THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 205579. March 14, 2018.]
SPOUSES AGUSTO TIMICHAN AND ORDELIA TIMICHAN,petitioners, vs. JOHNNY SY, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 14, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 205579 (SPOUSES AGUSTO TIMICHAN and ORDELIA TIMICHAN, Petitioners, v. JOHNNY SY, Respondent.) — The petitioners seek the review and reversal of the adverse decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) on June 22, 2012 1 affirming the decision dated August 25, 2009 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, in Baguio City in Civil Case No. 4893-R ordering the petitioners to pay their monetary obligation to the respondent arising from the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). 2
Antecedents
The CA summarized the factual and procedural antecedents, thus:
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint, dated February 23, 2001, filed by plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Timichan. Appellants alleged that sometime in September 1997, defendant-appellee Johnny Sy (Sy) influenced them to lease a bakery in La Union which he claimed he owns and operates. To alleviate their doubts, Sy offered to accompany the Spouses Timichan to visit the bakery and inquire about the status of the business from the employees themselves. Plaintiff-appellants agreed to visit the bakery and its employees confirmed that business was good. Thus, they decided to agree to lease the bakery.
Subsequently, Sy presented a document captioned as a Memorandum of Agreement, which was signed by both defendant Sy and plaintiff Agusto Timichan, with the consent of plaintiff Ordelia Timichan. However, the spouses Timichan were not given a copy of the said document. Resultantly, plaintiffs issued twenty six (26) post dated checks to cover rentals and other charges.
Upon assuming control over the bakery, plaintiffs noticed that the bakery was not as prosperous as they were led to believe. After three weeks, the bakery employees informed plaintiffs that the business was actually experiencing heavy losses and they were just told by defendant to say that business was good when asked by the plaintiffs about its status. When they were finally furnished with a copy of the Memorandum of Agreement, they found out that it contained provisions regarding the purchase of jeep and payment of penalties and surcharges. Also, plaintiffs discovered that defendant was not the owner of the bakery but only a lessee and the lease contract was about to expire on October 1, 1997. AScHCD
In his Answer, defendant-appellee denied most of the allegations in the Complaint. He further alleged that it was plaintiff-appellant Agusto Timichan who came to him and expressed his interest in purchasing a mini-bus owned by the Samahan ng Lahing Pilipino, Inc., where Sy then served as its president. They entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for purchase of the said vehicle during the first quarter of 1997, secured by a real estate mortgage over plaintiff-spouses' house and lot, and later, a chattel mortgage over the said vehicle, in order to release the real estate mortgage. However, before the real estate mortgage was cancelled, plaintiffs entered into another Memorandum of Agreement for the lease of the bakery and purchase of the jeepney. To ensure compliance with the MOA for the lease, the parties had an oral agreement that the real estate mortgage will serve as security for it instead. Defendant-appellee also alleged that he loaned the Spouses Timichan the amount of Forty-Seven Thousand Pesos (Php47,000.00), with a monthly interest of 5%, as they had no money for starting capital. 3
As stated, the RTC, finding no fraud having been employed by the respondent on the petitioners when they entered into the MOA, ruled against the petitioners. It observed that, on the contrary, there was nothing in the MOA or in the subsequent actions of the parties that showed that the respondent had duped the petitioners as to persuade them to lease the bakery, to buy the jeepney, and to obtain a loan. The fallo of the judgment of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant Johnny Sy and against the plaintiffs Agusto and Ordella Timichan who are hereby ordered to pay the said defendant the following:
1. P102,000.00 as payment for the jeepney with the interest at 12% per annum from May 21, 2001, the date of judicial demand until fully paid;
2. P25,000.00 as payment for the loan extended by the defendant to the plaintiffs to start the bakery business with interest at 12% per annum from May 21, 2001 until fully paid;
3. P100,000.00 as liquidated damages; and
4. P25,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 4
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, reiterating that there was no evidence of bad faith or fraud on the part of the respondent; that the stipulations of the MOA sufficiently apprised the petitioners about the facts that they alleged had been concealed from them (i.e., that the respondent was a mere lessee and the business standing of the bakery); and that there was no cause that nullified the MOA. The CA disposed thusly:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision, dated August 25, 2009, issued by Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 4893-R, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.5 AcICHD
After the CA denied their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners are now before the Court on appeal.
Issue
The petitioners assert that the CA erred in affirming the validity of the MOA; that the CA did not properly appreciate that there was fraud committed against them; that there was no legal basis for the monetary judgment rendered in favor of the respondent, specifically, the cost of the jeepney, the loan obligation, and the liquidated damages and attorney's fees; and that it was unwarranted to impose solidary liability against petitioner Ordelia Timichan only because she had consented to the MOA.
Did the CA err in upholding the validity of the MOA?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
It is obvious that the petitioners are raising factual issues in this appeal. Such issues cannot be the subject of review by petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a mode of appeal that is limited to the review of questions of law, to wit: caITAC
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
A question of law is one that raises doubts as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. In contrast, a question of fact exists when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 6 The test to determine whether or not the question is one of law or of fact is the query: can the appellate court determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence; if it can, the question is one of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. 7 TAIaHE
Applying the test, the Court holds that the petition raises questions of fact. Indeed, the Court cannot resolve whether the MOA was valid or not without sifting the pieces of evidence presented by the parties. Moreover, the issue of whether or not fraud existed was a question of fact. 8 The determination of fraud requires an evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties. As such, the appeal must be turned down because the Court is not a trier of facts.
Nonetheless, even if the Court is to be liberal as to determine the factual issues raised by the petitioners, the denial of the petition will still be warranted. Anent the factual issues raised by the petitioners, the Court accords great weight and respect, sometimes even finality, to the findings of fact of the RTC as the trial court, especially after such findings were affirmed by the CA. 9 Although this rule admits of exceptions, 10 the petitioners utterly failed to prove that their case came within the ambit of the exceptions instead of the rule. To prove was their burden to discharge. Consequently, the Court has to concur with the uniform findings of fact of the RTC and the CA, and reject the plea of the petitioners for the invalidation of the MOA on the ground of fraud.
The award of P100,000.00 as liquidated damages was warranted. It is not disputed that the petitioners backed out of their contract with the respondent. Such act violated the MOA, in which they stipulated that:
10. That in case of backing out by (sic) second party, she (sic) shall be liable for P100,000.00 under this agreement as liquidated damages and 25% as attorney's fees. Likewise, any payments made shall be forfeited in favor of the first party. 11
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 22, 2012 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED." cDHAES
Very truly yours,
WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of CourtBy:(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 38-51; penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio, and concurred in by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla.
2.Id. at 58-64; penned by Presiding Judge Mona Lisa V. Tiongson-Tabora.
3.Id. at 39-40.
4.Id. at 64.
5.Id. at 51.
6.Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr., G.R. No. 189647, February 6, 2012, 665 SCRA 38, 46-47.
7.Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation v. Escaño, G.R. No. 190994, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 306, 314.
8.Sampaco v. Lantud, G.R. No. 163551, July 18, 2011, 654 SCRA 36, 50.
9.Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations of the United Presbyterian Church in the USA, G.R. No. 140472, June 10, 2002, 383 SCRA 326, 334.
10. In New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 149281, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 220, 227, the Court, citing The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 401 SCRA 79, 85-86, stated that "[i]t is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion."
11.Rollo, p. 63.