FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 231045. March 18, 2021.]
ROBERT SURBAN y GALLARDO a.k.a. "BORORONG", petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 18, 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC
"G.R. No. 231045 (ROBERT SURBAN y GALLARDO a.k.a. "Bororong," petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent). — For resolution before this Court is a Petition 1 dated May 4, 2017 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution 2 dated October 21, 2016 and Resolution 3 dated April 17, 2017, issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in the case entitled People of the Philippines v. Robert Surban and docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 36164, which denied Robert Surban y Gallardo's (petitioner) Motion to Reopen the Case/For New Trial4 dated June 21, 2016 (Motion for New Trial). In the said Motion, petitioner sought to re-open the case and prayed for new trial on the basis of supposedly newly discovered evidence, which consisted of the Resolution 5 dated May 23, 2016 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Andres, Catanduanes in a related case, 6 quashing Search Warrant No. 2011-03 which is the same search warrant subject of the instant case.
The Antecedent Facts
On August 11, 2011, a team of police officers and several barangay officials went to the house of petitioner at Real St., Barangay Codon, San Andres, Catanduanes, 7 to serve Search Warrant No. 2011-03 8 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes for the search and forthwith seizure of a caliber .45 pistol and caliber .38 revolver. 9
Upon their arrival, the team served upon petitioner the Search Warrant. During the search, Police Officer Edward Barcenas found five pieces of live ammunitions for caliber .38 10 in petitioner's bedroom. Meanwhile Chief of Police Francisco R. Rojas, together with the barangay officials and media representative, proceeded to search petitioner's store adjacent to his house 11 and discovered a plastic bag containing marijuana in an open wooden shelf, visible to the searching team. 12 Notably, petitioner was seated inside his living room while the police officers conducted the search of the other rooms in his house. 13
Accordingly, separate Informations were filed in connection with the seized ammunitions and marijuana.
An Information dated August 12, 2011 was filed with the RTC of Virac, Catanduanes for illegal possession of marijuana, a dangerous drug, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 11th day of August 2011 at around 7:30 o' clock [sic] in the evening at barangay Codon, municipality of San Andres[,] province of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1) brick of marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total volume/ weights [sic] of 20.325 grams, to the damage and prejudice of the State and public interest. 14
Another Information for illegal possession of live ammunition in violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree 1866, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294 was filed with the MTC of San Andres, Catanduanes and docketed as Criminal Case No. 4027. 15
During the proceedings before the trial court in Criminal Case No. 4447, petitioner, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty and during pre-trial made the following admissions, among others: (1) existence of the Search Warrant No. 2011-03; and (2) existence of the Return of the Search Warrant. 16 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Notably, petitioner never filed a Motion to Quash nor questioned Search Warrant No. 2011-03 during the proceedings before the RTC.
On November 15, 2013, the RTC rendered its Judgment 17 of even date finding petitioner guilty of violation Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00. 18
Thereafter, on November 20, 2013, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the RTC in its Order 19 dated November 21, 2013.
After the parties' submission of their respective Briefs, the CA issued a Decision dated October 1, 2015, which affirmed the RTC's Judgment dated November 15, 2013 in Criminal Case No. 4447. 20
On November 10, 2015 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 21 through his new counsel of record, questioning the validity of the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2011-03. Petitioner argues that Search Warrant No. 2011-03 is a general search warrant and had been issued on the basis of perjured testimonies of its applicant. 22 In a Resolution 23 dated March 3, 2016, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, ruling:
In praying for his acquittal, accused-appellant argued in his Motion for Reconsideration that the police officers' implementation of a general search warrant, which in turn was issued pursuant to a perjured testimony of its applicant, violated his Constitutional right. At first glance, such argument might seem an issue raised for the first time on appeal. However, accused-appellant's argument was hinged on the police officers' alleged fishing expedition and the inadmissibility as evidence of the marijuana found in his abandoned store. Such arguments were duly addressed and passed upon by Us when We rendered the October 1, 2015 Decision that is sought to be reconsidered. The same is true with accused-appellant's other contention that the prosecution witnesses' testimonies should not be given credence because it contains inconsistencies. 24
Notably, petitioner no longer elevated the foregoing Decision and Resolution of the CA. 25
On March 22, 2016, petitioner received a copy of the foregoing CA Resolution. 26 Thereafter, on June 21, 2016, or around three months from his receipt of the CA Resolution dated March 3, 2016, petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial with the CA praying that the case be re-opened and for the court to allow a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 27 In support of the said motion, petitioner alleged that the MTC of San Andres, Catanduanes, in the related case docketed as Criminal Case No. 4027, issued a Resolution dated May 23, 2016 (MTC Resolution) which quashed Search Warrant No. 2011-03. 28 Notably, Search Warrant No. 2011-03 is the same search warrant which yielded the corpus delicti subject of the present case. Although the MTC Resolution originally indicated in its dispositive portion that Search Warrant No. 2014-33 was quashed, the clerical error was eventually corrected by the MTC in its Order dated November 3, 2016 which amended the MTC Resolution to correctly reflect that it was Search Warrant No. 2011-03 that was quashed. 29 CAIHTE
In the said Resolution, the MTC found that Search Warrant No. 2011-03 was defective and violated petitioner's Constitutional rights. In particular, the MTC Resolution stated that the applicant for the issuance of the search warrant for illegal possession of firearms had no personal knowledge that the firearms were indeed unlicensed and no negative certification to that effect was ever presented during its application. 30 As found by the MTC, the records reveal that it was only three days after the service and implementation of Search Warrant No. 2011-03 that a Request for Verification of Firearms Holder was belatedly made. 31 Accordingly, the MTC, citing our ruling in Paper Industries Corp. of the Phils., et al. v. Judge Asuncion, 32 ruled that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2014-33 was issued based merely on the personal belief of the applicant and that there was no probable cause based on personal knowledge which would have warranted the issuance of the search warrant in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights. 33
In response, respondent through its counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment 34 (To Appellant's Motion to Reopen the Case/For New Trial) dated September 9, 2016. In its Comment, respondent pointed out that the CA's Decision affirming the RTC Judgment had already attained finality considering that petitioner failed to file a timely appeal and that petitioner's Motion for New Trial was filed out of time. 35 Moreover, respondent argues that petitioner's failure to file a Motion to Quash with the RTC in Criminal Case No. 4447 constitutes a waiver of his right to question the validity of Search Warrant No. 2011-03. In particular, respondent draws attention to the fact that petitioner filed his Motion to Quash with the MTC in Criminal Case No. 4027 on November 26, 2015, at which point the CA had already promulgated its Decision affirming the RTC Judgment finding him guilty of violating of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 36
The CA Ruling
Thereafter, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dated October 21, 2016 which denied petitioner's Motion for New Trial for having been filed out of time and likewise ruling that the MTC's Resolution is not a newly discovered evidence as contemplated by law. 37
Unperturbed, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 1, 2016 wherein petitioner clarified that due to a clerical error, the MTC Resolution incorrectly identified the Search Warrant that was declared quashed. Petitioner pointed out instead, attaching the Order of the MTC correcting and amending the MTC Resolution that it was Search Warrant No. 2011-03 that had been declared fatally defective, which is the same Search Warrant subject of the proceedings a quo. 38
In a Resolution dated April 17, 2017, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, reiterating that petitioner's Motion for New Trial had been filed out of time and that petitioner had waived his right to question Search Warrant No. 2011-03 by his failure to question the same before the RTC. Accordingly, the CA reiterated that it had already ruled on the validity of Search Warrant No. 2011-03. The pertinent portion of the Resolution, reads:
We resolve.
In the 24 October 2016 Resolution, this Court held that Our 01 October 2015 Decision has become final and executory as to accused-appellant on 06 April 2016. Of consequence therefore is that accused-appellant's Motion to Reopen the Case/For New Trial (filed on 21 June 2016) has been filed beyond the prescriptive period provided for under Section 14, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Notwithstanding the Amended Order which is herein presented as new evidence, this Court cannot sanction accused-appellant's plea for the liberalization of the Rules in his favor to accommodate the reopening of the case for trial not by reason of abuse on his part, but because the relief sought is already in excess of this Court's jurisdiction to grant.
Even more important, this Court, in affirming the Regional Trial Court's appealed 15 November 2013 Judgment, positively ruled on the validity of Search Warrant No. 2011-03. In failing to question the validity of the subject search warrant, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to assail the same. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
The MTC's Amended Order cannot expediently overturn this Court's 01 October 2015 Decision which already sustained the validity of Search Warrant No. 2011-03. As pointed out in the OSG's Comment, the accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to file a motion to quash search warrant as none had been filed before the Regional Trial Court which by chronological perspective, had proceeded ahead of the other cases.
Indeed, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. In the case at bench, for accused-appellant's failure to file the Motion to Quash in the criminal proceeding for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, he is deemed to have waived the same. The Amended Order which he presents as new evidence cannot be considered given that this Court already made a pronouncement as to the validity of Search Warrant No. 2011-03 in the 01 October 2015 Decision which attained finality. 39
Petitioner now comes before this Court questioning the foregoing Resolutions of the CA denying his Motion for New Trial, raising the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA CORRECTLY RULED IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND FOR NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE MTC RESOLUTION WHICH QUASHED SEARCH WARRANT NO. 2011-03.
Our Ruling
We resolve to deny the petition.
Petitioner's Motion for New
As correctly held by the CA, petitioner's Motion for New Trial was filed out of time which warranted its outright denial.
Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution should be filed within 15 days from notice. The 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. 40 If no appeal or motion for reconsideration is filed within this period, the judgment or final resolution becomes final and executory. aScITE
While it is conceded that procedural rules are to be construed liberally, 41 it is also true that the provisions on reglementary period or those prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial businesses. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative. 42
In Ponciano, Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, 43 this Court refused to admit a motion for reconsideration filed only one day late, pointing out that the Court has, in the past, similarly refused to admit motions for reconsideration which were filed late without sufficient justification. 44
More recently, this Court in Spouses Mila Yap-Sumndad v. Friday's Holdings, Inc., 45 upheld the CA's resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration for having been filed 20 days beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
In the instant case, petitioner received, through counsel a copy of the CA Resolution dated March 3, 2016, denying his Motion for Reconsideration, on March 22, 2016. 46 Thus, petitioner had 15 days therefrom, or until April 6, 2016, within which to timely file his appeal to forestall the finality of the CA Decision, which affirmed his conviction. However, as admitted by petitioner himself, he no longer elevated the foregoing CA Decision to this Court. Thereafter, on June 21, 2016 or seventy-six (76) days after the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period, petitioner filed his Motion for New Trial. 47
Clearly from the foregoing narration, the Motion for New Trial was belatedly filed and the CA was correct in denying the same.
Moreover, although no Entry of Judgment of the CA Decision had been issued when petitioner filed his Motion for New Trial, the same cannot be made basis to allow his belated filing.
Judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law, and not by judicial declaration. The finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or no motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed. 48 The courts need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the same becomes final by operation of law. 49
The finality of the CA Decision having acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 50 The Court is without jurisdiction to modify, much less, reverse, a final and executory judgment. Invariably, petitioner's belated fi ling of the Motion for New Trial is not just a procedural lapse, but also a jurisdictional defect which effectively prevents the Court from taking cognizance of the present petition. 51
Petitioner failed to timely move
In any event, the CA correctly held that petitioner had already waived his right to question and assail Search Warrant No. 2011-03 on the grounds presently raised.
Petitioner citing the MTC Resolution issued in Criminal Case No. 4027, contends that Search Warrant No. 2011-03, is fatally defective considering that the applicant thereof had no personal knowledge of any probable cause for illegal possession of firearms considering that applicant failed to present any negative certification to that effect. As found by the MTC, the records reveal that it was only three days after the service and implementation of Search Warrant No. 2011-03 that a Request for Verification of Firearms Holder was belatedly made. 52
Notably, petitioner failed to file a similar pleading before the RTC in Criminal Case No. 4447, subject of the proceedings a quo. It was only in the Motion for New Trial filed in the CA did petitioner belatedly raise the defect in the application and issuance of Search Warrant No. 2011-03. Accordingly, the CA correctly denied petitioner's motion for not having been timely raised.
We have held that the omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise, said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
In this regard, the Court has ruled in a number of cases 53 that the omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions to quash search warrants. Furthermore, the Court distinctly stated in Abuan v. People, 54 that "the motion to quash the search warrant which the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress x x x." 55 Thus, the trial court could only take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the motion to quash if: (1) said issue was not available or existent when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In the instant case, the issue of the defect in the application and issuance of Search Warrant No. 2011-03, was already available and existent during the proceedings in the RTC. Petitioner cannot now be allowed to belatedly question the validity of Search Warrant No. 2011-03. DETACa
Petitioner Should have filed the
A motion to quash involves a review of whether or not the search warrant was properly issued, i.e., whether or not it complied with constitutional safeguards. Pertinently, the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are inscribed in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Relatedly, Sections 4 and 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sets forth the requisites for the issuance of search warrant:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant, record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Probable cause necessary prior to the issuance of a search warrant is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. 56 In this regard, for a search warrant to be valid, the determination of the existence of probable cause shall be done personally by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. 57 Moreover, reasonable minds may differ on the question of whether a particular affidavit/deposition or testimony of the affiant/deponent establishes probable cause. However, great deference is to be accorded to the Judge's determination. 58
Accordingly, in Abuan v. People, we emphasized the general rule that the task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determination of probable cause but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the records supporting the Judge's decision to issue the search warrant: HEITAD
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Reasonable minds may differ on the question of whether a particular affidavit/deposition or testimony of the affiant/deponent establishes probable cause. However, great deference is to be accorded to the Judge's determination. The affidavit/deposition supporting an application for a search warrant is presumed to be valid.
Affidavits/depositions for search warrants must be tested and interpreted by Judges in a common-sense and realistic fashion. They are normally drafted by non-lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. Technical requisites of elaborate specificity have no place in this area. The Judge in determining probable cause is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. Probable cause exists if a practical, common-sense evaluation of the facts and circumstances show a fair possibility that dangerous drugs will be found in the asserted location. There must be a factual showing sufficient to comprise probable cause of particular facts and circumstances so as to allow the Judge to make an independent evaluation of the matter. It is sufficient if the information put forth in the affidavit/deposition or testimony of the affiant/deponent are believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant/deponent as true. Sufficient information must be presented to allow a Judge to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare/unsubstantiated contention of others.
The general rule is that the task of a reviewing court is not to conduct a de novo determination of probable cause but only to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the records supporting the Judge's decision to issue the search warrant. The reviewing court is simply to ensure that the Judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed, and once ascertained that the Judge had substantial basis for concluding that a search would unearth evidence of a wrongdoing, the determination of probable cause must be upheld. In the absence of any showing that the Judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal examination he so conducted on the affiants/deponents before him, there is no basis for doubting the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.
However, the finding of probable cause of the Judge may be set aside and the search warrant issued by him based on his finding may be quashed; the evidence seized by the police officers based on said search warrant may be suppressed if the accused presents clear and convincing evidence that the police officers and/or a government informant made a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in said affidavit/deposition or testimony which is essential or necessary to a showing of probable cause. Such evidence must focus on the state of mind of the affiants/deponents that he was conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation. The requirement that a search warrant not issue but upon probable cause would be reduced to a nullity if a police officer and his informant are able to use deliberately falsehood allegations to demonstrate probable cause and, having misled the Judge, was able to remain confident that the ploy succeeded. However, innocent and negligent omissions or misrepresentation of a police officer or government informant will not invalidate a search warrant. And even if the police officer or government informant may have deliberately made a falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth in his or her affidavit/deposition but the remaining portions thereof are sufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant will not be quashed for lack of probable cause. 59 (Citations omitted)
In the instant case, this Court is faced with a peculiar scenario, wherein a Search Warrant yielded seized items, pertaining to two separate offenses, the subject matter of which falls within the jurisdiction of two different courts and separate Informations were filed accordingly, i.e., illegal possession of live ammunition 60 filed with the MTC, and illegal possession of marijuana 61 filed with the RTC.
We hold that petitioner should have filed the Motion to Quash before the RTC instead of the MTC.
Again, the task of a reviewing Court in resolving a Motion to Quash is to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the records supporting the Judge's decision to issue the search warrant.
Search Warrant No. 2011-03 was issued by RTC, while the Motion to Quash was filed and resolved by a lower court, MTC. MTC granted the Motion to Quash and ultimately declared that the Search Warrant No. 2011-03 issued by RTC was null and void. Necessarily, in resolving the Motion to Quash, MTC reviewed the findings of RTC to determine if it had substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed and that a search would unearth evidence of a wrongdoing. MTC's review of the findings of RTC, a court of higher jurisdiction, completely disregards the doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference.
The doctrine of non-interference or judicial stability is a time-honored policy that mandates that "no court can interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction." 62 Simply put, a court cannot interfere with the judgment, order, or resolution of another court exercising concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The doctrine finds basis on the concept of jurisdiction: "a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment." 63
If a court cannot interfere in the judgment, order, resolution of another court exercising concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction, all the more reason, can a court of lower jurisdiction such as the MTC not interfere with or nullify the writ or order of a court of higher jurisdiction such as the RTC. aDSIHc
Accordingly, it was improper for MTC to resolve much less entertain the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 2011-03 issued by the RTC.
Given the foregoing, the Court no longer deems it necessary to discuss the other arguments raised in the instant petition for review on certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated May 4, 2017 filed by petitioner Robert Surban is DENIED. The Resolution dated October 21, 2016 and the Resolution dated April 17, 2017, issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36164, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-9.
2.Id. at 103-111; penned by Associate Justice Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Franchito N. Diamante, concurring.
3.Id. at 123-127.
4.Id. at 62-64.
5.Id. at 65-69; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Arnel P. Cezar.
6. Criminal Case No. 4027 for illegal possession of ammunition in violation of P.D. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294.
7.Rollo, p. 17.
8.Id. at 91.
9.Id.
10.Id. at 65.
11.Id. at 17.
12.Id.
13.Id. at 25.
14.Id. at 15.
15.Id. at 65.
16.Id. at 16.
17.Id. at 145-151.
18.Id. at 151.
19.Id. at 27.
20.Id. at 50.
21.Id. at 183-187.
22.Id. at 183.
23.Id. at 59-61.
24.Id. at 60.
25.Id. at 4.
26.Id. at 62.
27.Id. at 61-64.
28.Id. at 62-69.
29.Id. at 115-116.
30.Id. at 67-69.
31.Id. at 67.
32. 366 Phil. 717 (1999).
33.Rollo, pp. 67-68.
34.Id. at 71-81.
35.Id. at 72-73.
36.Id. at 76-77.
37.Id. at 108.
38.Id. at 62-70.
39.Id. at 125-127.
40.Barrio Fiesta Restaurant v. Beronia, 789 Phil. 520, 535 (2016); Ponciano, Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, 591 Phil. 194, 209 (2008).
41.BBB v. Cantilla, G.R. No. 225410, June 17, 2020.
42.Ponciano, Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, supra at 209.
43.Id.
44.Id. at 208-209.
45. G.R. No. 235586, January 22, 2020.
46.Rollo, p. 62.
47.Id. at 61-64.
48.Barrio Fiesta Restaurant v. Beronia, supra note 40 at 535.
49.Testate Estate of Manuel v. Biascan, 401 Phil. 49, 59 (2000).
50.Rep. of the Phils. v. Catubag, 830 Phil. 226, 234 (2018).
51.Ponciano v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, supra note 40 at 212-213.
52.Rollo, p. 67.
53.Abuan v. People, 536 Phil. 672 (2006); Garaygay v. People, 390 Phil. 586 (2000); People v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 604 (1998).
54.Id. at 692.
55.Id.
56.People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 869, 880 (1998).
57.Chiong v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 604, 619 (1998).
58.Abuan v. People, supra note 53 at 699.
59.Id. at 609-701.
60. In violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294.
61. In violation Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165.
62.United Alloy Phils. Corp. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 773 Phil. 242, 260 (2015).
63.Id.