THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 210902. February 5, 2014.][Formerly UDK-15003]
BERNARD STA. MONICA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ROBERT ROMERO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated February 5, 2014, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 210902 [Formerly UDK-15003] (Bernard Sta. Monica vs. Hon. Court of Appeals and Robert Romero). — Petitioner Bernard Sta. Monica comes to this court without the assistance of counsel. He prays that the Court of Appeals' resolutions 1 dismissing the motion for reconsideration of his petition for review be annulled and that such petition be evaluated on the merits.
In his petition, Bernard Sta. Monica stated that the Municipal Trial Court of Naguilian, La Union, convicted him of the crime of trespass to dwelling. 2 The Regional Trial Court affirmed his conviction; hence, he filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals. 3 In a resolution dated May 13, 2011, the Court of Appeals 4 dismissed the instant petition. 5 Petitioner Sta. Monica filed a motion for reconsideration.
In a resolution dated November 11, 2011, the Court of Appeals ordered petitioner Sta. Monica "to inform the Court the type of bond and the amount posted to enjoy his provisional liberty pending appeal." 6 Petitioner Sta. Monica filed his compliance. However, he failed to attach the official receipt of the cash bail bond deposited with the Municipal Trial Court. 7
In another resolution dated November 8, 2012, the Court of Appeals ordered petitioner Sta. Monica to submit the official receipt of the cash bail bond deposit. 8 He attached a certification dated November 23, 2012 from the Municipal Trial Court of Naguilian, La Union, stating the following:
This is to certify that . . . the Official Receipt of the Cash Bailbond [sic] alleged to have been paid by the accused in the case and other related documents thereto like the Warrant of Arrest, Order of Release, etc., are not attached to the record. 9
In a resolution dated March 18, 2013, the Court of Appeals found that the compliance of petitioner Sta. Monica to its directive was insufficient and resolved to dismiss his motion for reconsideration. 10 Petitioner Sta. Monica, without the assistance of counsel, sought reconsideration of this resolution. He reasoned that when he submitted his compliance with the Court of Appeals' order to submit the official receipt of the cash bail bond deposit, he was no longer consulting his counsel who, at that time, refrained from practicing law due to legal impediments. 11 Petitioner Sta. Monica submitted the certification dated November 23, 2012 in the honest belief that it would be recognized as a form of compliance to the Court of Appeals' directive. He also believed that it would be the Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Naguilian, La Union, which would furnish the Court of Appeals with a copy of the certification. 12 HSaEAD
Despite petitioner Sta. Monica's explanations, the Court of Appeals denied his motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated August 14, 2013. 13 This resolution had the effect of terminating his petition for review pending in the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner Sta. Monica brought his case to this court through a petition for certiorari. 14He remained unaided by counsel; hence, there were technical deficiencies in his petition, including the lack of proof of his motion to litigate as pauper litigant. However, the fact of his indigency is taken in good faith (as manifested by the lack of counsel), and we decided to give due course to the petition.
The issue raised is whether the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed petitioner Sta. Monica's motion for reconsideration solely on his failure to submit the official receipt of his cash bail bond deposit.
We resolve to GRANT the petition and REMAND the case to the Court of Appeals.
The Constitution mandates that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law" 15 (the right to due process) and that "any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right . . . to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one" 16 (the right to counsel). These constitutional provisions should govern every individual that undergoes criminal prosecution, regardless of the gravity and nature of the crime. It also serves as a guidepost in every stage of criminal procedure, including appeals.
The right to appeal is neither natural nor inherent; rather, it is considered as a statutory privilege. 17 However, once there is compliance with the statutory requirements, the right to appeal becomes part of due process. This court has always reminded. the bench and bar of the importance of appeals in rendering justice, to wit:
An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. We have advised the courts to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal (National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities (A-One feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 590). 18
In the case at bar, the timely filing of the petition for review in the Court of Appeals gave petitioner Sta. Monica a right to appeal. Once appeal is "granted by law, . . ., its suppression would be a violation of due process, a right guaranteed by the Constitution." 19
The Court of Appeals' dismissal of the petition for review's motion for reconsideration solely based on the non-attachment of the official receipt of the cash bail bond deposit is considered a suppression of the right to appeal. It allowed a, technicality to override substantial justice even after petitioner Sta. Monica had pleaded the fact of his lack of counsel. The absence of counsel should not have affected petitioner Sta. Monica's substantial rights, especially since it was not his fault why he did not have counsel to advise him. The Court of Appeals should have realized the importance of counsel for him to be able to comply with its order. We have stated previously that:
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. To demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such right.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be involved at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Sta. Monica had the right to be assisted by a lawyer while his case was pending in the Court of Appeals. He should not be penalized for his lack of counsel. If he were assisted by counsel when the Court of Appeals ordered him to submit the official receipt of the cash bail bond deposit, petitioner Sta. Monica would have known that the Municipal Trial Court would not automatically assist him in complying with the Court of Appeals' order. With counsel, petitioner Sta. Monica would have been aware of the alternative documents he could have presented in lieu of his copy of the official receipt, or he would have been able to explain the document presented in a manner that would have satisfied the Court of Appeals' order. He was not only deprived of his right to counsel. His absence of counsel deprived him of the right to due process. TIcEDC
Given these facts, the just thing for the Court of Appeals to do is to assign counsel de officio to petitioner Sta. Monica and not dismiss his motion for reconsideration solely on a technicality. Criminal cases should be evaluated and resolved with care and caution because the consequence for wrongful conviction entails deprivation of liberty. Time and again, we have said that "[d]ismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims." 21
Hilario v. People 22 presents a similar set of facts to the case at bar. In Hilario, the conviction against the accused attained finality because he was detained and. was unaware that his counsel abandoned his instructions to file a notice of appeal. Unassisted by counsel, Hilario filed a petition for relief in the Regional Trial Court. The trial court denied the petition for relief. Thus, Hilario questioned the denial in the Court of Appeals, again, unassisted by counsel The Court of Appeals dismissed Hilario's case due to technical deficiencies caused by the late filing of the petition for review.
This court decided to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals' decision dismissing the case due to technical deficiencies and remanded the case to be evaluated on the merits. We considered it an instance when the rigid application of the technical rules frustrated substantial justice. 23
The case at bar is on all fours with the facts of Hilario in a sense that the convicted accused. was unassisted by counsel during post-conviction. This led to technical mistakes that could have been avoided if petitioner Sta. Monica had been assisted by counsel. It is an assault to justice if petitioners faced deprivation of liberty due to the denial of their constitutional right to counsel.
With these premises considered, this court resolves to GRANT petitioner Sta. Monica's motion to litigate as a pauper litigant and consequently, formally docket this case.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 118311. dated March 18, 2013 and August 14, 2013 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to (1) appoint the Public Attorney's Office as ex officio counsel for petitioner Sta. Monica; (2) allow petitioner Sta. Monica and his ex officio counsel to present evidence of payment of his cash bond for bail; and (3) proceed to hear the merits of petitioner Sta. Monica's motion for reconsideration.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANODivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 6-8. This resolution was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 118311 and was dated August 14, 2013. Another Court of Appeals resolution concerning this case was dated March 18, 2013.
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id.
4. Twelfth Division composed of Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, Romeo F. Barza (ponente), and Edwin D. Sorongon.
5. Rollo, p. 6.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 6-7.
8. Id. at 7.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 7-8.
13. Id. at 6-8. This resolution was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 118311.
14. Id. at 2-5.
15. Consti., art. III, sec. 14, par. (1).
16. Consti., art. III, sec. 12, par. (1).
17. Yao v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 86, 100 (2000) citing Aris, Phil., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 90501, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA 246, 253.
18. Castro v. Court of Appeals, 208 Phil. 691, 696 (1983).
19. Hilario v. People, G.R. No. 161070, April 14, 2008, 551 SCRA 191, 209.
20. Spouses Telan v. Court of Appeals, 279 Phil. 587, 594-595 (1991), as reiterated in Hilario v. People, G.R. No. 161070, April 14, 2008, 551 SCRA 191, 209. Spouses Telan was a civil case but emphasized the importance of counsel in both criminal and civil cases.
21. A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 188 Phil. 577, 580 (1980), as reiterated in Pacific Life Assurance Corporation v. Sison, 359 Phil. 332, 339 (1998) and in Cusi-Hernandez v. Spouses Diaz, 390 Phil. 1245, 1252 (2000).
22. Hilario v. People, G.R. No. 161070, April 14, 2008, 551 SCRA 191.
23. Id. at 205.