FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232936. October 13, 2021.]
DANILO E. SUAREZ, petitioner,vs. JOSELITO A. OJEDA, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 13, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 232936 (Danilo E. Suarez, petitioner v. Joselito A. Ojeda, respondent).
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the January 23, 2017 Decision 2 and July 18, 2017 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 142014. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Danilo E. Suarez (petitioner) seeking to reverse the December 10, 2014 Decision 4 and May 26, 2015 Order 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 225 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-02-110366.
Antecedents
On May 17, 2002, Joselito Ojeda (respondent) was charged with libel under the following information:
That on or about the 31st day of January, 2001 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, the former Mayor of the Municipality of Mulanay, Quezon, with evident purpose of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of DANILO E. SUAREZ, the then incumbent Congressman of the 3rd District of Quezon province and then holding office at the House of Representative, this City, and with malicious intent to exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, did then and there wilfully unlawfully and feloniously utter the following injurious and defamatory statements relative to and concerning the person of said DANILO E. SUAREZ, which were aired live on television on Channel 8 and on radio over DWTI, both of which were broadcast in the province of, among others, Quezon, to wit:
'x x x Pero ang unang unang dahilan ay ang Congressman nyo, ang sabi sa amin ng SMART. Sabi ko'y bakit po? Kala ko ba humihingi ng 5 million ay ang NPA? Yun naman pala, alam anya mo eh. Sabi ko ay, bakit po, paano po yung Congressman Suarez? Ay wala sa kalingkingan nyan yung hinihingi ni Congressman Suarez. x x x'
That the said statements had for their object to insinuate and made it understood, as was in effect understood and interpreted by the public who heard it that the Congressman Suarez referred to therein can be no other than the said DANILO E. SUAREZ, the herein offended party, in this manner transmitting maliciously and intentionally to the public the impression that the said DANILO E. SUAREZ committed acts which constitute violations of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officers and Employees) thereby causing dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of DANILO E. SUAREZ, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
In his defense, respondent argued that the subject utterances were a fair and true report on the delayed infrastructure project implemented by Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart) in the province of Quezon. According to him, the Kamhantik tower hosted by their municipality would have opened access to cellular phones communication in all areas within the Bondoc Peninsula. Allegedly, he was able to talk to a lawyer from Smart who confirmed to him that the delay in the completion of the project was due to petitioner. He further claimed that several other stations and broadcasters in the region have made even more serious accusations or commentaries against petitioner but he was singled out for harassment because petitioner was then a regular topic on their radio and television programs. 7
The RTC Ruling
On December 10, 2014, the trial court rendered a Decision 8 acquitting respondent from the charge of libel. CAIHTE
According to the trial court, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that respondent made the remarks knowing that they were false and with the intent of impeaching or discrediting petitioner's honor. Since the element of malice was not satisfied, the trial court ruled that respondent must be acquitted from the libel charge. The court also did not award any civil damages ex delicto. 9
In denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the trial court cited jurisprudence on the doctrine of privileged communications. After further evaluating the testimonies of respondent and his witnesses, the trial court concluded that the subject utterances were "a fair comment on matters of public interest that happened to be directed at a public official in his public capacity." Reiterating that the prosecution is still burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt that actual malice attended the statements charged to be malicious, the court said that the prosecution did not even attempt to show the requisite mens rea. 10
The CA Ruling
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He contended that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that the crime of libel was not proven and that the subject utterances fall under the category of qualified privileged communications. Likewise, he faulted the trial court for absolving respondent of any civil liability. 11
In its assailed Decision, 12 the CA held that petitioner failed to sufficiently discharge his burden of proving that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting respondent. Finding the arguments and matters raised by petitioner as mere errors of judgment which are not correctible by certiorari, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner contends that a review by this Court of the rationale for respondent's acquittal and the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration would reveal the jurisdictional errors committed by the trial court. Contrary to the CA's findings, petitioner asserts that in his Petition for Certiorari, 13 he had explicitly established that the trial court a) misapplied the actual malice test; b) erroneously held that subject defamatory statement is a privileged communication; c) misapplied the ruling in Guingguing v. Court of Appeals; 14 and d) grossly disregarded the law and settled jurisprudence, in particular, Articles 353 and 354 of the Revised Penal Code, and the other cases cited in its decision. 15
On the matter of respondent's civil liability, petitioner argues that "where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages." Being the person against whom the subject defamatory statements were directed and whose reputation was impaired, petitioner insists that he is entitled to damages. 16
Respondent's Arguments
Respondent maintains in his Comment 17 that the trial court and the CA have already adjudged him not guilty of libel. He argues that giving due course to this petition would violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy as his acquittal from the crime charged is final and immutable.
As to the civil liability being pursued by petitioner, respondent contends that he is not entitled to damages in view of the failure of the prosecution to establish by convincing evidence the factual basis therefor. He stresses that petitioner did not present himself as a witness during the trial to substantiate the alleged injury or damage he suffered as a result of the subject utterances. 18
ISSUE
The Court is tasked to resolve whether the CA correctly determined the absence of grave abuse in the judgment rendered by the trial court.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition. DETACa
At the outset We state that being a private offended party, petitioner's interest in the criminal case filed against respondent is limited to the civil liability arising from it. Basic is the rule that if the trial court dismisses the case or renders a judgment of acquittal, the private offended party cannot appeal the criminal aspect of the case. 19 Only the Solicitor General (OSG) representing the People may prosecute such appeals before the CA or this Court. 20
Nevertheless, the right of a private offended party to appeal the civil aspect of the case despite the acquittal of the accused is recognized. 21 Thus, a private complainant or offended party may, even without the intervention of the OSG, pursue on appeal the civil liability of the accused or file a special civil action for certiorari solely for that purpose. 22
Here, petitioner raised before the CA the alleged misapplication by the trial court of the law and jurisprudence on libel, as well as its supposedly mistaken appreciation of the evidence presented at the trial.
"It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem — beyond the ambit of appeal." 23 The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include the review of public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon. 24
Moreover, We have held such mistakes asserted by petitioner as insufficient to reverse a judgment of acquittal.
x x x a mistake in the judgment acquitting the accused of the crime charged occasioned by misappreciation of evidence or errors of law does not necessarily nullify the decision. What may vitiate a decision are jurisdictional errors arising from the court's commission of grave abuse of discretion or denial of due process. In which event, the factual circumstances constituting grave abuse of discretion or denial of due process must be shown as patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 25 (citation omitted, emphasis supplied)
Petitioner failed to evince facts demonstrating gross abuse, bias or irregularity committed by the trial court in acquitting respondent. There is likewise no allegation that the prosecution was denied due process. Instead, he harps on the conclusion reached by the trial court regarding the privileged nature of the subject utterances and its finding that the prosecution failed to show that the alleged defamatory statements were false and made with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. Since the matters raised by petitioner concern errors of judgment and not jurisdictional flaws, the CA correctly dismissed his petition.
As to petitioner's claim for civil damages, We find it equally without merit.
In this jurisdiction, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is expressed in Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "[E]very man criminally liable is also civilly liable." Where no libel was committed, there can be no civil liability arising from the crime. There was no act that exists from which the civil liability may arise. 26
Petitioner insists that respondent remains liable for damages as a result of his defamatory statements which are presumed malicious. However, implicit in such argument is the failure to distinguish malice in law and malice in fact (actual malice). It is the latter principle that has become the standard in the prosecution of libel cases involving public officials 27 such as petitioner.
First enunciated in the United States case of New York Times v. Sullivan, 28 the "actual malice" test requires as a condition for a public official to "recover damages for a defamatory falsehood on their official conduct" proof "that the statement was made x x x with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 29 This was adopted in our jurisdiction and applied in several cases including Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 30Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 31 and Guingguing v. Court of Appeals. 32
Petitioner questions the trial court's application of this standard and its refusal to award civil damages in his favor. However, the petition he filed in the CA is not confined to the civil aspect of the case considering that he sought primarily to reverse respondent's acquittal. As already stated, petitioner failed to demonstrate in the certiorari proceeding any circumstance that would render void the trial court's judgment.
Co v. Muñoz, Jr.33 provides a concise discussion of the civil liability of an accused acquitted of libel pursuant to the doctrine of privileged communication, to wit:
To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused's acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. We thus now proceed to determine if Co's claim falls under any of these three situations. aDSIHc
The respondent is not civilly liable
The CA has acquitted Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged communication. In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the crime. The law presumes that every imputation is malicious; this is referred to as malice in law. The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that the imputations were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused proved that the imputation is true and published with good intention and justifiable motive.
There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance, Article 354 of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:
(1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
(2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
Jurisprudence supplements the enumeration in Article 354 of the RPC. In Borjal v. CA, we held that in view of the constitutional right on the freedoms of speech and of the press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged. In Guingguing v. CA, we ruled that the remarks directed against a public figure are likewise privileged. In order to justify a conviction in libel involving privileged communication, the prosecution must establish that the libelous statements were made or published with actual malice or malice in fact — the knowledge that the statement is false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. In other words, our rulings in Borjal and Guingguing show that privileged communication has the effect of destroying the presumption of malice or malice in law and consequently requiring the prosecution to prove the existence of malice in fact.
In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muñoz' statements were fair comments. Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has the burden of proving that Muñoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed in this respect.
Co assails the CA's ruling by raising arguments that essentially require a review of the CA's factual and legal findings. However, the Court cannot, through the present petition, review these findings without going against the requirements of Rule 45 with respect to factual matters, and without violating Muñoz' right against double jeopardy given that the acquittal is essentially anchored on a question of fact.
In light of the privileged nature of Muñoz' statements and the failure of the prosecution to prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muñoz. Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the present petition. There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.34 (citations omitted, additional emphases supplied)
Similarly in this case, respondent was acquitted of libel because the subject utterances were privileged, being a fair commentary on matters of public interest. Accordingly, the prosecution is burdened to prove actual malice or that the respondent made the defamatory utterances with "the knowledge that the statement is false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true." The trial court found that the prosecution failed in proving actual malice, hence, no libel was committed by respondent. Ergo, there exists no act from which the civil liability might arise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The January 23, 2017 Decision and July 18, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 142014, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." Lopez, M., J., on official leave.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 11-42.
2. Id. at 46-60; penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a Member of this Court), with Associate Justices Marlene B. Gonzales-Sison and Ramon A. Cruz, concurring.
3. Id. at 62-63.
4. Id. at 109-130; penned by Acting Presiding Judge Cleto R. Villacorta III.
5. Id. at 131-157.
6. Id. at 109.
7. Id. at 116-117.
8. Id. at 109-130.
9. Id. at 127-130.
10. Id. at 153-154.
11. Id. at 91-107.
12. Id. at 46-60.
13. Id. at 11-42.
14. 508 Phil. 193 (2005).
15. Rollo, pp. 26-27.
16. Id. at 36.
17. Id. at 301-305.
18. Id. at 304-305.
19. People v. Santiago, 255 Phil. 851, 861-862 (1989).
20. Id.; People v. Gabriel, 539 Phil. 252, 256 (2006).
21. Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 236686, February 5, 2020.
22. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. v. Piccio, 740 Phil. 616, 623 (2014).
23. People v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 169, 182 (1999).
24. Yuchengco v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 11, 23 (2002).
25. Id. at 23-24.
26. Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo, 813 Phil. 37, 72 (2017), see Co v. Muñoz, Jr., 722 Phil. 729, 743 (2013).
27. See Guingguing v. Court of Appeals,supra note 14.
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29. Id. at 279-280, cited in Tulfo v. People, G.R. Nos. 187113 & 187230, January 11, 2021.
30. 361 Phil. 1 (1999).
31. 373 Phil. 238 (1999).
32. Supra note 14.
33. Supra note 26.
34. Id. at 740-743.