Spouses Sagad v. Isidro-Viceo

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 11429. July 6, 2021.](Formerly CBD Case No. 17-5299)

SPOUSES FREDDIE*AND ELENITA SAGAD, complainants, vs.ATTY. EMELITA**ISIDRO-VICEO, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 6, 2021 which reads as follows: HTcADC

"A.C. No. 11429 (Formerly CBD Case No. 17-5299) — SPOUSES FREDDIE and ELENITA SAGAD, complainants, versus ATTY. EMELITA ISIDRO-VICEO, respondent.

This is an administrative complaint 1 filed by the Spouses Freddie and Elenita Sagad (Spouses Sagad) for the disbarment of Atty. Emelita Isidro-Viceo (Atty. Viceo) for purportedly violating Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 2

The Case

The complaint stemmed from the Spouses Sagad's construction of their residential house in North Susana Executive Village, Diliman, Quezon City. At the time of the filing of the complaint, Atty. Viceo was the incumbent President of the North Susana Homeowners' Association, Inc. (NSHAI). 3

According to the Spouses Sagad, their house was under construction, and they were able to complete the requirements necessary therefor, including the building permit. Sometime in February 2015, the security guards of the village prevented the entry of a delivery truck carrying construction materials for their house. They allegedly appealed to Atty. Viceo to allow them to continue, but Atty. Viceo unjustifiably refused, even if all the necessary permits were in order and the required construction bond was already paid to NSHAI. 4

The Spouses Sagad further aver that Atty. Viceo, in her efforts to halt the construction of their house, went to the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to question the legality of their building permit. 5 The appeal was later dismissed in the Resolution 6 dated April 14, 2016 of the DPWH Office of the Secretary, which sustained the issuance of the building permit issued by the Quezon City Department of Building Official. 7

Meanwhile, the Spouses Sagad filed an application with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking the issuance of a Cease and Desist Order (CDO). They alleged that they suffered grave and irreparable injury from the discontinuation and incomplete construction of their house, which resulted from NSHAI and Atty. Viceo's refusal to honor their building permit. 8 In an Order 9 dated January 14, 2015, the HLURB granted the application of the Spouses Sagad. The NSHAI and all persons acting on their behalf were ordered to cease, desist, and refrain "from restraining the entry and passage of construction workers, materials and the stoppage of construction works (sic) at the property of [the Spouses Sagad]." 10 This was followed by a Writ of Execution 11 issued by the HLURB on April 28, 2015, addressed to the ex-officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.

The Spouses Sagad allege, however, that Atty. Viceo acted oppressively 12 by writing to the Sheriff of the RTC of Quezon City and questioning his authority to implement the Writ of Execution, instead of merely complying with the HLURB's CDO. 13 This prompted the Sheriff, Mr. Fructoso L. Loja (Sheriff Loja), to seek guidance from the Executive Judge of Branch 78 of the Quezon City RTC, Hon. Fernando T. Sagun, Jr., (Judge Sagun) on the implementation of the HLURB's Writ of Execution. In an Order 14 dated May 13, 2015, Judge Sagun directed Sheriff Loja to proceed. Sheriff Loja, in turn, issued a Notice to Comply 15 dated May 26, 2015 to NSHAI and Atty. Viceo.

Despite the foregoing, the Spouses Sagad contend that Atty. Viceo ignored and dishonored these directives. 16 They attached the Sheriff's Report 17 dated June 26, 2015, which stated that the security personnel of North Susana Executive Village refused entry to the delivery truck carrying construction materials for their residence upon the directive of the NSHAI.

The Spouses Sagad argue that Atty. Viceo's utter refusal to comply with the legal processes of the court and the HLURB violated Canons 1 18 and 10 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. They pray for the disbarment or suspension of Atty. Viceo from the practice of law. 20

In a Resolution 21 dated September 14, 2016, the Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Atty. Viceo filed her Answer 22 with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on May 12, 2017, denying the allegations of the Spouses Sagad that she violated Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

She argues that while she was indeed a member of the NSHAI Board of Directors, as well as the President thereof, she does not decide on matters pertaining to the association on her own. The Board of Directors is composed of fifteen (15) members, all of whom collectively decide on these matters. 23

Atty. Viceo particularly denies that she personally prevented the entry of the delivery truck containing the construction materials for the house of the Spouses Sagad. According to her, she was not even physically present at the North Susana Executive Village at that time. Atty. Viceo further points out that the construction of the Spouses Sagad's residence was in violation of the height restrictions annotated on the title of their property. The construction bond paid by the Spouses Sagad was already forfeited due to numerous violations in the construction of the first two floors of their residence. The Spouses Sagad likewise allegedly failed to deposit the bond for the third-floor construction. 24

She emphasizes that she did not personally receive the copy of the HLURB's CDO. Neither did she receive the Writ of Execution and the Notice to Comply. The Sheriff's Report dated June 26, 2015 also states that it was the directive of the NSHAI, and not hers alone, to prohibit the entry of the delivery truck. She therefore prays that the complaint be dismissed for being baseless and unfounded. 25

Thereafter, the Investigating Commissioner directed the parties to appear in a mandatory conference on March 19, 2018. 26 During the scheduled conference, the parties stipulated on the existence and due execution of most of the documentary evidence attached to their respective pleadings. They were also directed to submit their position papers within thirty (30) days or until April 18, 2018. 27

Atty. Viceo submitted her Position Paper 28 on April 18, 2018, insisting that there was a dearth of evidence to establish her having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, especially since the actions complained of pertain to the NSHAI itself. 29 She also argues that there is no violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she wrote to the Sheriff regarding his authority to implement the HLURB's CDO. She states that the letter only sought to clarify the application of the Court's ruling in A.M. No. 14-7-224-RTC, 30 where the Court denied the request for the designation of a sheriff to implement the writ of possession issued by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples because it is an executive, and not a judicial agency. 31

The Spouses Sagad, on the other hand, submitted their position paper 32 on April 19, 2018, essentially reiterating the allegations in their complaint. They additionally prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary damages in the respective amounts of P200,000.00 and P100,000.00. 33

Report and Recommendation

The IBP-CBD, through its Investigating Commissioner, submitted its Report and Recommendation, 34 finding the complaint unmeritorious. Preliminarily, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the Spouses Sagad raised the issue of damages for the first time in their final submission. Aside from depriving Atty. Viceo with the opportunity to address this argument, the Investigating Commissioner stated that the payment of damages is not among the penalties that can be imposed in this proceeding. 35

As regards the other allegations in this case, the Investigating Commissioner held that the Spouses Sagad bear the burden of proving their case by preponderance of evidence. The Spouses Sagad failed to discharge this burden because the acts complained of were not attributable to Atty. Viceo personally, but to the NSHAI Board of Directors, which manages the affairs and exercises the powers of the association. Neither is there any evidence that Atty. Viceo refused to allow the entry of the delivery truck, considering that the Sheriff's Report stated that the directive was from the NSHAI, as confirmed by a certain Melchor Cerna to Freddie Sagad. 36

On the letter of Atty. Viceo to the Sheriff, the Investigating Commissioner found that she had sufficient legal basis to seek clarification on the authority of the RTC Quezon City Sheriff to implement an order of the HLURB. By citing A.M. No. 14-7-224-RTC, and considering the subsequent Resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 15-07-12-SC 37 that court sheriffs cannot enforce the writs of quasi-judicial bodies, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Viceo did not violate Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 38

The Investigating Commissioner therefore recommended to dismiss the complaint for lack of merit. 39 The IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution 40 dated December 15, 2019, adopted the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. aScITE

The Court's Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case and the evidence submitted by the parties, the Court resolves to modify the findings of the IBP.

At the onset, it should be clarified that the quantum of proof for administrative proceedings against lawyers is substantial evidence and not preponderance of evidence as erroneously stated in the Report and Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. This was already settled in Reyes v. Nieva, 41 which the Court reiterated in Tan v. Alvarico: 42

In the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, the quantum of proof by which the charges against respondent were assessed was preponderance of evidence, which is defined under Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as "superior weight of evidence on [where] the issues involved lies." Notably, however, the Court has already clarified in Reyes v. Atty. Nieva that based on a survey of jurisprudence, the quantum of proof for administrative proceedings against lawyers is substantial evidence and not preponderance of evidence. We stressed that this pronouncement ought to control and quell any further confusion on the proper evidentiary threshold. Moreover, we recognized that the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence, as opposed to preponderance of evidence, is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending disciplinary cases:

Besides, the evidentiary threshold of substantial evidence — as opposed to preponderance of evidence — is more in keeping with the primordial purpose of and essential considerations attending this type of cases. As case law elucidates, '[d]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.'

A survey of administrative cases recently promulgated in the year 2020 affirms that the Court has been applying substantial evidence as the quantum of proof in disbarment proceedings. 43 (Emphasis supplied)

Be that as it may, the Court finds that the Spouses Sagad were unable to present substantial evidence to show that Atty. Viceo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility which would warrant her disbarment or suspension.

Apart from their own allegation, there was no evidence that it was Atty. Viceo herself who unjustifiably refused entry to the delivery truck carrying the construction materials for the Spouses Sagad's residence on two (2) separate occasions: in February 2015 and on June 25, 2015. As the Investigating Commissioner found, the affairs and the operation of the North Susana Executive Village were managed by the Board of Directors of the NSHAI. 44 The records further establish that the appeal from the issuance of the building permit before the DPWH was made by the NSHAI, through its counsel, Atty. Abelardo G. Luzano. 45 This belies the allegation of the Spouses Sagad that it was Atty. Viceo who filed the appeal and that she did so "as an act of suppression and oppression." 46

Neither can the Spouses Sagad rely on the Sheriff's Report dated June 26, 2015 to establish that Atty. Viceo arbitrarily ignored the legal processes of the HLURB. It is evident from the Sheriff's Report that the delivery truck was refused entry by the security personnel "as per directive/instruction from the Homeowners Association (sic)." 47 Atty. Viceo was not mentioned at all in this report. Rather, the report stated that it was a certain Melchor Cerna who confirmed said instruction to Freddie Sagad. 48

The Court likewise agrees that Atty. Viceo cannot be held liable for writing the letter to Sheriff Loja, which pointed out the Court's August 26, 2014 Resolution 49 in A.M. No. 14-7-224-RTC. In this Resolution, the Court denied the request to designate a court sheriff to implement a writ issued by a quasi-judicial agency. Thus, Atty. Viceo correctly sought clarification on the authority of Sheriff Loja, a court sheriff from the RTC of Quezon City, to implement the Writ of Execution issued by the HLURB. There being sufficient legal basis for her concern, the IBP correctly ruled that Atty. Viceo did not unjustifiably disrespect the legal processes of the courts by virtue of this letter.

In fact, the Court issued another Resolution 50 dated February 2, 2016 in A.M. No. 15-07-12-SC clarifying that court sheriffs cannot enforce writs of execution issued by quasi-judicial bodies. Pursuant to the resolutions in A.M. No. 14-7-224-RTC and A.M. No. 15-07-12-SC, the Office of the Court Administrator issued OCA Circular No. 161-2016 51 directing all judges and clerks of court to refrain from designating their respective sheriffs to implement the writs issued by non-judiciary agencies. The HLURB, for its part, issued Memorandum Circular No. 9, series of 2016, 52 to inform the Commissioner and the Chief Executive Officer of these Court resolutions.

It does not escape the Court's attention, however, that Atty. Viceo herself wrote the letter to Sheriff Loja. This contradicts her claim that she was unaware of the HLURB's issuance of the CDO, which ordered the NSHAI and Atty. Viceo to cease, desist, and refrain "from restraining the entry and passage of construction workers, materials and the stoppage of construction works (sic) at the property of [the Spouses Sagad]." 53 Cognizant of this directive, Atty. Viceo could have, at the very least, counseled the Board of Directors against prohibiting the entry of the delivery truck. She should have been more mindful that without an injunction against the Spouses Sagad's construction activities, the NSHAI had no authority to defy the order of the HLURB notwithstanding their alleged violation of the Deed of Restrictions on their property. Furthermore, by virtue of her position as President of the NSHAI, she cannot simply claim a passive involvement with the affairs of the association or feign ignorance of the actions of its security personnel. She should have avoided any appearance of impropriety by proposing that the NSHAI initiate an action for injunction, instead of outrightly refusing the delivery of construction materials for the Spouses Sagad's residence.

In this regard, Atty. Viceo clearly fell short of her duty to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities" 54 and not to "counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." 55 At any rate, disbarment is the harshest form of disciplinary sanction, which the Court must impose with great caution and only with the intention to preserve the integrity of the legal profession. 56 The Court deems it more proper to admonish Atty. Viceo to be more circumspect in her dealings.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Emelita Isidro-Viceo is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in her dealings and avoid any appearance of impropriety. She is STERNLY WARNED that the repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

The Notice of Resolution dated December 15, 2019 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Board of Governors, transmitted by letter dated January 19, 2021 of Director Randall C. Tabayoyong, Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Commission on Bar Discipline, together with the records and compact disc containing the PDF file of the case, is NOTED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

* Also appears as "Fredie" in some parts of the rollo.

** Also appears as "Emily" in some parts of the rollo.

1.Rollo, pp. 1-8.

2.Id. at 5-7.

3.Id. at 1, 9 and 320.

4.Id. at 2 and 18.

5.Id. at 2.

6.Id. at 19-24.

7.Id. at 24.

8.Id. at 25-26.

9.Id. at 25-28.

10.Id. at 28.

11.Id. at 30-31.

12.Id. at 4.

13.Id. at 32.

14.Id. at 33-34.

15.Id. at 35.

16.Id. at 5.

17.Id. at 36.

18. CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

19. CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

20.Rollo, pp. 6-7.

21.Id. at 37.

22.Id. at 68-72.

23.Id. at 68.

24.Id. at 69.

25.Id. at 70-71.

26.Id. at 122.

27.Id. at 124-125.

28.Id. at 126-134.

29.Id. at 132-133.

30.Id. at 103-106. Court's Resolution dated August 26, 2014 in A.M. No. 14-7-224-RTC, Letters of CoC Marion Gay C. Mirabueno, RTC-OCC, Gen. Santos City on the Designation of a Sheriff to Implement the Writ of Possession Issued by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).

31.Id. at 130.

32.Id. at 176-184. Denominated as Memorandum (for the complainants).

33.Id. at 183.

34.Id. at 318-341.

35.Id. at 332-333.

36.Id. at 334-338.

37.Id. at 169. Court's Resolution dated February 2, 2016 in A.M. No. 15-07-12-SC, Re: Enforcement by Court Sheriffs of the Writs of Execution Issued by Quasi-Judicial Bodies, e.g., Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, Housing and land Use Regulatory Board, and Pag-IBIG.

38.Id. at 338-339.

39.Id. at 341.

40.Id. at 316-317.

41. A.C. No. 8560, September 6, 2016, 802 SCRA 196.

42. A.C. No. 10933, November 3, 2020.

43.Id. at 6-7. Citations omitted.

44.Rollo, pp. 336-337; see also id. at 137.

45.Id. at 19.

46.Id. at 2.

47.Id. at 36.

48.Id.

49.Supra note 30.

50.Supra note 37.

51. RE: NON-DESIGNATION OF SHERIFFS TO IMPLEMENT ALL WRITS ISSUED BY THE NON-JUDICIARY AGENCIES, July 22, 2016.

52. Re: Supreme Court En Bank (sic) Notices: (1) A.M. No. 15-07-12-SC dated February 2, 2016; (2) A.M. No. 14-7-224-RTC dated August 26, 2014, rollo, p. 168.

53.Supra note 10.

54. RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 3 (Lawyer's Oath).

55. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 1, Rule 1.02.

56. See Arma v. Montevilla, A.C. No. 4829, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 1, 8-9.