FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 249285. September 29, 2021.]
SPOUSES REYNALDO M. MENDOZA & VIRGINIA R. MENDOZA, petitioners, vs.FRANCISCO U. TOLENTINO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 29, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 249285 — Spouses Reynaldo M. Mendoza & Virginia R. Mendoza v. Francisco U. Tolentino. — Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the Decision 2 dated June 4, 2019 and Resolution 3 dated September 11, 2019 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 155002. The Decision upheld the denial of the quashal of the Writ of Execution against petitioners, 4 while the assailed Resolution denied their Motion for Reconsideration. 5
The Antecedents
Times Transit Co., Inc. (Times), a corporation engaged in the business of land transportation, 6 hired Francisco U. Tolentino (respondent) as a bus driver 7 on February 1, 1993. 8 Later, respondent joined the employees' union of Times (TEU), which was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit in the company. 9 Citing unfair labor practices, TEU staged strikes on March 3, 1997 and on October 17, 1997. 10 Times questioned the legality of the strike before the NLRC. 11 Pending its resolution, members of the TEU were relieved from employment. 12
In the interim, Mencorp Transport Systems, Inc. (Mencorp), a domestic corporation also engaged in the business of transporting passengers, freight and cargo owned and operated by Spouses Reynaldo and Virginia Mendoza (petitioners)13 acquired ownership over Times' Certificates of Public Convenience and a number of its bus units by virtue of several deeds of sale executed on December 12, 1997. 14
In a Decision dated May 21, 1998, the NLRC held the first strike of TEU legal, but the second strike as illegal. As a consequence, 23 union members were declared to have lost their employment after committing acts of violence during the second strike. 15 Since respondent was not among those terminated, he informed Times of his desire to return to work but he was asked to be on stand-by while the company studied his case. 16 Meanwhile, TEU and Times brought the NLRC Decision dated May 21, 1998 on appeal to the CA. 17 DACcIH
After two (2) years of waiting for his reinstatement, respondent filed a separate complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of wages and other benefits against Times before the Labor Arbiter (LA). 18 During the pendency of the case for illegal dismissal, the CA promulgated its Decision dated November 17, 2000, which affirmed the NLRC Decision dated May 21, 1998. 19 Times elevated the decision of the CA before this Court. 20
While the appeal (strike case) was pending before this Court, LA Facundo L. Leda (LA Leda), rendered a Decision dated September 27, 2004, which dismissed the case for illegal dismissal on the ground of litis pendencia. 21 In a Decision dated November 29, 2006, this Court affirmed the CA Decision dated November 17, 2000, both with respect to the illegality of the second strike held by the TEU and the dismissal of the 23 employees who were found to have participated in such illegal strike. 22
In the meantime, respondent appealed LA Leda's Decision dated September 27, 2004 before the NLRC, 23 which case was docketed as NLRC CA Case No. 042680-05/NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-04551-99. 24 On August 22, 2008, the NLRC, rendered a Decision, 25 which reversed and set aside LA Leda's Decision dated September 27, 2004 (illegal dismissal case), the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, Reversing and Setting aside the Decision issued by Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda on September 27, 2004, and a new one issued remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings leading to the issuance of an appropriate Writ of Execution.
SO ORDERED. 26
The NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008 became final and executory on September 18, 2008, 27 and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on said date, per Entry of Judgment 28 dated December 9, 2008.
On November 8, 2013, respondent filed a Motion to Resume Proceedings, 29 praying for the remand of the case to the LA to enforce the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008. In an Order 30 dated April 25, 2014, Labor Arbiter Julia Cecily Coching Sosito (LA Sosito) declared respondent's motion to resume proceedings as moot and academic, since the case records of NLRC CA Case No. 042680-05/NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-04551-99, that was the subject of the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008, were already transmitted to her office for further proceedings. 31 Nevertheless, she held that respondent was illegally dismissed and ordered petitioners and Mencorp solidarily liable to pay respondent's backwages and separation pay. 32
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed LA Sosito's Order dated April 25, 2014 to the NLRC. 33 In its Decision 34 dated July 18, 2016, the NLRC nullified LA Sosito's Order and held that "while the Labor Arbiter was correct in saying that respondent's prayer to remand this case x x x had become moot and academic for the reason that the record of the entire case was already transmitted to her office, this is not so with regard to the complaint for illegal dismissal." 35 The NLRC explained its ruling in this wise:
Stated differently, as complainant (herein respondent) was not among the 23 employees, he filed an independent cause of action for illegal dismissal since he was not reinstated or allowed to return to work despite the clear terms of the return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated 17 November 1997. Also, he was not included in the NLRC decision dated 21 May 1998. Thus, his status remains unresolved and there is no closure up to this time insofar as his employment with Times is concerned. HSCATc
Apropos thereto, the exclusion of complainant (herein respondent) will not automatically entitle him to the reliefs of reinstatement plus backwages as these were not decreed by the NLRC nor by the higher Courts. Even if we pursue the execution of the final decision of the NLRC dated 21 May 1998, there is still no basis to grant the reliefs being sought by the complainant as he is not covered by the fallo in any of the court's decisions. He even had no personality to demand for the enforcement of the said decision by way of execution precisely because there is absence of a declaration with regard to the non-participants to the illegal strike where complainant presumably belonged.
To our mind, the "further proceedings" contemplated in the NLRC decision was the adjudication of the parties' respective claims relative to the complaint for illegal dismissal. 36
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, the NLRC concluded that respondent was illegally dismissed, since he was simply made to wait for his reinstatement, until Times supposedly closed shop in December 1997. 37 For this reason, the NLRC held petitioners and Mencorp, solidarily liable to respondent for the payment of backwages and separation pay 38 which amounted to P2,518,705.19, more or less. 39 The NLRC Decision dated July 18, 2016 became final and executory on October 9, 2016. 40 Thereafter, LA Sosito issued a Writ of Execution 41 on May 8, 2017. 42
Petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution 43 where they argued, among others, that: a) their liability had not been established; b) the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008 had become dormant and can only be revived in accordance with Section 2, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure; and c) the Order dated April 25, 2014 and subsequent appeal and Decision were void after an invalid resumption of proceedings. 44
In her Order 45 dated October 5, 2017, LA Sosito denied the motion to quash citing therein that "the grounds alleged in the motion are not among those allowed by law and jurisprudence that would merit the quashal of the Writ of Execution issued in this case." 46
Consequently, Sheriff Antonio Datu, Jr. (Sheriff Datu) issued a Notice 47 of Levy/Sale on Real Property on October 9, 2017, to attach a parcel of land registered in petitioners' name to satisfy the order of execution.
Unyielding, petitioners filed a Petition 48 to have the Order dated October 5, 2017 and Notice 49 of Levy/Sale on Real Property nullified before the NLRC.
On October 30, 2017, the NLRC rendered its first assailed Resolution 50 which affirmed the Order dated October 5, 2017 of LA Sosito, that denied petitioners' motion to quash.
Not satisfied, petitioners moved for reconsideration, but it was similarly denied by the NLRC, in its second assailed Resolution dated December 28, 2017. 51
Undaunted, petitioners elevated the case before the CA via a Petition for Certiorari. 52
As aforementioned, the CA held that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it upheld the denial of the quashal of the Writ of Execution. 53 The CA underscored that there was no need to revive the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008, as it had not become dormant in the first place. 54 In the Order dated April 25, 2014 of LA Sosito, respondent's motion to resume proceedings was found to be moot and academic because the case records had in fact already been remanded to her office for further proceedings. 55 Notably, upon appeal of the Order dated April 25, 2014, the NLRC in its Decision dated July 18, 2016, found the resumption of proceedings in order and ruled on the issue of illegal dismissal pertaining to respondent. 56 Since the NLRC Decision dated July 18, 2016 had attained finality, the subsequent Writ of Execution was validly issued pursuant to Section 1, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. 57 IDTSEH
Nonetheless, the CA held that Sheriff Datu immediately made a levy/attachment on petitioners' real property without first making a demand for payment. 58 Thus, the CA partially granted the petition, in its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution dated October 30, 2017 and the Resolution dated December 8, 2017 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC LER No. 10-239-17 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION in that the Sheriff's Notice of Levy/Sale on Real Property issued on October 9, 2017 is NULLIFIED, Sheriff Antonio T. Datu, Jr. is ORDERED to proceed with the execution of the writ in accordance with the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.
SO ORDERED.59
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration 60 but the same was denied by the CA in its challenged Resolution dated September 11, 2019. Hence, petitioners appealed before this Court and raised the following assignment of errors: 61
I.
THE HONORABLE [CA] COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE AUGUST 22, 2008 DECISION OF THE NLRC HAD NOT BECOME DORMANT, AND FOR RULING THAT THERE WAS NO NECESSITY TO REVIVE IT
II.
THE HONORABLE [CA] COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT LACK OF JURISDICTION IS NOT A GROUND FOR THE QUASHAL OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION
III.
AS AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE THAT ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW ARE REVIEWABLE BY THE HONORABLE COURT: THE HONORABLE [CA] FAILED TO NULLIFY THE WRIT OF EXECUTION ISSUED TO ENFORCE THE COLLECTION OF P2,518,705.19 WHICH IS BASELESS, ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND EVIDENCE
Petitioners assert in the main that the Writ of Execution has been improvidently issued because the NLRC Decision dated July 16, 2018, which held respondent to have been illegally dismissed, was predicated upon an invalid revival of judgment. 62 Petitioners claimed that the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008, which reinstated the illegal dismissal case attained finality on September 18, 2008. 63 By operation of law, the said NLRC Decision became dormant five (5) years from its finality on September 18, 2013, 64 pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule XI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. 65 Meanwhile, respondent filed his motion to resume proceedings only on November 8, 2013, or more than five (5) years after the NLRC Decision had become final. 66 Hence, there was a need to file an independent action, and not a mere motion, to revive the NLRC Decision as it had become dormant. 67
On the contrary, respondent essentially contends that the issuance of the Writ of Execution is proper based on the following grounds: a) the NLRC Decision dated July 18, 2016 already attained finality on October 9, 2016, 68 b) petitioners raised the issue that the assailed judgment had already become dormant only before the CA, 69 and c) the Writ of Execution was issued in accordance with Sections 1 (a) and 6, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. 70 SICDAa
In sum, the issue is whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the NLRC's denial of the quashal of the Writ of Execution. Stated otherwise, the main issue is whether grounds exist to quash the Writ of Execution dated May 8, 2017.
Our Ruling
After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves to deny the petition.
Nothing is more settled than the rule that a judgment that is final and executory is immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, except when the judgment is void, or to correct clerical errors or to make nunc pro tunc entries. 71 Outside of these exceptions, the court that rendered the judgment only has the ministerial duty to issue the writ of execution. The judgment also becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. Any amendment or alteration that substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, and the nullity extends to the entire proceedings held for that purpose. 72 Accordingly, the court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution upon a final and executory judgment, or quash it, or stay its implementation. 73
Concomitantly, neither may the parties object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law. The only exceptions thereto are when: "(i) the writ of execution varies the judgment; (ii) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; (iii) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; (iv) it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court; (v) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or (vi) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority." 74
In the present case, there is no dispute that the NLRC Decision dated July 18, 2016, which held that respondent was illegally terminated and accordingly entitled to the payment of back wages and separation pay, already attained finality. The bone of contention, however, lies in its validity. Petitioners essentially claim that the NLRC Decision dated July 18, 2016 is void because it emanated from NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008, which had become dormant, since it was not properly revived by way of an independent action. Hence, the Writ of Execution in said case should be quashed.
The Court finds such contention utterly erroneous and misleading.
First, the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008, which reinstated respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal, never became dormant in the first place.
Section 2, Rule XI of the 2011 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that a final and executory decision shall become dormant if not executed after five (5) years from its finality. After the lapse of such period, such judgment may only be enforced by an independent action before the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin and within a period of 10 years from the date of its finality. Section 2, Rule XI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure contemplates a situation where a winning party initiates the enforcement of a final and executory decision that has become dormant, by filing an independent action before the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin, within 10 years from its finality.
Corollarily, it is also well to note that under Section 1 (a) of Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, "[a] writ of execution may be issued motu proprio or on motion, upon a decision or order that has become final and executory." Pertinently, the dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008, which became final and executory on September 18, 2008, states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, Reversing and Setting aside the Decision issued by Labor Arbiter Facundo L. Leda on September 27, 2004, and a new one issued remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings leading to the issuance of an appropriate Writ of Execution.
SO ORDERED. 75
Consequently, the NLRC motu proprio remanded the case records of NLRC CA Case No. 042680-05/NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-04551-99, that was the subject of its Decision dated August 22, 2008, to LA Sosito "for further proceedings." The term "further proceedings" meant the adjudication on respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal, 76 as the NLRC opined that his employment status remained on hiatus since he was not among the 23 employees who were declared to have been lawfully dismissed for participating in the illegal strike, yet he was not reinstated up to this date. 77
To the mind of the Court, the NLRC motu proprio remanded the records of the case subject of its Decision dated August 22, 2008, to LA Sosito instead of waiting for a motion from the parties' to remand the said records to the LA, for purposes of expediency. For this reason, the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008, did not become dormant, precisely because the labor tribunal, on its own accord, already forwarded the records of the case to the LA, to prevent further delays in its disposition. HDICSa
As a matter of fact, LA Sosito took cognizance of the case and ruled that respondent was illegally dismissed and entitled to receive backwages and separation pay in her Order 78 dated April 25, 2014, which the NLRC affirmed in its Decision 79 dated July 18, 2016. The NLRC Decision dated July 18, 2016 became final and executory on October 9, 2016. 80 Consequently, LA Sosito issued a Writ of Execution 81 dated May 8, 2017 to enforce the judgment award in favor of respondent. Hence, the directive for the LA to conduct "further proceedings leading to the issuance of an appropriate Writ of Execution" in the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008 was indeed fulfilled.
Second, petitioners did not raise the issue that the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008 had become dormant, at the earliest possible time, which can be construed as waiver or acquiescence on their part. Extant from the records of the case is the fact that they did not aver the alleged dormancy of the assailed NLRC Decision in their Omnibus Motion before the LA, but only did so when the Writ of Execution dated May 8, 2017 in favor of respondent had been issued.
It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court 82 for it would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice. 83 While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that elementary considerations of due process require that a party be duly apprised of a claim against him or her before judgment may be rendered. 84
Moreover, assuming that the NLRC did err in rendering its assailed Decision, petitioners could have elevated the same before the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, but they did not do so, which resulted in the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008 attaining finality. Evidently, petitioners belatedly raised the issue as regards the alleged dormancy of the said NLRC Decision, hence they are now precluded from assailing the same.
Third, even assuming that the NLRC Decision dated August 22, 2008 became dormant, such fact will not render the subsequent proceedings and the judgment resulting therefrom as null and void because "the execution of a decision is merely incidental to the jurisdiction already acquired by a trial court." 85 In Mejia-Espinoza v. Cariño, 86 the Court thus explained:
Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Whatever irregularities attended the issuance and execution of the alias writ of execution should be referred to the same administrative tribunal which rendered the decision. This is because any court which issued a writ of execution has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes.
It is consistent practice that once a judgment has become final and executory, a writ of execution is issued as a matter of course in the absence of any order restraining its issuance. 87 Suffice it to say that petitioners failed to prove that the final and executory Decision of the NLRC is a void judgment, which equates to the fact that they failed to establish that grounds exist to warrant the quashal of the subject Writ of Execution.
Public policy and sound practice dictate that every litigation must come to an end at the risk of occasional errors. 88 An effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 89 Lamentably, the case at bar reveals the attempt of the losing party to thwart the execution of a final and executory judgment, rendered by the labor tribunal almost five (5) years ago. The Court cannot sanction such vain and obstinate attempts to forestall the execution of a final ruling. 90 It is high time that the case be settled with finality and the ruling of the NLRC be given full force and effect. IDaEHC
In sum, the CA committed no reversible error when it ruled that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in denying the quashal of the Writ of Execution against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision dated June 4, 2019 and Resolution dated September 11, 2019 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 155002, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Respondent Francisco U. Tolentino is declared to have been illegally dismissed from employment. Consequently, petitioners Spouses Reynaldo M. Mendoza and Virginia R. Mendoza are ordered to pay him back wages and separation pay in the aggregate amount of P2,518,705.19. Spouses Reynaldo M. Mendoza and Virginia R. Mendoza are also liable to pay the execution fee (P24,687.05) and deposit fee (P12,613.52), attendant in the satisfaction of the judgment award. Accordingly, Sheriff Antonio T. Datu, Jr. is ORDERED to proceed with the enforcement of the Writ of Execution in accordance with the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 9-44.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi with Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring; id., at pp. 46-56.
3. Penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi with Associate Justices Danton Q. Bueser (designated new member in view of the retirement of Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon) and Edwin D. Sorongon, concurring; id., at 58-59.
4.Id. at 54.
5.Id. at 59.
6.Id. at 47.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 72.
9.Id. at 47.
10.Id.
11.Id.
12.Id.
13.Id.
14. See Times Transport Co., Inc. v. Sotelo, 491 Phil. 756-771 (2005).
15.Rollo, p. 47.
16.Id.
17.Id.
18.Id.
19.Id.
20.Id.
21.Id.
22.Id.
23.Id.
24.Id. at 72.
25.Id. at 72-78.
26.Id. at 100.
27.Id.
28.Id. at 90.
29.Id. at 91-92.
30. Penned by Labor Arbiter Julia Cecily Coching Sosito; id. at 99-102.
31.Id. at 101.
32.Id. at 101-102.
33.Id. at 134.
34. Penned by Commissioner Gina F. Cenit-Escoto, with Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and Commissioner Romeo L. Go, concurring, id. at 129-146.
35.Id. at 139.
36.Id. at 139-140.
37.Id. at 143.
38.Id. at 59.
39.Id.
40.Id. at 228.
41.Id. at 147-149.
42.Id. at 147-149.
43.Id. at 150-156.
44.Id. at 49.
45.Id. at 157-158.
46.Id. at 158.
47.Id. at 159.
48.Id. at 160-177.
49.Id. at 159.
50.Id. at 181-186.
51.Id. at 46.
52.Id.
53.Id. at 54.
54.Id. at 52.
55.Id.
56.Id.
57.Id.
58.Id.
59.Id. at 55. (Emphasis in the original)
60.Id. at 225-228.
61.Id. at 23-24.
62.Id. at 26.
63.Id. at 25.
64.Id.
65. Section 2. EXECUTION BY MOTION OR BY AN INDEPENDENT ACTION. — Pursuant to Art. 224 of the Labor Code, a decision or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such period, the judgment shall become dormant, and may only be enforced by an independent action before the Regional Arbitration Branch of origin and within a period of ten (10) years from date of its finality.
66.Rollo, p. 25.
67.Id.
68.Id. at 230.
69.Id. at 231.
70.Id. at 233-234. Section 1 (a), Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure states:
SECTION 1. Execution upon finality of decision or order. — (a) A writ of execution may be issued motu proprio or on motion, upon a decision or order that has become final and executory.
SECTION 6. Pre-execution conference. — Within two (2) working days from receipt of a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution which shall be accompanied by a computation of a judgment award, if necessary, the Commission or the Labor Arbiter may schedule a pre-execution conference to thresh out matters relevant to execution including the final computation of monetary award. The pre-execution conference shall not exceed fifteen (15) calendar days from the initial schedule, unless the parties agreed to an extension.
Any order issued by the Labor Arbiter in the pre-execution conference is not appealable, subject to the remedies available under Rule XII.
71.Salazar v. Felias, G.R. No. 213972, February 5, 2018.
72.Dagondon v. Ladaga, G.R. No. 190682, February 13, 2019.
73.Salazar v. Felias, supra note 71 citing Vargas v. Cajucom, 761 Phil. 43-63 (2015).
74.Id.
75.Id. at 100.
76.Id. at 140.
77.Id. at 139.
78.Id. at 99-102.
79.Id. at 129-146.
80.Id. at 148.
81.Id. at 147-149.
82.Ejercito v. Commission on Elections, 748 Phil. 205-281 (2014).
83.Id.
84.Id.
85.Mejia-Espinoza v. Cariño, 804 Phil. 248-264 (2017).
86.Id., citing Deltaventures Resources, Inc. v. Cabato, 384 Phil. 252 (2000).
87.Vargas v. Cajucom, supra note 73.
88.Spouses Poblete v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 228620, June 15, 2020.
89.Salazar v. Felias, supra note 71.
90.Id.