FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 219137. March 29, 2022.]
SPOUSES NELSON LIGAWEN AND PACITA LIGAWEN, petitioners,vs. BENITA GUESNAED MARTIN, BENITO GUESNAED, EMILIA G. SENTI, TERESITA G. AMBACAN AND JULIA G. JACOB, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 29, 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 219137 (Spouses Nelson Ligawen and Pacita Ligawen v. Benita Guesnaed Martin, Benito Guesnaed, Emilia G. Senti, Teresita G. Ambacan and Julia G. Jacob). — This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Spouses Nelson Ligawen and Pacita Ligawen (petitioners) praying for the reversal of the Decision 2 dated the June 27, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 122769. The CA affirmed the Decision 3 dated July 5, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 64, Abatan, Buguias, Benguet, which remanded the Complaint filed by respondents Benita Guesnaed Martin, Benito Guesnaed, Emilia G. Senti, Teresita G. Ambacan and Julia G. Jacob (collectively, respondents) with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Buguias-Bakun.
The Antecedents
Respondents are the co-owners pro-indiviso of a parcel of land located at Baey Ata, Bangao, Buguias, Mountain Province, which they inherited from their parents Legario Guesnaed and Ligay Pias Guesnaed (Spouses Guesnaed). 4 Albert Licanio, (Albert), respondents' cousin, farmed and occupied a portion of the Spouses Guesnaed's property (subject property) with the permission of the latter. 5
On December 27, 1984, Albert obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from petitioners. To secure the loan, Albert offered the subject property as a collateral. The parties stipulated that the loan shall be payable within one year, and in case of default, the subject property shall automatically be claimed by the petitioners. They further agreed that the petitioners may occupy the subject property and plant vegetables thereon, as payment for the interest of the loan. 6
The loan remained unpaid for several years. Eventually, Albert offered to pay back the loan but the petitioners refused to receive his money. Thus, Albert handed the P20,000.00 to the respondents for them to pay the petitioners. 7
Meanwhile, the petitioners started constructing on the property, which alarmed the respondents. 8 Thus, on June 2, 2009, the respondents filed a Complaint for Consignation and Ejectment with Damages 9 against the petitioners. Respondents consigned the payment to the trial court.
In response, the petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims 10 asserting that Albert voluntarily mortgaged the property to them. They clarified that they never refused to accept Albert's payment, and hence, there is no need to consign the amount in court. They further claimed that they have become the owners of the subject property by way of prescription. They have openly worked on the property, introduced improvements thereon, and exercised acts of ownership without any objections from the respondents. 11
Ruling of the MCTC
On January 28, 2011 the MCTC rendered a Decision 12 dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The MCTC held that the respondents failed to allege the jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer. It opined that there is no showing of how and when the petitioners' possession had become unlawful, or that the respondents have a better right of possession over the litigated property. 13 It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, [respondents] having failed to substantiate their entitlement to the relief sough, this Court resolves to DISMISS this case for insufficiency of evidence. If they suppose themselves to be the owners of the property subject of this suit, they have to vindicate their ownership against the [petitioners] in an appropriate action in a court of competent jurisdiction.
Consequently, the amount of Php20,000.00 deposited with the Clerk of Court by way of consignation may now be withdrawn upon the execution of the proper documents relative to its receipt.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED. 14
Aggrieved, the respondents filed an appeal. 15
Ruling of the RTC
On July 5, 2011, the RTC rendered a Decision 16 reversing the MCTC's judgment. The RTC ruled that the MCTC erred when it classified the respondents' action as one for unlawful detainer. The RTC noted that a reading of the allegations and prayers in the respondents' complaint reveals that their first cause of action is for quieting of title. The RTC explained that the contract of loan constitutes a cloud on the respondents' title. Said contract appears to be valid, but is actually invalid in view of the stipulation allowing the petitioners to automatically appropriate the property used as a collateral in case of non-payment. 17
Next, the RTC held that the respondents' second cause of action is for recovery of possession. It further observed that the contract of loan is a contract of antichresis or a "salda Ilocano." It ratiocinated that the demand to vacate is only incidental to the action for recovery of possession. 18 Accordingly, it ordered the case to be remanded to the MCTC, and for the respondents to amend their cause of action, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Decision, being appealed is hereby reconsidered and set aside.
Pursuant to Sec. 8, Rule 40, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the record of this case is hereby remanded to the lower court, which is hereby ordered to conduct a regular trial, pursuant to the Rules on Civil Procedure.
The Lower Court is instructed to consider the true nature of the Contract of Loan, which may actually be a Contract of Antichresis, with all its legal effects and consequences.
To avoid confusion, [respondents] are hereby ordered to amend the Cause of Action in their Complaint, as follows: Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession, with Consignation and Damages.
SO ORDERED.19
Dissatisfied with the ruling, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied in its November 9, 2011 Order. 20
Undaunted, the petitioners filed a Petition for Review 21 with the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In a Decision 22 dated June 27, 2014, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling that the respondents' action is one for quieting of title, and not ejectment. The CA noted that the petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject property is premised on the contract of loan between the latter and Albert. However, the CA stressed that said contract of loan is void in view of the stipulation that allows the automatic transfer of ownership in favor of the petitioners in case of Albert's failure to pay. As such, the respondents remain to be the owners of the property, and may consider the contract of loan as a cloud on their title. Thus, the CA ordered the case to be remanded to the MCTC to effect a complete relief to the respondents who own the subject property. It emphasized that the MCTC has jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title, considering that the subject property's assessed value is P10,660.00. 23
Petitioners received a copy of the CA's Decision on September 8, 2014. 24
On September 23, 2014, the last day for filing of a motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, on the ground that counsel is saddled with earlier deadlines in cases of equal importance. 25
On November 7, 2014, the CA issued a Resolution 26 denying the petitioners' request for extension. The CA explained that the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration does not toll the 15-day period before a judgment becomes final and executory. It stressed that a party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the prescribed period loses the right to do so, and the decision as to him, becomes final and binding. 27
On December 2, 2014, petitioners filed a Notice of Receipt of November 7, 2014 Resolution with Apology and Motion for Reconsideration 28 (Notice of Receipt), begging for the Court's compassion. Counsel pleaded that she is a solo practitioner, a mother of two children, the Vice President for High School Affairs of her children's school, is facing a medical challenge due to her scoliosis, and had to attend proceedings in the other cases she handled. 29
On May 26, 2015, the CA issued a Resolution 30 stating that the Notice of Receipt is noted without action, as it no longer has jurisdiction to act on the matter. The CA reiterated that its June 27, 2014 Decision had already attained finality on September 23, 2014, due to the petitioners' failure to move for reconsideration within the fifteen-day reglementary period. 31 It decreed as follows:
We NOTE WITHOUT ACTION petitioners' Notice of Receipt of November 7, 2014 Resolution with Apology and Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that this Court no longer has jurisdiction to act on it. The Decision dated June 27, 2014 had already attained finality on September 23, 2014 for petitioners' failure to move for reconsideration within the fifteen day reglementary period.
SO ORDERED. 32
Undeterred, the petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. 33
Issues
Petitioners lament that the CA erred in denying their plea for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, they maintain that the MCTC correctly appreciated the case as one for unlawful detainer, and conversely, the RTC and CA erred in regarding the case as an action for quieting of title and recovery of possession. They urge that the respondents' complaint and its annexes, as well as the respondents' active participation during the trial, show that their (respondents') case is one for unlawful detainer. 34
Petitioners further bewail that the CA erred when it "silently sustained" the RTC's erroneous application of Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. They allege that said provision is inapplicable considering that the MCTC decided the case on the merits based on summary procedure, and had jurisdiction over the case. The respondents point out that the MCTC never foreclosed other options available for the respondents. Thus, the petitioners urge the respondents to file a plenary action before the proper court with the proper title corresponding to the allegations of their complaint, and pay the proper docket fees. 35
On the other hand, the respondents counter that the CA correctly denied the petitioners' motion for extension to file a motion for reconsideration. They maintain that the CA's Decision has become final and executory and cannot be appealed via the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. They also accuse the petitioners of delaying the performance of the parties' rights and interests by filing the present case. 36
Moreover, the respondents emphasize that it is clear from the allegations and prayers in their complaint that their cause of action is for quieting of title. They argue that the petitioners' basis of ownership, namely, the contract of loan, is void. Hence, they are still the owners of the subject property, and the contract of loan may be regarded as a cloud on their title. They claim that the RTC was correct in remanding the case to the MCTC, which has the proper jurisdiction for purposes of quieting title and restoring their possession. They further riposte that the RTC's Decision did not supplant that of the MCTC's, but only set it aside as an appellate court. 37
Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied.
The assailed CA Decision has
The 2009 Internal Rules of the CA unequivocally states:
RULE VII
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AND REMAND OF CASES
SECTION 1. Entry of Judgment. — Unless a motion for reconsideration or new trial is filed or an appeal taken to the Supreme Court, judgments and final resolutions of the Court shall be entered upon expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties.
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SECTION 5. Entry of Judgment and Final Resolution. — If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become final and executory.
Notably, in Rivelisa Realty, Inc. v. First Sta. Clara Builders Corporation, (Rivelisa), 38 the Court stringently ruled that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed in courts, save for the Supreme Court, as the court of last resort:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. 39 (Underscoring and emphasis omitted)
In the present case, the petitioners received the June 27, 2014 CA Decision on September 8, 2014. Thus, they had until September 23, 2014 to file a motion for reconsideration. However, on September 23, 2014, they filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration from September 23, 2014 to October 8, 2014.
As clearly stated in the 2009 Internal Rules of the CA and in Rivelisa, the 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is non-extendible. As such, the petitioners' filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, did not toll the 15-day period before a judgment becomes final and executory. 40 In turn, the petitioners' failure to perfect an appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law renders the decision sought to be appealed final, with the result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review it. 41 Consequently, not only did the CA properly deny the petitioners' motion for extension of time, but the petitioners likewise lost their remedy of review before the Court.
Petitioners implore the Court's liberality to disregard their procedural blunder. However, the Court shall not lightly grant every entreaty for the relaxation of the rules of procedure, for to do so, will render said rules inutile. 42 Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights. 43 Like all rules, they must be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons. 44 Certainly, the relaxation of the application of the Rules in exceptional cases was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. 45
Likewise, the petitioners' counsels' excuse of being saddled with a heavy workload is not a compelling reason to disregard the procedural rules. It is settled that the excuse of a heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. 46 Should the failure of the petitioners' counsel to cope with her heavy workload be considered a valid justification to sidestep the reglementary period, there would be no end to litigations simply because of the counsel's lack of diligence. 47 Besides, the zeal and fidelity demanded of a lawyer to his/her client's cause require that not only should counsel be qualified to handle a legal matter, but said counsel must also prepare adequately and give appropriate attention to his/her legal work. 48
Accordingly, the petitioners' failure to timely file their Motion for Reconsideration foreclosed any right which they may have had under the rules to seek reconsideration of the CA's assailed Decision and to question said Decision before the Court.
In any event, even if the Court disregards the petitioners' procedural blunder, the petition still fails on the merits.
The allegations in the
Essentially, the nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the claimant is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. 49
Respondents' complaint before the MCTC bears the following averments:
(2) That [respondents] are the co-owners pro-indiviso by operation of law or the laws on succession of that parcel of land devoted to vegetable raising located at Baey, Alta, Bangao, Buguias, Benguet Province covered by Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 99-007-00539 having inherited the same thru intestate succession form the late [Spouses Guesnaed] as evidenced by the extra-judicial settlement of estate x x x[;]
(3) That this real property afore-said is owned by the [respondents] pro-indiviso or share and share alike by operation of law or succession as of December 25, 1984 and May 5, 1995, the respective dates of deaths of the decedent parents, [Spouses Guesnaed] x x x[;]
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(4) That sometime December 27, 1984, [Albert], a cousin of the [respondents] had taken a loan of Php20,000.00 from [petitioners] and used a portion of the afore-described property, he was then occupying and farming temporarily as allowed by said decedents, to secure the faithful repayment of his loan or as collateral wherein such portion be occupied by [petitioners] and use the same within such specified or agreed period just to answer for the interests of the loan but which shall be returned voluntarily upon return or repayment within one (1) year of the loan or the amount of Php20,000.00. x x x[;]
(5) That the portion temporarily occupied by [petitioners] on the account of the loan of [Albert] is part of the co-ownership of [respondents] x x x, while the occupancy and use of said portion was earlier made by said [Albert] thru the consent or permission from the said decedent-spouses, as the former stayed with decedents being his uncle and auntie after being left without parents at [sic] young age, due to the demise of his natural parents;
(6) That [Albert] after having been able to save and was able to return or pay the loan and which were signified to be handed and tendered to herein [petitioners] on several occasions, after a mutual verbal understanding of extension of one (1) year thereafter relating to the re-payment of the loan however on those several occasions, the same were simply ignored and refused on reasons only known to said [petitioners][;]
(7) That only recently, the [petitioners] started to undertake certain backfilling on the portion they are supposed to be temporarily occupying or utilizing which resulted in the reactions and protests of [respondents] as against [Albert] and said [petitioners]. This also resulted to the filing of Barangay Case No. 06-09, the subject being "Land Dispute." However after conciliations/mediations were had, no amicable settlement was reached nor had by the parties, hence a certificate to file action was issued by the Barangay office of Bangao, Buguias, Benguet Province. x x x[;]
(8) That on account of the failure for any amicable settlement with the Barangay [Albert] had instead deposited or consigned voluntarily to the co-owners the amount of P20,000.00 loan and for [respondents], being the true and real owners of the lot occupied now by [petitioners] and for the former, enforce legally or judicially such property rights and interests thereon as against [petitioners]. x x x[;]
(9) That while the loan transactions between [petitioners] and [Albert] involving the amount of Php20,000.00 cannot be questioned, the using of a portion of the property now adjudicated to [respondents] as collateral and the use thereof, to cover interests for the benefit of [Albert's] obligees, is unauthorized for being without the conformities from [respondents] and the surviving spouse of decedent — Legario Guesnaed even as shown on the written transactions (loan contract — Annex "C") between them;
(10) That legal demands for the voluntarily [sic] return of the property and return of the amount consigned/voluntary deposit in the amount of P20,000.00 had been undertaken dated April 28, 2009, but [petitioners] just ignored and utterly refused to turn over voluntarily and peacefully the possession of the portion they occupied by reason of the loan, hence this complaint. x x x[;]
(11) That from [sic] date of filing of this complaint, the possession of [petitioners] is deemed illegal and/or unwarranted for all lawful intents and purposes thus reasonable rentals be assessed for the use thereof until the full determination or resolution of the case but to be not less than Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P7,500.00) annually; 50 (Emphasis supplied)
Glaringly, the respondents mainly allege that: (i) they are the co-owners of the subject property; (ii) that their cousin Albert obtained a loan from the petitioners; (iii) that the contract of loan was invalid for having been executed without their authority or of their deceased parents; and (iv) that pursuant to the contract of loan, the petitioners were granted the right to occupy the subject property as payment for the interests due. These allegations make up a case for quieting of title.
Article 476 of the Civil Code defines an action for quieting of title as follows:
Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Relatedly, "a 'cloud on title' is an outstanding instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may nevertheless impair or affect injuriously the title to property." 51 The cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded.
Notably, an action for quieting of title requires proof of the following: (i) the plaintiff has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (ii) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his/her title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. 52
It cannot be gainsaid that the contract of loan, which granted the petitioners the right to occupy the subject property as payment of the interests, is actually a contract of antichresis. A contract of "antichresis involves an express agreement between parties such that the creditor will have possession of the debtor's real property given as security, and such creditor will apply the fruits of the property to the interest owed by the debtor, if any, then to the principal amount." 53 The Civil Code enumerates the following rules relative to a contract of antichresis:
Article 2132. By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit. (1881)
Article 2134. The amount of the principal and of the interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise, the contract of antichresis shall be void. (n)
Article 2137. The creditor does not acquire the ownership of the real estate for non-payment of the debt within the period agreed upon.
Every stipulation to the contrary shall be void. But the creditor may petition the court for the payment of the debt or the sale of the real property. In this case, the Rules of Court on the foreclosure of mortgages shall apply. (1884a)
Article 2139. The last paragraph of article 2085, and articles 2089 to 2091 are applicable to this contract. (1886a)
Article 2085. The following requisites are essential to the contracts of pledge and mortgage:
(1) That they be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation;
(2) That the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged;
(3) That the persons constituting the pledge or mortgage have the free disposal of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied)
A perusal of the Complaint instantly shows the apparent invalidity of the contract of antichresis. Paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 of the Complaint clearly state that the respondents are the owners of the subject property, and paragraph 9 specially alleges that the use of the subject property to cover the interests is unauthorized. 54 On this score, said contract of antichresis runs afoul to the mandate of Article 2085, which requires the mortgagor to be the absolute owner of the property.
The RTC and the CA went a step further and declared the contract of loan as invalid for being a pactum commissorium. Concededly, a perusal of the contract of loan reveals the following prohibited stipulation:
3. That the herein parties have agreed that the duration of the loan shall be one year from this date; that in the event the First Party fails to settle and/or pay the said loan to the Second Party, it is likewise agreed that the parcel of the vegetable land which is the security of the loan shall automatically be claimed by the Second Party as her lot considering that the value of the said lot is equivalent to the amount of loan and for this reason the First Party shall be obliged to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Second Party; 55
However, it must be noted that for purposes of determining the true nature of the action filed, the Court is limited to a scrutiny of the allegations raised in the complaint. Unfortunately, the complaint failed to mention the stipulation in the contract of antichresis pertaining to the automatic appropriation of the subject property in case of default in payment. Nonetheless, the apparent invalidity of the contract of antichresis is still evident from the allegation that it was constituted by Albert, who is not the owner of the subject property, in clear violation of Article 2085 of the Civil Code, thereby showing that the respondents' complaint is indeed an action for quieting of title.
The improper application of
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. — If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction there over, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings.
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.
It bears stressing that the two scenarios envisioned in Section 8, Rule 40, involve the same ground for dismissal, namely, lack of jurisdiction. The first paragraph of said rule contemplates an appeal from an order of dismissal issued without a trial of the case on the merits, while the second paragraph deals with an appeal from an order of dismissal after a trial on the merits. 56
Obviously, the rule does not apply to the case at bar. For one, the MCTC did not dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, but due to insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, the first paragraph does not apply considering that the MCTC tried the case on the merits. Neither does the second paragraph apply since the MCTC had jurisdiction over the case for unlawful detainer.
Nevertheless, the MCTC erred in treating the case as one for unlawful detainer, when clearly, the allegations spell out a case for quieting of title. In fact, the respondents' even objected to the action being treated as an unlawful detainer. 57
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of real property is determined by the assessed value of said property. Specifically, Section 33 of R.A. No. 7691 provides:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
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'(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.'
Currently, R.A. No. 11576, 58 has increased the threshold amount for the first-level courts' jurisdiction in real actions to not more than P400,000, except for forcible entry into, and unlawful detainer of lands and buildings, wherein original jurisdiction remains with the first-level courts, regardless of the property's assessed value. Paragraph 3 of the Complaint alleges that the assessed value of the subject property is P10,660.00. Clearly, the MCTC has jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title.
All told, the undeniable reality is that there exists a need to resolve the issue of ownership to completely settle the controversy. In fact, even the petitioners concede that the respondents own the subject property, albeit arguing that they have a right to possess said property on account of the contract of antichresis and on the basis of prescription. Following the Court's ruling in Reyes v. Manalo59 and for the sake of judicial economy, rather than dismiss the case, which would merely delay the ultimate reckoning between the parties, the interest of justice would best be served by remanding the case to the MCTC to try the case as an action for quieting of title. After all, "justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and a final disposition of cases before the court." 60
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The June 27, 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 122769 is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buguias-Bakun to be tried as an Action for Quieting of Title.
SO ORDERED."Hernando, J., designated additional Member per Raffle dated March 30, 2022; Inting, J., no part.
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 14-37.
2.Id. at 42-50; penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez (now a Member of this Court), with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now a Retired Member of this Court) and Socorro B. Inting, concurring.
3.Id. at 111-113; penned by Presiding Judge Agapito K. Laoagan, Jr.
4.Id. at 42.
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 43.
9.Id. 130-137.
10.Id. at 152-160.
11.Id. at 154-155.
12.Id. at 114-125; rendered by Judge Amparo M. Malinias Espada.
13.Id. at 122-125.
14.Id. at 125.
15.Id. at 111.
16.Id. at 111-113.
17.Id. at 112.
18.Id.
19.Id. at 113.
20.Id. at 75-78.
21.Id. at 70-110.
22.Id. at 42-50.
23.Id. at 47-49.
24.Id. at 52.
25.Id.
26.Id. at 52-54.
27.Id. at 53-54.
28.Id. at 55-65.
29.Id. at 56.
30.Id. at 68-69.
31.Id. at 68.
32.Id.
33.Id. at 14-39.
34.Id. at 28-33.
35.Id. at 33-34 and 36.
36.Id. at 275 and 278.
37.Id. at 276 and 278.
38. 724 Phil. 508 (2014).
39.Id. at 516, citing Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon, 226 Phil. 144, 148 (1986).
40.Id.
41.Id. at 517.
42.Rivera-Ante v. Rivera, G.R. No. 224137, April 3, 2019.
43.Id. citing Foculan-Fudalan v. Spouses Ocial, 760 Phil. 815, 829 (2015).
44.Id.
45.Id.
46.Heirs of Ramon Gayares v. Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corporation and Kuwait Oil Tanker Co., S.A.K., 691 Phil. 46, 54 (2012).
47.Hernandez v. San Pedro Agoncillo, 697 Phil. 459, 470 (2012).
48.Id.
49.Padlan v. Sps. Dinglasan, 707 Phil. 83, 91 (2013).
50.Rollo, pp. 130-133.
51.Aquino v. Quiazon, 755 Phil. 793, 811 (2015).
52.Id.
53.Cotoner-Zacarias v. Sps. Revilla, 746 Phil. 692, 711 (2014), citing Diego v. Fernando, 109 Phil. 143, 145 (1960).
54.Rollo, pp. 130-131 and 133.
55.Id. at 143.
56.De Vera v. Sps. Santiago, 761 Phil. 90, 103 (2015).
57.Rollo, p. 127.
58.An Act Further Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purposes Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise Known as 'The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,' As Amended.
59.Reyes v. Manalo, et al., G.R. No. 237201, September 22, 2020.
60.Id. citing Ramos v. Spouses Alvendia, 589 Phil. 226, 236 (2008).