FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 194843. March 13, 2019.]
SPOUSES LANISA DIONELA AND LEONARDO DIONELA, petitioners, vs.SPOUSES ESEQUIO AYUSTE AND RICARDA AYUSTE, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated March 13, 2019which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 194843 (Spouses Lanisa Dionela and Leonardo Dionela v. Spouses Esequio Ayuste and Ricarda Ayuste). — This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the February 9, 2010 2 and November 18, 2010 3 Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02686-MIN. The February 9, 2010 Resolution dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment 4 filed by Spouses Lanisa and Leonardo Dionela (petitioners) for failure to prosecute their action for an unreasonable length of time while the November 18, 2010 Resolution denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the February 9, 2010 Resolution.
The case stemmed from a complaint 5 for recovery of possession with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order filed by Spouses Esequio and Ricarda Ayuste (respondents) with Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley against Juan Diamante, petitioner Lanisa Dionela (petitioner Lanisa), Jesus Bacalso, Jacinto Sabsalon, Gregorio Camacho, Leonardo Camacho, Ernesto Ponsica, Salome Impas, Dominiciana Vallente, and Gina Tanamal (defendants). The complaint, dated September 24, 2001 and docketed as Civil Case No. 667, alleged that respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. C-709 with a total area of 47,400 square meters. Due to abnormal peace and order conditions nine years prior, respondents allowed defendants to construct their houses on the land with an understanding that should respondents need a portion of the land being occupied, defendants would dismantle their houses and vacate the land. As respondents already needed the portion of the land being occupied by defendants, they made several demands for the latter to vacate but defendants refused and even committed and/or threatened to commit acts of harassment and threatened respondents' life and property rights. Respondents consequently asked the RTC to issue a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to deter the harassment and threats and, thereafter, render a decision ordering defendants to restore possession of the land to respondents and award them moral damages, litigation expenses, and attorney's fees.
Defendants failed to file an answer, which impelled respondents to file on February 14, 2002 a motion to declare defendants in default. The RTC granted the motion and declared defendants in default for their failure to file an answer despite the additional period granted to them to file the same. Respondents were then allowed to present their evidence ex parte. 6 CAIHTE
On August 9, 2006, the RTC issued an Order 7 directing defendants to vacate the contested property, among others. Thus:
Having established the allegations by competent evidence, ORDER is hereby issued directing the defendants to vacate and deliver peacefully the portion of Plaintiffs' property defendants occupied to the herein plaintiffs spouses; ordering the defendants to pay moral damages in the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php10,000.00), litigation expenses in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) and to reimburse the appearance fees incurred by the Plaintiffs spouses.
SO ORDERED. 8
On July 31, 2007, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution. 9
Petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment 10 dated December 17, 2008 before the CA, alleging that they learned about the case only on August 21, 2008 when they received copies of the Writ of Execution and the August 9, 2006 RTC Order that was attached to the writ. 11 Petitioner Lanisa, supposedly a defendant in the RTC case, was never served with summons 12 or copies of any pleading, order, or process emanating from the RTC in relation to the case. 13 As a matter of fact, the RTC record is bereft of a sheriff's return of service and proof of service of summons. 14 This is bolstered by a Certification 15 dated October 7, 2008 issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 3, stating that the original copy of the summons in Civil Case No. 667 was not returned by its then Process Server, Virgilio C. Sanchez. Petitioners argued that, while the same Certification also states that there is on record a motion for extension of time to file responsive pleadings 16 "filed by Atty. Graciano C. Arafol, Jr., counsel for the defendants" 17 dated December 6, 2001, petitioner Lanisa could not have possibly engaged the services of Atty. Arafol, Jr. precisely because she was not served with summons. 18 In light of these events, petitioners argued that petitioner Lanisa's right to due process was violated and that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over her person. Consequently, the August 9, 2006 Order and the Writ of Execution are void 19 with respect to her.
On the substantive aspect of the case, petitioners contested the claim of ownership of respondents over the 4,700-square meter land petitioners are occupying, claiming that the land was bought by petitioner Lanisa's father, Iluminado Cuyos, Jr. (Iluminado), from Salvador Mantog as evidenced by a contract of sale dated November 23, 1971. In 1974, Iluminado constructed a house on the land, which was occupied by him, his wife, and his six children, including petitioner Lanisa. Later, Iluminado bought additional parcels of land on the same lot from Salvador Mantog and constructed a bigger house beside the house built in 1974. 20 Petitioners attached the affidavits of several witnesses 21 who attested to Iluminado's ownership since 1971 and physical possession of the subject land since 1974, when he constructed a house thereon. Petitioners argued that the lot area of the subject land, which is 4,700 square meters, belies respondents' allegation that they merely tolerated petitioner Lanisa's occupation thereof, for no one in his right mind would allow a stranger to build a temporary residence over a portion of his land with an area of a little less than half a hectare. 22
Petitioners also claimed that Iluminado, respondents, and other occupants of Lot No. 1211, which encompasses the subject land, executed a document on May 30, 1990 denominated as "Kasunduan Ukol sa Sama-Samang Pag-aari," 23 in which they agreed that respondent Esequio Ayuste's name shall appear on the face of the certificate of title of the land while the names of all the other occupants of the land shall appear at the back. However, when OCT No. C-709 with Certificate of Land Ownership Award No. 00040037 came out, it bore the name of respondent Esequio Ayuste only, without the names of the other occupants. 24 DETACa
Petitioners finally argued that respondent Esequio Ayuste's claim that he obtained title over the subject land by virtue of a deed of sale dated December 14, 1986 executed by Salvador Mantog as vendor and himself as vendee, is belied by the Certificate of Death of Salvador Mantog which shows that he died on May 18, 1986. Hence, he could not have possibly executed the said deed of sale. 25
In view of the foregoing incidents, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction to restrain the execution of the August 9, 2006 RTC Order, and for the CA to subsequently render judgment declaring the said RTC Order and Writ of Execution void, and ordering respondents to pay petitioners moral damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit. 26
In a Resolution 27 dated March 9, 2009, the CA gave due course to the petition for annulment of judgment. Thus:
Finding prima facie merit on the instant Petition, the same is GIVEN DUE COURSE.
The Division Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED, within five (5) days from notice, to issue the SUMMONS to the private respondents.
As to the Very Urgent Application for Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners, private respondents are DIRECTED TO SHOW CAUSE why the application for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted within ten (10) days from notice.
In the meantime, action on the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order is held in abeyance pending compliance thereof.
In any event, We would like to point out that an action for annulment of judgment may be availed of even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed or implemented. In short, the instant Petition would not become moot and academic just because the judgment was already fully executed.
SO ORDERED.28 (Citation omitted.)
The Sheriff's Return of Summons filed on April 2, 2009 stated that the summons, together with the copy of the petition for annulment of judgment, was duly tendered to respondent Esequio Ayuste on March 28, 2009. Nonetheless, no answer was filed according to the Judicial Records Division's (JRD) Report dated January 20, 2010. 29
On February 9, 2010, the CA issued the assailed Resolution 30 dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment on the following rationale:
From the time the said summons and copy of the petition for annulment was [sic] served to private respondent Esequio Ayuste on March 28, 2009, almost one (1) year had elapsed and petitioners have not filed the necessary and appropriate pleadings to have the case moving, and consequently, their failure to do so, necessitates this Court to dismiss the petition as petitioners in effect failed to prosecute their action for an unreasonable length of time. Consequently, the instant petition for annulment is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED. 31
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 32 whereby their counsel, Atty. Maria Gracia A. Paderna (Atty. Paderna), contritely implored the CA to reconsider its February 9, 2010 Resolution on the ground of higher interests of justice and equity. 33 She alleged that she received a copy of the Sheriff's Return of Summons on April 8, 2009. 34 On September 26, 2009, a Saturday, she prepared a motion to declare respondents in default and handed 11 copies to her law firm's messenger, Jeffrey R. Castillones (Castillones), for filing and service through registered mail. She allegedly specifically instructed Castillones to file the motion the following Monday, September 28, 2009. Before going to the airport on September 28, 2009 for her flight to Manila from Davao City, Atty. Paderna said she even called Castillones to check on and give last minute instructions to him. At around lunch time, she called Castillones again to follow up on the filing of the motion. The latter allegedly assured her that that he was on his way to file the motion through registered mail. With the said assurance, Atty. Paderna directed Castillones to place the motion on file and place the case folder in the record room of their office. 35 When Atty. Paderna reported back to their office on October 3, 2009, she learned that Castillones resigned effective October 1, 2009. 36 From December 20, 2009 to February 27, 2010, she was in California, USA. 37 She believed all the while that the motion has been filed, and discovered that all her instructions to Castillones were not followed only on March 2, 2010, when she received the CA Resolution dated February 9, 2010. She thus caused the staff to trace the events that took place and search for the copies of the motion that never reached the CA. After four days of searching, the 11 copies of the motion were discovered in the drawer of the stockroom of the law firm where messengers usually take a rest during their free time and where records of the cases handled by the firm from the 1960s to the 1990s are placed. Atty. Paderna said she contacted Castillones and inquired about his failure to file the motion to which the latter explained that he was disoriented at the time due to the numerous tasks that he needed to perform for the firm and his personal life. 38 Atty. Paderna asserted that petitioners should not be penalized and made to suffer the consequences of her failure to file the appropriate pleading following respondents' failure to file an answer, and that petitioners' substantial rights and interests over the land in dispute should not be set aside. 39 Attached to the motion for reconsideration were Castillones' affidavit of merit 40 and a copy of the motion to declare respondents in default 41 dated September 26, 2009, which was never filed with the CA. aDSIHc
In a Resolution 42 dated November 18, 2010, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. It emphasized that the summons was tendered to respondents on March 28, 2009 as stated in the Sheriff's Return of Summons filed on April 2, 2009. However, as admitted by petitioners' counsel, it was only on September 26, 2009 that the motion to declare respondents in default was prepared. Also, when counsel returned to work on October 3, 2009 and learned that Castillones already resigned from office, she could have very well checked if all pleadings and pertinent documents had been filed, served, and/or mailed. She could have verified whether the registry receipts were left by Castillones for her files. From October 3 to December 20, 2009, Atty. Paderna had not done any action to verify if all the pleadings she left with Castillones were indeed mailed. Castillones was admittedly only one of their firm's messengers. Also, petitioners' counsel is a law firm with several partners and associates. Had Atty. Paderna not been remiss in her duties, she could have endorsed the case to her colleagues. 43
The CA also held that while it commiserates with petitioners' plight, it cannot countenance the negligence of counsel, who shifted the blame to her subordinates. It thereafter reminded Atty. Paderna of her duties under Canons 18 44 and 12 45 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 46
Petitioners now appeal the Resolutions of the CA before us, submitting the following issues for our consideration:
(1) Did the Honorable Court of Appeals violate Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, mandating that "[t]hese Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding," by its Resolution of November 18, 2010 denying the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of February 9, 2010?
(2) Did the Honorable Court of Appeals commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it did not consider the factual background it found but instead resolved to deny the motion for reconsideration of petitioners? 47
We grant the petition.
The CA held that almost one year had elapsed since respondents' receipt of summons, yet petitioners did not file the necessary and appropriate pleadings to get their case moving. 48 Hence, it found that petitioners failed to prosecute their action for an unreasonable length of time and dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment based on Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, which states:
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. (Emphasis supplied.)
We have held that what constitutes an "unreasonable length of time," within the purview of the above-quoted provision, depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Moreover, the sound discretion of the court in the determination of said question will not be disturbed in the absence of patent abuse, and the burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon appellant since every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the court's action. Thus, We refused to disturb orders of dismissal for failure of the plaintiffs to prosecute for a period of four years, about three years, over a year, less than a year, and even less than three months, as well as for failure of the plaintiffs to comply, for less than two months, with an order directing him to file a bill of particulars. 49
In Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 50 however, We explained that, in the instances above contemplated when the Court considered "less than a year" and "even less than three months" as "unreasonable length of time" to justify dismissal of a complaint, there was repeated failure of plaintiffs to appear and prosecute their complaint, or to resist a motion to dismiss by defendant. 51 We emphasized that the dismissal of suits should be resorted to only in circumstances where the actions of the party show deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority, or in instances where a party has been duly forewarned of the drastic consequences should there be failure to comply. But in all cases, there must be a scrupulous regard for the rights of the parties to the action. 52 ETHIDa
Subsequently, We held that the fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute, 53 or to proceed with trial, as when both plaintiff and counsel made no appearance at all or with the assumption that plaintiff has already lost interest in prosecuting his action. Should the ground for dismissal be delay, this delay or failure to proceed must be for an unreasonable length of time beyond the reasonable allowance to which, by judicial leniency, a litigant is normally entitled. 54
We note that there is no indication in the record that petitioners had been wanting in the exercise of due diligence. Nor is there evidence of a loss of interest or unwillingness to prosecute on their part.
On the other hand, the fault may be traced to petitioners' counsel, who failed to monitor the case with diligence and exert effort towards its speedy and efficient resolution. Atty. Paderna claimed that she prepared a motion to declare respondents in default on September 26, 2009 55 after she received a copy of the Sheriff's Return of Summons on April 8, 2009. However, it cannot be gainsaid that the amount of time she took to prepare the said motion is rather long. To make matters worse, the motion was not filed. Her lack of conscientiousness in handling the case resulted in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against her clients.
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. 56 Consequently, in the ordinary course, Atty. Paderna's negligence should have spelled the fate of petitioners' case, as decided by the CA. Providentially, We have carved out exceptions to this rule as where its observance would result in the outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property, or where the interest of justice so requires. 57 We held that, in cases where one of the exceptions is present, the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby. 58
We find that the case falls under the said exceptions to the general rule, since to uphold the Resolutions of the CA would result to an outright deprivation of petitioners' property rights. Interests of substantial justice far outweigh whatever negligence counsel might have committed. 59 There is thus a need to relax procedural rules in order to relieve petitioners of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of their counsel's thoughtlessness. 60
Under the scales of justice, technical procedural rules pale in comparison to, and are outweighed by, substantive violations affecting the bill of rights. 61 Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." Petitioner Lanisa argues that she is in danger of being deprived of her property without due process of law 62 by the RTC Order requiring her to vacate and deliver her house and lot to respondents without the benefit of her defense, since she was not served with summons in the first place. If the RTC Order will be executed, she will stand to lose the property she inherited from her parents consisting of 4,700 square meters of land with improvements. We are not prepared to compound the violation of petitioner Lanisa's right to due process, if indeed such violation took place, or brush it aside on the basis of a technicality. We note that the CA itself recognized the merit of the petition for annulment of judgment when it initially gave due course to it. The gravity of petitioners' claim of violation of due process compels Us to favor the examination of the merits of her petition for annulment of judgment.
At this point, We reiterate our ruling in Belonio v. Rodriguez63 that the power of the court to dismiss an action for non prosequitur is not without its limits. If a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff is not present, courts should not wield their authority to dismiss. Indeed, while the dismissal rests on the prerogative of the court, it must be soundly exercised and not abused, as there must be sufficient reason to justify its extinctive effect on the plaintiff's cause of action. Courts are reminded to exert earnest efforts to resolve the matters before them on the merits and adjudicate the case in accord with the relief sought by the parties, otherwise, in hastening the proceedings, they further delay the final settlement of the case. cSEDTC
Finally, We have also held that the extreme sanction of dismissal of the case might not be warranted if no substantial prejudice would be caused to the defendant, and there are special and compelling reasons which would make the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. 64
Here, We note that respondents failed to file their answer to the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners with the CA. However, they were able to file a comment opposing the present petition. To the mind of the Court, this indicates that they have no meritorious defense in the annulment of judgment proceeding, and that they took advantage of this petition to hammer on the dismissal of the case, which is of course favorable to them. In this light, We are more convinced that justice will be served if the petition for annulment of judgment will be decided on the merits. Respondents have not demonstrated that they will suffer any substantial injury thereby. On the other hand, their inaction before the CA suggests that the only injury that they stand to suffer is one that will result from the unearthing of the truth.
All told, We exercise our equity jurisdiction and allow the petition for annulment of judgment to run its course.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02686-MIN dated February 9, 2010 and November 18, 2010 are SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to decide the case on the merits.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 28-47.
2.Id. at 14-15; penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Leoncia R. Dimagiba and Angelita A. Gacutan.
3.Id. at 17-19.
4.Id. at 48-77.
5.Id. at 82-87.
6.Id. at 115.
7.Id. at 79-80.
8.Id. at 80.
9.Id. at 81.
10.Id. at 48-77.
11.Id. at 51.
12.Id. at 50.
13.Id. at 51.
14.Id. at 54.
15.Id. at 88.
16.Id. at 221-223.
17.Id. at 88.
18.Id. at 50-51.
19.Id. at 52-53.
20.Id. at 62-65.
21. In his affidavit dated October 6, 2008 (rollo, pp. 96-97), Pablo P. Camacho attested that Iluminado Cuyos engaged him as a carpenter to construct his house on the subject land in 1974. He knew the original owner of the land, Salvador Mantog, who had been his neighbor since 1969. After the house was constructed, Iluminado turned it into a family home. His family home was just across the street from the Cuyos home. In 1982, he was again engaged by Iluminado to construct a bigger house. After Iluminado and his wife passed away, their children continued to occupy the house. At present, it is being occupied by Lanisa Dionela.
In her affidavit dated November 20, 2008 (rollo, pp. 98-99), Cornelia G. Camacho attested that she has been a resident of Purok Lanzones, Inacayan, La-ac, Compostela Valley Province, where the subject land is located, since 1969, and was very familiar with the people and conflicts in the community. She knows Lanisa Dionela, being one of the six children of Iluminado, whose family had been her neighbor from 1974 until the present. It was known in the community that Iluminado bought the land previously owned by Salvador Mantog in 1971 and had a house constructed thereon in 1974. No portion of the land has been occupied by Esequio and Ricarda Ayuste at any time, contrary to their allegation with the RTC. The latter spouses' claim that they allowed Lanisa to construct a house on the subject land due to abnormal peace and order conditions in the community is entirely false. There was no need for Lanisa to ask permission to occupy the land since she inherited it from her father.
In his affidavit dated November 20, 2008 (rollo, pp. 100-101), Ernesto A. Sibay attested that he knows Lanisa Dionela as one of the six children of Iluminado, who had been his neighbor from 1974 to present. It was known in the community that Iluminado bought a piece of land from Salvador Mantog in 1971 on which he constructed a house in 1974. Iluminado had been in possession of the premises since 1974 and at no time was the land occupied by spouses Esequio and Ricarda Ayuste. It is not true that there was an abnormal peace and order condition in the community. Lanisa occupies the subject land as owner, having inherited it from her father.
In her affidavit dated November 20, 2008 (rollo, p. 102), Reusora Artemio attested that she knew Iluminado since 1976 since she was his farm worker. It has been known in the community that Iluminado owns a parcel of land formerly owned by Salvador Mantog. Iluminado and his family had been in actual possession of the subject land since 1976. She never saw the spouses Esequio and Ricarda Ayuste occupy or possess the property during the entire duration of her residency in the area. The claim of the spouses that they merely tolerated Lanisa's construction of a house in the area in 1992 due to abnormal peace and order conditions in the community is entirely untrue. Lanisa is the owner and actual possessor of the subject land along with her five siblings, having inherited the same from their late father, Iluminado.
22.Id. at 68.
23.Id. at 108-109.
24.Id. at 69.
25.Id.
26.Rollo, pp. 73-74.
27.Id. at 114-117; penned by Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson and concurred in by Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Michael P. Elbinias.
28.Id. at 116-117.
29.Id. at 14.
30.Supra note 2.
31.Rollo, p. 15.
32.Id. at 124-147.
33.Id. at 142.
34.Id. at 125.
35.Id. at 133.
36.Id. at 134, 186.
37.Id. at 134.
38.Id. at 135.
39.Id. at 140.
40.Id. at 190-192.
41.Id. at 182-183.
42.Supra note 3.
43.Rollo, pp. 18-19.
44.Canon 18. A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
45.Canon 12. A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
46.Rollo, p. 19.
47.Id. at 32-33.
48.Id. at 15.
49.Montejo v. Urotia, G.R. Nos. L-27187, L-29098, L-29373, L-29454, L-29542, L-30711, L-30744, L-30933, & L-31072, July 22, 1971, 40 SCRA 41, 51-52. Citations omitted.
50.G.R. No. 99431, August 11, 1992, 212 SCRA 498.
51.Id. at 509.
52.Id. at 508.
53.Shimizu Philippines Contractors, Inc. v. Magsalin, G.R. No. 170026, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA 65, 81. Citations omitted.
54.Gapoy v. Adil, G.R. No. L-46182, February 28, 1978, 81 SCRA 739, 745.
55.Rollo, p. 133.
56.Multi-Trans Agency Phils., Inc. v. Oriental Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 180817, June 23, 2009; Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191972, January 26, 2015, 748 SCRA 198, 207.
57.City of Dagupan v. Maramba, G.R. No. 174411, July 2, 2014, 728 SCRA 520, 538. Citation omitted.
58.Multi-Trans Agency Phils., Inc. v. Oriental Assurance Corp., supra.
59.Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128967, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 586, 597; Republic v. Luriz, G.R. No. 158992, January 26, 2007, 513 SCRA 140, 152.
60.City of Dagupan v. Maramba, supra.
61.Fontanilla v. The Commissioner Proper, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 209714, June 21, 2016, 794 SCRA 213, 223.
62.Rollo, p. 41.
63.G.R. No. 161379, August 11, 2005, 466 SCRA 557.
64.Olave v. Mistas, G.R. No. 155193, November 26, 2004, 444 SCRA 479, 495.