Spouses Placido v. Dizon

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-21-009. November 11, 2021.][Formerly OCA IPI No. 18-4856-RTJ]

SPOUSES CARMELITO AND JENNIFER PLACIDO, complainants, vs.HON. RODOLFO B. DIZON, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 18, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ILAGAN CITY, ISABELA, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedNovember 11, 2021 which reads as follows: HTcADC

"A.M. No. RTJ-21-009 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 18-4856-RTJ] (Spouses Carmelito and Jennifer Placido, complainants, v. Hon. Rodolfo B. Dizon, Presiding Judge, Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Ilagan City, Isabela, respondent)

Before this Court is an administrative complaint (Pinag-Isang Salaysay-Reklamo)1 filed by Spouses Carmelito (Carmelito) and Jennifer Placido (Jennifer; collectively complainants) against Rodolfo B. Dizon (respondent), former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Ilagan City, Isabela, Branch 18 (RTC), for gross misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law.

Deposing their statements in the vernacular, complainants averred that they were the parents of Harvy Placido (Harvy), the victim in Criminal Case No. 6229 for murder, raffled to the sala of herein respondent. 2 They claimed that on November 17, 2016, respondent promulgated a decision in open court convicting accused Robert Rosete y Verona of homicide, and imposed upon said accused the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years to ten (10) years. On the same date, Carmelito received a one-page order, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:

ORDER

xxx xxx xxx

Today's incident is the promulgation of judgment in the above-captioned case. For expediency, on motion of the defense counsel, only the dispositive portion of the judgment was read, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the accused Robert Rosete y Verona, whose guilt for the felony of homicide has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, is penalized as follows:

1) In view of the privileged circumstance in his favor, to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, to from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum;

2) To pay the heirs of Hardy (sic) Placido y Martinez the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P45,200.00 as funeral expenses, per stipulation of the parties (TSN OF OCTOBER 22, 2014). (People v. Vicente Vilbar, G.R. No. 186541, February 1, 2012)

The accused Robert Rosete y Verona is entitled full credit [of] his number of years of detention at the BJMP City of Ilagan, Isabela commencing on the date of his commitment on April 15, 2013 until the date of his release on August 24, 2015 in view of the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty. x x x.

SO ORDERED. 3

Complainants alleged that they did not receive any copy of the decision or judgment in the said case except for the above quoted order. However, a month after the promulgation, complainants received through mail another copy of the Order 4 similarly dated November 17, 2016, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the accused Robert Rosete y Verona, whose guilt for the felony of homicide has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, is penalized as follows:

1) In view of the privileged circumstance in his favour, to suffer imprisonment [of] two (2) years[,] four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum; and

2) To pay the heirs of Hardy (sic) Placido y Martinez the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P20,000.00 as moral damages; and P45,200.00 as funeral expenses, per stipulation of the parties (TSN OF OCTOBER 22, 2014). (People v. Vicente Vilbar, G.R. No. 186541, February 1, 2012)

The accused Robert Rosete y Verona is entitled full credit [of] his number of years of detention at the BJMP City of Ilagan, Isabela commencing on the date of his commitment on April 15, 2013 until the date of his release on August 24, 2015 in view of the bond posted by the accused for his provisional liberty.

SO ORDERED.5 (emphasis supplied)

The seemingly different RTC orders received by complainants caused them fear and apprehension since there was still another criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 6230 for frustrated murder, involving the same accused, pending before respondent's sala. Complainants also found as suspicious the frequent visits made by the counsel for the accused, Public Attorney's Office (PAO) lawyer Atty. Ethel Myra Santiago, to respondent's chambers after their scheduled hearings. These incidents allegedly brought about complainant Jennifer Placido's (Jennifer) bouts of depression that caused her to be bedridden. 6

Feeling aggrieved, complainants decided to file a handwritten Letter 7 dated November 24, 2017, addressed to then Deputy Court Administrator Thelma C. Bahia (DCA Bahia). Acting on the said letter, DCA Bahia referred the matter to respondent for his appropriate action. 8

On March 31, 2018, Sheriff Christopher Belleza (Sheriff Belleza), allegedly upon instructions from respondent, went to complainants' residence and persistently asked them who among the personnel of Branch 18 had provoked them to file the complaint. He also served upon complainants a Show Cause Order dated March 20, 2018, and advised them to attend the scheduled hearing on April 5, 2018, otherwise, they would be arrested. This incident with Sheriff Belleza caused severe stress on Jennifer which led to her hospitalization. Sheriff Belleza again threatened complainants of incarceration should they fail to attend the rescheduled clarificatory hearing on April 19, 2018. 9

Feeling desperate, complainants wrote to the Court anew to narrate the alleged harassment they experienced from respondent. 10 They averred that despite informing Sheriff Belleza of Jennifer's condition, the hearing on April 19, 2018 still pushed through. Consequently, respondent issued a warrant of arrest against them. To ensure their arrest, respondent ordered retired Provincial Director Rivera, Head of the Provincial Security Guard; Atty. Watu Foronda; and officers of the PNP, Benito Soliven, Isabela, to implement the warrant. 11

In his Comment with Counterclaims, 12 respondent informed the Court of Jennifer's death on July 27, 2018. In response to the administrative complaint, he asserted that complainants were only being used by Merlyn Garro (Garro) and Rubiminda Diamante (Diamante)alias Karen to harass, vex, and irritate him. He theorized that Garro and Diamante, who had filed administrative complaints against him 13 and at the same time, were facing criminal complaints for extortion, conspired in producing the two fake orders which became the basis of the present complaint. 14

Anent the show cause order he issued against complainants, respondent maintained that he did so in the exercise of his "judicial power" pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He emphasized that complainants became the subject of the show cause order because they had conspired with Garro and Diamante. During the hearings he conducted pursuant to the show cause order, complainants also exposed the "abomination" of Garro and Diamante in connection with the two fake orders. 15

With regard to the allegations against Sheriff Belleza, Judge Dizon defended him by saying that the former merely obeyed the court's order to serve notice on complainants and is, thus, presumed to have performed his duty with regularity. 16

Pending this administrative matter, the Court received from Carmelito an undated handwritten Letter 17 on November 12, 2018. In the said letter, which the Court treated as a supplemental complaint, Carmelito reiterated that respondent had been harassing him for filing the instant administrative complaint and had ordered his arrest on May 18, 2018. He also alleged that respondent threatened him with incarceration and a fine of P30,000.00 if he would not take the witness stand. He claimed that he was only compelled to obey what respondent asked him to do as he feared being imprisoned and paying a hefty fine. He also averred that a certain "Allan" from respondent's office instructed him to meet with Atty. Raymundo Ramirez to sign a document, the contents of which he did not know.

In his Comment to the Supplemental Complaint, 18 respondent casts doubt on the letter for being undated and written in Tagalog which was foreign to Carmelito; and because the signature therein appeared to be different from Carmelito's signature on the Acknowledgment Receipt dated September 26, 2018. He maintained that even assuming that the letter was written by Carmelito, the latter only did so at the behest of Garro and Diamante. He believed that Garro and Diamante deliberately kept the supplemental complaint undated because Carmelito was then already suffering from a serious illness; and they were not sure if he would survive. He also furnished the Court with a copy of a death certificate indicating that Carmelito died on November 29, 2018. 19

Report and Recommendation

In its November 16, 2020 Report and Recommendation, 20 the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) made the following recommendation:

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for consideration of the Honorable Court:

1.1) x x x;

1.2) Respondent Judge Rodolfo B. Dizon, Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Ilagan City, Isabela, be found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and be meted the penalty of FINE in the amount of P21,000.00; and

1.3) Respondent Judge Dizon be also found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and be meted the penalty of REPRIMAND. 21

Since the two (2) conflicting Orders, both dated November 17, 2016, were the subject of three consolidated administrative complaints filed against respondent, 22 the OCA deemed it best to focus on the matters concerning the indirect contempt proceedings against the complainant spouses. 23

The OCA found that respondent failed to follow the proper procedure for indirect contempt. In issuing the March 20, 2018 Show Cause Order, respondent directed complainants to appear in court on April 5, 2018, without requiring them first to comment on the charges contained in the said order. 24 Under Section 3 of Rule 71, respondent should have given complainants reasonable time to explain in writing why they should not be cited for indirect contempt.

Even assuming that complainants were accorded procedural due process, the OCA noted that respondent gravely abused his authority when he arbitrarily subjected them to an indirect contempt proceeding. 25 The OCA emphasized that the referral of complainants' letter, dated November 24, 2017, to respondent was with the obvious objective of addressing complainants' concern involving the two (2) dissimilar November 17, 2016 RTC Orders and, at the same time, to give respondent the opportunity to answer the same. Unfortunately, respondent pounced on the matter as a chance to go after his perceived enemies in court, specifically, Garro and Diamante. While it is within his right as a magistrate to resist and challenge what he believes to be an affront not only to his honor but to the integrity of the court as well, the OCA opined that employing the judicial remedy of contempt against complainants was an overstretch on his part. 26

While this complaint was being heard by the Court, respondent's counsel filed an Entry of Appearance with Manifestation and Omnibus Motion27 on March 9, 2021. In the said motion, respondent prays for the dismissal of the present administrative complaint for failure to prosecute, owing to the death of the complainants, and due to his retirement from the service last June 10, 2020. By way of an alternative prayer, respondent seeks for the conduct of a summary hearing to determine the merits of the instant complaint.

ISSUES

The issues for the Court's consideration are as follows:

I

Whether the present administrative complaint may be dismissed due to the death of complainants and respondent's retirement from the service;

II

Whether respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority, and gross misconduct.

Ruling of the Court

The Court ADOPTS with MODIFICATION the findings of the OCA to conform with prevailing rules and jurisprudence.

The death of complainants

Jurisprudence holds that the death of the complainant in an administrative complaint does not warrant the withdrawal of the charges against the respondent nor does this development render the complaint moot; the complainant is treated only as a witness in this type of proceedings. 28 Hence, even if the unfortunate death of complainants intervened while their complaint was being heard, the same shall not cause the dismissal of the instant complaint. Such occurrence shall not operate to divest the Court of its disciplinary jurisdiction over court personnel, the rule being that jurisdiction, once acquired, continues to exist until the final resolution of the case. 29

It bears emphasis that the unilateral decision of a complainant to withdraw from an administrative complaint, or even his death, as in the case at bar, does not prevent the Court from imposing sanctions upon the parties subject to its administrative supervision. 30 Respondent's cessation from office does not warrant the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service, nor does it render the instant administrative case moot and academic. The Court's jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent had ceased in office during the pendency of the case, thus:

x x x The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. . . If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. 31

Respondent's compulsory retirement from the judiciary last June 10, 2020, will not preclude the Court from determining his administrative liability and imposing the corresponding penalty. Hence, respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.

Respondent is guilty of

There is gross ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was gross or patent, deliberate or malicious, or when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. 32

When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of the courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence. Basic rules must be at the palm of his hands. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules. 33

Here, in issuing the March 20, 2018 Show Cause Order, respondent directed complainants to appear in court without requiring them to first comment on the charges against them. Clearly, this was a deviation from the rules because in indirect contempt proceedings, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him or her. There must also be a hearing, and the court must investigate the charge and consider the respondent's answer. 34

In Soriano v. Court of Appeals, 35 the Court stated that Sec. 3, Rule 71 requires that there must be a hearing of the indirect contempt charge after notice thereof is validly served on the person charged with indirect contempt. An order requiring the party to submit a written explanation constitutes the written charge for indirect contempt, and at the same time serves as notice of said charge. However, such notice, cannot by all means, be considered as a notice of hearing itself. The two notices are different, for they each have distinct object and purpose. 36

Indeed, respondent failed to observe the proper procedure under Sec. 3 of Rule 71 that gives complainants reasonable time to submit and explain in writing why they should not be cited for indirect contempt. Respondent also failed to offer any justification for his failure to accord complainants due process. The Court has been consistent in ruling that when the law is so elementary, for a judge not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Indeed, failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law, from which no one is excused, and surely not a judge like respondent. 37

Time and again, We have held that competence is the mark of a good judge. Based on his conduct, respondent failed to conform to the high standards of competence required of judges under the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically, Rule 1.01 38 which mandates that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. Respondent likewise failed to comply with the mandate under Rule 3.01 39 of the said Code which requires that judges shall maintain professional competence. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law. To reiterate, unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of incompetence.

Respondent gravely abused

The Court likewise finds respondent guilty of grave abuse of authority in subjecting complainants to indirect contempt proceedings when there was no valid ground for the same.

It is well-settled that the power to declare a person in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the administration of justice. Nonetheless, judges are enjoined to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindication. 40

As correctly observed by the OCA, the indirect contempt proceedings originated from complainant's letter which DCA Bahia referred to respondent for appropriate action. Instead of addressing the matter, respondent resorted to contempt proceedings to intimidate and harass complainants. This was apparent from the charges stated in the show cause order, 41viz.:

SECOND, you state likewise in Paragraph 1 of your letter-complaint "that you heard clearly in Court that the penalty was eight (8) years to ten (10) years and was recorded even by the recording machine of the Court Stenographer" on duty then. Thus, you will be given the opportunity to identify in Court the Stenographer that supposedly recorded the penalty of eight (8) years to ten (10) years so that the Stenographer herself would play in Court the recording machine to prove your point, if that is the case.

THIRD, in Paragraph 2 of your letter-complaint, you state further that "because of the supposed two (2) conflicting Court Orders in Criminal Case No. 6229, you have serious apprehension that it may be repeated again in Criminal Case No. 6230." Thus, you will be given the opportunity in Court to explain your supposed apprehension;

FOURTH, you state furthermore in Paragraph 2 of your letter-complaint "that you observed Atty. Santiago of PAO, lawyer of accused Robert Rosete and Alvaro Rosete, enter the Chamber of Presiding Judge during all the past hearings in Criminal Case No. 6230" thus accusing Atty. Santiago and the Presiding Judge to have acted with impropriety. It is noted however in your letter-complaint that you never mentioned that Prosecutor Rossmund Paolo R. Remudaro, your lawyer, also frequently visited the Chamber of the Presiding Judge during all the past hearings of your case, as you claimed. Hence, you will be given the opportunity in Court to confront Atty. Santiago and the Presiding Judge about the alleged repeated entries of Atty. Santiago in Judge's Chamber.

FIFTH, you state further still in Paragraph 3 of your letter-complaint "that you did not get justice" from the Presiding Judge in regard to the death of your son relating to Criminal Case No. 6229, despite the conviction of Robert Rosete. Thus, you plead for help from DCA Bahia so that the "alleged injustice" that you experienced supposedly in Criminal Case No. 6229 would not be repeated in Criminal Case No. 6230. Thus, you will be given the opportunity in Court to explain and prove the "alleged injustice" that you experienced supposedly in Criminal Case No. 6229, which you fear, may happen again in Criminal Case No. 6230.

In conclusion, considering the gravity of the charges stated in Paragraphs 1, 2, & 3 of your said letter-complaint, you are both advised to secure the services of a practicing lawyer who is MCLE compliant to represent you at the hearing on April 5, 2018 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to explain why you should not be cited for "indirect contempt" of Court under Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which provides that: "Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice." The charge in your letter-complaint "that you were the victims of injustice in Criminal Case No. 6229" and "the probability that you may again be victims of injustice in Criminal Case 6230" are very serious accusations directed to the "very honor and good reputation" of Presiding Judge of the Court. To add, using a fake Court Order in filing a letter-complaint against the Presiding Judge in the Supreme Court is likewise a very serious offense. x x x 42

The Court had warned before that the contempt power could easily tempt a judge to make its exercise nothing more than a camouflage for a wounded pride, a burning prejudice, revenge, a misplaced passion, or selfish motives. 43 This appears to be the case for respondent. A plain reading of the above charges indicates that respondent faults and persecutes complainants for submitting a complaint to the OCA. Notable also that respondent characterized their complaint as contemptuous because it contained "serious accusations directed to the very honor and good reputation of [the] Presiding Judge of the Court."

Clearly, respondent had no basis to initiate contempt proceedings against complainants. They only ventilated their apprehensions of bias in the subject complaint because instead of receiving a copy of the decision in Criminal Case No. 6229, they received an order which was worded differently from the previous order they had obtained from respondent's court. Instead of allaying complainants' fears of prejudice and bias, respondent resorted to harassment, intimidation, and oppression by whimsically subjecting them to contempt proceedings, and even ordering them to confront him regarding their allegations. Understandably, complainants who are unacquainted and unfamiliar with the law and legal processes, would cower at the thought of confronting respondent in his own court and sitting as judge in the same proceedings. Verily, respondent failed to preserve the dignity and even abused the prerogatives of his office. Instead of sparingly and judiciously resorting to contempt proceedings, he did the opposite and used the same to oppress complainants in order to vindicate his injured pride. aScITE

Respondent is not guilty

For the charge of gross misconduct, the Court notes that the OCA no longer discussed or made any findings thereon. The Court, however, finds it imperative to discuss this matter.

Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with one's performance of official functions and duties. It generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. 44 For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. 45

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Reyes, 46 the Court found respondent judge guilty of gross misconduct for his act of demanding money in exchange for acquittal of the accused in cases pending before his sala. In said case, there was evident presence of corruption. The Court held that respondent judge was remiss in the discharge of his judicial functions; and with the allegation of corruption, damaged the integrity of the Judiciary which he represents. 47

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Salise, 48 respondent Judge Salise dismissed several cases based on fabricated grounds and granted petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage despite lack of the court's jurisdiction and on the basis merely of a psychological report. It was likewise found that respondent judge allowed plea bargaining in cases for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, with the consent of the prosecution, in order to decongest the jails. The number of cases involved and the manner by which he disposed of said cases, clearly showed a pattern of misdeeds and a propensity to violate the law and established procedural rules, particularly, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, R.A. No. 9165, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Rules of Court. He acted with conscious indifference to the possible undesirable consequences to the parties involved. Thus, he was found guilty of gross misconduct. 49

Hence, to be held liable for gross misconduct, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to persistently violate the law. These circumstances are wanting in this case, notwithstanding the previous findings of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority on the part of respondent.

We shall expound.

Respondent cannot be held liable for gross misconduct considering that the term "gross" connotes something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful." 50 Respondent's resort to a show cause order against complainants, although condemnable, cannot be regarded as corrupt or a manifestation of continued disregard of well-known rules. While respondent had improperly subjected the complainants to contempt proceedings, he did not completely deprive the latter of the opportunity to be heard and to explain their side. The records bear out that respondent only failed to provide complainants with due process before the scheduled contempt hearing.

It would appear, likewise, that the contempt proceedings were respondent's means to conduct a fact-finding investigation to determine the origin of the two conflicting orders. In fact, he informed Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez in his Letter-Reply 51 (to the 1st Indorsement-Letter from the Office of DCA Bahia), dated March 14, 2018, that he would conduct an investigation on the matter and "summon" complainants to find the root cause of the subject orders. The pertinent portion of the said letter reads:

To provide assistance to the Placido couple, per directive of the then DCA Bahia, the undersigned would conduct a fact finding investigation on the matter by summoning the Placido couple to Court to secure relevant information vis-à-vis their bogus court order (Annex "B"). The investigation will center on the Stenographer on duty then during the "Judgment Day" of November 17, 2016 since she is the only person who has the software to cause the printing of both the authentic and bogus Court Orders (Annexes "A" & "B"). 52

Unfortunately, respondent's chosen means to "summon" the complainants and conduct an investigation was by way of contempt proceedings. Respondent must have been under a wrong impression that he may only conduct an investigation through such proceedings, when he could have done the same discreetly and without recourse to court processes. Indeed, his gross ignorance of the law and motivation to immediately vindicate himself, made him decide to issue a show cause order which inevitably resulted in his grave abuse of authority. However, the manner by which respondent resorted to and implemented the show cause order, as well as his conduct of the contempt proceedings, does not fall under the category of gross misconduct.

The Court notes that despite the improper and unjustified issuance of the show cause order, respondent did not completely deprive complainants of due process. During the contempt proceedings, he provided complainants with the opportunity to identify in court the stenographer who supposedly recorded the wrong penalty in the purported two (2) conflicting orders in Criminal Case No. 6229. It also appears that despite respondent's order for complainants to appear at the hearing without requiring them first to submit an explanation, he allowed complainants to be represented by Atty. Jonathan dela Cruz, who volunteered as complainants' counsel de officio during the May 23, 2018 hearing. 53 After the hearings, respondent became convinced of Carmelito's explanation and absolved them from any liability as shown by the order he issued on May 23, 2018, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

After conducting a thorough and searching questions on Mr. & Mrs. Placido, the Court is of the honest belief that they are without fault in regard to the show cause order. It became evident during this hearing that Mr. & Mrs. Placido were merely used as a tool or a weapon by Court Stenographer Rubiminda Diamante alias Karen and Criminal Docket Clerk Merlyn Garro in writing their letter complaint to DCA Thelma Bahia marked as Court Exhibit "1" for an evil purpose.

Thus, the Court hereby absolves them from any liability. Make it of record that this Court will endeavor to solicit help from the Provincial Government of Isabela relating to the health condition of Mrs. Jennifer Placido who is suffering from hypertension, diabetes and undergoing dialysis. 54

The subsequent acts of respondent also reveal that he even endeavored to solicit help from the Provincial Government of Isabela to provide assistance to complainant Jennifer who was then suffering from hypertension, diabetes, and was undergoing dialysis. The Joint Affidavit 55 dated February 11, 2019, executed by the court staff (of RTC Branch 18, Ilagan City, Isabela, then presided by the respondent) attested to the orderly conduct of the contempt hearings, as well as respondent's assistance to complainants despite the latter not falling within his duty and responsibility as a judge. The court staff also attested that respondent had extended financial assistance to help defray the burial expenses of complainant Jennifer and that, in October 2018, he again extended assistance to complainant Carmelito when the latter visited his chambers. The pertinent portions of the said affidavit provides:

11. That in the same hearing, Spouses Placido were absolved from any liability in the indirect contempt case and the Bench Warrant issued was lifted. Further, Judge Dizon even declared in open Court that the Court will endeavor to solicit help from the Provincial Government of Isabela relating to the health condition of Mrs. Jennifer Placido who is suffering from hypertension, diabetes and undergoing dialysis. Again, by reason of compassion, Judge Dizon provided financial assistance to the couple for dialysis session of deceased Jennifer Placido;

12. That on September 26, 2018, Mr. Placido personally appeared in Branch 18 and voluntarily submitted to Judge Dizon a copy of his wife's Death Certificate (Annex "A"). By reason of compassion, Judge Dizon contributed a meaningful amount for the burial expenses of deceased Jennifer Placido;

13. That the acknowledgment receipt dated September 26, 2018 (Annex "B") substantiated the voluntary and willful act of (deceased) Carmelito Placido in submitting his wife's death certificate which therefore belies any coercion or intimidation by Judge Dizon;

14. That sometime in the first week of October, (deceased) Carmelito Placido visited Judge Dizon in Chamber. Again, by reason of compassion, Judge Dizon provided financial assistance for the cost of his medicines;

15. That sometime in the third week of October, (deceased) Carmelito Placido visited again Judge Dizon, who by reason of compassion provided financial assistance for the additional cost of his medicines; x x x. 56

Notably, respondent acted within the dictates of his conscience when he went beyond his duties as a judge to extend financial assistance to complainant Carmelito. Based on the circumstances attending the issuance of the show cause order and the conduct of the contempt proceedings, the Court is not convinced that respondent's conduct was corrupted or inspired by an intention to willfully violate the law or persistently disregard well-known rules that may constitute gross misconduct. In light of the factual milieu and the circumstances attendant in this case, the Court finds no reason to charge respondent for gross misconduct.

The Proper Penalties

In imposing penalties involving multiple administrative offenses, the Court laid down the following guidelines in Boston Finance and Investment Corporation v. Gonzalez (Boston Finance): 57

(a) Rule 140 of the Rules of Court shall exclusively govern administrative cases involving judges or justices of the lower courts. If the respondent judge or justice of the lower court is found guilty of multiple offenses under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the Court shall impose separate penalties for each violation; and

(b) The administrative liability of court personnel (who are not judges or justices of the lower courts) shall be governed by the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which incorporates, among others, the civil service laws and rules. If the respondent court personnel is found guilty of multiple administrative offenses, the Court shall impose the penalty corresponding to the most serious charge, and the rest shall be considered as aggravating circumstances. 58 (emphases in the original)

Thus, in resolving administrative cases against judges or justices of the lower courts, reference need only be made to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as regards the charges, as well as the imposable penalties. 59 If the respondent judge or justice is found liable for two (2) or more charges, separate penalties shall be imposed on him/her. 60 The multiplicity of penalties to be imposed on judges and justices is consistent with the higher level of decorum expected from them. 61

Under Sec. 8, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious offense. On the other hand, grave abuse of authority or oppression is considered a grave offense under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). 62 Clearly, the offense of grave abuse of authority is also classified as a serious offense under Rule 140. 63

Sec. 25 (A), of Rule 140 as amended by A.M. No. 21-03-17-SC, 64 which took effect on May 31, 2021, provides the following penalties for serious offenses, viz.:

"Section 25. Sanctions. —

A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credit;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P100,000.00 but not exceeding P200,000.00.

The Court has not hesitated to impose the maximum fines or even the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service on employees found guilty of grave offenses. However, due to respondent's compulsory retirement on June 10, 2020, the penalties of dismissal and suspension can no longer be implemented against him. Instead, the penalty of fine will be imposed 65 based on Sec. 25 (A) of Rule 140 as amended, and the guidelines laid down in Boston Finance. Thus, for both offenses of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority, respondent should be ordered to pay a fine of P100,000.00 each or a total of P200,000.00.

However, the Court finds that there are mitigating circumstances which should be appreciated in favor of respondent and which should warrant the reduction of the penalty to be imposed upon him. Sec. 48, Rule X of the RRACCS provides that in determining the penalties to be imposed, the following mitigating and/or aggravating circumstances attendant to the commission of the offense may be considered:

a. Physical illness;

b. Good faith;

c. Malice;

d. Time and place of offense;

e. Taking undue advantage of official position;

f. Taking advantage of subordinate;

g. Undue disclosure of confidential information;

h. Use of government property in the commission of the offense;

i. Habituality;

j. Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building;

k. Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense;

1. First offense;

m. Education;

n. Length of service; or

o. Other analogous circumstances.

In exercising this discretion granted by the RRACCS, the Court, in previous cases, had imposed lesser penalties in the presence of mitigating circumstances. This is consistent with precedent where the Court refrained from imposing the actual administrative penalties prescribed by law or regulation in the presence of mitigating factors. Indeed, while the Court is duty bound to sternly wield a corrective hand to discipline errant employees and to weed out those who are undesirable, the Court also has the discretion to temper the harshness of its judgment with mercy. 66

Thus, in Fernandez v. Vasquez, 67 the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstances of unblemished judicial service and first offense in imposing the penalty of fine of P50,000.00 against respondent judge who was held guilty of dishonesty, an offense punishable with dismissal even on the first commission. The fine was imposed in lieu of suspension from office which can no longer be imposed due to respondent judge's retirement. 68 In Office of the Court Administrator v. Chavez, 69 the Court took into consideration the mitigating circumstances of: (1) remorse in committing the infractions; (2) length of government service; (3) first offense; and (4) health and age. Judge Chavez was therefore penalized with a fine equivalent to three months of his last salary. 70

Also, in Domingo v. Pagayatan, 71 the Court considered the absence of bad faith or malice and respondent judge's unblemished record in reducing the penalty to P5,000.00 for his gross ignorance of law. The Court likewise considered the fact of respondent judge's first offense in Benito v. Balindong72 in reducing the fine imposed against him to P30,000.00.

Notably, in these cases, the Court imposed lesser penalties in the presence of mitigating factors such as the respondent's length of service, respondent's first infraction, unblemished judicial service, humanitarian and equitable considerations, and other analogous circumstances.

From 2014 until his retirement in 2020, respondent did not commit any infraction and had an unblemished judicial service save for this present administrative matter. During his service in the judiciary, he was even conferred a Certificate of Recognition 73 dated February 14, 2014, as a distinguished member of the bar. The Court also notes that despite the contempt proceedings, respondent endeavored to solicit help to provide assistance to complainant Jennifer who was then suffering from hypertension, diabetes, and was undergoing dialysis; and that he had also provided financial assistance to complainant Carmelito.

It is a settled rule that in administrative cases, the determination of the amount of fine that may be imposed is subject to the sound discretion of the court. 74 Taking into account the mitigating circumstances of unblemished judicial service and first offense, and in acting within the dictates of his conscience when he went beyond his duties as a judge to extend assistance to complainants, the Court deems it proper to impose a lesser penalty against respondent. All considered, the Court finds as proper to impose a fine in the total amount of P100,000.00 as penalty for the charges of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority.

In view of respondent's retirement from the Judiciary on June 10, 2020, the fines imposed herein should be deducted from his retirement benefits or privileges. This is consistent with jurisprudence wherein the penalty of a fine was deducted or taken from the retirement benefits of a judge found to be administratively liable. 75

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES respondent's Omnibus Motion to dismiss the instant administrative complaint for lack of merit; and finds former Judge Rodolfo B. Dizon of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan City, Isabela, Branch 18, GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority for which he is FINED in the total amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) to be deducted from his accrued leave benefits. If such amount is insufficient to answer for the aforementioned fine, Judge Dizon shall pay the balance thereof.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

by:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-8.

2.Id. at 113.

3.Id. at 11.

4.Id. at 12.

5.Id. at 12.

6.Id. at 114.

7.Id. at 73-74.

8.Id. at 13.

9.Id. at 5-6.

10.Id. at 6.

11.Id. at 115.

12.Id. at 22-30.

13. Docketed as OCA IPI No. 18-4832-RTJ (Clerk III Merlyn C. Garro, Branch 18, RTC, Ilagan City, Isabela v. Judge Rodolfo B. Dizon, also of Branch 18, RTC, Ilagan City, Isabela) and OCA IPI No. 18-4840-RTJ (Court Stenographer III Rubiminda B. Diamante, Branch 18, RTC, Ilagan City, Isabela v. Judge Rodolfo B. Dizon, also of Branch 18, RTC, Ilagan City, Isabela).

14.Id. at 115-116.

15.Id. at 116.

16.Id.

17.Id. at 91-92.

18.Id. at 97-101.

19.Id. at 102.

20.Id. at 113-126.

21.Id. at 126.

22. Namely OCA IPI No. 18-4832-RTJ (Clerk III Merlyn C. Garro, Branch 18, RTC, Ilagan City, Isabela v. Judge Rodolfo B. Dizon, also of Branch 18, RTC, Ilagan City, Isabela) and OCA IPI No. 18-4840-RTJ (Court Stenographer III Rubiminda B. Diamante, Branch 18, RTC, Ilagan City, Isabela v. Judge Rodolfo B. Dizon, also of Branch 18, RTC, Ilagan City, Isabela) and OCA IPI No. 18-4837-RTJ (Legal Researcher Aljun P. Dela Peña, Branch 18, RTC, Ilagan City, Isabela v. Judge Rodolfo B. Dizon, also of Branch 18, RTC, Ilagan City, Isabela).

23.Id. at 118.

24.Id. at 120.

25.Id. at 121.

26.Id. at 122.

27.Rollo, pp. 128-130.

28.Mercado v. Salcedo, A.M. Nos. RTJ-03-1781 & RTJ-03-1782, 619 Phil. 3, 32 (2009).

29.Opena v. Luna, 514 Phil. 345, 351 (2005).

30.Ferrer v. Tebelin, A.C. No. 6590 [Formerly CBD-02-961], 500 Phil. 1, 9 (2005); citing Tudtud v. Coliflores, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1347, 458 Phil. 49, 53 (2003).

31.Office of the Court Administrator v. Hamoy, 489 Phil. 296, 302 (2005); citing Gallo v. Cordero, 315 Phil. 210, 220 (1995).

32.Office of the Court Administrator v. Flores, 758 Phil. 30, 59 (2015).

33.Baculi v. Judge Belen, 604 Phil. 1, 11 (2009); Tiongco v. Salao, 528 Phil. 969, 978-979 (2006).

34. See Baculi v. Judge Belen, 695 Phil. 598, 615 (2012); citing In the Matter of the Contempt Orders against Lt. Gen. Jose M. Calimlim and Atty. Domingo A. Doctor, Jr., 584 Phil 377, 382 (2008).

35. 474 Phil. 741, 749-750 (2004).

36.Id.; citing Balasabas v. Aquilisan, 193 Phil. 639, 650 (1981).

37.Baculi v. Judge Belen, supra note 33.

38. Rule 1.01 — A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.

39. Rule 3.01 — A Judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

40.Panaligan v. Ibay, 525 Phil. 22, 30 (2006).

41.Rollo, pp. 14-16.

42.Rollo, pp. 15-16.

43.Paredes-Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 420, 436 (1996).

44.Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga, 505 Phil. 143, 158 (2005).

45.Office of the Court Administrator v. Flores, supra note 32 at 60.

46. A.M. No. RTJ-17-2506, November 10, 2020.

47.Id.

48. 824 Phil. 797 (2018).

49.Office of the Court Administrator v. Salise, id. at 808-809.

50.Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga, supra note 44 at 158.

51.Rollo, pp. 76-77.

52.Id. at 77.

53.Id. at 34; see TSN, May 23, 2018, p. 3 in Criminal Case No. 6229.

54.Id. at 64; TSN, May 23, 2018, p. 33.

55.Id. at 107-110.

56.Id. at 108-109.

57. A.M. No. RTJ-18-2520, October 9, 2018, 883 SCRA 17.

58.Id. at 40-41.

59.Id. at 39.

60.Id.

61.Id. at 41.

62.See SECTION 46.Classification of Offenses. — Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service. x x x

B. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal from the service for the second offense:

1. Less serious dishonesty;

2. Oppression; x x x (Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, CSC Resolution No. 1101502, November 8, 2011)

63. Section 22 (3), Rule 140, as amended (A.M. No. 18-01-05-SC dated July 7, 2020).

64.Amendments to the Fines Provided in Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, A.M. No. 21-03-17-SC, March 16, 2021.

65.Fernandez v. Vasquez, 669 Phil. 619, 637 (2011).

66.Office of the Court Administrator v. Dela Cruz, A.M. No. P-20-4041, October 13, 2020.

67.Supra note 64.

68.Id. at 637-638.

69. 815 Phil. 41, 49 (2017).

70.Id.

71. 451 Phil. 472, 481 (2003).

72. 599 Phil. 196, 204 (2009).

73.Rollo, p. 106.

74.Fernandez v. Vasquez, supra note 64 at 637.

75.Victory Liner, Inc. v. Bellosillo, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321, 469 Phil. 15, 31 (2004); Lauria-Liberato v. Lelina, 672 Phil. 301, 314 (2011).