FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 194144. September 9, 2015.]
ALICIA CADS SUNGA AND IRENE CADS, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES BENJAMIN AND REGINA SANTOS, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedSeptember 9, 2015 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 194144 (Alicia Cads Sunga and Irene Cads v. Spouses Benjamin and Regina Santos). — The Court DENIES the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioners for lack of merit.
In its Orders dated 30 May 2008 and 7 August 2008, 2 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled for the final dismissal of the Complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and preliminary injunction instituted by petitioners, given their failure to follow its Order dated 27 September 2007 3 to timely implead the Tolentino heirs as indispensable parties.
In its Decision and Resolution dated 28 April 2010 and 24 September 2010, 4 respectively, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA maintained that the negligence of the counsel of petitioners in informing them of the RTC Order to implead the Tolentino heirs did not excuse them. In any event, as to the merits of the appeal, the CA ruled that petitioner's alleged right of first refusal under Section 6 of the Urban Land Reform Act covered only parcels of land classified as both an Area for Priority Development (APD) and an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). 5 Appreciating that the records only depicted their claimed lot as an APD, 6 the CA held that petitioners did not have a prima facie proof of their claim.
In the instant petition, petitioners no longer question the status of the Tolentino heirs as indispensable parties. Instead, they blame their counsel for failing to notify them of the Order of the RTC dated 27 September 2007. As they were not informed, they posit that the RTC should excuse them.
Such an excuse is untenable. Notice to counsel is notice to client. 7 Petitioners are deemed to have been notified of the directive of the trial court to implead the Tolentino heirs, even if the former's counsel failed to inform them of that directive. 8
Although jurisprudence provides exceptions to that basic principle, this Court will not make one in this case. We note, as the CA did, that as early as 1995, petitioners already knew that the RTC had already declared the heirs of the spouses Cecilio and Regina Tolentino as indispensable co-defendants given that the dispute below involved the sale by the latter of their own properties. 9 In the Pre-Trial Order of the RTC dated 30 January 2007, the stipulations of the parties included the admission that the spouses Tolentino, "being the owners then and the sellers of the property in question are the primary defendants in this case." 10 Based on the foregoing, this Court reckons that petitioners simply refused to include the Tolentino heirs despite clearly knowing that the latter were indispensable parties.
Furthermore, this Court observes that during the hearing of the case on 1 February 2008, petitioners through their new counsel already knew of the RTC Order dated 27 September 2007. The records show that the counsel of respondent manifested in open court that petitioners have yet to implead the Tolentino heirs. 11 Therefore, petitioners could have endeavored to comply with the Order then. But, instead of heeding the words of the trial court to include the Tolentino heirs as indispensable parties, petitioners filed a belated Amended Complaint 12 that still did not contain the names of the heirs.
Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court 13 allows the trial court to dismiss a complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff to comply with its order. Therefore, our procedural rules sanction the ruling of the courts a quo. Nevertheless, petitioners herein maintain that technicalities should not trump the merits of their appeal. They reiterate their prayer for the remand of the case to the RTC so that they can prove that they are entitled to the right of first refusal under Section 6 of the Urban Land Reform Act. They also dispute the finding of the CA that their claimed property must be both an APD and a ULRZ before it falls within the protected ambit of the law. acEHCD
However, a long line of jurisprudence 14 supports the ruling of the CA that the right of first refusal under Section 6 of the Urban Land Reform Act covers only parcels of land classified as both an APD and a ULRZ. Categorically, in Spouses Frilles v. Spouses Yambao, 15 the Court explained that a legitimate tenant's right of first refusal to purchase the leased property under the Urban Land Reform Act depends on whether the disputed property in Metropolitan Manila is situated in an area specifically declared to be both an APD and a ULRZ.
In this case, as appreciated by the CA, the records merely show that the property occupied by petitioners is an APD. 16 Therefore, it correctly concluded that petitioners do not have a prima facie proof to claim the subject lot. Finding no reversible error on the part of the courts a quo, this Court thus resolves to DENY the instant petition.
SO ORDERED." EcTCAD
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 3-21; Petition for Review on Certiorari filed on 21 October 2010.
2. Id. at 44-45, 47; the RTC Orders dated 30 May 2008 and 7 August 2008 in Civil Case No. 95-0530 were penned by Presiding Judge Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan, Branch 111, Pasay City.
3. Id. at 56-59.
4. Id. at 25-37, 39-40; the CA Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 92045 were penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Michael P. Elbinias concurring.
5. Presidential Decree No. 1517 (1978), Proclaiming Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the Implementing Machinery thereof, Section 6 reads:
Section 6. Land Tenancy in Urban Land Reform Areas. — Within the Urban Zones legitimate tenants who have resided on the land for ten years or more who have built their homes on the land and residents who have legally occupied the lands by contract, continuously for the last ten years shall not be dispossessed of the land and shall be allowed the right of first refusal to purchase the same within a reasonable time and at reasonable prices, under terms and conditions to be determined by the Urban Zone Expropriation and Land Management Committee created by Section 8 of this Decree.
6. Rollo, p. 60; Land Transaction Certificate issued on 28 September 1995 by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council.
7. Ramos v. Spouses Lim, 497 Phil. 560 (2005).
8. Guanzon v. Aragon, 107 Phil. 315-322 (1960).
9. Records, p. 51; Order dated 24 August 1995.
10. Id. at 158-159.
11. Id. at 196.
12. Id. at 207-212; Amended Complaint filed on 28 February 2008.
13. The provision reads:
SECTION 3. Dismissal Due to Fault of Plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
14. Solanda Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 194 (1999); Vidal v. Escueta, 462 Phil. 314 (2003); and Esteban v. Spouses Marcelo, G.R. No. 197725, 31 July 2013, 703 SCRA 82.
15. Spouses Frilles v. Spouses Yambao, 433 Phil. 715 (2002).
16. Rollo, p. 60; Land Transaction Certificate issued on 28 September 1995 by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council.