Spouses Yap v. Chua

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 216576. November 10, 2021.]

SPOUSES JESSE Y. YAP AND BESSIE T. YAP, petitioners, vs.ELISA CHUA, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated10 November 2021which reads as follows: HTcADC

"G.R. No. 216576 (Spouses Jesse Y. Yap and Bessie T. Yap v. Elisa Chua). — This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, assailing the Decision 1 dated February 12, 2014 and Resolution 2 dated January 13, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 04428-MIN.

Antecedents

Sometime in 1996, the spouses Jesse Y. Yap (Jesse) and Bessie T. Yap (Bessie) (collectively, petitioners) attempted to venture in the real estate business in the areas of South Cotabato, Sarangani, and General Santos City. In the course of securing funds for the acquisition of real property from local landowners, Jesse approached respondent Elisa Chua (respondent) under a rediscounting scheme.

As agreed by both parties, respondent released substantial amounts of money in favor of Jesse in exchange for several postdated checks. Thus, Jesse issued the following Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) checks in the name of respondent which were, however, all dishonored by the drawee bank:

Check No.	Date	Amount	Reason for Dishonor
659599	July 30, 1997	P3,000,000.00	ACCOUNT CLOSED
708158	July 30, 1997	2,500,000.00	ACCOUNT CLOSED
708160	July 30, 1997	2,756,666.00	ACCOUNT CLOSED
712417	July 30, 1997	10,900,000.00	ACCOUNT CLOSED
712418	July 30, 1997	10,900,000.00	ACCOUNT CLOSED
727214	July 30, 1997	960,000.00	PAYMENT STOPPED
		––––––––––––––––
	TOTAL	P31,016,666.003

Jesse further issued two postdated BPI checks in favor of a third party 4 amounting to P1,541,666.66, which were both rediscounted by respondent. The same were also dishonored by the bank.

Despite verbal and written demands, Jesse refused to pay the value of the foregoing eight checks, contending that the lands supposedly purchased through the same were not delivered to him.

Consequently, on December 12, 1997, respondent instituted a Complaint 5 for collection of sum of money against petitioners, before Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), General Santos City, docketed as Civil Case No. 6236.

Thereafter, respondent filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law against Jesse. This resulted in the filing of six Informations 6 against him — all dated February 19, 1998 — before Branch 2 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of General Santos City, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 34859-2 to 34861-2 and 35870-2 to 34872-2 (consolidated criminal cases).

Professing innocence and denying all liability, petitioners claimed that Jesse transacted with one Evelyn Te (Te) who promised to facilitate the purchase and delivery of the lands that he intended to purchase for his real estate business. In view of their agreement, Jesse allegedly issued several crossed checks to Te. Unbeknownst to him, Te negotiated these checks to respondent. Since some of the real property supposedly purchased by Te were not delivered to him, Jesse stopped the payment of the same. Thereafter, respondent allegedly convinced Jesse to replace the checks that he initially issued to Te, which he did. Thus, the checks in question were issued by Jesse in the name of respondent. Since petitioners still did not receive the lands that Jesse wanted to purchase, they cannot be held liable for the value of the checks. Neither could Jesse be found guilty of violating BP 22.

Proceedings before the lower courts

The outcome of the civil case

On June 8, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision 7 in Civil Case No. 6236, finding petitioners civilly liable to respondent for the amounts represented in the eight checks that were rediscounted by the latter.

The RTC found that respondent had indeed parted with her own money in exchange for the checks issued by Jesse. There being no evidence that the issuance of the postdated checks in question were contingent upon the delivery of the lands intended to be purchased by Jesse through the intercession of Te, petitioners must perforce be held liable for the amounts reflected therein.

Ultimately, the RTC disposed:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former the following:

1. [P]32,558,332.00 as principal with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the case until the whole amount is fully paid;

2. [P]150,000.00 as moral damages;

3. [P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. [P]1,000,000.00 in concept of attorney's fees; and

5. The cost of suit.

The third party complaint is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 8

In its Decision 9 dated March 31, 2005, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 71934 affirmed with modification the above RTC ruling. Thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. It is hereby declared that defendants-appellants Spouses Jesse and Bessie Yap are liable to plaintiff-appellee Elisa Chua in the amount of [P]31,016,666.00, representing the value of the six BPI Checks Nos. 659599, 708158, 708160, 712418, 712417 and 727214. The awards of moral damages in the amount of [P]150,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of [P]50,000, and attorney's fees in the amount of [P]1,000,000.00 are SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 10

The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA in its Resolution 11 dated October 19, 2005.

When the case was elevated by petitioners to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari, the same was denied in the Resolution 12 dated February 27, 2006. Then, in the Resolution 13 dated June 5, 2006, We denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration with finality. An Entry of Judgment 14 was issued by the Court on July 18, 2008.

The result of the consolidated

On July 26, 2010, the MTCC issued a Consolidated Decision 15 acquitting Jesse of the six charges of violation of BP 22.

The trial court ratiocinated that "the prosecution failed to establish the elements for the six (6) cases because the drawee bank failed to give notice to the drawer when the checks presented bounced as the prosecution failed to present any bank representative as to whether or not the Notice[s] of Dishonor were sent" 16 to Jesse. Moreover, because the checks issued to respondent were replacements for previously dishonored crossed checks, the MTCC held that respondent was aware of the infirmity or defect in Jesse's checks.

Thus, the MTCC disposed:

In these cases at bench, the prosecution miserably failed to sufficiently establish proofs for each checks [sic] that accused JESSE YAP issued the subject checks for value to the private-complainant Elisa Chua, and in all the subject checks issued, the civil liability which might arise did not exist.

1. In Criminal Case No. 34859-2, accused JESSE YAP is hereby ACQUITTED for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged.

2. In Criminal Case No. 34860-2, accused JESSE YAP is hereby ACQUITTED for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged.

3. In Criminal Case No. 34861-2, accused JESSE YAP is hereby ACQUITTED for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charge[d].

4. In Criminal Case No. 34870-2, accused JESSE YAP is hereby ACQUITTED for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged.

5. In Criminal Case No. 34871-2, accused JESSE YAP is hereby ACQUITTED for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged.

6. In Criminal Case No. 34872-2, accused JESSE YAP is hereby ACQUITTED for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged.

The judgment of acquittal of the accused extinguishes the civil liability of the accused when it includes a declaration that the facts from whom the civil might arise did not exist x x x.

SO ORDERED. 17

The instant controversy

In an Order 18 dated November 24, 2008, the RTC, in Civil Case No. 6236, granted respondent's Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. 19

Petitioners responded by filing a motion 20 to suspend the enforcement of the said writ, invoking the then-pendency of the consolidated criminal cases against Jesse. Petitioners contended that there was still a chance that they could be declared free from civil liability. The RTC denied said motion in its Order 21 dated June 8, 2009.

Petitioners then interposed a Motion for Reconsideration, 22 followed by an Addendum 23 thereto, the latter invoking Jesse's acquittal in the consolidated criminal cases filed against him before the MTCC. Clutching tightly on the MTCC's declaration that "the civil liability which might arise did not exist," 24 petitioners argued that the writ of execution in the civil case could no longer be enforced against them.

On July 29, 2011, the RTC issued an Order 25 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. It ratiocinated, inter alia, that its Decision in Civil Case No. 6236 had long become final and executory; that Jesse's acquittal did not amount to the extinction of his civil liability; that the MTCC clearly stated in its Consolidated Decision that the same was limited to determining Jesse's criminal liability; and that the MTCC went beyond its jurisdiction when it declared that Jesse's civil liability did not exist.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari26 before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In the herein assailed Decision dated February 12, 2014, the CA denied petitioners' petition for certiorari. Finding petitioners' pleas unmeritorious, the appellate court affirmed the finding that Civil Case No. 6236 was filed ahead of the consolidated criminal cases; that Civil Case No. 6236 became final and executory on July 18, 2008 or before Jesse's acquittal in the consolidated criminal cases; that as acknowledged by the MTCC itself, the six Informations in the consolidated criminal cases uniformly state that "a separate civil action was filed for recovery of civil damages"; 27 and that, consequently, petitioners' argument that they are no longer civilly liable by virtue of Jesse's acquittal must fail.

Thus, the CA disposed:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The questioned Orders of the Regional Trial Court are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 28

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration 29 was denied by the CA in the herein assailed Resolution dated January 13, 2015.

Hence, the present recourse.

Petitioners contend that the criminal and civil aspects of the present controversy cannot be treated as separate and distinct from each other because respondent never made any prior reservation of her right to prosecute the civil aspect separately; that, as a result, Jesse's acquittal in the consolidated criminal cases amounts to the extinguishment of petitioners' civil liability for the value of the checks that they transacted with respondent; and that the execution of the judgment in Civil Case No. 6236 would be unjust and inequitable.

In her Comment, 30 respondent countermands that since the civil action was filed ahead of the consolidated criminal cases, the extinction of Jesse's criminal liability did not result in the extinguishment of petitioners' civil liability.

Issues

The Court is called upon to determine whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC's denial of petitioners' motion to suspend the enforcement of the writ of execution of the final and executory Decision in Civil Case No. 6236, notwithstanding Jesse's acquittal in the consolidated criminal cases.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is bereft of merit.

Respondent is not precluded from

An independent civil action is an action that is based upon the same criminal act 31 which requires only a preponderance of evidence. 32 As a general rule, no independent civil action is allowed to recover the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. 33 The criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. 34

Rule 111, Section 1 (b) of the Rules of Court so states:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — x x x

xxx xxx xxx

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with Section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Relative thereto, Sections 1 and 3 of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97, which took effect on November 1, 1997, read as follows:

Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:

1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.

xxx xxx xxx

3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2(a) of Rule 111 governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.

The rationale for the foregoing rule is expediency. Prohibiting the institution of separate civil and criminal cases for violations of BP 22 helps declog court dockets and expedites the disposition of such cases. 35

Nevertheless, this rule admits of an exception. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. 36

Here, it may be recalled that respondent instituted Civil Case No. 6236 on December 12, 1997. On the other hand, the six Informations for the consolidated criminal cases were filed with the MTCC on February 19, 1998. Clearly, the civil case was filed ahead of the consolidated criminal cases. And as far as the records show, no attempt to consolidate the civil and criminal aspects was made by either party. Thus, respondent's separate courses of action did not violate the rules concerning the adjudication of BP 22 cases.

Too, it bears stressing that the Informations filed with the MTCC uniformly state that "a separate civil action was filed for recovery of civil damages." 37 Since an information is defined as "an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court," 38 petitioners cannot now feign ignorance to the fact that the civil case was pursued by respondent independently of the consolidated criminal cases.

The extinction of Jesse's criminal

In Bernardo v. People, 39 the Court, through Justice Arturo D. Brion, exhaustively discussed the classes of civil liabilities that may be pursued by an aggrieved party, viz.:

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to several distinct civil liabilities on the part of the offender. If the conduct constitutes a felony, the accused may be held civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code (ex delicto). This particular civil liability due the offended party is rooted on facts that constitute a crime. Otherwise stated, civil liability arises from the offense charged. It is not required that the accused be convicted to be entitled to civil liability based on delict. As long as the facts constituting the offense charged are established by preponderance of evidence, civil liability may be awarded. Moreover, the civil liability based on delict is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The same act or omission, however, may also give rise to independent civil liabilities based on other sources of obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: (a) law (b) contracts; (c) quasi-contracts, and (d) quasi-delicts. Among these are the civil liabilities for intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil Code and for quasi-delicts under Article 2176 of Civil Code. For conduct constituting defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the Civil Code likewise grants the offended party the right to institute a civil action independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. 40

In the case at bar, petitioners misappreciated the MTCC's declaration in the consolidated criminal cases that "the civil liability which might arise did not exist." 41 While the MTCC's Consolidated Decision speaks of Jesse's civil liability arising from violation of BP 22, the RTC's Decision in Civil Case No. 6236 concerns petitioners' contractual obligation to respondent.

At this juncture, We quote with affirmation the following discussion of the CA:

This pronouncement could only mean the civil liability arising from the criminal offense of violation of BP 22. The trial court acknowledged in its own decision that: (1) "a separate civil action was filed for recovery of civil damages" and (2) the issue before it is "whether or not accused Jesse Yap is criminally liable of the crime of violation of Pambansa Blg. 22 (6 counts)." Clearly, the trial court was aware that it shall only determine criminal liability and not the civil liability arising from the value of the checks. Consequently, its pronouncement on civil liability could only mean civil liability arising from the offense pursuant to Rule 111, Section 1(a) of the Rules of Court which states that "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action."

It must be recalled that the gravamen of a BP 22 case is the issuance of a worthless check. "The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order." Hence, the criminal prosecution of BP 22 against Yap was directed against his issuance of a worthless check. The civil liability arising from the issuance of the worthless check was what was decided by the consolidated criminal cases because, as stated earlier, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action.

In contrast, the civil liability, which is the subject of the writ of execution, arose from the value of the checks. This civil liability did not arise from the offense. It is grounded on a different source of obligation, which is the contract between the parties. In fact the decision of the Court of Appeals in the civil case, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, clearly stated that "Spouses Jesse and Bessie Yap are liable to plaintiff-appellee Elisa Chua in the amount of P31,016,666.00, representing the value of the six BPI Checks x x x." This civil liability arising from the value of the issued checks has long been settled and is in fact final and executory in a civil action filed ahead of the consolidated criminal cases. 42

At any rate, the doctrine of immutability

It is beyond cavil that the RTC's Decision in Civil Case No. 6236 had already attained finality, an Entry of Judgment having been issued by this very Court on July 18, 2008.

A judgment, once it has attained finality, can never be altered, amended, or modified, even if the alteration, amendment, or modification is to correct an erroneous judgment. 43 Indeed, a decision must become final and executory at some point in time; all litigations must necessarily come to an end. 44

In Mocorro, Jr. v. Ramirez, 45 We decreed:

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred. 46

While there are recognized exceptions to the rule on immutability of judgments, such as: (1) correction of any clerical error; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable 47 — none of which are obtaining in this case.

The collection of petitioners' civil liability arising from a contractual obligation cannot be considered unjust and inequitable. By virtue of a judgment that had attained finality long before Jesse's acquittal in the consolidated criminal cases, it was found that respondent had actually parted with her own hard-earned money and had given the same to petitioners pursuant to their contractual agreement. The execution of the said judgment in the civil aspect of the case is warranted.

All told, fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice dictate 48 that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere. 49 It is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause therein should be laid to rest. 50 The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. 51 It is in the best interest of justice that this Court write finis to this litigation. 52 aScITE

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 12, 2014 and Resolution dated January 13, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04228-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." (Inting, J., no part; Carandang, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated September 6, 2021.)

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDivision Clerk of Court

Footnotes

1. Rollo, pp. 35-42; penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a Member of this Court) with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Jhosep Y. Lopez (also now a Member of this Court) concurring.

2. Id. at 57-59; penned by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a Member of this Court) with Associate Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Pablito A. Perez concurring.

3. Id. at 340-342.

4. Id. at 343-344.

5. Id. at 324-336.

6. Id. at 345-356.

7. Id. at 60-74; rendered by Presiding Judge Jose S. Majaducon.

8. Id. at 74.

9. Id. at 75-95; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo A. Camello with Associate Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Myrna Dimaranan Vidal concurring.

10. Id. at 94.

11. Id. at 96-97.

12. Id. at 98.

13. Id. at 99-100.

14. Id. at 101.

15. Id. at 302-311; rendered by Judge Jose A. Bersales.

16. Id. at 306.

17. Id. at 310-311.

18. Id. at 103; rendered by Judge Andres N. Lorenzo, Jr.

19. Id. at 384-388.

20. Id. at 104-113.

21. Id. at 117-119.

22. Id. at 120-132.

23. Id. at 133-138.

24. Id. at 310.

25. Id. at 139-140.

26. Id. at 158-195.

27. Id. at 345-356.

28. Id. at 42.

29. Id. at 43-55.

30. Id. at 377-383.

31. Corpus v. Paje, 139 Phil. 429, 433 (1969).

32. People v. Lipata, 785 Phil. 520, 534 (2016).

33. Heirs of Eduardo Simon v. Chan, 569 Phil. 81, 96 (2011).

34. Evangelista v. Screenex, Inc., 820 Phil. 997, 1008 (2017).

35. Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electric Corp., 503 Phil. 411, 418 (2005).

36. Id.

37. Rollo, pp. 345-356.

38. RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, Section 4.

39. 770 Phil. 509 (2015).

40. Id. at 518-521.

41. Rollo, p. 310.

42. Id. at 40-41.

43. Republic v. Heirs of Cirilo Gotengco, 824 Phil. 568, 578 (2018).

44. Go v. Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, 761 Phil. 223, 238-239 (2015).

45. 582 Phil. 357 (2008).

46. Id. at 366-367.

47. Masakazu Uematsu v. Balinon, G.R. No. 234812, November 25, 2019.

48. Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corp., 512 Phil. 679, 708 (2005).

49. Mendoza v. Court of Appeals (Eighth Division), 764 Phil. 53, 66 (2015).

50. Aledro-Ruña v. Lead Export and Agro-Development Corp., 836 Phil. 946, 957 (2018).

51. Spouses Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corp., 533 Phil. 645, 669 (2006).

52. Yap v. Heirs of Pantalan, G.R. No. 199783, April 10, 2019.