four of the eight lots involved in Civil Case No. CEB-27334 were included in Civil Case No. CEN-17236 for partition; there was no need to implead the complainant as she and the other heirs could very well be represented by Pantaleon who owned four of the lots in question and is a co-owner of the other four; no damage was done to the complainant because the case is on appeal with the CA; the complainant did not move for intervention in the rescission case as an indispensable party; and the matter of plaintiff Virgilio B.'s non-payment of the filing fees was not brought to the court's attention. Apropos the allegation about his having instructed the plaintiff's counsel on what to do in the case, respondent countered that it is the court's duty, in the course of a hearing, to suggest to litigants and their counsels to follow the proper procedures so that cases be speedily resolved.
On September 20, 2006, respondent judge reached the compulsory retirement age of 70. The Court, however, ordered that the release of his retirement benefits be held in abeyance until the resolution of this administrative case and to hold these benefits available to answer for any monetary penalty that may be imposed.
Following due hearings, the Investigating Justice submitted on December 6, 2006 an investigation report. In it, she recommended that respondent judge be adjudged guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and grave misconduct in the performance of his duties and be meted the penalty of dismissal. She predicated her recommendation on the guilt of respondents on three (3) main premises, to wit: (1) respondent proceeded with the rescission case without impleading indispensable parties; (2) he "lawyered" for the plaintiff, thus betraying his partiality towards a party in a case; and (3) he denied and/or refused to act on the motion to intervene of an indispensable party. Here are some excerpts of the investigation report: DHATcE
Admittedly, respondent presided over the Partition Case, having held preliminary conferences . . . . The fact that he conducted conferences among the heirs of the deceased Vicente coupled by the fact that the Partition Case was filed by one of the heirs in defiance to the position of the other heirs respecting the settlement of the vast estate, would sufficiently serve notice to him that there is a severe conflict of interests among said heirs. Respondent judge may very well insist that he did not have the opportunity to read the voluminous case records as well as the Rescission Case [which] would have alerted him of the need to implead all the heirs of the deceased Vicente.
Besides, respondent . . . cannot simply feign ignorance of the Partition Case. Before he had rendered his now assailed Decision, [he] was even reminded by plaintiff Vicente of the pendency of the Partition Case when the latter filed his opposition to the motion of intervenors De Leon.
So viewed, respondent judge need not wait for the complainant or the other heirs to intervene in the Rescission Case, since it is his duty as a judge to ensure that all indispensable parties are impleaded before resolving a case. Law and jurisprudence clearly and explicitly dictate compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the fling of the complaint including the judgment.
Parenthetically, when an action involves reconveyance of property . . . owners of property over which reconveyance is asserted are indispensable parties . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Still and all respondent judge opted . . . to exclude the complainant and the other heirs of the deceased Vicente based on the bare supposition that since Pantaleon owns the remaining half of the subject lots and that Pantaleon is also an heir of the deceased, there is no longer any need to implead the other heirs. . . . HIACEa
Clearly, this manifests the bias and partiality of the respondent judge in favor of Pantaleon. At this point, it bears to stress that respondent judge is at a complete loss as to what capacity Pantaleon stands in the Rescission Case. In his Comment dated March 8, 2005, respondent judge refers to Pantaleon, and not plaintiff Vicente, as the plaintiff in the Rescission Case and the supposed owner of half of the subject lots.
. . . Whether the Rescission Case was resolved speedily is of no moment . . . . What remains is the fact that respondent judge favored Pantaleon and disposed of the Rescission Case to the detriment of the other heirs of the deceased Vicente. . . .
Worse, respondent judge had inexcusably failed to act on a motion to intervene filed by one of the heirs of the deceased Vicente. While said motion to intervene was filed after the assailed Decision had been rendered, respondent judge should have prudently acted on it especially so since the motion itself had raised the issue of non-joinder of indispensable parties. . . .
Needless to state, whenever it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party. Such an order is unavoidable, for it is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed."
What further reflects respondent judge's utter betrayal of his duties and responsibilities as a judge is his admission that he had in fact taught Pantaleon what to do in the case. . . .
Certainly, the fact that respondent judge instructed Pantaleon to withdraw the verification and certification of non-forum shopping and replace it with one executed by plaintiff Vicente is blatantly partial, irregular and in direct violation of procedural rules. Respondent judge should have dismissed the complaint outright as provided under Section 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. . . . SaIEcA
xxx xxx xxx
All the foregoing are telling proofs that the act of the respondent judge knowingly rendering the assailed Decision is indisputably unlawful, anomalous and is totally inconsistent with any claim of good faith in the performance of his judicial functions. The evidence on record proves that the respondent judge committed acts amounting to grave misconduct.
The Court is unable to fully agree with the recommendation and the premises and arguments holding it together.
We start off with the role of the respondent in the matter of the amendment of the complaint. As complainant claims, respondent judge instructed Pantaleon's counsel to amend the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-27334 and to attach to the amended complaint the verification of his son, Vicente B., and to allege that the amount deposited in escrow, exclusive of the interest accrued, should be paid to Vicente B. by way of rentals.
Agreeing with the complainant, the Investigating Justice stated the observation that said actuations of respondent judge is "partial, irregular and in direct violation of procedural rules", adding that the original complaint should have been dismissed outright pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
We are not persuaded.
Contrary to complainant's posture, the assailed suggestions made by respondent may be viewed as an attempt to comply with the guidelines laid down in Administrative Matter No. 03-1-09-SC, more known as the Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Courts in the Conduct of Pre-trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures. The policy behind the pre-trial guidelines is to abbreviate court proceedings and ensure prompt disposition of cases and decongest court dockets. Pursuant to this policy, the judge is expected to determine during pre-trial if there is a need to amend the pleadings.
Sec. 5 of the pre-trial guidelines reads:
5. If all efforts to settle fail, the trial judge shall:
a. Adopt the minutes of preliminary conference as part of the pre-trial proceedings and confirm markings of exhibits or substituted photocopies and admissions on the genuineness and due execution of documents; ECDaTI
b. Inquire if there are cases arising out of the same facts pending before other courts and order its consolidation if warranted;
c. Inquire if the pleadings are in order. If not, order the amendments if necessary;
d. Inquire if interlocutory issues are involved and resolve the same;
e. Consider the adding or dropping of parties.
As it were, respondent judge noticed that the person who verified Vicente B.'s complaint was his attorney-in-fact, obviously leading the respondent to conclude that the verification was defective. He believed a correction was in order to prevent future complications, such as the filing of a motion to dismiss the complaint which undeniably will only prolong or delay the case.
In actuality, no clear benefit redounded to Vicente B. as a result of respondent's suggestion, for the requirement on verification may be made by the party, his lawyer or his representative or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading. 11
Thus, Pantaleon's verification accompanying the original complaint would have had sufficed.
Complainant's assertion that respondent made it appear that Pantaleon was the plaintiff is a bit specious. The title of the case, no less, clearly indicated that Vicente B. is the plaintiff, not Pantaleon.
The Investigating Justice erred too when she concluded that the complaint should have been dismissed outright under Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 5, Rule 7 refers to certification against forum shopping. The correct and applicable rule is the preceding Sec. 4 of Rule 7 which deals with verification. CaAIES
Even if the Investigator cited the correct Rule (Sec. 4, Rule 7), she would still be incorrect in her conclusion that the complaint should be dismissed, for it is basic that verification is only a formal, not jurisdictional, requisite. 12 Accordingly, even if the verification is flawed or defective, the Court may still give due course to the pleading if the circumstances warrant the relaxation of the rule in the interest of justice. 13
On another point, the Investigating Justice faulted the respondent for not impleading complainant and her brother, Carlos del Rosario, as parties-plaintiffs. She reasoned that respondent need not wait for complainant and the other heirs to intervene, it being the court's duty to implead all indispensable parties before resolving the case.
To a certain extent, the Investigating Justice is correct.
While it is true that the pre-trial guidelines (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC) obliges the judge, if proper, to add or drop parties to the case, the inclusion of parties-plaintiffs is a different situation.
Intervening in a case is not a matter of right but of sound discretion of the Court. Sec. 2, Rule 19 of the Rules on the subject, Time to intervene, specifically provides that "the motion to intervene may be filed at anytime before rendition of judgment by the trial court". Thus, intervention to unite with the plaintiffs must be filed before rendition of judgment. Thus, respondent acted within the bounds of the rules when he denied Carlos del Rosario's intervention, filed as the corresponding motion was after the assailed decision was rendered.
The investigation report stated that it is the "duty of the judge to ensure that all indispensable parties are impleaded before resolving the case". This may be true with respect to the joinder of defendants as jurisdiction over their persons can be acquired by means of service of summons. With respect to other real parties-in-interest as additional plaintiffs, however, the court cannot simply issue an order towards the impleadment of said parties as additional plaintiffs. These proposed plaintiffs must give their consent to their inclusion as plaintiffs. Otherwise, the addition of such parties will be useless and irregular considering they may be adverse to the idea of being parties-plaintiffs in the first place. Thus, the respondent was correct in not simply adding complainant and Carlos del Rosario as co-plaintiffs of Vicente B. since the RTC had yet to acquire jurisdiction over their persons. As a matter of fact, they filed a motion to intervene but was rejected because it was filed after the decision was promulgated. CHcTIA
To be sure, the Investigating Justice was mistaken in her belief that Pantaleon, the attorney-in-fact of plaintiff Vicente B., cannot represent the other interested heirs like complainant and Carlos del Rosario even without the joinder of the latter as co-plaintiffs.
It should be borne in mind that Pantaleon, Carlos del Rosario, and complainant, as compulsory heirs of Vicente S., are co-owners of the subject lots. And a co-owner may bring an action in that capacity without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. 14 When a suit is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights. 15 Thus, complainant and Carlos del Rosario stood to be benefited by the suit filed by Pantaleon, as attorney-in-fact of Vicente B., as the two, as co-owners, are entitled to their pro-rata share in the monetary award to be adjudged to Vicente B. Thus, there was really no prejudice suffered by complainant or her brother, Carlos, when respondent denied the faulty-filed motion for intervention.
No one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of dispensing justice can be infallible. 16 To hold judges for every erroneous ruling or order issued, assuming they have erred, would be nothing short of downright harassment and would make the judge's position untolerable. 17 To dismiss a judge for what may be considered as serious offenses under the Code of Judicial Conduct, there must, ideally, reliable evidence to show that the judicial acts complained of were ill-motivated, corrupt or inspired by a persistent disregard of well-known rules.
While there is no evidence tending to show that respondent perverted his office for some financial benefits or for consideration less than honest, respondent to be sure did not conduct himself, in relation to Civil Case No. CEB-27334, with the exacting partiality required under the Code of Judicial Conduct. As the records show, respondent indeed suggested to Vicente B.'s counsel that the amendment to his complaint should, in relief portion, include a claim for rentals. This to us is improper and at least constitutes simple misconduct. CTHDcE
Simple misconduct is punishable under Rule 140 as follows:
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Since respondent has already retired, 18 only a maximum fine of PhP20,000 can be imposed under said rule. Since he, however, had previously been adjudged guilty of and penalized for various infractions in more than a few cases, 19 with repeated warnings of more severe sanction in case of repetition, a fine of PhP100,000 is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, the Court adjudges former Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. of the RTC, Branch 5 in Cebu City GUILTY of Simple Misconduct. He is hereby meted the penalty of FINE in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos (PhP100,000) to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby ordered to facilitate the processing of the retirement papers of retired Judge Gako for the speedy release of his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., join the dissent of Justice Brion.
Quisumbing, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro and Peralta, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., I dissent.
Separate Opinions
BRION, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion and conclusion. I do not agree with the unusual sympathy and consideration that the ponencia has demonstrated towards the respondent judge who — by the measure of what he did in this case, his record of past transgressions and past warnings from this Court, and our governing precedents — should be held liable for more than simple misconduct and be penalized accordingly. I say this with emphasis as I fear that this en banc decision will set a dangerous precedent that will shield members of the Judiciary who have soiled the judicial robe on many occasions and who continue to commit violations that put the whole judiciary to shame. ISCDEA
Two essential facts must be appreciated at the outset in considering the case. The first, a matter of record, is that the rescission complaint that gave rise to the present administrative matter involved a contract between Vicente S and his son, Pantaleon, on the one hand, and the City of Cebu, on the other. Interestingly, Pantaleon did not frontally sue on this contract; it was his son, Vicente B who did and Pantaleon only acted as Vicente B's attorney-in-fact. The second essential and undisputed fact is that Vicente S had died at the time Vicente B sued for rescission. As a result of Vicente S' death, the heirs of Vicente S (among whom was Pantaleon) had an active case for partition that for one year was pending before the respondent Judge until he was compelled to inhibit himself at the instance of the parties. Half of the property subject of the rescission case belonged to Vicente S and, hence, is part of his undivided estate.
In the course of the rescission case, the respondent Judge advised the petitioner that the complaint be amended so that the verification shall be made by Vicente B instead of Pantaleon, and that the purchase price paid by Cebu City and held in escrow shall, upon rescission of the contract, be paid as rentals, not to the parties to the rescinded contract, but to Vicente B, the direct petitioner.
The ponencia points out that the suggestions made by respondent judge to Vicente B., represented by Pantaleon, may be viewed as an attempt to comply with the guidelines laid down in Administrative Matter 03-1-09-SC, otherwise known as the Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct of Pre-trial and Use of Discovery Deposition Measures (Guidelines); the purpose of the Guidelines is to abbreviate court proceedings, ensure prompt disposition of cases, and decongest court dockets. The ponencia suggested that the respondent might have noticed that the person who verified the complaint was Pantaleon (the attorney-in-fact) and possibly concluded that the verification was defective and should be addressed to prevent future complications, such as the filing of a possible motion to dismiss; and that there was really no need for a new verification because the attorney-in-fact is allowed to verify. The ponencia also points out that the Investigating Justice erred when she concluded that the complaint should be dismissed outright under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court (the rule on certification against Forum Shopping), and when she faulted the respondent for not impleading complainant Tanjuatco and Carlos del Rosario as parties-plaintiffs. CITaSA
I find the ponencia's statements highly unusual. First, the Guidelines were nowhere cited by the respondent Judge as basis for his actions. The justification was provided purely by the ponencia, not by the respondent judge. Second, the respondent judge's advice to Vicente B went beyond matters of form that were legitimate for a Court to bring up at the earliest possible time in order to expedite proceedings and avoid unnecessary delay. A closer look at the rescission case shows that the complaint, on its face, raised a lot of questions on who the real party in interest from the plaintiff side really was. The actionable document, attached to the rescission complaint, was the contract between Cebu City, and Vicente S and Pantaleon. Yet, Vicente B stood as the direct petitioner with Pantaleon being a mere attorney-in-fact. It was Pantaleon who initially verified the complaint, and this was changed at the suggestion of the respondent Judge, so that Vicente B made the verification. The other amendment the respondent judge suggested certainly cannot but lead to raised eyebrows; to allege in the amended complaint that the amount deposited in escrow inclusive of interest should be paid to plaintiff (Vicente B) by way of rentals. These were the basic facts that underlie the ponencia's conclusion that the respondent judge merely committed a simple misconduct.
A companion development in the case that makes matters "curiouser and curiouser" (as Alice in Wonderland puts it) is that the respondent judge was not a stranger at all to the del Rosario family; members of the family had appeared before the respondent judge as heirs in the partition of the estate of their patriarch, the late Vicente S. del Rosario. As reflected in the Report of Investigating Justice, the heirs/co-owners of the estate of Vicente S appeared at the pre-trial of the partition of estate case before the respondent judge, although the latter was subsequently compelled to withdraw from the case at the instance of the heirs who, in the judge's words, "misunderstood" him. As the Report puts it, "[t]he fact that he conducted conferences among the heirs of the deceased [Vicente S] coupled by the fact that the Partition Case was filed by one of the heirs in defiance to the position of the other heirs respecting the settlement of a vast estate, would sufficiently serve notice to him that there is a severe conflict of interests among said heirs." HIETAc
Thus, the respondent judge who presided over the rescission case knew, not only of the partition case, but also of the conflicting claims by the heirs of Vicente S who were then effectively co-owners pending partition of the estate. Yet, the respondent judge simply went ahead and decided the rescission case, adjudicating the whole amount held in escrow to Vicente B as rentals, without any acknowledgment in his decision of the co-ownership status of part of the award to Vicente B. Significantly, one of the heirs (Carlos del Rosario) moved to be allowed to intervene in the case although the motion was filed after the issuance of the decision in the case but prior to its finality. The respondent judge, in defense, simply said that he did not act on the motion to intervene because it "skipped from the attention of the court" — a most uncommon explanation indeed.
Knowledge of the pending partition case (and necessarily of the co-ownership among the heirs) should have alerted the respondent judge that the partition case would impact on the rescission case as the part of the land, subject of the disputed contract, and part of the amount held in escrow belonged to Vicente S and therefore to his estate after his death and, pending partition, to his heirs in co-ownership. Thus, the personality of the plaintiff and the nature of the property in dispute should have been live issues in the rescission case. To be sure, a co-owner may sue without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. Adlawan v. Adlawan 1 echoes this doctrinal rule. However, where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone in disregard of his or her co-owners, the action should be dismissed. Arturo M. Tolentino, 2 explained the rule as follows:
A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession or possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis supplied.) 2005jurcd
The respondent judge disregarded this rule although in his mind Pantaleon, rather that Vicente B, was the real plaintiff as reflected in his Comment dated March 8, 2005 where he referred to Pantaleon, not Vicente B, as the plaintiff and owner of the half of the lots disputed with Cebu City. The ponencia itself appeared at a loss about the parties' relationships in the rescission and the partition cases as shown by its ruling that:
It should be borne in mind that Pantaleon, Carlos del Rosario, and complainant, as compulsory heirs of Vicente S, are co-owners of the subject lots. And a co-owner may bring an action in that capacity without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. When a suit is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights. Thus, complainant and Carlos del Rosario stood to be benefited by the suit filed by Pantaleon, as attorney-in-fact of Vicente B, as the two, as co-owners, are entitled to their pro-rata share in the monetary award to be adjudged in Vicente B. Thus, there was really no prejudice suffered by complainant or her brother, when the respondent denied the faulty-filed motion for intervention.
The ponencia clearly overlooked that the rescission complaint was not filed by a co-owner in his capacity as a co-owner. More importantly, it was not even brought by a co-owner but by the son of a co-owner; co-owner Pantaleon pointedly avoided being a direct party to the rescission case, and even withdrew his verification at the instance of the respondent judge. Thus, the award of the rentals to Vicente B was not an award to a co-owner — a circumstance that will vastly complicate the partition case if an attempt is made to bring in this award as part of the estate. The ponencia, too, devoted a lengthy discussion on the issue of joinder of parties, on both the plaintiff and the defendant sides. It, however, forgot that the respondent did not make any ruling on the intervention that Carlos del Rosario — the brother of Pantaleon and a co-heir — sought: as already mentioned, his motion for intervention, according to the respondent judge, simply "skipped the attention of the court".
Given these observations, it may well now be asked for purposes of evaluating the import of the suggestion of the respondent judge to Vicente B: why did Pantaleon not bring the rescission case himself and even went to the extent of withdrawing his verification at the direct suggestion of the respondent judge? In fact, were the suggestions of the respondent judge — on the matter or verification and on the amendment of the complaint to reflect that the amount in escrow should be paid to Vicente B as plaintiff — simply matters of procedure intended to expedite the proceedings? HEaCcD
To recall the basic facts narrated above, the parties in interest on the part of the del Rosario in the contract with Cebu City were father and son, Vicente S and Pantaleon. Thus, in the rescission case, it was Pantaleon's interest that was at stake, not Vicente B's. By undertaking the verification (which by the way, is a substantive change, not simply a matter of form as the verifier swears to his personal knowledge of the facts stated), Vicente was effectively reinforcing the idea that his was the direct interest to protect. At the same time, Pantaleon, the direct co-owner in the estate of Vicente S, was dissociating himself from the rescission case as to was already a party to the partition case then already pending; his presence in both cases could raise forum-shopping issues as the Investigating Justice directly implied when she said that "the respondent judge should have dismissed the case outright as provided under Section 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court". The whole intent of the change in the verification becomes apparent with the respondent judge's second suggestion — to allege in the amended complaint that the amount deposited in escrow be paid to the plaintiff (who is Vicente B) by way of rentals. These companion moves ensured the objective of securing for Vicente B — a non-party to the partition case — the funds in escrow.
Under this view, the respondent judge directly paved the way in securing the objective, firstly by the out-of-bounds suggestions described above. His help was also indispensable because he overlooked in his decision Vicente B's lack of interest and personality to bring the rescission suit, while at the same time making sure that none of the other heirs in Vicente S' estate intervened. The respondent judge further helped by granting the motion for execution pending appeal despite live issues that would have alerted a fair and conscientious judge that something was amiss. From this perspective, the ponencia's cited Guidelines loses relevance even if it had been invoked by the respondent judge, while the other grounds the ponencia raised are mere technical grounds that do not detract from the conclusion that the respondent grossly violated his judicial duties and did not simply commit simple misconduct. The way the Investigating Justice put it is particularly apt: "what the respondent committed in this case is not sheer ignorance of the law but a blatant miscarriage of justice and betrayal of his sacred oath as a judge."
It is interesting to note that while the ponencia does not completely exonerate the respondent judge, it did its utmost to lighten his liability. This is particularly apparent when it said: DcCEHI
While there is no evidence tending to show that the respondent perverted his office for some financial benefits or for consideration less than honest, respondent to be sure did not conduct himself, in relation to [the rescission ease], with the exacting partiality required under the Code of Judicial Conduct. As the records show, respondent indeed suggested to Vicente B.'s counsel that the amendment to his complaint should, in relief portion, include a claim for rentals. This to us is improper and at least constitutes simple misconduct. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Dissent posits that under the given facts, what the respondent judge did cannot be characterized as simple misconduct. As an intervention, it was beyond being "improper" as it was effectively the presiding judge lawyering for one of the parties. This is gross partiality and plain injustice to those affected by the decision in the rescission case.
This Court does not likewise need a finding of "financial benefits" or "considerations less than honest" in order to conclude that what the respondent judge did was gross misconduct in the performance of duties. Had these benefits and considerations been found, they would have simply been grounds, not only for the administrative charge of gross misconduct, but for a criminal charge for bribery at the very least. What appears clear to this Dissent, again as the Investigating Justice phrased it, is that the respondent judge had the "deliberate intent to do injustice to the complainant and other heirs" that brought the respondent judge in conflict with Canons 2 and 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which read:
Canon 2
A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES
Canon 3
A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE
As stressed in the foregoing discussions, the respondent went beyond due bounds and committed improprieties in the performance of his duties when he maliciously intervened, through suggestions from the bench to a party, in order to influence the outcome of the case before him. He was also manifestly unfair, using his skewed reading of the law, in continuing to entertain the rescission complaint despite its obvious detects, despite the pendency of the partition case, and despite the prejudicial effects of his ruling on the other heirs of Vicente S. To be sure, what he did in the case were not mere isolated acts of improprieties but gross and unmistakable violations that, following a pattern, were geared towards the objective of favoring a chosen party.
Investigating Justice Guevarra-Salonga recommended that the respondent, who then was still in the service, be dismissed from the service for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and for grave misconduct in the performance of his duties. This Dissent fully agrees with this recommendation and with its counterpart — the complete forfeiture of the respondent judge's benefit — now that the respondent judge has retired from the service.
The Dissent is driven by two compelling reasons in taking this position. First is the respondent judge's record of violations while in the service. He is not a first-time offender and had been repeatedly warned in the past that more severe penalties awaited him should he commit the same or similar offenses. He remained incorrigible, however, and showed a propensity to violate his duties and the trust reposed in him as a judge. This is evident from the cases filed against him, charging him with and finding him guilty of various offenses committed in relation to his duties as a judge. TEIHDa
In Rallos v. Gako, Jr., 3 this Court found the respondent guilty of grave abuse of authority, partiality and dishonesty when he made it appear that the complainants, who were petitioners in an intestate estate proceedings before his court, were present during a hearing of their petition when in fact they had not attended because the respondent changed the date of hearing without notifying them. We fined him P10,000.00 and warned him that a commission of similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely.
In Zamora v. Gako, Jr., 4 then Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora charged the respondent with ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority for having ordered the release of 25,000 sacks of smuggled rice to the claimants, notwithstanding the pendency of seizure and forfeiture proceedings with the Bureau of Customs, the office with exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings. We found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law and suspended him for three (3) months without pay, with the stern warning that the commission of similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely.
InLagkao v. Gako, Jr., 5 we found the respondent guilty of grave abuse of authority for issuing a temporary restraining order in defiance of the decision of a higher court setting aside an injunctive writ he had issued. We fined him P20,000 and sternly warned him.
In City of Cebu v. Gako, Jr., 6 we found the respondent guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision in a civil case. We imposed a fine of P40,000.00 and our usual warning.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Gako, Jr., 7 the respondent and some of his court employees were found to have violated pertinent circulars and orders on the procedure for raffling of cases. The respondent judge acted on 518 petitions for voluntary confinement and rehabilitation of drug dependents filed from 1998 to 2006; these petitions had not been raffled as required and had instead been brought directly to the respondent's sala, in clear violation of Section 2, Rule 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. We fined him P40,000 with the ever-present warning that the next offense would merit a sterner penalty. aEcHCD
At this point, the respondent has already mocked this Court by continuing his violations and his perverse ways, and getting away with it. He will continue to mock this Court when he reads that all that we can do is fine him another P100,000.00 that the majority found sufficient and appropriate for his SIXTH offense. Unfortunately for the Court, this time we can no longer serve him a warning as he is now beyond such warning.
A second reason why this Dissent believes that the respondent merits the ultimate administrative penalty is this Court's record of dismissing other members of the judiciary for less than the record of offenses that the respondent judge committed in his years of service, as well as the message we are communicating to the public who will surely learn of how the majority has been unusually lenient with the respondent judge. We shall be disturbing existing jurisprudence and starting a jurisprudential trend that may prove detrimental to the administration of justice in the long run.
Given the penalty the majority imposed on the respondent judge, the members of the Judiciary who had earlier been dismissed as well as the public would cry "foul"' when they learn of the Gako record of surviving his sixth major offense. To name some, this Court since 1992 has dismissed:
Judge Florante Madrono; 8 Judge Angelito C. Teh; 9 Judge Eduardo F. Cartagena, 10 Judge Bienvenido M. Rebosura; 11 Judge Walerico Butalid; 12 Judge Estanislao S. Belan; 13 Judge Rica H. Lacson; 14 Judge Abelardo H. Santos; 15 Judge Melchor E. Bonilla; 16 Judge Erna Falloran-Aliposa; 17 Judge Salih Musa; 18 Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr.; 19 and Judge Fabian M. Bautista. 20 In recent memory, we dismissed no less than three Justices of the Court of Appeals; Justices Demetrio Demetria for violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA; 21 Justice Elvi John Asuncion for gross ignorance of the law in A.M. No. 06-44-CA-J; 22 and very recently, Justice Vicente Roxas for multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct, grave misconduct, dishonesty, undue interest and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, 23 his second offense. HaSEcA
Why Judge Ireneo Gako has been differently treated will be a question that many will ask. Many will even wonder why, after finding the respondent judge liable and fining him P100,000.00, the majority is even directing the Office of the Court Administrator to "facilitate the processing of the retirement papers or [respondent judge] for the speedy release of his retirement benefits."
The Dissent reiterates that respondent Judge Ireneo Gako should be found guilty of gross misconduct for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross partiality, and gross ignorance of the law. He should be imposed the penalty of forfeiture of all benefits, except only for already earned leave credits, and perpetually disqualified from appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and -controlled corporations. Only by such measures and by consistency in our penalties can we effectively relay the message that we are serious and we mean business when we say that we shall cleanse the courts, including our own ranks, of hoodlums in robes and scalawags who bring the administration of justice to disrepute. HDIaST
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3-13. DSIaAE
2. Id. at 160.
3. Id. at 33-35.
4. Id. at 93. Respondent's Comment.
5. Id. at 181. Direct Testimony of Corazon R. Tanjuatco by way of Judicial Affidavit.
6. Id. at 38.
7. Id. at 94.
8. Id. at 101-103. DTESIA
9. Id. at 87-88.
10. Id. at 92-95.
11. 1 Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 145; citing Arambulo Perez, 78 Phil. 387; Matel v. Rosal, 96 Phil 984; Cajefe v. Fernandez, 109 Phil 743.
12. Buenaventura v. Uy, et al., No. L-28156, March 31, 1982. ScCEIA
13. Oshita v. Republic, No. L-21180, March 31, 1967.
14. 2 Tolentino, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 170.
15. Id.
16. Vda. De Zabala v. Pamaran, 39 SCRA 430-431 (1971).
17. Barroso v. Arche, Adm. Case No. 216-CFI, 67 SCRA 161.
18. The retirement of judges does not render moot the administrative cases against them for acts committed while in the service. See Lagcao v. Gako, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1840, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 55, 69-70; Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Cebu City, A.M. No. 05-2-101-RTC, April 26, 2005, 457 SCRA 1, 11.
19. Office of the Court Administrator v. Gako, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-07-2074, October 24, 2008; City of Cebu v. Gako, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-08-2207, May 7, 2008; Lagcao, supra; Zamora v. Gako, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 178; Rallos v. Gako, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484 (A), March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 324. IAEcCT
BRION, J. dissenting:
1. G.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006, 479 SCRA 275.
2. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Edition, p. 157.
3. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484 (A), March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 324.
4. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484, October 24, 2000, 344 SCRA 178.
5. A.M. No. RTJ-04-1840, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 55.
6. A.M. No. RTJ-08-2207, promulgated on May 7, 2008.
7. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2074, promulgated on October 24, 2008.
8. A.M. No. MTJ-90-486, October 20, 1992, 214 SCRA 740. The Court held that the penalty against a judge found guilty of several violations is dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all salaries, benefits and leave credits to which he may be entitled and with prejudice to reemployment in the government service, including government-owned or controlled corporations. AcSCaI
9. A.M. No. RTJ-97-1375, October 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 623. Judge Teh was dismissed for gross ignorance of the law.
10. A.M. No. 95-9-98-MCTC, December 4, 1997, 282 SCRA 370. Judge Cartagena was dismissed for gross incompetence, ignorance of the law, and misconduct.
11. A.M. No. MTJ-95-1069, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 109. Judge Rebosura was dismissed for gross misconduct. caCTHI
12. A.M. No. 97-8-242-RTC, August 5, 1998, 293 SCRA 589. The Court dismissed Judge Butalid for dishonesty.
13. A.M. No. MTJ-95-1059, August 7, 1998, 294 SCRA 1. Judge Belan was dismissed for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for dishonesty.
14. A.M. No. MTJ-93-881, August 3, 1998, 293 SCRA 524. For violations of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Memorandum Circular No. 30 of the Civil Service Commission, Judge Lacson was dismissed from service.
15. A.M. No. MTJ-99-1197, May 26, 1999, 307 SCRA 582. Judge Santos was dismissed for transgressing Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
16. A.M. Nos. MTJ-94-923 and MTJ-95-11-125-MCTC, September 10, 1999, 314 SCRA 141. Judge Bonilla was dismissed for falsification of public document, graft and corruption, dishonesty, gross misconduct, grave abuse of authority and immorality. ACETIa
17. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1446, March 9, 2000, 327 SCRA 427. Judge Falloran-Aliposa was dismissed for serious misconduct and for failure to measure up to the exacting standards of conduct and morality expected of members of the judiciary.
18. A.M. No. SCC-00-5, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 240. The Court dismissed Judge Musa for offensive conduct, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
19. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1448, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 79. Judge Jardin, Sr. was dismissed for impropriety and failure to measure up to stringent judicial standards under the Code of Judicial Conduct.
20. A.M. No. MTJ-99-1188, July 2, 2001, 360 SCRA 489. Judge Bautista was dismissed for grave misconduct.
21. In Re: Derogatory News Items Charging Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria with Interference on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen, March 27, 2001, 355 SCRA 366. DITEAc
22. Padilla vs. Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion, Court of Appeals, March 20, 2007, 518 SCRA 512.
23. Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. on CA-G.R. SP No. 103692/Antonio Rosete, et al. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al., September 9, 2008.