Tan v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 255669. October 6, 2021.]

AMY FRANCES TAN, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 6, 2021which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 255669 — Amy Frances Tan v. People of the Philippines

The Petition for Review was

It is settled that appeal is not a matter of right, but one of sound judicial discretion. 1 It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Parties wishing to appeal must, thus, comply with the requirements of the rules, otherwise they lose their opportunity to appeal. 2 A party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed by law loses the right to do so as the decision, as to him, becomes final and binding. 3

Here, it was incumbent on petitioner Amy Frances Tan to timely file her appellant's brief before the Court of Appeals, thus, her failure to do so caused the verdict of conviction against her to lapse into finality.

To recall, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)-Branch 46, Pasay City convicted petitioner of Grave Slander under Decision 4 dated February 16, 2017. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)-Branch 117, Pasay City affirmed through Decision 5 dated November 21, 2017. On July 8, 2019, petitioner received copy of the Order 6 dated June 24, 2019 denying her motion for reconsideration. She, thus, had until July 23, 2019 to file with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. But she sought a fifteen (15)-day extension or until August 7, 2019, within which to file her petition for review. As it was, though, she failed to file her petition within the given period. Thereafter, her counsel withdrew the motion for extension. Then on January 24, 2020, she filed her petition for review, sans a motion to admit.

Indisputably, petitioner's appeal was not perfected because she failed to file the petition within the reglementary period.

Section 8, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court ordains:

Section 8. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. — (a) Upon the timely filing of a petition for review and the payment of the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, properly dismissed the petition as the trial court's verdict of conviction had long become final and executory. 7

Petitioner, nonetheless, prays for a liberal interpretation of the rules and to give due course to her belatedly filed petition for review.

True, the Court has relaxed the governing periods of appeal in exceptional cases. But this case is sadly not one of them.

Petitioner's counsel claims that the petition was not filed within the original and extended period because petitioner did not go to her counsel's office due to alleged medical reasons. We note, however, that soon after recuperating from her alleged illness, petitioner went back to her counsel as early as November 27, 2019. But still the petition was filed only two (2) months later and six (6) months following the expiration of the original reglementary period.

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. Hence, failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment final and executory. The Court, therefore, can no longer review the case on its merits. 8

Even petitioner's Manifestation

Section 1, Rule 52 9 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution should be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice. If no appeal or motion for reconsideration is filed within such period, the notice or final resolution shall be entered by the clerk of court in the book of entries of judgments. 10

Here, petitioner, through counsel, received copy of the January 22, 2020 Resolution 11 of the Court of Appeals on January 30, 2020. She had only until February 14, 2020 to file her motion for reconsideration. As it was, petitioner belatedly filed her motion for reconsideration only on the next working day, February 17, 2020. It may just be a one (1)-day delay, but still, it is a delay which caused the verdict of conviction against her to become final and executory.

The fifteen (15)-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. 12 Rules prescribing the period within which certain acts should be done or certain proceedings taken must be strictly complied with to ensure the orderly and speedy administration of justice. 13 While a relaxation in the application of the rules is allowed in exceptional cases, this was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. 14

In seeking a liberal application of the rules, however, petitioner argues that the one (1)-day delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration was due to mere inadvertence and human error. Instead of serving and filing it by registered mail on February 14, 2020, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) office staff filed it personally before the Court of Appeals on the next working day, February 17, 2020.

But the circumstances cited by petitioner do not justify the belated filing of the motion for reconsideration because petitioner's counsel had the duty to invariably adopt a system to ensure that all pleadings are timely filed and served. Since petitioner's counsel failed to do so, the negligence or inadvertence of his staff to timely file such pleading is imputable on him. 15 Petitioner, in turn, is bound by the mistake of her counsel. 16

In fine, the Court of Appeals did not err when it declined to act on petitioner's belatedly filed Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration as the subject Resolution dated January 22, 2020 thereof had already become final following the lapse of the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period from petitioner's receipt thereof. By operation of law, therefore, the assailed Resolution dated January 22, 2020 as well as the verdict of conviction against petitioner became final and executory. To be sure, the Court has no jurisdiction to modify, alter, or reverse a final and executory judgment. 17

As for petitioner's Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration (Of the Resolution dated September 17, 2020), the same merely reiterates her arguments in her Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration of the January 22, 2020 Resolution. For all intents and purposes, it partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which is prohibited under Section 2, Rule 52 18 of the Revised Rules of Court. More, an entry of judgment relative to the final January 22, 2020 Resolution had already been issued.

But even if we relax the procedural rules and resolve the case on the merits in the higher interest of substantial justice, the petition must still fail.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised and resolved by this Court via a Rule 45 petition because the Court, not being a trier of facts, is not duty bound to re-examine and calibrate the evidence on record. 19 The factual findings of the trial court are generally binding and conclusive upon this court when supported by evidence, 20 as in this case.

The petition raises questions of fact pertaining to the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence on record and assessment of the credibility of the witnesses which this Court cannot take cognizance of as it would entail a review of the facts of the case and recalibration of the evidence which is not a function of this Court. Specifically, it asks the Court to recalibrate the evidence and give more weight to petitioner's evidence with the end in view of reversing her conviction.

At any rate, the lower courts did not err in finding petitioner guilty of grave slander.

Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is penalized under Article 358 21 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood." 22 The elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonour, discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature. 23

These elements are all present here. The prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the one who publicly uttered serious and insulting defamatory words against private complainant Johnson Chang y Lubos (Chang), calling him "a drug lord who have millions that can bribe even the PDEA agent for him to be released after his arrest."

The Court has always accorded great weight and respect to the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and calibration of their testimonies as it had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment and the manner of testifying of the witnesses before it. 24 Here, the lower courts gave much credence to the uniform, positive and direct testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over petitioner's bare denial and uncorroborated testimony. SPO1 Rolando Pura, P/Insp. Geronimo C. Diaz, PO2 Gerardo Navarro uniformly and categorically testified that they actually arrested Chang on January 28, 2011 as shown in the Arrest Report and Incident Report both dated January 28, 2011. The lower courts also ruled that the credibility and the truthfulness of the testimonies of the police officers who positively identified petitioner as the one who publicly uttered the subject defamatory words against Chang on said date, was not at all affected by the outcome of a separate criminal case they initiated against petitioner for attempted corruption of public official. That case happened on January 25, 2011, while the present case happened on January 28, 2011. There is absolutely no connection between these two cases. And the fact that in the earlier case, petitioner was acquitted has no bearing at all to the verdict of conviction here.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated September 17, 2020 and January 27, 2021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 43646 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. See Heirs of Gamaliel Albano v. Sps. Ravanes, 790 Phil. 557, 574 (2016).

2.Kumar v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No 247661, June 15, 2020.

3.Heirs of Gamaliel Albano v. Sps. Ravanes, supra at 574.

4. Penned by Judge Eduardo Cruz Solangon, Jr., rollo, pp. 96-107.

5. Penned by Presiding Judge Eugenio G. Dela Cruz of RTC-Pasay City, Branch 117, id. at 84-89.

6. Penned by Presiding Judge Rowena Nieves A. Tan of RTC-Pasay City, Branch 118, id. at 90-95.

7.Boardwalk Business Ventures, Inc. v. Villareal, 708 Phil. 443, 456 (2013).

8.Id.

9. Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Period for filing. — A party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party.

10. Section 10, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. — If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment of final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.

11.Rollo, pp. 846-847.

12. See Philippine Coconut Authority v. Garrido, 424 Phil. 904, 909 (2002).

13. See Ponciano, Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, 591 Phil. 194, 209 (2008).

14.Spouses Yap v. Friday's Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 235586, January 22, 2020.

15.See The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. Hon. Court of Appeals, 574 Phil. 380, 393 (2008).

16.See Ponciano, Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, supra at 210.

17.See id. at 212.

18.Rule 52, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Second motion for reconsideration. — No second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained.

19.Quines v. United Philippine Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 248774, May 12, 2021.

20.Gumama v. People, G.R. No. 253799 (Notice), February 3, 2021.

21.Article 358, RPC:

Art. 358. Slander. — Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200 pesos.

22.De Leon v. People, 776 Phil. 701, 717 (2016).

23.Ramos v. People, 820 Phil. 1182, 1190-1191 (2017).

24. See Gatan v. Vinarao, 820 Phil. 257, 273 (2017).