FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 202878. June 4, 2014.]
ALVARO TABORA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. MARIA VIRGINIA M. JAYME, REPRESENTED BY JESUS A. JAYME, JR., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 4, 2014 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 202878 (Alvaro Tabora, et al. vs. Maria Virginia M. Jayme, represented by Jesus A. Jayme, Jr.). — Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 2 dated July 26, 2012 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93600.
On December 1, 1999, Maria Virginia M. Jayme (Jayme) filed a complaint for accion publiciana with damages against several individuals, including Alvaro Tabora, Rodolfo Fajardo, Emmanuel Sarvida, and Freshie Fontanos (petitioners), with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 80, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-39411. In her complaint, Jayme alleged that she is the owner of a parcel of land, containing an area of about 5,000 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-11041 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. That sometime in 1997, she discovered that the petitioners, together with the other defendants therein, had occupied and constructed various structures in her property without her knowledge and consent. Jayme then demanded the petitioners and the other defendants to vacate her property and to pay rent, but they refused to do so.
The petitioners and the other defendants filed a consolidated answer with counterclaims, alleging that TCT No. RT-11041 is spurious and/or irregularly issued and, therefore, a nullity; that they are qualified applicants under the Friar Lands Act and have already filed their applications to own the respective areas occupied by them. Further, they claimed that they have already acquired ownership of the portions of the subject property occupied by them through acquisitive prescription, having occupied the same for more than 30 years, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest.
After the submission of the respective pre-trial briefs of the parties, a pre-trial conference was conducted on February 28, 2002. Meanwhile, the petitioners and the other defendants filed with the RTC a motion, which seeks permission from the court to allow them to question Jayme's claim of ownership over the property. The RTC denied the said motion in its Order dated May 21, 2003. Trial on the merits of the case ensued thereafter.
During the hearing on November 27, 2006, Jayme's counsel manifested that he has no more witness to present. The RTC then, in its Order of even date, set the initial presentation of the petitioners' and the other defendants' evidence on February 12, 2007. On December 21, 2006, Jayme made a formal offer of her evidence. The scheduled hearing for the petitioners' and the other defendants' presentation of evidence was cancelled and reset on several occasions, until it was reset on November 26, 2007.
Meanwhile, on September 6, 2007, a motion to withdraw as counsel for the petitioners was filed by Atty. Pastor M. Reyes. The motion was granted by the RTC in its Order dated September 28, 2007. The RTC then directed the petitioners to secure the services of a new counsel. On November 23, 2007, a notice of entry of appearance for the petitioners with motion to reschedule the hearing for the initial presentation of the petitioner's evidence was filed by Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo (Atty. Espejo) with the RTC. TcHDIA
During the scheduled hearing on November 26, 2007, the petitioners and the other defendants failed to present their evidence despite due notice. The RTC then issued an Order on even date, which resets the hearing on January 21, 2008. The RTC warned the petitioners and the other defendants that the failure on their part to present their evidence on the next scheduled hearing will be considered a waiver of their right to present evidence.
The scheduled hearing on January 21, 2008 was again reset on March 3, 2008 since the counsel of Jayme was not around. On March 3, 2008, the petitioners and the other defendants again failed to present their evidence; instead, their counsel filed a motion to suspend the proceedings on the ground that there is a pending petition for cancellation of the title to the subject property. On the other hand, Jayme's counsel made an oral motion to consider the case submitted for decision due to the petitioners' and the other defendants' failure to present their evidence. On March 17, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, which denied the motion to suspend the proceedings and considered the case submitted for decision on account of the failure of the petitioners and other defendants to present their evidence.
Meanwhile, on March 25, 2008, a compromise agreement dated February 27, 2008 was executed between Jayme and the other defendants, stating that the former has already agreed to sell to the latter certain portions of the subject property. On February 27, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision, with respect to the other defendants, based on the aforementioned compromise agreement.
On November 18, 2008, the RTC rendered a Decision, which ordered the petitioners to vacate the subject property and pay Jayme attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00. The petitioners filed an appeal with the CA, claiming that they were denied due process when the RTC considered the case submitted for decision on account of their failure to present evidence.
On July 26, 2012, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, which affirmed the RTC Decision dated November 18, 2008.
In the instant petition, the petitioners claim that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to present evidence; that they were denied due process and, hence, the decision against them is a nullity. They likewise maintain that their possession of the subject property had ripened into ownership, having possessed the same for more than 30 years. They further claim that Jayme's title over the subject property is spurious and is thus a nullity.
The petition is denied.
"The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can present its side or defend its interest in due course, there is no denial of procedural due process." 3 "Verily, so long as a party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process." 4
A perusal of the records of this case shows that, contrary to their insinuation, the petitioners were not denied due process when the RTC considered the case below submitted for decision sans the presentation of their evidence. It cannot be gainsaid that the RTC accorded every opportunity to the petitioners to present their evidence. However, the petitioners failed to present their evidence despite due notice and the various postponements of the hearings below. Accordingly, it is the petitioners themselves who should be blamed for their failure to present their evidence.
That it is Jayme's counsel who failed to appear on the January 21, 2008 hearing is immaterial. To stress, the RTC, in its Order dated November 26, 2007, already informed the petitioners that the failure on their part to present their evidence on the next scheduled hearing would mean that they are already waiving their right to present evidence. Nonetheless, the petitioners, during the hearing on March 3, 2008, still failed to present their evidence. In an apparent intent to further delay the proceedings below, the petitioners instead filed a motion to suspend the proceedings due to a pending suit to cancel the TCT from which Jayme's title to the subject property was derived.
The petitioners posited that their counsel Atty. Espejo failed to appear during the November 26, 2007 hearing since she filed a motion to reschedule the said hearing. This, however, does not justify Atty. Espejo's non-appearance during the said hearing; she cannot simply assume that her motion to reschedule the hearing would be automatically granted by the court. Until the court issues an order granting her motion to reschedule the hearing, Atty. Espejo should have prepared to present the evidence for the petitioners during the scheduled hearing date. "A motion for postponement is a privilege and not a right. A movant for postponement should not assume beforehand that his motion will be granted. The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is a matter that is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court." 5SaHcAC
In any case, the Court notes that the petitioners' arguments as against Jayme's claim are plainly bereft of any merit. The petitioners' possession of the subject property for more than 30 years, assuming the same to be true, would not ripen into ownership since the subject property is covered by a Torrens title issued in the name of Jayme. In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. 6 "Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession. Consequently, proof of possession by the defendants is both immaterial and inconsequential." 7
Anent the petitioners' claim that the Torrens title issued in the name of Jayme over the subject property is spurious, suffice it to say that the same is but a mere claim unsupported by any evidence. "In civil cases, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. It is incumbent upon the party claiming affirmative relief from the court to convincingly prove its claim. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof under [the Court's] Rules. In short, mere allegations are not evidence." 8
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 13-22.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion, with Associate Justices Vicente S. E. Veloso and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring; id. at 29-40.
3. The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company v. Enario, G.R. No. 182075, September 15, 2010, 630 SCRA 607, 620, citing Air Phils. Corp. v. Int'l. Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., 481 Phil. 366, 386 (2004).
4. Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 812, 826 (2002).
5. Memita v. Masongsong, 551 Phil. 241, 251 (2007).
6. Spouses Ragudo v. Fabella Estate Tenants Association, Inc., 503 Phil. 751, 763 (2005).
7. Natalia Realty Corporation v. Vallez, 255 Phil. 510, 519 (1989).
8. Manaloto v. Veloso III, G.R. No. 171365, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 347, 367.