Spouses Casil, Sr. v. Heirs of Uy

FIRST DIVISION

[UDK 17380. April 26, 2022.]

SPOUSES RODULFO M. CASIL, SR. and ELISA D. CASIL, petitioners,vs. HEIRS OF LEONCIO UY, JR., namely: CONCEPCION T. UY, MARRY ANN U. ARQUIZA, and LEONCIO UY III represented by KENNETH T. UY, private respondents, and THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAASIN CITY, SOUTHERN LEYTE and THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, public respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedApril 26, 2022which reads as follows:

"UDK 17380— SPOUSES RODULFO M. CASIL, SR. and ELISA D. CASIL, petitioners, versusHEIRS OF LEONCIO UY, JR., namely: CONCEPCION T. UY, MARRY ANN U. ARQUIZA, and LEONCIO UY III represented by KENNETH T. UY, private respondents, and THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAASIN CITY, SOUTHERN LEYTE and THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, public respondents.

After a careful review of the records, and in view of the retroactive application of Republic Act No. (RA) 11573, 1 the Court GRANTS IN PART the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari2 (Petition) filed by petitioners Spouses Rodulfo M. Casil, Sr. and Elisa D. Casil (Spouses Casil). Accordingly, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the April 23, 2021 Decision 3 (assailed Decision) and July 29, 2021 Resolution 4 (assailed Resolution) of the Court of Appeals (CA), Eighteenth (18th) Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 05417 which affirmed the dismissal of Spouses Casil's Application for Registration of Title (Application) filed with the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sogod-Libagon-Bontoc, Sogod, Southern Leyte against private respondents, the Heirs of Leoncio Uy, Jr. (respondent heirs).

In view of the foregoing disposition, Spouses Casil's Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction5 is DENIED for being moot and academic. CAIHTE

The Petition must be resolved

Spouses Casil filed their Application with the MCTC on February 11, 2003. Therein, they prayed for the issuance of a decree of registration over a parcel of land situated in Sogod, Southern Leyte denominated as Lot No. 170 (Lot 170) with a total area of "414 square meters, more or less." 6

Specifically, Spouses Casil alleged, among others, that they are the current owners and possessors of Lot 170 which they purchased from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 22, 1994 7 (1994 DOAS), and that they, by themselves and through their predecessors in interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot 170 since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto. 8

Therefore, it is clear that Spouses Casil anchored the Application on then Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529 9 which reads as follows:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxx xxx xxx

However, during the pendency of this Petition, Section 14 of PD 1529 was amended by RA 11573. Section 6 of RA 11573, which amends Section 14 of PD 1529, states:

SEC. 6. Section 14 of [PD 1529] is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file at any time, in the proper Regional Trial Court in the province where the land is located, an application for registration of title to land, not exceeding twelve (12) hectares, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

"(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not covered by existing certificates of title or patents under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. They shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under this section.

"(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned riverbeds by right of accession or accretion under the provisions of existing laws.

"(3) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law.

"Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.

"Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an application for the original registration of the land: Provided, however, That should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.

"A trustee on behalf of the principal may apply for original registration of any land held in trust by the trustee, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 6 shortened the period of possession required under the old Section 14 (1) of PD 1529. Instead of requiring proof of possession dating back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, the new Section 14 (1) only requires proof of possession for a period of "at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure."

Further, the final proviso of the new Section 14 (1) also states that upon presentation of proof of possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain for the period and in the manner required thereunder, the applicant/s "shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under this section." This final proviso thus clarifies that for purposes of confirmation of title under PD 1529, the presentation of an "express government manifestation that said land constitutes patrimonial property or is 'no longer retained' by the State for public use, public service, or the development of national wealth" shall no longer be required. 10

In addition to these amendments, Section 7 of RA 11573 also prescribes the nature of proof required to establish the status of land as alienable and disposable. It states: DETACa

SEC. 7. Proof that the Land is Alienable and Disposable. — For proposes of judicial confirmation of imperfect titles filed under [PD 1529], a duly signed certification by a daily designated DENR geodetic engineer that the land is part of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain is sufficient proof that the land is alienable. Said certification shall be imprinted in the approved survey plan submitted by the applicant in the land registration court. The imprinted certification in the plan shall contain a sworn statement by the geodetic engineer that the land is within the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and shall state the applicable Forestry Administrative Order, DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, Proclamations and the Land Classification Project Map Number covering the subject land.

Should there be no available copy of the Forestry Administrative Order, Executive Order or Proclamation, it is sufficient that the Land Classification (LC) Map Number, Project Number, and date of release indicated in the land classification map be stated in the sworn statement declaring that said land classification map is existing in the inventory of LC Map records of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) and is being used by the DENR as land classification map.

In the recent case of Republic v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc. 11(Pasig Rizal), the Court, sitting en banc, ruled that RA 11573 may operate retroactively and apply to all applications for land registration pending as of September 1, 2021, or the date when RA 11573 took effect. It held:

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. However, this rule is subject to certain recognized exceptions, as when the statute in question is curative in nature, or creates new rights, thus:

As a general rule, laws have no retroactive effect. But there are certain recognized exceptions, such as when they are remedial or procedural in nature. This Court explained this exception in the following language:

"It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, '(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.' But there are settled exceptions to this general rule; such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.["] x x x

In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court shed light on the nature of statutes that may be deemed curative and may therefore be applied retroactively notwithstanding the absence of an express provision to this effect:

According to Tolentino, curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo, on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils. x x x By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive x x x (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."

xxx xxx xxx

In Nunga, Jr. v. Nunga III, the Court further clarified that while a law creating new rights may be given retroactive effect, this can only be done if the new right does not prejudice or impair any vested rights.

On this basis, the Court finds that RA 11573, particularly Section 6 (amending Section 14 of PD 1529) and Section 7 (prescribing the required proof of land classification status), may operate retroactively to cover applications for land registration pending as of September 1, 2021, or the date when RA 11573 took effect.

To be sure, the curative nature of RA 11573 can easily be discerned from its declared purpose, that is, "to simplify, update and harmonize similar and related provisions of land laws in order to simplify and remove ambiguity in its interpretation and implementation." Moreover, by shortening the period of adverse possession required for confirmation of title to twenty (20) years prior to filing (as opposed to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier), the amendment implemented through Section 6 of RA 11573 effectively created a new right in favor of those who have been in possession of alienable disposable land for the shortened period provided. The retroactive application of this shortened period does not impair vested rights, as RA 11573 simply operates to confirm the title of applicants whose ownership already existed prior to its enactment. 12 (Emphasis and underscoring omitted)

Accordingly, the Court applies RA 11573 to resolve this Petition.

Spouses Casil's open,

The new Section 14 (1) is explicit on the nature and period of possession required for confirmation of title — open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title. Thus, to be entitled to registration under the new Section 14 (1), Spouses Casil must establish proof of possession of the entire 413.69-square meter area of Lot 170 in the manner required by law for at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding February 11, 2003, or the date when their Application was filed. 13

Here, the MCTC denied Spouses Casil's Application based on the finding that they "are not in actual, open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the entire [Lot 170] as a portion thereof, i.e., 191 square meters[,] is possessed and claimed by [respondent heirs.]" 14

The CA echoed the MCTC's findings in the assailed Decision, adding that Spouses Casil's documentary and testimonial evidence only establish open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of a 241.90-square meter portion of Lot 170 since 1977. To quote: aDSIHc

[Spouses Casil's] testimonial and documentary evidence reveal that although Tax Declaration No. 1547 did not mention any lot number, the land was declared in the name of Teodoro Talavar, who in turn, conveyed it to Juana Calope in 1922. In 1925, Juana Calope sold a 100-square meter area of land to Ismael Calope. In 1976, Ismael executed a Deed of Absolute Sale wherein Leonor Cordovez acquired an area of 170 square meters. However, in Tax Declaration No. 1994, the lot had only an area of 93.50 square meters. After less than a year, Leonor Cordovez sold it to Teresita Angcoy. Thereafter, Teresita Angcoy had the land resurveyed. The result of the resurvey showed that the actual area is 241.90. Teresita Angcoy then mortgaged the property in favor of the DBP. For her failure to pay her loan, the DBP foreclosed the mortgage on the property and thereafter sold it in a public auction where the bank emerged as the highest bidder. x x x

x x x [Spouses Casil's] pieces of evidence merely show the chain of ownership of [Lot 170]. Other than [Teresita Angcoy's] possession and occupation of the 241.9[-]square [meter] portion of [Lot 170] which started in 1977, [Spouses Casil] did not discuss the length and character of the rest of their predecessors-in-interest's actual occupation and possession x x x thereof. The evidence consist of general statements with no specifics as to when the rest of their predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of [Lot 170]. Settled is the rule that general statements are mere conclusions of law and do not qualify as competent evidence of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. Moreover, an applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.

xxx xxx xxx

Here, while [Spouses Casil] presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which is 1906, they only established actual possession of a portion, i.e., 241.9 square meters, of [Lot 170] in 1977 when [Teresita Angcoy] bought it from Leonor Cordovez and constructed a house thereon. It is well-settled that tax declarations are mere bases for inferring possession. They must be coupled with proof of actual possession for them to constitute incontrovertible evidence of a claim of ownership. Again, [Spouses Casil's] claim of ownership will not prosper on the basis of the tax declarations alone. It is only when these tax declarations are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property that they may become the basis of a claim of ownership. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. 15 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, Spouses Casil's claim of ownership and possession of the 241.90-square meter portion of Lot 170 is not disputed by respondent heirs. In fact, in their Formal Appearance and Opposition to Application for Registration filed with the MCTC, respondent heirs conceded that the actual area owned by Spouses Casil is at most, "241 square meters and not 413.69 square meters."16 In line with this, respondent heirs did not pray for the outright dismissal of Spouses Casil's Application, but merely prayed to exclude from its scope the portion of Lot 170 in their possession. 17

Consequently, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the fact that Spouses Casil's possession of the 241.90-square meter portion of Lot 170 traces back to the year 1977 remains uncontroverted, as is thus deemed established.

On this score, it bears recalling that Spouses Casil's Application was filed on February 11, 2003, or twenty-six (26) years after 1977. It appears, therefore, that the requirement of twenty (20) years possession under the new Section 14 (1) is satisfied, insofar as the 241.90-square meter portion of Lot 170 is concerned.

Spouses Casil failed to prove

Objecting to the findings of the CA, Spouses Casil vehemently maintain that the 1994 DOAS covers the entire land area of Lot 170 consisting of 413.69 square meters, and that they should therefore be entitled to register said entire area. In particular, they argue:

x x x [T]he best evidence proving that the portion of the lot in litigation, being part or portion of x x x Lot 170, is [Spouses Casil's] Advance Plan bearing AP-08-000700 and approved on December 20, 2002 x x x. This document shows that the original cadastral survey was conducted on December 16, 1975 and November 1, 1976, respectively, and approved on July 18, 1977. As surveyed, Lot 170 contains an area of 414 square meters, more or less.

In approving the advance second survey of said Lot 170 by the Regional Office VIII, Tacloban City, the Lands Management Services, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, made the following certification:

"I hereby certify to the technical correctness of the survey plotted herein, the original field notes and computations of which are on file in this office, wherefore, the same is hereby recommended for approval.

Sgd. FELIPE S. CALUB,18

While Spouses Casil concede that the 1994 DOAS does not reflect the exact area of the lot they purchased from DBP, they argue that what defines a piece of land is "not the area, calculated with more or less certainty, mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits." 19 In this regard, they point out that the lot they purchased was described as having the exact same boundaries reflected in the approved cadastral surveys covering Lot 170. 20

Spouses Casil's assertions fail. ETHIDa

The fact that the entire land area of Lot 170 consists of a total of 413.69 square meters is of no moment as the evidence on record clearly shows that the subject of the transactions preceding the sale between DBP and Spouses Casil pertain only to a portion of Lot 170. These transactions are summarized, as follows:

 

Transaction	Year	Subject Land Area
Sale executed by Teodoro Talavar in favor of Juana Calope	1922	Unclear 21
Sale executed by Juana Calope in favor of Ismael Calope	1925	100 square meters
Sale executed by Ismael Calope in favor of Leonor Cordovez	1976	170 square meters
Sale by Leonor Cordovez in favor of Teresita Angcoy	1977	170 square meters
Mortgage by Teresita Angcoy in favor of DBP	1977	241.90 square meters, as determined after resurvey
Purchase by DBP as highest bidder in the foreclosure sale	Unclear 22	241.90 square meters 23

 

As Spouses Casil themselves assert, the property they purchased from DBP via the 1994 DOAS is the very same property which Teresita Angcoy mortgaged in favor of DBP. 24This property is none other than the 241.90-square meter portion of Lot 170 that DBP acquired in the aforesaid foreclosure sale.

By the contract of sale, the seller is obliged to transfer ownership of and deliver a determinate thing subject of the contract to the buyer in exchange for a price certain in money or its equivalent. 25 In this connection, Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides that the vendor must have the right to transfer the ownership of the determinate thing subject of the contract at the time it is delivered. Hence, the Court has ruled that "[a] seller can only sell what he or she owns, or that which he or she does not own but has authority to transfer, and a buyer can only acquire what the seller can legally transfer." 26 Clearly, DBP only had the right to transfer ownership and possession of said 241.90-square meter portion in favor of Spouses Casil. In turn, Spouses Casil only assumed ownership and possession of said 241.90-square meter portion.

In all, the scope of Spouses Casil's open, continuous, and exclusive possession in the concept of owners for the required period of at least twenty (20) years immediately preceding the filing of the application is limited only to the 241.90-square meter portion of Lot 170 which they purchased from DBP.

Spouses Casil must present

Despite the foregoing, the records readily show that Spouses Casil did not present evidence to prove that the relevant portion of Lot 170 forms part of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Notably, Spouses Casil's failure to present such evidence was no longer discussed as an issue by the MCTC and the CA due to their uniform findings as to Spouses Casil's failure to establish the required nature of possession for the period required by the old Section 14 (1), that is, from June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Nevertheless, in view of the retroactive application of RA 11573 and bearing in mind its curative nature, the Court remands the case to the CA for reception of additional evidence on the land classification status of the 241.90-square meter portion of Lot 170 in accordance with Section 7 of the said statute, guided by the parameters set forth in Pasig Rizal, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

a. Such additional evidence shall consist of a certification issued by the DENR geodetic engineer which (i) states that the land subject of the application for registration has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (ii) bears reference to the applicable Forestry Administrative Order, DENR Administrative Order, Executive Order, or proclamation classifying the land as such; and (iii) indicates the number of the LC Map covering the land.

b. In the absence of a copy of the relevant issuance classifying the land as alienable and disposable, the certification must additionally state (i) the release date of the LC Map; and (ii) the Project Number. Further, the certification must confirm that the LC Map forms part of the records of NAMRIA and is precisely being used by the DENR as a land classification map. cSEDTC

c. The DENR geodetic engineer must be presented as witness for proper authentication of the certification in accordance with the Rules of Court. 27

Spouses Casil's Motion for

In conjunction with the Petition, Spouses Casil also pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) to restrain respondent heirs from "continuing to intrude and/or possess the western portion of Lot 170 and from introducing additional improvements during the pendency of the instant [P]etition." 28

TROs and WPIs are ancillary remedies issued only to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until the merits of the main case resolving the rights of the parties are heard and decided. 29 As aptly explained in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas: 30

TROs and WPIs "constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action" and are "preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights" of the parties. They are ancillary because "they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action." Ancillary writs are not causes of action in themselves; they are mere adjuncts to the main suit with the sole object of preserving the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. Being ancillary in nature, the existence of a main action or proceeding is a condition sine qua non before a WPI or TRO may lie:

In our jurisdiction, writs of preliminary injunction and TROs are considered as provisional injunctive reliefs that are only permitted to be issued in connection with — or as an ancillary to — a main action or proceeding pending in court. It is settled that the office of a writ of preliminary injunction is limited only to the preservation of the status quo until an action or proceeding could be fully decided; whereas a TRO is merely the maintenance of such status until an application for a writ of preliminary injunction can be heard. Evidently, the existence of a main action or proceeding is a condition sine qua non before a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO may lie.

The ancillary character of the writs of preliminary injunction and TROs also finds black letter support in our rules of procedure. Sections 1, 2 and 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court — which define and describe the precise circumstances under which a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO may be granted — all assume the prior existence of a main action or proceeding before such writ and order may be granted [.] x x x

Thus, any preliminary writ cannot survive the resolution of the main case of which it is an incident because an ancillary writ "loses its force and effect after the decision in the main petition." x x x 31 (Emphasis supplied; original emphasis omitted)

Accordingly, in view of this Resolution disposing the instant Petition, Spouses Casil's prayer for TRO and/or WPI "during the pendency of the instant [P]etition" 32 must be denied for being moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED IN PART. The April 23, 2021 Decision and July 29, 2021 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Eighteenth (18th) Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 05417 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence on the land classification status of the 241.90-square meter portion of Lot No. 170 purchased by petitioners Spouses Rodulfo M. Casil, Sr. and Elisa D. Casil from the Development Bank of the Philippines under the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 22, 1994 based on the parameters set forth in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 11573. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals is directed to resolve the present case in accordance with this Resolution with due and deliberate dispatch.

In view of the foregoing, Spouses Casil's accompanying Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic. SDAaTC

The Order dated April 18, 2022 awaiting the replacement of the stale check as payment for docket and other legal fees is REITERATED.

SO ORDERED." Gaerlan, J., on official leave.

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

By:

MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1. AN ACT IMPROVING THE CONFIRMATION PROCESS FOR IMPERFECT LAND TITLES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE PUBLIC LAND ACT," AND PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE," July 16, 2021.

2.Rollo, pp. 6-39.

3.Id. at 45-57. Penned by Associate Justice Dorothy P. Montejo-Gonzaga, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Gabriel T. Ingles and Bautista G. Corpin, Jr.

4.Id. at 40-44.

5.Id. at 30-33.

6.Id. at 46.

7.Id. at 48.

8.Id. at 46.

9. AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise known as the "PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE," approved on June 11, 1978.

10. See Republic v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207, February 15, 2022, p. 26.

11.Id.

12.Id. at 29-31. Citations omitted.

13. See rollo, p. 9.

14.Id. at 49.

15.Id. at 41-43.

16.Id. at 47. Emphasis supplied.

17.Id. The portion in possession of respondent heirs covers 191 square meters per Commissioner's Report dated October 22, 2007 issued by court-appointed commissioner Engineer Wilfredo Alterjar; see id. at 56.

18.Id. at 20.

19.Id. at 63.

20. See id. at 64.

21. The scope of the Deed of Sale executed in favor of Juana Calope cannot be ascertained from the rollo.

22. The exact date of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale cannot be ascertained from the rollo.

23. See rollo, pp. 52-53.

24.Id. at 9.

25. See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1458.

26.Spouses Ponce v. Aldanese, G.R. No. 216587, August 4, 2021, p. 9. Citation omitted.

27.Republic v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., supra note 10, at 32-33.

28.Rollo, p. 32.

29.J. Perlas-Bernabe, Separate Concurring Opinion in Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) v. Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc.(NIASSI), 807 Phil. 942, 971 (2017).

30. G.R. No. 200642, April 26, 2021.

31.Id. at 9. Citations omitted.

32.Rollo, p. 32.