FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 226752. September 29, 2021.]
SPOUSES PACIFICO and MARIA RESANO, petitioners,vs. LUCIO MACO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 29, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 226752 (Spouses Pacifico and Maria Resano v. Lucio Maco). — This is a Petition for Review 1 of the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 16, 2016 in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03967, which affirmed the October 6, 2010 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. 00-26048 for Recovery of Possession, Accounting and Damages filed by respondent Lucio Maco (Lucio) against petitioners Pacifico (Pacifico) and Maria Resano (Maria) (collectively petitioners).
Facts
Lucio was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Barangay Tuy-an East, Ma-asin, Iloilo based on an Original Certificate of Title (OCT)4 issued in his name by virtue of a 1977 free patent grant. He inherited the land from his mother in 1937 and had since paid the corresponding realty taxes as shown by tax declarations and tax receipts made of record. In 1980, he learned that Pastor Segaya (Segaya), a tenant of petitioners, was cultivating a portion of the land, and that petitioners were actually claiming ownership over the same. Lucio demanded for petitioners to vacate the land, but they refused. Supposedly because of mental depression, Lucio claimed he was not able to promptly institute this action and had instead gone away to live with his son on account of his illness. It was only after his recovery that he made another, yet unheeded, demand to vacate. Efforts at settlement failed at the barangay lupon. Hence, on September 4, 2000, Lucio brought the instant suit. 5
Petitioners immediately moved to dismiss the complaint before the trial court on the ground of bar by the statute of limitations, as well as waiver, abandonment and extinction of the claim. The trial court denied the motion for lack of substantiation. 6 Before the court, they admitted the existence of the OCT, but challenged its validity. They manifested that there was a pending action for the annulment of the said OCT before the Bureau of Lands, which was supposedly a prejudicial question that needed prior resolve. Reiterating the ground for their earlier motion to dismiss, they claimed that the ten-year prescription of an action to recover real property had already lapsed when the present action was instituted. Lastly, they alluded to a compromise agreement, allegedly entered into by Maria and respondent's son, Donato, whereby they subdivided the lot in question into two parts for each party. 7 In his open court testimony, however, Lucio denied having entered into such agreement or having ratified the same. ATICcS
Maria testified that the subject land was originally owned by her grandfather upon whose death transferred it to her mother, and from whom she inherited the same. She likewise presented tax declarations and tax receipts showing she has not been remiss in her tax obligations on the property. She alleged that Lucio's mother owned an adjoining land which Lucio inherited and registered in his name, but Lucio allegedly mistakenly included the subject lot supposedly owned by Maria. Because of this alleged mistake, Maria supposedly asked for the cancellation of Lucio's title, and entered into a compromise agreement with Donato. 8 In the interim, Lucio died and was substituted by his heirs. 9
In its Decision dated October 6, 2010, the RTC granted the complaint. First, on the issue of prescription and bar by laches, it held that an action to recover possession of registered land is imprescriptible. As to proof of who has better right to the land in question, it noted that the tax declarations and tax receipts on record, while indeed useful as mere indicia of ownership, were not of themselves proof of ownership that could determine the better right of possession in the case. Second, it declared the compromise agreement signed by Maria and Donato to be void in the absence of a special power of attorney in favor of the latter to execute the same, and in the absence of proof that Lucio actually ratified the same in his lifetime. Third, on the issue of prejudicial question, it ruled that the annulment of title case before the Bureau of Lands had long been considered closed and terminated in an order of the said agency a copy of which was made of record in the proceedings. 10 The disposition reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff or his substituted compulsory heirs as named in the Order dated July 4, 2005 namely: Donato Maco, Violeta M. Palma, Remia M. Candido, Jose Maco and Salvador Maco, and by ordering the defendants to do the following:
1) To vacate with their privies, agents or representatives, the lot in question;
2) To pay jointly and solidarily the attorney's fees of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);
3) To pay jointly and solidarily the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) every month for the use and occupation of the subject property, starting from the date of the demand to vacate up to the time the subject property is turned over to the plaintiffs;
4) To render an accounting of the produce derived from the property since 1978 up to the present or the money equivalent to the produce.
SO ORDERED. 11
On appeal, the CA affirmed the Decision 12 dated October 6, 2010 in toto and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 6 October 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Iloilo City, in Civil Case No. 00-26048, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 13 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioners now ascribe error to the CA in (a) denying recognition and effect to acquisitive prescription over the subject parcel of land in favor of petitioners; (b) holding sub silencio that a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration is the only remedy available to the rightful owner of land which had been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another; and (c) failing to reverse the decision of the trial court and consequently making them liable for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit. 14
Petitioners insist that their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and adverse possession of the subject land since 1942 — a fact supposedly judicially admitted by Lucio himself in the proceedings below. This, coupled with tax declarations and tax receipts in their possession, should constitute evidence of great weight in their claim of ownership, and to support their thesis on acquisitive prescription that accrued in their favor way before the title to the property was issued in 1978. They also assume, from the tenor of the assailed decision, that the only available remedy to enforce their right to the property is a reopening and review of the decree of registration which, however, was declared to have already lapsed one year after the issuance of the OCT. 15
In his Comment, Lucio posits that actual possession of the subject land is no longer a viable issue in view of the OCT issued in his predecessor's name. He stands by the regularity by which the OCT was processed and issued, and claim the same to be immune from the present collateral attack. 16
Our Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
The elementary rule in land registration cases is that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The leading case of Natalia Realty Corporation v. Vallez17 instructs that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is registered land, based on Article 1126 18 of the Civil Code in relation to Section 47 19 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Thus, in Soriente, et al. v. The Estate of the late Arsenio E. Concepcion, 20 for instance, the claim of acquisition by prescription of a piece of registered land since time immemorial was dismissed upon the inflexible doctrine that possession, for any length of time, will never prevail over a Torrens title the validity of which is always presumed and immune to collateral attack.
Undisputed is the fact that the subject property designated as Lot 95 is land registered under the Torrens system on June 22, 1977 and titled under OCT No. F-210847 in the name of Lucio who, upon his death, transferred the same to his heirs. There is neither allegation nor proof offered in the proceedings below that the said title has been canceled, modified or altered at any time. Indeed, whoever holds a Torrens title in his name is entitled to the possession of the land covered by the title. 21 As the registered owners, Lucio and his heirs had the right to the possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of ownership. 22 Hence, as the registered owner of the subject property, Lucio and his heirs are preferred in the possession thereof. TIADCc
Inasmuch as Lucio and his heirs are entitled to the possession of the subject property as registered owners, they also possess the right to exclude anyone, including herein petitioners, from the possession and enjoyment thereof. This right is imprescriptible and is never barred by laches. Even if it be supposed that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. 23 The filing of the instant action for recovery of possession is precisely an exercise of that right.
In the complaint filed by Lucio, he alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in actual possession of the subject land even before 1978; that he left the property unattended for almost two years and found Segaya cultivating a portion thereof; that he immediately confronted Segaya, but was informed that the latter was authorized by petitioners, who claimed and represented themselves to be owners, to enter and cultivate that portion of the property; that he had repeatedly made unheeded demands for petitioners to vacate the premises; and that the matter was brought to the lupon, but no settlement was reached, hence, this recourse to the court. 24
Indeed, this Court assumes and exercises jurisdiction over a case based on the allegations in the complaint which, in turn, determine the nature and character of the action. Based on petitioners' original allegations, the trial court rightly resolved the controversy as an action for recovery of possession of the property, and properly dismissed the attack indirectly poised at the validity of the corresponding OCT. In resolving this primordial issue, the CA, affirming the trial court, was guided by the most fundamental rule on the indefeasibility of a Torrens title. The CA exhorted —
In land registration under the Torrens system, a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. An original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative proceeding is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial proceedings. Moreover, a public land patent, once registered, becomes as indefeasible upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof. The certificate of title thus becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. It bars all claims or rights, which arose or may have existed prior to the decree of registration. 25
Contrary to petitioners' lamentation, there is nothing in the assailed decision that categorically precluded them to pursue other legal remedies than the reopening or review of the decree of registration. From the portion of the ruling quoted above, what may be inferred is that the remedy against the title in this case could have been pursued around the time prior to the issuance of the decree of registration or within one year thereafter — remedies, however, that they have already let pass long ago when they failed to avail of them within the time allowed by law.
Be that as it may, Section 48 26 of P.D. No. 1529 proscribes a collateral attack on a certificate of title such as, in this case, in a proceeding for recovery of possession. The attack on a certificate of title is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul or set aside such proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. Conversely, an attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. Such action to attack a certificate of title may be an original action or a counterclaim, in which a certificate of title is assailed as void. 27 In an ordinary suit for recovery of possession, the court determines merely the better right of possession independently of title. The certificate of title is never imperiled because the decision of the ejectment court on the issue of ownership is merely provisional. 28 In other words, when petitioners launched a challenge on Lucio's OCT in their answer to the complaint — alleging mistake in the registration of the subject property — the same constitutes a collateral attack on the title which may not be passed upon in an action for recovery of possession.
Thus, it was ruled in Caraan v. Court of Appeals29 that:
It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to private respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession filed by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in their answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the investigatory power of the Director of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such a defense partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title brought under the operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant to Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P.D. 1259. The case law on the matter does not allow collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. The rule now finds expression in section 48 of P.D. 1529 otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. 30
In sum, We find no reversible error on the part of the CA in affirming the decision of the trial court. As We sustain the rulings below, We are well-informed that the findings of fact of lower courts, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive upon this Court. In this, as well as in other appeals, the Court, not being a trier of facts, does not review their findings, especially when they are supported by the records or based on substantial evidence. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower courts are absolutely devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion. 31
No such impression has been made by herein petitioners. AIDSTE
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CV No. 03967 dated March 16, 2016 affirming in toto the October 6, 2010 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 26 in Civil Case No. 00-26048, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Pablito A. Perez, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Gabriel T. Robeniol; rollo, pp. 65-75.
3. Rendered by Judge Antonio M. Natino; id. at 35-45.
4. OCT No. F-210847 issued on June 22, 1977; id. at 66.
5.Id. at 66.
6. In an Order dated July 27, 2001; id. at 66.
7.Id. at 67.
8.Id. at 68.
9. Identified in the trial court decision as Donato Maco, Violeta M. Palma, Remia M. Candido, Jose Maco and Salvador Maco; id. at 45.
10.Id. at 40-41.
11.Id. at 45.
12.Id. at 65-75.
13.Id. at 75.
14.Id. at 8-9.
15.Id. at 9-12.
16.Id. at 171-180.
17. 255 Phil. 510, 519 (1989).
18. Article 1126. — Against a title recorded in the Registry of Property, ordinary prescription of ownership or real rights shall not take place to the prejudice of a third person, except in virtue of another title also recorded; and the time shall begin to run from the recording of the latter.
19.Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. — No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
20. 620 Phil. 325, 340-341 (2009).
21.Heirs of Jose Maligaso Sr. v. Sps. Encinas, 688 Phil. 516, 523 (2012).
22.Spouses Esmaquel and Sordevilla v. Coprada, 653 Phil. 96, 106 (2010).
23.Supra note 21, at 526.
24.Rollo, pp. 35-36.
25.Id. at 71.
26. Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceedings in accordance with law.
27.Arangote v. Sps. Maglunob, et al., 599 Phil. 91, 111 (2009).
28. See Heirs of Alfredo Cullado v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019.
29. 511 Phil. 162 (2005), citing Ybañez, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 272 Phil. 586, 594 (1991).
30.Id. at 171
31.Abobon v. Abobon, 692 Phil. 530, 542-543 (2012).