FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 241915. January 7, 2019.]
SPOUSES MAT RANILLO PUGONG AND MARISSA PUGONG, petitioners, vs. LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJanuary 7, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 241915 — Spouses Mat Ranillo Pugong and Marissa Pugong, petitioners, vs. Luzon Development Bank, respondent.
The Court resolves to GRANT petitioners' Motion for Extension of Time 1 seeking an additional period of thirty (30) days within which to file their Petition for Review on Certiorari counted from the expiration of the reglementary period on September 27, 2018.
Considering the allegations, issues, and arguments raised in the Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Court further resolves to DENY the same for: (a) raising factual questions; and (b) failure of petitioners to show that the Court of Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error as to warrant the Court's exercise of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. CAIHTE
Petitioners insist that they could not be held liable to pay the unpaid balance of their loan obligation considering that the mortgaged vehicle had been lost through a fortuitous event, i.e., said vehicle was stolen by their lawyer, Atty. Florante Miano, who was tasked to surrender the same to respondent. 2 They also deny receiving a demand letter from respondent and, as such, they claim that they are not yet in default in the payment of their obligation. 3
At the outset, it bears stressing that the issues as to whether petitioners indeed received demand letters from respondent and whether the mortgaged vehicle was actually lost due to a fortuitous event are clearly factual in nature. As such, these issues cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition where the Court's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law that might have been committed by the lower courts. 4 Thus, on this ground, the Petition should be denied, in the absence of any exceptional circumstance5 as to merit the Court's review of factual questions that have already been settled by the lower courts.
In any case, Article 1169, par. 1 of the Civil Code clearly provides that demand is not necessary "when the obligation or the law expressly so declares." In this case, the Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage 6 signed by both parties specifically stated that demand for payment for the unpaid balance of the loan shall no longer be necessary should petitioners fail to pay any of the installments as they fell due, viz.:
I/We agree that if any of the installments is not paid when it falls due, the balance of this obligation then remaining unpaid shall forthwith become due and payable or shall be accelerated at the option of the holder of this note without necessity of demand. 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Since petitioners had expressly waived demand in said Promissory Note, demand was unnecessary for them to be deemed in default. Thus, their argument that their liability could not be deemed due and demandable for lack of demand must be struck down. 8
We likewise agree with the CA's conclusion that the loss of the mortgaged vehicle could not have extinguished petitioners' principal liability to respondent. As the CA aptly explained, the mortgage contract in this case is merely accessory to the contract of loan. Therefore, the loss of the mortgaged vehicle would not affect petitioners' principal obligation.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to AFFIRM the January 31, 2018 Decision and the August 30, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 107082. DETACa
SO ORDERED." Bersamin, C.J., on official leave; Del Castillo, J., designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2632 dated December 28, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-5.
2.Id. at 19-20.
3.Id. at 20.
4. See Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. People, 721 Phil. 760, 770 (2013) citing Remalante vs. Tibe, 241 Phil. 930 (1988).
5. See New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213 (2005).
6.Rollo, pp. 47-49.
7.Id. at 43.
8. See Cabanting v. BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 201927, February 16, 2016, 784 SCRA 251, 256-259.