SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 226780. November 9, 2016.]
SPOUSES OTHELIA ANCHETA-LEUNG AND JOSEPH LEUNG, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE, ORA BETTER BUSINESS VENTURES, AND SPOUSES ROBERT LEUNG AND EDITHA LEUNG, petitioners, vs. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 09 November 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 226780 — Spouses Othelia Ancheta-Leung and Joseph Leung, doing business under the name and style, Ora Better Business Ventures, and Spouses Robert Leung and Editha Leung vs. Banco de Oro Unibank, Inc.
Acting on Petitioners' Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari praying for an additional period of 15 days within which to file their Petition for Review on Certiorari, the same is hereby granted.
However, after a judicious review of the records, the Court resolved to DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari for failure to show that the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101736 committed any reversible error in affirming the August 13, 2012 Decision and the October 24, 2013 Order issued by Branch 133 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC) in Civil Case No. 10-1134.
The core issue in this Petition is the propriety of filing a Motion for New Trial. Like the courts below, we find no reason to grant such for the sole reason that petitioners failed to allege the proper ground. As correctly reasoned out by the appellate court, even assuming that the August 13, 2012 Decision of the RTC did not attain finality, the RTC properly denied the motion for new trial since lack of jurisdiction over petitioners due to defective summons is not a ground for a motion for new trial.
Rule 37, Section 1 of the Rules of Court enumerates the proper grounds for a motion for new trial:
Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration. — Within the period for taking an appeal, the aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial for one or more of the following causes materially affecting the substantial rights of said party:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has probably been impaired in his rights . . .
Petitioners, who have been declared in default, reason out that they failed to participate in the trial when they transferred residences, and such can fall under 'accident' or 'excusable negligence.' However, petitioners' act of entering into transactions with respondent bank and subsequently changing their addresses without at all informing the bank cannot be said to fall under accident or excusable negligence. Accident conveys that something occurred by chance. "Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against." 1 AScHCD
In any case, the CA properly dismissed petitioners' appeal before it, because petitioners' proper recourse should have been a Rule 65 petition instead of an appeal. Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Subject of appeal. — An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.
No appeal may be taken from:
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration;
xxx xxx xxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to AFFIRM the assailed December 11, 2015 Decision and August 16, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101736.
Petitioners' counsel is likewise ordered 1) to indicate his contact details pursuant to the En Banc Resolution dated July 10, 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, and 2) to submit to this Court a CD/verified declaration or send a soft copy of the pleading via email pursuant to the Court's Efficient Use of Paper Rule, both within 10 days from receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED. (Mendoza, J., on official leave from November 8-15, 2016 per Resolution dated January 26, 2016 in A.M. No. 07-11-02-SC under the 2016 Wellness Program)."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Uy vs. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation, 534 Phil. 839, 847 (2006).