Suplico v. Lokin, Jr.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 199520. August 3, 2016.]

ATTY. ROLEX T. SUPLICO and ATTY. DEMAREE J.B. RAVAL, petitioners, vs. ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., and ATTY. SALVADOR C. HIZON, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated August 3, 2016, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 199520 — ATTY. ROLEX T. SUPLICO and ATTY. DEMAREE J.B. RAVAL, Petitioners, v. ATTY. LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., and ATTY. SALVADOR C. HIZON, Respondents.

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated August 9, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101403 and the Resolution 2 dated November 23, 2011 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners Rolex T. Suplico and Demaree J.B. Raval.

CA-G.R. SP No. 101403 is a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Orders dated October 8, 2007, July 3, 2007 and October 23, 2006 of Presiding Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio and Judge Alfredo C. Flores of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 133450-PSG for estafa against respondents Luis K. Lokin, Jr. and Salvador C. Hizon. 3 The dispositive portions of the three Orders assailed in the Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals are as follows:

(1) Omnibus Order dated October 23, 2006:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, let therefore a warrant of arrest issue against both accused Salvador C. Hizon and Luis K. Lokin Jr.

Upon the other hand, both the private complainants Demaree J.B. Raval and Rolex T. Suplico are directed to comply with the payment of legal fees in accordance with A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC of the Supreme Court dated 01 March 2000, amending Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof and to submit immediately, thereafter, the proof of payment for the guidance of the Court and of the accused. 4

(2) Omnibus Order dated July 3, 2007:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions for Reconsideration of Accused Hizon and Lokin are GRANTED, and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration with Manifestation of Private Complainants is DENIED. Accordingly, the Information in Criminal Case No. 133450-PSG is hereby QUASHED for lack of probable cause and non-payment of the required docket fees. Accordingly, the instant case is, as it is hereby, DISMISSED. 5

(3) Omnibus Order dated October 8, 2007:

WHEREFORE, Private Complainants' Motions for Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto are DENIED for lack of merit. 6

The Court of Appeals summarized the factual and procedural antecedents of the case, thus: DcHSEa

The present case originated from a joint affidavit dated 30 October 2003 of herein petitioner Rolex Suplico (hereafter, "Suplico") and herein movant-intervenor Demaree J.B. Raval (hereafter, "Raval") filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig.

As stated in the petition, sometime in February 1994, Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc. (hereafter, "Aerocom") engaged the services of the law firm of Raval, Suplico and Lokin, Lawyers (hereafter, "Law Firm") as its counsel for the recovery of certain shares of stocks and cash dividends sequestered by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Aerocom committed to pay the Law Firm attorney's fees equivalent to forty percent (40%) of any recovery made by it for and in behalf of Aerocom. This was evidenced by a Letter-Engagement Agreement dated 21 February 1994 signed by Pablo L. Lobregat, President of Aerocom and Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. with the conformity of herein private respondent Luis K. Lokin, Jr. (hereafter, "Lokin") in behalf of the Law Firm.

As partners of the Law Firm, petitioner Suplico, movant-intervenor Raval and herein private respondents Lokin and Salvador C. Hizon (hereafter, "Hizon") agreed among themselves that the division of any attorney's fees realized from the Aerocom Case shall be shared among them as follows:

Thirty percent (30%) to Hizon;

Accordingly, the Law Firm handled for Aerocom a civil case before the Sandiganbayan entitled: "Aerocom Investors & Managers, Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)" for the recovery of cash dividends and shares of stocks and thereafter, obtained a favorable decision.

Upon its finality, Raval caused the filing of a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution with the Sandiganbayan and the same was granted.

Consequently, per Sheriff's Reports dated 10 June 1999 and 28 December 1999, all the cash dividends and the interests thereon, in the amount of PhP362,078,428.74, were released to Lokin and Hizon for and in behalf of Aerocom. From the total recovery, Lokin and Hizon, in behalf of the Law Firm, also received from Aerocom the full attorney's fees in the amount of PhP144,831,371.49, which is the 40% of the total recovered amount. However, Lokin and Hizon denied having received payment. Thus, Suplico and Raval filed a complaint for estafa against Hizon and Lokin before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig.

On 15 March 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig issued a Resolution dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.

Evidently not satisfied with the resolution, Suplico and Raval elevated the case to the Department of Justice.

On 7 February 2005, the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of the city prosecutor and ruled that probable cause exists to charge Lokin and Hizon with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. SCaITA

Consequently, Lokin and Hizon filed a motion for reconsideration on the findings of the Secretary of Justice, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 16 June 2006.

Hence, the corresponding Information was filed before the RTC, Pasig City, Branch 167 on 10 July 2006.

Upon the filing of the said information, Lokin filed before the RTC a Motion to Order Payment of Fees (Under Special Appearance) on 19 July 2006 and a Motion for the Judicial Determination of Probable Cause on 21 July 2006.

On 23 October 2006, the trial court issued one of the assailed orders directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Lokin and Hizon and directing Suplico and Raval to comply with the payment of legal fees in accordance with A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC dated 1 March 2000.

However, on motion for reconsideration separately filed by Lokin and Hizon, the RTC issued its assailed order dated 3 July 2007, which quashed the Information filed against Lokin and Hizon on the grounds of lack of probable cause and non-payment of docket fees.

Then, the court a quo further affirmed the dismissal of the criminal case in its assailed order dated 8 October 2007 by denying the motion for reconsideration filed by Suplico and Raval. 7

Suplico filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that the Orders of the RTC were rendered with grave abuse of discretion. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101403 and was assigned to the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals. Suplico argued therein that: cHECAS

1. The RTC cannot require them to pay docket fees because they manifested their intention to reserve their right to institute separately the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged;

2. The RTC cannot quash the Information on the ground of non-payment of filing fees as this is not among the grounds in Rule 117, Section 3;

3. The RTC cannot quash the Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, as it is not within its power to overturn the ruling of the Secretary of Justice; and

4. On the substantive aspect of the case, Suplico claims that there is probable cause to indict Hizon and Lokin because, contrary to the ruling of public respondent, there was never any waiver of all their claims arising from the Aerocom case.

On December 27, 2007, Raval filed a Motion for Intervention with attached Petition-In-Intervention likewise assailing the orders of public respondent dismissing the criminal case due to lack of probable cause and nonpayment of docket fees.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment opining that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the estafa case for want of probable cause as it was in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and that there was abjectly no evidence that the crime of estafa has been committed by Lokin and Hizon.

On August 9, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari of Suplico and denying the Petition-in-Intervention of Raval. The Court of Appeals ruled that:

1. The assailed order dismissing the criminal case for lack of probable cause had long attained finality for failure of the public prosecutor to file a motion for reconsideration. The private complainant may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal the criminal aspect of the case;

2. Only the Office of the Solicitor General can bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People in criminal proceedings pending before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court;

3. The insistence of Suplico and Raval that they have manifested their intention to reserve their right to file a separate civil action for the recovery of damages only bolster the fact that they have no business in this case as no civil aspect was involved; and

4. The records do not show that the RTC's finding that there was no probable cause was based on whims or caprices. The OSG itself, as the representative of the State, opposes the petition and opined that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC.

Suplico and Raval filed the present Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals decision, reiterating their arguments in the Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Petitioners add that they have legal standing to file the dismissed Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals since certiorari is an independent action and is neither a continuation nor a part of the trial resulting in the judgment complained of. Thus, according to petitioners, certiorari does not require the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General. Furthermore, according to petitioners, public respondent judge is an officer of the government that is legally entitled to representation by the OSG under Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code. Hence, the ruling of the Court of Appeals that it is the OSG that should have instituted the petition for certiorari would lead to an absurd situation wherein the OSG becomes the counsel of both the petitioner and public respondent judge. 8 Petitioners claim that they are the aggrieved parties and are parties in interest, citing Ong v. Genio, 9 wherein this Court held: AHDacC

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.

We disagree. As held by the Court of Appeals, petitioners have manifested their intention to reserve their right to file a separate civil action for the recovery of damages. Accordingly, there never was a civil aspect to the criminal case pending before the Regional Trial Court and petitioners cannot be considered as parties-in-interest to said case. This Court held in Ong, the same above case cited by petitioners, that:

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. 10

Neither do we find any merit in petitioners' argument that if it is the OSG that should have instituted the petition for certiorari, there would be an absurd situation wherein the OSG becomes the counsel of both the petitioner and public respondent judge. We have held that in certiorari petitions, a judge whose order is challenged in an appellate court does not have to file any answer or take active part in the proceeding unless expressly directed by order of this Court. It is the duty of the private respondent to appear and defend, both in his/her behalf and in behalf of the Court or judge whose order or decision is at issue. In fact, the judge should maintain a detached attitude from the case and should not waste his time by taking an active part in a proceeding which relates to official actuations in a case but should apply himself to his principal task of hearing and adjudicating the cases in his court. He is merely a nominal party to the case and has neither personal interest nor personality therein. 11

Finally, this Court is in agreement with the Court of Appeals that public respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction in finding that there was no probable cause to indict respondents. The insistence of petitioners Suplico and Raval that public respondent judge should have given due courtesy to the finding of probable cause by the previous judge Alfredo C. Flores (who went on leave at the time the motion for reconsideration was decided until his retirement) and by the Secretary of Justice (who reversed the findings of the city prosecutor that there was no probable cause to charge private respondents) has no basis in law or jurisprudence. The inherent power of a court to amend and control its processes and orders includes the right to reverse itself if only to make its findings and conclusions conformable to law and justice. Every court has the power and the corresponding duty to review, amend or reverse its findings and conclusions whenever its attention is seasonably called to any error or defect that it may have committed. 12 IDSEAH

As regards the determination by the Secretary of Justice, we have held time and again that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case (which includes dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused) rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court, as it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. 13 The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case. In the exercise of its discretion, it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. On the contrary, reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would in fact be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. 14

In light of the foregoing discussion, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED." CAGUIOA, J., took no part; PERALTA, J., additional member per raffle dated May 23, 2016.

Very truly yours,

 

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1.  Rollo, pp. 56-67; penned by Associate Justice Florito S. Macalino with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Ramon M. Bato, Jr. concurring.

2.  Id. at 53-54.

3.  The case was originally raffled to Judge Alfredo C. Flores but he went on leave in November 2006 and retired in December 2006. Thereafter, the case was handled by Judge Agnes Reyes-Carpio as pairing judge.

4.  Rollo, p. 185.

5.  Id. at 178.

6.  Id. at 172.

7.  Id. at 57-59.

8.  Id. at 42.

9.  623 Phil. 835, 842 (2009), citing Rodriguez v. Gadiane, 527 Phil. 691, 696 (2006).

10.  Ong v. Genio, id. at 842.

11.  Turqueza v. Hernando, 186 Phil. 333, 341 (1980).

12.  Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna, 541 Phil. 318, 322 (2007).

13.  Crespo v. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465, 476 (1987).

14.  Flores v. Gonzalez, 640 Phil. 694, 706-707 (2010).