Takenaka Corporation Philippine Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 211589. March 12, 2018.]

TAKENAKA CORPORATION PHILIPPINE BRANCH, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 12, 2018, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 211589 (Takenaka Corporation Philippine Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) — This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the August 22, 2013 Decision 1 and February 26, 2014 Resolution 2 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA En Banc) in CTA EB Case No. 853, which affirmed the August 25, 2011 Decision 3 and December 16, 2011 Resolution 4 of the CTA, Second Division (CTA 2nd Division) in CTA Case No. 7542, a petition for review seeking the cancellation and setting aside of the assessment notices issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (respondent) against Takenaka Corporation Philippine Branch (petitioner) for deficiency Withholding Tax on Compensation (WTC) in the amount of P2,278,563.92 and deficiency Expanded Withholding Tax (EWT) in the amount of P10,815,409.63.

The Antecedents

Petitioner is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of Japan, duly licensed to transact business in the Philippines with principal business address at 18th Floor, Tower 2, The Enterprise Center, 6766 Ayala Avenue corner Paseo de Roxas, Makati City, Philippines.

Respondent, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), is the public officer authorized under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) to decide disputed assessments arising under said law and other laws or portions thereof administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).

On December 29, 2005, petitioner received from respondent a Preliminary Assessment Notice with attached Details of Discrepancies (PAN) covering taxable year ending December 31, 2002, stating that petitioner has deficiency income tax of P164,354,535.58; deficiency value-added tax of P2,755,688.07; deficiency WTC of P2,252,756.71; and deficiency EWT of P10,692,913.38.

On January 9, 2006, petitioner filed a protest letter to the PAN.

On January 14, 2006, a Formal Assessment Notice (FAN) was issued against petitioner alleging that it is liable for deficiency income tax in the amount of P166,224,626.69; value-added tax in the amount of P2,786,970.56; WTC in the amount of P2,278,563.92; and EWT in the amount of P10,815,409.63 for the taxable year 2002.

On February 9, 2006, petitioner filed a protest letter questioning the FAN and submitted documents in support thereof on April 12, 2006.

Respondent did not act with finality on the protest. Hence, on November 8, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for review, which was raffled to the CTA 2nd Division.

On February 14, 2008, during pendency of the case, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw petition, in view of the fact that it availed of the tax amnesty program under Republic Act No. 9480 (RA No. 9480), or the Tax Amnesty Law of 2007, for the deficiency income tax and deficiency value-added tax. In a resolution, dated March 19, 2008, the CTA 2nd Division partially granted the motion.

The CTA 2nd Division Ruling

In its decision dated August 25, 2011, the CTA 2nd Division denied the petition for review.

A. Deficiency Expanded Withholding Tax

It held petitioner liable for deficiency EWT in the amount of P1,922,787.07, as follows:

 

Income Payments	EWT Due
Professional Fees	P168,172.51
Security Expenses	66,559.55
Rental of Equipment	242,386.25
Payment to Subcontractors (Subcontracted Labor)	1,445,668.76
	––––––––––––
TOTAL	P1,922,787.07
	===========

 

On the professional fees: The Division held that petitioner failed to substantiate with proper supporting documents its claim that the amount of P1,007,144.93 was payment to general professional partnerships (GPPs) which are exempt from withholding tax. Thus, it imposed 10% withholding tax on the same in the amount of P100,714.49. It also found that petitioner failed to fully remit the 10% and 2% withholding taxes due on the amount of P13,218,215.81. Hence, it held petitioner liable for additional deficiency withholding tax on professional fees in the amount of P67,458.02. In sum, the deficiency withholding tax on professional fees amounts to P168,172.51, broken down as follows:

 

Withholding tax due on the unsubstantiated payments to GPPs (P1,007,144.93 x 10%)	P100,714.49
Additional withholding tax subject to 2% and 10% rates	67,458.02
	–––––––––––
Total deficiency withholding tax on professional fees	P168,172.51
	==========

 

On security expenses: It was found that, contrary to respondent's claim, petitioner did not fail to withhold and remit the full amount of P310,780.82 representing the tax due on the security expenses of P15,939,041.00. Rather, petitioner included these security expenses in the payment to prime contractors/subcontractors in its BIR Form 1601-E or the Monthly Remittance Return of Creditable Income Taxes Withheld (Expanded) for the period January to December 2006. However, it ruled that petitioner failed to include in the said return security expenses in the amount of P3,327,977.43. Thus, it still held petitioner liable for deficiency withholding tax on security expenses in the amount of P66,559.55.

On rental of equipment: Contrary to respondent's assertion, the CTA-2nd Division agreed that petitioner properly withheld and remitted to the BIR the corresponding taxes due on the prepayments of rentals made in year 2002. Nevertheless, it found that petitioner failed to provide proof of withholding and remittance of the corresponding taxes due on the prepayments of rentals made in prior years which were amortized during the year 2002 in the amount of P5,387,996.81. It noted that petitioner presented payment vouchers pertaining to the amortizations but held that these are not conclusive proof that the corresponding taxes thereon were actually withheld and remitted. Thus, it held petitioner liable for deficiency withholding tax on rentals in the amount of P242,386.25, as follows:

 

Expanded Withholding Tax Due		P616,544.48
Less: Tax Withheld
Tax Withheld classified under rentals	P300,337.73
Tax Withheld classified under prime	73,820.50
contractors/subcontractors		P374,158.23
		–––––––––––
Deficiency Expanded Withholding Tax on Rentals		P242,386.25
		==========

 

On payment to subscontractors (subcontracted labor): The CTA 2nd Division verified the transactions pertaining to subcontracted labor on the basis of supporting schedules and documents. It found petitioner liable only for deficiency EWT on subcontracted labor in the amount of P1,445,668.75.

B. Deficiency Withholding Tax on Compensation

The CTA 2nd Division held petitioner liable for deficiency WTC in the amount of P1,409,420.98 for failure to present documentary proof to substantiate the alleged non-taxable compensation of P5,573,055.25. The alleged non-taxable compensation is broken down as follows:

 

SSS, Medicare (PhilHealth), ECC and HDMF	P1,250,555.00
Reversal of Provision for termination benefit	(752,545.00)
Other employee benefits (FB)	4,771,554.00
Bonuses & 13th month pay	303,491.25
	––––––––––––
Alleged non-taxable compensation	P5,573,055.25
	===========

 

On the SSS, Medicare, ECC and HDMF: It held that petitioner failed to present any supporting source document that would prove actual remittance of the P1,250,555.00 contributions to SSS, PhilHealth, and Pag-IBIG. Thus, it is liable for the corresponding tax due on the said amount.

On the Other Employee/Fringe Benefits: It held that petitioner failed to establish that fringe benefits in the amount of P4,771,554.00 are not subject to tax absent any document to support such claim. Thus, it subjected this amount to tax on compensation.

On the bonuses and 13th month pay: It held that it cannot ascertain, in the absence of any supporting document, if the amount of P303,491.25 pertains to non-taxable bonuses and 13th month pay granted to employees. Hence, it subjected the amount to tax on compensation.

The dispositive portion of the CTA 2nd Division's decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assessment against petitioner covering deficiency expanded withholding tax and withholding tax on compensation is hereby AFFIRMED with some modifications.

Accordingly, petitioner is ORDERED to pay respondent the amount of P4,165,260.07 representing deficiency withholding taxes for taxable year 2002, inclusive of 25% surcharges imposed pursuant to Section 248(3) of the NIRC of 1997, computed as follows:

 

	Basic	Surcharge	Total
WTC	P1,409,420.98	P352,355.25	P1,761,776.23
EWT	1,922,787.07	480,696.77	2,403,483.84
	––––––––––––	–––––––––––	––––––––––––
TOTAL	P3,332,208.05	P833,052.02	P4,165,260.07
	===========	==========	===========

 

Likewise, petitioner is ORDERED to pay (a) deficiency interest at the rate of twenty percent (20%) per annum on the basic deficiency WTC in the amount of P1,409,420.98 and EWT in the amount of P1,922,787.07 computed from January 15, 2003 and January 25, 2003, respectively, until full payment thereof pursuant to Section 249(B) of the NIRC of 1997; and (b) delinquency interest at the rate of twenty percent (20%) per annum on the 20% deficiency interest which have accrued from the dates aforestated in (a) until February 16, 2006 and on the total deficiency taxes of P4,165,260.07, computed from February 16, 2006 until full payment thereof pursuant to Section 249(C) of the NIRC of 1997.

SO ORDERED." 5

In its December 16, 2011 resolution, the CTA 2nd Division likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration with motion to re-open the case for lack of merit.

First, it found that petitioner failed to show reasons or facts that will convince it to apply the rule on "paramount interest of justice" to allow the re-opening of the case. It held that petitioner's failure to present the needed evidence constituted simple negligence and to allow them to present them at that point would be to put a premium on its negligence.

Second, it did not find credible petitioner's assertion that it is not required to provide supporting documents for items appearing in its Audited Financial Statements (AFS), such as the remittance of contributions to SSS, PhilHealth, and Pag-IBIG; payment of other employee/fringe benefits; and payment of bonuses & 13th month pay. It held that the determination of respondent is presumed correct and it is the taxpayer's burden to rebut such presumption. Otherwise, the presumption in favor of the tax assessments stands.

Third, it held that there is legal basis for the double imposition of 20% per annum interest. A deficiency interest of 20% per annum is imposed on the unpaid tax until the deficiency is fully paid under Section 249 (B) of the NIRC. Should the taxpayer fail to fully pay the tax within the time stated in the notice and demand, in addition to the 20% deficiency interest, another 20% per annum, representing delinquency interest, shall be imposed until the full amount is paid under Section 249 (C) (3) of the NIRC.

Unsatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA En Banc.

The CTA En Banc Ruling

In its decision, dated August 22, 2013, the CTA En Banc denied the petition and affirmed in toto the CTA 2nd Division's ruling. It expressly adopted the latter's discussion and ruling on the amount of deficiency EWT and deficiency WTC due from petitioner. It further discussed the other issues raised by petitioner as follows:

First, it held that the reopening of a case is not merely rooted in the interest of justice but rests within the sound discretion of the Court. It stated that while petitioner alleged that it omitted to present the required documentary evidence to prove actual payment of deficiency EWT because of inadvertence or mistake, it failed to present proof to bolster such allegation. Second, it ruled that it is not precluded from seeking further evidence to verify petitioner's AFS because (1) the documents submitted are still subject to verification and comparison with the originals, and (2) the findings of an independent certified public accountant (ICPA) are not conclusive on the courts. It also ruled that the burden of proof did not shift from petitioner to respondent when petitioner presented its AFS. It repeated that tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, and all presumptions are in favor of a tax assessment unless proven otherwise. Accordingly, the burden of proof rests on petitioner to prove the opposite. Lastly, it ruled that the imposition of deficiency interest and delinquency interest are simultaneous pursuant to Section 249 (A) (B) (C) of the NIRC.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CTA En Banc in its assailed February 26, 2014 resolution.

Hence, this petition, anchored on the ground that the CTA seriously erred in rendering the assailed decision and resolution. Petitioner argues that: (1) respondent's right to collect deficiency taxes had already prescribed; (2) the case should be remanded by the Court for reception of additional documentary evidence concerning the deficiency EWT due; (3) its AFS enjoys the presumption of regularity and, thus, is not liable for the assessed deficiency WTC; and (4) there is no legal basis for the double imposition of the 20% per annum interest.

In its Comment, 6 dated November 7, 2014, respondent, through the OSG, asserts that: (1) its right to collect deficiency taxes had not yet prescribed since petitioner's act of filing a petition for review constituted a positive act which tolled the prescriptive period; (2) remand of the case for reception of further evidence is not the proper remedy since the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner is not newly discovered evidence which may justify a new trial. Also, petitioner should be deemed to have waived presentation of these documents as they failed to adduce the same during trial; and (3) the simultaneous imposition of deficiency interest and delinquency interest is allowed in view of Section 249 (C) (3) of the NIRC. It submits that if only a single 20% interest rate is imposed on petitioner, it would not be additionally penalized for its delinquency.

In its Reply, 7 dated September 13, 2016, petitioner argues that: (1) its filing of a petition for review is not a positive act which tolled the prescriptive period to collect; (2) there is no specific provision governing motions to reopen the case for reception of additional evidence, only that of paramount interest of justice. The interest of substantial justice is better served with reopening the case in order to resolve the issues on merit. Since respondent failed to present contrary evidence to petitioner's AFS, the AFS must stand; and (3) the simultaneous imposition of 20% deficiency interest and 20% delinquency interest is improper.

ISSUE

WHETHER OR NOT THE CTA EN BANC COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING THE ASSAILED AUGUST 22, 2013 DECISION AND FEBRUARY 26, 2014 RESOLUTION.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Respondent's Right to Collect Taxes

The period for the BIR to assess and collect an internal revenue tax is limited to three (3) years as mandated by Section 203 of the NIRC, as amended. 8 It provides that:

SEC. 203. Period of limitation upon assessment and collection. — Except as provided in the succeeding section, internal revenue taxes shall be assessed within three years after the last day prescribed by law for the filing of the return, and no proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall be begun after the expiration of such period: Provided, That in a case where a return is filed beyond the period prescribed by law, the three-year period shall be counted from the day the return was filed. For the purposes of this section, a return filed before the last day prescribed by law for the filing thereof shall be considered as filed on such last day. 9

The three-year period of limitations on the assessment and collection of national internal revenue taxes set by Section 203, as amended, may be affected, adjusted, or suspended, in accordance with Sections 223 and 224 of the NIRC. 10

The assessment of the tax is deemed made and the three-year period for collection of the assessed tax begins to run on the date the assessment notice had been released, mailed or sent by the BIR to the taxpayer. 11 The Court notes that there is no allegation as to when the assessment notice was released, mailed or sent by the BIR to petitioner. In Bank of the Philippines Islands v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 12 the Court considered the taxpayer's receipt of the assessment notice as the starting date of the prescriptive period.

In the instant case, petitioner received the FAN on January 17, 2006. In accordance with Section 203 of the NIRC, the BIR had three (3) years, or until January 18, 2009, to collect the taxes from petitioner by serving a warrant of distraint or levy on petitioner's properties, or by initiating any judicial proceedings against petitioner. The record reveals that respondent did not take any such action against petitioner.

Respondent contends that the statute of limitations was tolled when petitioner filed the petition for review with the CTA 2nd Division on November 8, 2006. It argues that such action constituted a positive act which dissuaded the government from enforcing collection on its withholding tax liabilities. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the filing of a petition for review did not toll the period since no restraining order was issued against the government.

The question before the Court is as follows: Did petitioner's appeal before the CTA and this Court toll the prescriptive period to collect the deficiency taxes? This question was answered in the affirmative by the Court in the case of Protector's Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 13 thus:

In the instant case, PSI filed a petition before the CTA to prevent the collection of the assessed deficiency tax. When the CTA dismissed the case, petitioner elevated the case before us, hoping for a review in its favor. The actions taken by the petitioner before the CTA and now before us, suspended the running of the statute of limitation. In the old case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Ker and Company, Ltd., we held:

Under Section 333 (renumbered to 271 during the instant case) of the Tax Code the running of the prescriptive period to collect deficiency taxes shall be suspended for the period during which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is prohibited from beginning a distraint and levy or instituting a proceeding in court, and for sixty days thereafter. In the case at bar, the pendency of the taxpayer's appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals and in the Supreme Court had the effect of temporarily staying the hands of the said Commissioner. If the taxpayer's stand that the pendency of the appeal did not stop the running of the period because the Court of Tax Appeals did not have jurisdiction over the case of taxes is upheld, taxpayers would be encouraged to delay the payment of taxes in the hope of ultimately avoiding the same. Under the circumstances, the running of the prescriptive period was suspended. 14

Accordingly, the prescriptive period to collect taxes from petitioner was suspended when petitioner initiated its appeal before the CTA and continued the same before this Court. Evidently, respondent's right to collect the deficiency taxes from petitioner has not prescribed.

Petitioner Liable for P1,922,787.07

As previously stated, the CTA En Banc affirmed in toto the CTA 2nd Division's discussion and ruling on the amount of deficiency EWT and deficiency WTC due from petitioner. It held petitioner liable for P1,922,787.07 deficiency EWT and P1,409,420.98 deficiency WTC.

First, petitioner argues that it remitted the proper EWT to the government. It insists that it should be allowed to present evidence in support of this allegation by remanding the case to the CTA 2nd Division.

The Court disagrees with petitioner.

As aptly pointed out by the CTA En Banc, this Court held in Republic v. Sandiganbayan15 that:

Admission of additional evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Indeed, in the furtherance of justice, the court may grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question. The remedy of reopening a case for presenting further proofs was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

While it is true that the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, prescribed an order of trial (Section 5, Rule 30), relaxation of the rule is permitted in sound discretion of the court. According to Justice Jose Y. Feria in his annotations on civil procedure:

After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons in the furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. 16

The Court finds that none of the grounds for reopening of a case is present herein. Petitioner's contention that paramount interest of justice requires the remand of the case lacks merit. Petitioner had the opportunity to present any documentary evidence in support of its defense during trial before the CTA 2nd Division. Its failure to present said evidence is its own negligent act, which the Court will not reward by remanding the instant case. Every litigation must come to an end. Parties cannot be given unbridled license to prove its case anew when its failure to do so was a product of its own negligence.

Second, petitioner argues that it remitted the proper WTC to the government, as shown in its AFS. It asserts that said AFS enjoys presumption of regularity. As a result, it is not required to submit supporting documents for items appearing therein, such as remittance of contributions to SSS, PhilHealth, and Pag-IBIG; payment of other employee/fringe benefits; and payment of bonuses & 13th month pay. Further, it contends that since it was able to present the AFS, the burden of proof shifted to respondent to prove that, indeed, the assessed WTC was not remitted by petitioner.

The Court again disagrees with petitioner.

Section 3, Rule 13 of A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, or the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, provides:

SECTION 3. Findings of Independent CPA. — The submission by the independent CPA of pre-marked documentary exhibits shall be subject to verification and comparison with the original documents, the availability of which shall be the primary responsibility of the party possessing such documents and, secondarily, by the independent CPA. The findings and conclusions of the independent CPA may be challenged by the parties and shall not be conclusive upon the Court, which may, in whole or in part, adopt such findings and conclusions subject to verification. 17

A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA is clear. Any document presented by the ICPA, such as the AFS, is subject to verification. The findings and conclusions of the ICPA are not conclusive on the CTA; they are subject to further verification. Accordingly, petitioner's failure to present supporting documents for those items appearing in its AFS is fatal. It remains liable for the deficiency WTC.

The Court also does not agree with petitioner's argument that the burden of proof shifted to respondent. Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith. The taxpayer has the duty to prove otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of duties, an assessment duly made by a BIR examiner and approved by his superior officers will not be disturbed. All presumptions are in favor of the correctness of tax assessments. 18

Having failed to substantiate with documentary evidence its claim that it properly remitted the deficiency EWT and WTC to the government, petitioner is liable for deficiency EWT in the amount of P1,922,787.07 and deficiency WTC in the amount of P1,409,420.98.

Simultaneous Imposition of 20%

The CTA En Banc upheld the simultaneous imposition of 20% deficiency interest and 20% delinquency interest upon petitioner. Petitioner insists that such imposition is improper. It cited the decision of the CTA En Banc in CTA E.B. No. 1117 and CTA E.B. No. 1119 entitled Liquigaz Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Liquigaz Philippines Corporation, respectively. Allegedly, the CTA En Banc held in these cases that deficiency interest extends only up to the time when the taxpayer is informed and required to pay the assessed tax which is usually the due date indicated in the FAN. On the other hand, the delinquency interest shall accrue from the time the taxpayer fails to pay the assessed tax within the time allowed as stated in the FAN. Thus, there can be no simultaneous imposition of both deficiency and delinquency interests. Delinquency interest can only be applied when the imposition of deficiency interest ends.

The Court again disagrees with petitioner.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the Court is not bound by the ruling of the CTA En Banc in CTA E.B. No. 1117 and CTA E.B. No. 1119. These cases are not on appeal before the Court and may not be considered by the Court in arriving at its ruling on the instant case.

The law is clear. The imposition of deficiency interest and delinquency interest is simultaneous, pursuant to Section 249 (A) (B) (C) of the NIRC, as amended, to wit:

SEC. 249. Interest. —

(A) In General. — There shall be assessed and collected on any unpaid amount of tax, interest at the rate of twenty percent (20%) per annum, or such higher rate as may be prescribed by rules and regulations, front the date prescribed for payment until the amount is fully paid.

(B) Deficiency Interest. — Any deficiency in the tax due, as the term is defined in this Code, shall be subject to the interest prescribed in Subsection (A) hereof, which interest shall be assessed and collected from the date prescribed for its payment until the full payment thereof.

(C) Delinquency Interest. — In case of failure to pay:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) A deficiency tax, or any surcharge or interest thereon on the due date appearing in the notice and demand of the Commissioner, there shall be assessed and collected on the unpaid amount, interest at the rate prescribed in Subsection (A) hereof until the amount is fully paid, which interest shall form part of the tax. 19

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure." 20

The NIRC is clear. It imposes deficiency interest at the rate of 20% per annum on any deficiency in the tax due from the date prescribed for its payment under the relevant tax law until full payment thereof. In addition, the NIRC imposes delinquency interest at the rate of 20% per annum on any deficiency tax, or any surcharge or interest thereon from its due date, appearing in the notice and demand of respondent, until the amount is fully paid. Failure to pay the deficiency tax assessed, including any surcharge or interest thereon, within the time prescribed for its payment justifies the imposition of delinquency interest. 21

It is worthy to note that tax revenue statutes are not generally intended to be liberally construed. Moreover, the CTA is a highly specialized court particularly created for the purpose of reviewing tax and customs cases. Its findings and conclusions are accorded great respect and are generally upheld by this Court, unless there is a clear showing of a reversible error or an improvident exercise of authority. Absent such errors, the challenged decision should be maintained. 22

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 22, 2013 Decision and February 26, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB Case No. 853 are AFFIRMEDin toto.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 47-72; penned by Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista with Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario, Associate Justices Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino, Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla and Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban, concurring.

2.Id. at 73-75; penned by Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista with Presiding Justice Roman G. Del Rosario, Associate Justices Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr., Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova, Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino, Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas and Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban, concurring.

3.Id. at 88-110; penned by Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova with Associate Justices Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr. and Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, concurring.

4.Id. at 172-183.

5.Id. at 108-109.

6.Id. at 449-466.

7.Id. at 472-480.

8.Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 510 Phil. 1, 14 (2005).

9. TAX CODE, as amended, Sec. 203; emphasis supplied.

10.Supra note 8.

11.Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 738 Phil. 577-586 (2014).

12.Id.

13. 386 Phil. 611 (2000).

14.Id. at 624-625; citing Republic of the Philippines v. Ker and Company, Ltd., 124 Phil. 822 (1966).

15. 643 Phil. 283 (2010); citations omitted.

16.Id. at 299-300.

17. A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, Rule 13, Sec. 3; emphases supplied.

18.Po v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 247 Phil. 487-493 (1988).

19. TAX CODE, Sec. 249.

20.Bolos v. Bolos, 648 Phil. 630, 637 (2010).

21. See First Lepanto Taisho Insurance Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 708 Phil. 616, 625 (2013).

22.Id.