FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 163819. June 5, 2013.]
SPOUSES MARCOPOLO AND PERLITA DEGOLLACION, and SPOUSES ROLANDO AND EULANDA GASATAYA, petitioners, vs. DAMASO SEDORIOSA, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, TERESITA SEDORIOSA, HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SPECIAL TWELFTH DIVISION, HON. AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 16, RTC-CEBU CITY, and HON. GERALDINE FAITH ECONG, PRESIDING JUDGE-MTC-MINGLANILLA, CEBU, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 5, 2013, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 163819 — SPOUSES MARCOPOLO AND PERLITA DEGOLLACION, and SPOUSES ROLANDO AND EULANDA GASATAYA, Petitioners v. DAMASO SEDORIOSA, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, TERESITA SEDORIOSA, HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FORMER SPECIAL TWELFTH DIVISION, HON. AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 16, RTC-CEBU CITY, and HON. GERALDINE FAITH ECONG, PRESIDING JUDGE-MTC-MINGLANILLA, CEBU, Respondents. aSIAHC
The case stemmed from a dispute between petitioners and respondent Damaso Sedoriosa, who were relatives, involving a registered parcel of land with an area of 514 square meters known as Lot No. 5609, Flr-133, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-59993 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu in the names of Sedoriosa and his wife Rosario Caballero. Wanting to oust petitioners from the property in question to allow its partition among the members of his immediate family, Sedoriosa instituted a complaint for ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Minglanilla, Cebu (Civil Case No. 379), claiming that he had only tolerated petitioners in occupying portions of the property in question where they had constructed their respective residential houses under their promise to vacate should he need the property for his own use; and that he now needed the property for himself and his children.
In their answer, 1 petitioners stated that the owner of the property had been Gabriel Caballero, their grandfather (who had his title under Transfer Certificate No. T-6416 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Cebu); that they had been occupying and possessing their respective portions for more than 45 years in the concept of owners in representation of their father, Teodulo Caballero, who had not sold his share in the property; that their grandfather could not have sold their father's share because doing so would have disposed of all of the legitime of his children; and that even assuming that their grandfather had sold the property, the sale would be void as far as the shares of his compulsory heirs were concerned.
Petitioners further stated that even before Sedoriosa instituted Civil Case No. 379 they had themselves commenced against him a civil action for the recovery of ownership and possession of the property in question, declaration of nullity of sale and partition, damages and attorney's fees also in the MTC of Minglanilla, Cebu, (Civil Case No. 361). 2
On July 23, 2002, the MTC resolved Civil Case No. 379 in favor of Sedoriosa, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter and any and all persons acting for and in their behalf, to immediately vacate Lot No. 5609, Flr-133, removed [sic] therefrom the improvements they may have introduced thereon, and to turn over possession thereof to the plaintiff. Defendants are furthered ordered to pay plaintiff reasonable rental in the sum of P200.00 per month from the date of filing of this complaint until they shall have vacated the premises. Costs against the defendants. EHSADc
SO ORDERED. 3
Petitioners appealed to the RTC in Cebu City. 4
On April 23, 2003, the RTC dismissed petitioners' appeal on the ground that they had not filed their memorandum pursuant to Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. 5 Although they received the order of dismissal on May 12, 2003, they filed their motion for reconsideration only on July 29, 2003, 6 averring therein that their failure to file their memorandum had been due to the excusable negligence consisting in the failure of the clerk-in-charge in their counsel's office to inform their counsel about the order of the RTC; and that substantial justice would be served by allowing their appeal to be resolved on the merits rather than dismissing it upon technicality.
The RTC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on August 8, 2003 because, firstly, the motion for reconsideration had been itself filed out of time; and, secondly, they had not presented any cogent reason justifying the RTC into disregarding the Rules of Court in order to reconsider its order of April 23, 2003. 7
On September 6, 2003, petitioners instituted in the CA a special civil action for certiorari to nullify and set aside the dismissal of their appeal by the RTC.
In the first assailed resolution promulgated on October 29, 2003, 8 the CA outrightly dismissed the petition, to wit:
A perusal of the present petition reveals that the same suffers from the following procedural flaws: EHCcIT
1.Copies of pleadings filed in the lower courts and other relevant documents are not appended as annexes to the petition in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; [and]
2.Counsel for petitioners failed to indicate his Roll of Attorney's [sic] Number as required by the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated November 12, 2002 in Bar Matter No. 1132.
Accordingly, the instant petition is DISMISSED outrightly.
SO ORDERED. 9
The CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration on May 12, 2004 for lack of a compelling reason to reconsider. 10
In their petition before this Court, petitioners present the following as the "questions of law" to be resolved, namely:
1.Whether or not the pendency of petitioners' complaint for recovery of ownership and possession, declaration of nullity [sic] of deed of sale and partition plus damages and attorney's fees with prayer of temporary restraining order (TRO) or temporary injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 361 which was filed ahead of an ejectment case constitute a bar for an ejectment justifying the suspension thereof;
2.Whether or not petitioners were deprived of [their] constitutional right of due process in CA-G.R. SP. No. 79917 when the Honorable Court of Appeals former Special Twelfth Division outrightly dismissed the petitioner; [and]
3.Respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing [sic] the petition for failure of the petitioners to attach relevant documents as annexes and indicate his Roll of Attorneys [number]. 11
The petition has no merit. TEacSA
It is not debatable that petitioners were guilty of serious procedural lapses that their insincere pleas for substantial justice will neither excuse nor erase. To start with, the decision of the MTC became final and executory after the RTC properly dismissed their appeal on account of their non-filing of the appeal memorandum. With its finality, the decision of the MTC became immutable and conclusive on the parties, especially petitioners, rendering the issues they are now raising in this appeal academic. And, secondly, they filed a petition for certiorari in the CA in order to nullify the dismissal of their appeal by the RTC. Such resort to certiorari was patently improper, however, because the correct recourse for them was to appeal to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from notice of the denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration. All errors of the RTC at that stage, whether jurisdictional or otherwise, should be appealed in due course, rendering certiorari unavailable to them unless they could show that appeal in due course would not be an adequate remedy. But appeal became impossible for them to take because of the lapse of their reglementary period to appeal. It seems clear to us, therefore, that they thereby intended their petition for certiorari as a substitute for their lost right to appeal, which is impermissible.
Petitioners' plea for a liberal construction of the rules of procedure in order to serve the ends of substantial justice, and their plea for the review of the merits of the case are unworthy of consideration. Although the Rules of Court calls for liberal construction of the rules of procedure in order to promote the objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceedings, 12 the exercise of the power to suspend the rules of procedure always lies within the sound discretion of the court. On its part, this Court will exercise its power to suspend the rules only when a sound reason to justify the suspension is presented. But petitioners have not presented such a reason, and worse they have not satisfactorily acquitted themselves in the eyes of the Court as to their serious procedural lapses. Hence, they deserve no liberality from the Court because their non-compliance with the rules of procedure is until now inexcusable. 13 DIETcH
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on October 29, 2003 and May 12, 2004; and ORDERS petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, p. 62.
2.Id. at 69-75.
3.Id. at 39.
4.Id. at 40.
5.Id.
6.Id. at 42-45.
7.Id. at 41.
8.Id. at 32-33; penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Romeo C. Brawner (later Presiding Justice/retired/deceased) and Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestaño (retired/deceased) concurring.
9.Id. at 32.
10.Id. at 31.
11.Id. at 14-15.
12.Section 6, Rule 1, Rules of Court.
13.In Marahay v. Judge Melicor, G.R. No. L-44980, February 6, 1990, 181 SCRA 811, 817, the Court said that "[i]n the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss."