Tan v. People

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 237137. April 16, 2018.]

EDUARDO "NONOY" TAN, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 16, 2018which reads as follows: HSAcaE

"G.R. No. 237137 — Eduardo "Nonoy" Tan v. People of the Philippines

This Court has carefully reviewed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari1 and accordingly resolves to DENY the same for: (1) lack of proof of service of the Petition on the Court of Appeals; (2) raising factual issues; and (3) failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 02452-CEB committed reversible error in affirming with modification the October 24, 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 43, in Criminal Case No. 06-29330.

It is worth stressing that a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited only to questions of law. Factual questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. The present petition directly raises as an argument the alleged error of the Court of Appeals in overlooking facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 2 It is therefore clear that the resolution of the argument requires a review of the factual findings, which is not a function of this Court. It is not the duty of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already considered in the proceedings below. 3 This Court therefore finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

In any case, a re-examination by this Court of the merits of the case will not result in a different outcome. The offense of violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7610, the Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discriminatory Act, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the following elements: (1) the offender commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 4 By shifting to the "sweetheart" defense in his appeal, petitioner no longer disputes that he had sexual intercourse with the victim. He also admitted during trial that he knew that the victim was of minor age. Moreover, the birth certificate of the victim showed that she was only 15 years old during the commission of the offense. Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. 5 It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one — through coercion, intimidation or influence — engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. 6 The evidence shows that petitioner influenced and induced the victim to have sexual intercourse with him by gaining her trust with assurances of his good intentions then by promising to take care of her and claiming responsibility for the consequences of their illicit affair. When the victim no longer wanted to cooperate, petitioner coerced her into sexual intercourse by threatening to reveal their relationship to her mother and classmates. These acts are considered sexual abuse under Section 2 (g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to implement the provisions of RA 7610 which provides that "sexual abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct of the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children."

The consent of the victim to engaging in sexual intercourse with petitioner does not negate the inducement and coercion constitutive of sexual abuse. "[C]onsent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610." 7 Stated differently, a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational consent to any sexual intercourse. 8 HESIcT

The penalty for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period with a range of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the penalty is prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period which is from 8 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Thus, the indeterminate prison term imposed by the Court of Appeals should be modified to 14 years and 8 months to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

The monetary awards must also be modified. Civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages must all be in the amount of P20,000.00. A fine in the amount of P15,000.00 shall be imposed on petitioner. These amounts are pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 9 The interest at the rate of 6% per annum imposed on all damages from the date of finality of the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals until fully paid was proper. 10

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to AFFIRM the assailed May 15, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 02452-CEB with further MODIFICATIONS in that:

1. Petitioner Eduardo "Nonoy" Tan is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term of 14 years and 8 months to 20 years of reclusion temporal;

2. Civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages shall all be in the amount of P20,000.00; and

3. A fine in the amount of P15,000.00 shall be imposed on petitioner.

SO ORDERED." (Sereno, C.J., on leave; De Castro, J., designated as Acting Chairperson of the First Division per Special Order No. 2540 dated February 28, 2018).

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. The pleading is entitled "Petition for Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court)."

2.Rollo, p. 6.

3.Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 228 Phil. 145, 149 (1986).

4.Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017.

5.Id.

6.Id.

7.Caballo v. People, 710 Phil. 792, 806 (2013).

8.Id. at 807.

9.Quimvel v. People, supra note 4.

10.Id.