Sta. Ana v. Court of Appeals

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 231784. October 4, 2017.]

ELY L. STA. ANA & ARSENIA E. CASIO, petitioners,vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, TWENTY-THIRD (23RD) DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, SPOUSES NICANOR ABADILLA AND HELEN ABADILLA, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 4, 2017, which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 231784 (Ely L. Sta. Ana & Arsenia E. Casio vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, Twenty-Third (23rd) Division, Mindanao Station, Cagayan de Oro City, Spouses Nicanor Abadilla and Helen Abadilla). — The Court INFORMS petitioners that they or their authorized representative may claim from the Cash Disbursement and Collection Division of this Court the excess payment of the prescribed legal fees in the amount of P270.00 under O.R. No. 0181245 dated June 13, 2017.

For the consideration of the Court is a Petition for Certiorari dated May 2, 2017 1 filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision dated September 14, 2016 2 and Resolution dated February 17, 2017 3 in CA G.R. SP No. 06532, entitled "Ely L. Sta. Ana and Arsenia E. Casio vs. Spouses Nicanor Abadilla and Helen Abadilla."

The CA affirmed the Decision dated August 4, 2014 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, in Davao City. In turn, the RTC found no reversible error in the Decision dated April 8, 2003 5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, in Davao City. The MTCC ruled in favor of respondents and ordered, among others, that petitioners vacate the subject properties and turn over possession to respondents.

The Facts

In a Complaint dated November 24, 2011, 6 respondents Spouses Nicanor and Helen Abadilla alleged that they are the registered owners of two (2) adjacent lots as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (TCT) T-359155 and T-409814 located at Block 2, Everly Subdivision, Brgy. 5-A, Bankerohan, Davao City. In 2003 respondents fenced the subject properties to secure them from illegal occupants. However, in 2005, Cecilia Valdez and petitioners Ely L. Sta. Ana and Arsenia E. Casio unlawfully entered, occupied, and resided on the lands. They claimed that they are bona fide members of the Alvarez Guzman Divine Land Development Association, Inc. (ALGUDILADEA), an urban poor association with a legal claim of ownership over a vast landholding that includes the subject property. Upon learning of such unlawful entry, respondents demanded that Valdez and petitioners vacate the property. Such demands were left unheeded. Respondents made several attempts to re-fence the property but were physically prevented from doing so by Valdez, petitioners, and the other occupants of the adjacent lands. This was despite the fact that policemen tried to assist respondents. Thus, on September 7, 2011, respondents sent a demand letter to petitioners to vacate the property. Again, such demand was ignored. Thus, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners to vacate the properties and pay rentals, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and cost of suit.

From such complaint, petitioners filed an Answer with Affirmative Defense dated March 29, 2012. 7 In their Answer, petitioners allege that respondents' properties are different from the ones that they were actually occupying. Also, petitioners assert that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, which they claim to be an accion publiciana, properly the subject matter of the Regional Trial Courts.

Ruling of the MTCC

The case was set for Judicial Dispute Resolution but the petitioners did not appear thereat. Afterwards, the case was set for preliminary conference and pre-trial, but again, petitioners did not appear. Thus, the case was set for reception of evidence ex-parte. 8

Afterwards, the MTCC issued its Decision wherein it upheld all the allegations of the respondents in the Complaint. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favour of the Plaintiffs and against the defendants Eli Sta. Ana and Arsenia Casio, ordering them jointly and severally to:

1. Vacate the property and peacefully turn over the possession to the plaintiffs;

2. Pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees of P15,000.00 plus P1,000.00 as appearance;

3. Pay the plaintiff of P20,000.00 as moral damages; and exemplary damages of P10,000.00; and

4. Pay the rental of P500.00 per month from 07 September 2011 as the date of (demand to vacate) until defendants have vacated the premises;

5. Pay the plaintiff the litigation fee of P7,500.00 and

6. Pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. 9

On the same date, the MTCC issued a Decision Nunc Pro Tunc replacing the one previously issued by it in order to include Cecil Valdez in the dispositive portion. 10 aScITE

Ruling of the RTC

Petitioners appealed to the RTC which rendered a Decision denying petitioners' appeal and affirming the MTCC ruling in toto. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the RTC ruling but were denied in an Order dated October 22, 2014. 11

Petitioners claimed before the RTC that respondents had no cause of action against them. Petitioners asserted that respondents' possession and ownership over the subject property is doubtful considering that the properties in question are the subject matter of a pending case filed by ALGUDILADEA against the University of Mindanao. Thus, they claimed that they have the absolute right and privilege of possession, control and administration over the property. 12

In ruling for the respondents, the RTC found that:

Plaintiffs-appellees sufficiently established their cause of action for recovery of possession. Plaintiffs claimed that being the registered owners of the subject properties, they have the better right to possess the same.

xxx xxx xxx

By virtue of plaintiffs' legal ownership, defendants have a correlative duty to respect the same. Thus, defendants' intrusion into the subject properties was in violation of plaintiffs' right. Plaintiffs were unlawfully deprived of their right of possession when defendants forcibly entered the properties in question by strategy and stealth. 13

Ruling of the CA

Unsatisfied, petitioners appealed such ruling to the CA which rendered the assailed Decision affirming the ruling of the RTC and MTCC. Petitioners moved for, but were denied, reconsideration in the assailed Resolution of the CA.

In upholding the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled:

As mentioned above, the core issue for resolution in forcible entry suits is the right to physical and material possession. The Court is not unmindful that the word "possession" in this action refers only to possession de facto, or actual possession, and not possession de jure, or possession flowing out of ownership.

However, in a plethora of jurisprudence, the Supreme Court declared that possession can be acquired not only through actual possession but also through juridical actions. In other words, there is acquisition of possession when the property is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for obtaining such right — i.e., donations, succession, execution, registration of public documents and inscription of possessory information titles. The underlying principle of this rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.

xxx xxx xxx

To the mind of this Court, the Abadilla's registration of Lots 9 and 10 under the Torrens System and their payment of its real property taxes are considered as juridical actions, of which is another mode to acquire possession. For this reason, the Abadillas were already deemed in possession of the lots long before Sta. Ana and Casio started their occupation. Hence, the fact that the lots were idle or vacant at the time of Sta. Ana and Casio's entry would not work to their advantage. The truth remains that the Abadillas had already established their prior possession.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

I.

Whether or not public respondent Hon. Court of Appeals, Twenty-Third Division, committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming in toto the rulings of the Regional Trial Court despite the obvious existence of grave and damaging mistakes committed by the trial court.

II.

Whether or not public respondent Hon. Court of Appeals, Twenty-Third Division, committed grave abuse of discretion by refusing to give evidentiary weight as evidence adduced by the petitioners. 14 HEITAD

Ruling of the Court

The petition must be dismissed.

Petitioners availed of an

Examining the issues raised in the petition, it is clear that petitioners raise errors of judgment made by the CA, RTC and MTCC. Thus, the proper remedy should be a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Section 1 of Rule 65 provides:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice nay require. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court has repeatedly held that when an ordinary appeal is available, a special civil action for certiorari will not be entertained. In Olongapo City v. Subic Water and Sewerage Co., Inc., the Court held:

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate only if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to the aggrieved party. As we have distinctly explained in the case of Pasiona v. Court of Appeals:

The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the CA via Rule 65 because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy, namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was, therefore, the correct remedy.

xxx xxx xxx

Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action for certiorari will not be entertained — remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.15 (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)

In the instant case, the remedy of an ordinary appeal under Rule 45 was available to them. Instead, petitioners chose to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Thus, on this ground alone, the instant petition must be dismissed.

Nevertheless, even if the Court does not dismiss the petition on this ground, the same must still fail.

Respondents had prior

The issues raised by petitioners boil down to the issue of who between the parties had prior possession of the subject properties. Petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in affirming in toto the findings of the lower courts despite the overwhelming evidence on record showing that petitioners have prior possession of the subject premises. Respondents alleged that they had prior possession of the property since 2002 until petitioners forcibly entered the same in 2005. 16

Petitioners refute this contention and argue that respondents have never had physical possession of the property and that they have been in actual possession of the property since 2002 and cannot be disturbed therefrom through an action for forcibly entry. Petitioners contend that, contrary to the findings of the CA, the TCTs, Tax Declarations and demand letters presented by respondents cannot establish the kind of possession required in forcible entry cases, that is, prior actual physical possession. ATICcS

The petitioners' arguments are bereft of merit.

Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides for an action for forcible entry:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs. (Emphasis supplied)

In Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the requisites for an action for forcible entry:

In actions for forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be met for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property. Second, they must also assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Third, the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of physical possession of the land or building. 17 (Emphasis supplied)

In Mangaser v. Ugay, 18 the Court made this disquisition on the requirement of prior physical possession, elucidating that the requirement may likewise be satisfied by judicial acts and not only by material occupation:

As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case."

The Court, however, has consistently ruled in a number of cases that while prior physical possession is an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in respondent's position is evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. The case of Quizon v. Juan, which surprisingly was relied on by the CA, also stressed this doctrine.

Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will. Here, respondent failed to show that he falls under any of these circumstances. He could not even say that the subject property was leased to him except that he promised that he would vacate it if petitioner would be able to show the boundaries of the titled lot. 19 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, in the same case, the Court cited the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., whose factual milieu is strikingly similar to the instant case:

In the case of Nunez v. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc., the subject parcel was acquired by the respondent by virtue of the June 4, 1999 Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng. The petitioner in the said case argued that, aside from the admission in the complaint that the subject parcel was left idle and unguarded, the respondent's claim of prior possession was clearly negated by the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof since 1999. The Court disagreed with the petitioner and said: Although it did not immediately put the same to active use, respondent appears to have additionally caused the property to be registered in its name as of February 27, 2002 and to have paid the real property taxes due thereon alongside the sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently did not matter that, by the time respondent conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003, petitioner had already been occupying the land since 1999.20 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) TIADCc

To recapitulate, the general rule is that prior physical possession of the subject property is required in forcible entry cases. However, as an exception to this rule, prior possession over property, for purposes of a forcible entry case, may be acquired by subjecting the property to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right over the thing, that is, having such property titled and paying taxes thereon. Verily, in the instant case, respondents had the requisite possession necessary to maintain an action for forcible entry. As such, the instant petition must fail.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals, the instant Petition for Certiorari dated May 2, 2017 is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 14, 2016, and Resolution dated February 17, 2017 in CA G.R. SP No. 06532 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-20.

2.Id. at 24-33. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben Reynaldo G. Roxas and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo T. Lloren and Rafael Antonio M. Santos.

3.Id. at 37-40.

4.Id. at 87-92.

5.Id. at 85-86.

6.Id. at 54-57.

7.Id. at 71-77.

8.Id. at 85.

9.Id. at 86.

10.Id. at 8.

11.Id. at 9.

12.Id. at 88-89.

13.Id. at 89.

14.Id. at 11.

15. G.R. No. 171626, August 6, 2014, 732 SCRA 132, 145.

16.Id. at 15.

17. G.R. No. 139442, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 103, 115.

18. G.R. No. 204926, December 3, 2014, 744 SCRA 13.

19.Id. at 24-25.

20. G.R. No. 180542, April 12, 2010, 618 SCRA 134.