St. Martin's Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 208668. December 7, 2021.]

ST. MARTIN'S FOUNDATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SISTER MA. CECILIA DE JESUS CALAGUAS, O.P., LA SALETTE OF SAN MATEO, INC. AND LA SALETTE OF CABANATUAN, INC., REPRESENTED BY FR. MANUEL R. MEDINA, MS, GENSANTOS FOUNDATION COLLEGE, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT[,] DOMINADOR S. DIZON, BANCO FILIPINO SUPERVISORS UNION [BFSU][,] REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT[,] ELLEN J. RAMOS-GAVADAN, BANCO FILIPINO STAFF ASSOCIATION [BFSA][,] REPRESENTED BY ITS VICE PRESIDENT[,] ARMANDO E. DIZON, PERLITA REPOTENTE, MARIO E. ABUYAN, NORA BALUYOT, ROLANDO REPOTENTE, MARIO C. CRUZ, DANIEL T. HIZON, BABY ROSELLA B. ODIAMAR, ARMANDO E. DIZON, ARCELITO M. MOJADO, ANTONIO H. BORJA, JR., ROMMEL D. GONZALES, HENRY P. DURANTE, RHODORA MARIE H. DURANTE, DIONISIO M. DOMINGO, REBECCA B. DAVID, LUCILLE I. AQUINO, JOHN WOO, VIRGINIA A. JIMENEZ, WILLIAM J. CHUA, MA. LANI B. VERDEFLOR, LUISA T. LIMOSO, LUTGARDA T. INGUILLO, CESAR I. CANLAS, EZPERANZA P. GAOIRAN, EMMA T. ILLUSTRISIMO, TERESITA D. WITONGCO, VALENTINE T. CANLAS, SOFRONIO C. DELOS SANTOS, DOMINADOR S. DIZON, CIELITO A. DIZON, CECILIA D. DANGANAN, CECILIA CALARA, RECELYN CASANDAG, ZONDREX ALLAN A. DIZON, ATTY. EUSEBIO M. MADRIGAL, ROMAN P. TIU, ELMINA RAYAH D. MANIAGO, ANDRES P. ARROJO, LORINA I. BERNARDO, CESAR E. PAGUIO, JR., ELLA S. ESCAÑO, CARLOS V. ESCAÑO, CARLO JAMES S. ESCAÑO, MARIA CHARISSMA S. ESCAÑO, EUGENIA DP FLORES, AURELIA B. CASTRO, CYD CHARISSE N. DIZON, HERMELINA A. GARCIA, GLENN T. ILLUSTRISIMO, JIMMY C. MANIAGO, AURORA C. SALE, ZOSIMO M. SALE, JOHNNY M. UY, BENJAMIN T. UY, ROSIE G. VIRAY, EDITA C. WONG, PAUL K.O. WONG, PAULINE C. WONG, LEANDRO ADOR A. DIZON, ROSELLER A. ROJAS, EUSTAQUIO I. VELASQUEZ, JR., ROSALINDA M. VELASQUEZ, JOAN O. FONG, CELERINA SABARIAGA, ALLAN B. CASTRO, FRANCIA FORONDA, HERNANIE DE LEON, VIANNELY BERWYN F. FLORES, VIANN RYAN DP FLORES, VIANNE RALPH DP FLORES, FLORENCIO BALUYOT, JAIME UANDORR D. MANIAGO, YAMA RAJ D. MANIAGO, ALETH L. ALBANO, RECAREDO P. ALBANO[,] III, JULIET V. CAMPO, ANTHONY T. CARAAN, SHIRLEY T. CARAAN, ERNESTO J. CHUA, HELEN K. DY, ALONA B. GARCIA, DAVID S. MENDOZA, NELLIE R. PEÑAS, PERLA R. PEÑAS, CORAZON P. PEREZ, FORTUNATO S. PEREZ, REMEDIOS M. SANTOS, CHERRY C. SAY, MARITES SULIT, CONCHITA G. TENG, MYRNA M. TORREFIEL, CECIL C. WONG, ANNE A. YEH, AND JOHN G. YEH, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS [FIFTH DIVISION], BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, THE MONETARY BOARD, AND PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution datedDECEMBER 7, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 208668(St. Martin's Foundation, Inc., represented by its President, Sister Ma. Cecilia De Jesus Calaguas, O.P., La Salette of San Mateo, Inc. and La Salette of Cabanatuan, Inc., represented by Fr. Manuel R. Medina, MS, Gensantos Foundation College, Inc., represented by its President[,] Dominador S. Dizon, Banco Filipino Supervisors Union [BFSU][,] represented by its President[,] Ellen J. Ramos-Gavadan, Banco Filipino Staff Association [BFSA][,] represented by its Vice President[,] Armando E. Dizon, Perlita Repotente, Mario E. Abuyan, Nora Baluyot, Rolando Repotente, Mario C. Cruz, Daniel T. Hizon, Baby Rosella B. Odiamar, Armando E. Dizon, Arcelito M. Mojado, Antonio H. Borja, Jr., Rommel D. Gonzales, Henry P. Durante, Rhodora Marie H. Durante, Dionisio M. Domingo, Rebecca B. David, Lucille I. Aquino, John Woo, Virginia A. Jimenez, William J. Chua, Ma. Lani B. Verdeflor, Luisa T. Limoso, Lutgarda T. Inguillo, Cesar I. Canlas, Ezperanza P. Gaoiran, Emma T. Illustrisimo, Teresita D. Witongco, Valentine T. Canlas, Sofronio C. Delos Santos, Dominador S. Dizon, Cielito A. Dizon, Cecilia D. Danganan, Cecilia Calara, Recelyn Casandag, Zondrex Allan A. Dizon, Atty. Eusebio M. Madrigal, Roman P. Tiu, Elmina Rayah D. Maniago, Andres P. Arrojo, Lorina I. Bernardo, Cesar E. Paguio, Jr., Ella S. Escaño, Carlos V. Escaño, Carlo James S. Escaño, Maria Charissma S. Escaño, Eugenia DP Flores, Aurelia B. Castro, Cyd Charisse N. Dizon, Hermelina A. Garcia, Glenn T. Illustrisimo, Jimmy C. Maniago, Aurora C. Sale, Zosimo M. Sale, Johnny M. Uy, Benjamin T. Uy, Rosie G. Viray, Edita C. Wong, Paul K.O. Wong, Pauline C. Wong, Leandro Ador A. Dizon, Roseller A. Rojas, Eustaquio I. Velasquez, Jr., Rosalinda M. Velasquez, Joan O. Fong, Celerina Sabariaga, Allan B. Castro, Francia Foronda, Hernanie De Leon, Viannely Berwyn F. Flores, Viann Ryan DP Flores, Vianne Ralph DP Flores, Florencio Baluyot, Jaime Uandorr D. Maniago, Yama Raj D. Maniago, Aleth L. Albano, Recaredo P. Albano[,] III, Juliet V. Campo, Anthony T. Caraan, Shirley T. Caraan, Ernesto J. Chua, Helen K. Dy, Alona B. Garcia, David S. Mendoza, Nellie R. Peñas, Perla R. Peñas, Corazon P. Perez, Fortunato S. Perez, Remedios M. Santos, Cherry C. Say, Marites Sulit, Conchita G. Teng, Myrna M. Torrefiel, Cecil C. Wong, Anne A. Yeh, and John G. Yeh v. The Court of Appeals [Fifth Division], Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, The Monetary Board, and Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation). — The instant Petition for Certiorari1 is dismissed for being moot and academic.

A case becomes moot when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by supervening events so that an adjudication of the case, or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. 2 In such an instance, there is no actual substantial relief to which a petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. 3 Accordingly, courts generally decline jurisdiction over such a case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness since the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced. 4

Here, CA-G.R. SP No. 122130, entitled "METROPOLIS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, APEX MORTGAGE AND LOANS CORPORATION, BF CITILAND CORPORATION GRAND FARMS, INC., SPRING SUN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CORPORATION, TROPICAL LAND CORPORATION, EL GRANDE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, CLI MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, CASA TROPICAL, INC., FILIPINO VASTLAND CO., INC., PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PSC FINANCIAL CORPORATION, TOP MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS CORPORATION, as stockholders of record of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank representing majority of its shareholders, petitioners, versus BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, THE MONETARY BOARD and PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents" — the case from which petitioners seek to intervene — was dismissed by the Court of Appeals (CA) Special Ninth Division on September 7, 2020, on the ground of mootness. 5 The CA denied the motion for reconsideration on October 14, 2021. 6 These are supervening events which rendered the issue of whether the movants-intervenors (herein petitioners) should have been allowed to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 122130, moot and academic. An intervention has been regarded as merely "collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action and not an independent proceeding; an interlocutory proceeding dependent on and subsidiary to, the case between the original parties." 7 The dismissal of the petition for certiorari before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 122130, negated the substantial relief to which petitioners, as movants-intervenors, would have been entitled. 8 There is no more case to intervene in. Thus, to rule on whether petitioners had the right to intervene would be a useless exercise and will result in an opinion on a hypothetical situation. 9

Consequently, there is no more justiciable controversy on the propriety of the issuance of the assailed March 18, 2013, 10 and July 2, 2013 11 Resolutions of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 122130, which denied, among other things, petitioners' motion to intervene in the case.

Regarding the issue of the constitutionality of the penultimate paragraph of Section 30 12 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7653, otherwise known as "THE NEW CENTRAL BANK ACT," petitioners argue that it is unconstitutional since it only allows bank stockholders to question in court the actions of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board on liquidation of banks. Petitioners posit that a bank is a triad of personal and business relations involving stockholders, employees, and depositors. The closure of banks and the consequent liquidation of its assets would affect the bank employees' livelihood and the amount that the depositors can recover. Therefore, they should also be allowed to question BSP MB's actions to protect their rights and interests.

The constitutionality of Section 30 of RA 7653 is challenged by petitioners on the grounds of due process and equal protection. "As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned." 13 The policy of deference or the doctrine of constitutional avoidance allows this Court to ignore or side-step a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which the case can be disposed of. We have stressed that "if the controversy on the constitutionality of a statute can be settled on other grounds, this Court stays its hand from ruling on the constitutional issue." 14 The Court explained the policy of constitutional avoidance in Palencia v. People, 15viz.:

The policy of constitutional avoidance finds its genesis in a concurring opinion on the United States case of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority. In his concurrence, Justice Louis Brandeis set forth the seven pillars of limitations of judicial review:

1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation [i]n a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions "is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act."

2. The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." "It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case."

3. The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."

4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because tile judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.

5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained. In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained, although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.

6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.

7. "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." (Citation omitted.)

These rules of avoidance were then summarized in Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, as follows:

The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

Here, it is of no moment that petitioner only raised the issue of constitutionality for the first time on appeal, as it was still properly and timely raised in a direct action. However, delving into the constitutionality of the assailed provisions of the law and implementing rules is not essential to the disposition of the case. It can still be resolved in favor of petitioner on other grounds without resorting to a review of the law. 16 (Emphases in the original, citations omitted.)

In the present case, there is no more justiciable controversy as to whether the petitioners (then movants-intervenors) should have been allowed to intervene in the case filed by Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank shareholders questioning Resolution No. 1635 directing the liquidation of the bank. As previously stated, the case had been finally decided by the CA; there is no more case to intervene in. "The settled rule is that courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." 17

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other arguments raised in the petition.

FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.

The Motion to Admit Compliance (with the resolution dated February 16, 2021) with Leave of Court and Manifestation dated August 2, 2021 filed by counsel for respondent Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation, among others, stating the reasons for the delay in filing its compliance, is NOTED." Carandang and Rosario, JJ., no part. Dimaampao, J., on official leave. (14)

SO ORDERED." HTcADC

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MARIFE M. LOMIBAO-CUEVASClerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo. 3-35.

2. So v. Hon. Tacla, Jr., 648 Phil. 149, 163 (2010), citing Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 753 (2006); and Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Pascua, 456 Phil. 425, 436 (2003).

3. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Pascua, supra.

4. Vilando v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 671 Phil. 524, 531-532 (2011).

5. Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario (now a Member of the Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices Maria Filomena D. Singh and Florencio Mallanao Mamauag, Jr. See https://services.ca.judiciary.gov.ph/csisver3-war/faces/pages/ResultInformation.xhtml (last accessed: November 22, 2021).

6. Penned by Associate Justice Florencio Mallanao Mamauag, Jr., with the concurrence of Associate Justices Maria Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and Maria Filomena D. Singh. See https://services.ca.judiciary.gov.ph/csisver3-war/faces/pages/ResultInformation.xhtml (last accessed: November 22, 2021).

7. Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan v. Judge Elbinias, 232 Phil. 90, 96 (1987).

8. See Republic v. Manalo, 735 Phil. 173, 179 (2014).

9. See Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. v. AZ Communications, Inc., G.R. No. 196902, July 13, 2020.

10. Rollo, pp. 44-47. Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario (now a Member of the Court), with the concurrence of Associate Justices Rosmari D. Carandang (now a Member of the Court) and Leoncia Real-Dimagiba.

11. Id. at 49-53.

12. SEC. 30. Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. —x x x.

The actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within ten (10) days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, liquidation or conservatorship.

13. Phil. Assn. of Colleges & Univ. v. Sec. of Edu., 97 Phil. 806, 809 (1955).

14. Palencia v. People, G.R. No. 219560, July 1, 2020.

15. Id.

16. Id.

17. Phil. National Bank v. Palma, 503 Phil. 917, 932 (2005).