FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 205773. June 16, 2021.]
SPOUSES ARTURO AND DOLORES ALINIO, petitioners,vs. WILFREDO B. AGUSTINO, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 16, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 205773 (Spouses Arturo and Dolores Alinio v. Wilfredo B. Agustino). — Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Spouses Arturo and Dolores Alinio (petitioners) assailing the Resolutions dated August 10, 2011 2 and January 16, 2013, 3 respectively, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00501 which affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 34, denying petitioners' application for issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO) and dismissing the case particularly against Wilfredo B. Agustino (Agustino). 4
Facts of the Case
In a Complaint for Injunction and Damages with Application for Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order 5 dated October 10, 2004, petitioners alleged that they are the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 1819 with an area of 2,111 square meters, located at Compania St., Barangay Compania Central, Molo, Iloilo City. Petitioners claimed that they acquired the subject property from Spouses Jose and Leonor Abad, pursuant to deeds of sale and donation. One of the original defendants, Enrique Castelo, Sr. (Castelo), is the registered owner of Cadastral Lot No. 1751, directly adjoining the lot owned by petitioners. 6
Because of the earth-filling activities undertaken by petitioners on their lot, on April 12, 2004, Castelo filed a letter addressed to the Officer-in-Charge of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Bernabe Garnace (Garnace), inquiring whether the activities required an Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC). Castelo also requested the CENRO to prevent petitioners from continuing with the earth-filling activities as they harm and prejudice the environmental condition in the area. In response to the inquiry, the members of the Task Force on Environmental and Natural Resources Laws and Enforcement (TF-ENRLE), conducted an ocular on petitioners' property where they noted and documented the presence of planted or naturally-grown mature mangroves within and at the periphery of the property. 7
Thereafter, on April 20, 2004, Garnace wrote a letter to Wilfredo Agustino (Agustino), Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), requesting an investigation of the activities undertaken by petitioners on their lot, to determine any possible violation of the Water Code. Garnace likewise reported to Agustino that the earth-filling activities by petitioners may have already breached the easement portion of the Batiano River. Acting on the said letter, Agustino ordered that a team of investigators conduct an inspection of the subject property. After inspection, the investigators recommended that a team composed of representatives from the DPWH and CENRO-DENR should be formed to conduct a delineation survey to determine the exact point where the legal easement portion of the Batiano River lies. Agustino approved the said recommendation. Because of this, petitioners moved for reconsideration. However, Agustino ruled that the motion should be submitted to the task force for final resolution. Not satisfied with the action of Agustino, petitioners appealed the same to the Secretary of the DPWH. Pending their appeal to the Secretary of the DPWH, petitioners filed this complaint. 8
In their complaint, petitioners asked the RTC to restrain Garnace, Agustino and Castelo from interfering with the development and use of Cadastral Lot No. 1819. Particularly, petitioners prayed that Agustino and the delineation survey team that he has formed, should be disallowed to inspect, and photograph the subject property to determine any possible violation of environmental laws or violation of the easement. 9
On October 27, 2004, the RTC conducted a summary hearing on the application of petitioners for a TRO. During the hearing, Agustino argued for the denial of the application and the dismissal of the case, by informing the trial court that an appeal to the Secretary of the DPWH was pending (at that time) questioning the ruling of Agustino. 10
After the hearing, the trial court ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda. In his memorandum, 11 Agustino reiterated that the recourse of petitioners to the RTC is premature since an appeal questioning the order of Agustino is pending before the Secretary of the DPWH. According to Agustino, the pendency of the appeal is fatal to the cause of action of petitioners which warrants the dismissal of the case against him. 12
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Order 13 dated November 4, 2004, the RTC agreed with Agustino. According to the RTC, the principal relief prayed for by petitioners in this case is to prevent Agustino and the survey team composed of representatives from the DPWH and CENRO-DENR, to enter the subject property and conduct a delineation survey on the same. However, this issue is pending before the Secretary of the DPWH on appeal. Therefore, the RTC held that the immediate recourse to the court is premature under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Given this, the RTC not only denied the application for TRO but also dismissed the complaint as to Agustino because of prematurity. The RTC added that the resolution of the main complaint would necessarily delve into the issues on legal easement, jurisdiction of the DPWH, and the authority of Agustino as the regional director to constitute a delineation survey team for the subject property. These are the very same issues pending before the Secretary of the DPWH on appeal. 14
Petitioners moved for partial reconsideration of the dismissal of the case as to Agustino, claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction to motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In an Order 15 dated December 6, 2004, the RTC denied the motion and held that it did not motu proprio dismiss the case because the issue on failure to exhaust administrative remedies was timely raised by Agustino during the summary hearing on the application for TRO and in his memorandum filed in court. 16
Due to the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 17
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On August 10, 2011, the CA rendered a Resolution 18 dismissing the petition filed by petitioners. According to the CA, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint against Agustino, after the latter raised the issue of prematurity in his memorandum. The CA held that if a hearing was held on the application for TRO, the evidence presented in said hearing can be considered in whether to dismiss the case or not. 19 The CA ruled that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their duties within their respective competence. 20
On reconsideration, the CA reiterated the same ruling in its Resolution 21 dated January 16, 2013.
Undeterred, petitioners filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari22 raising the lone legal issue of whether the RTC may dismiss the case against Agustino motu proprio on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 23 According to petitioners, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the case against Agustino even if the latter has not yet filed an answer or a motion to dismiss raising the defense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. 24 Petitioners averred that failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a ground to dismiss the case should be pleaded in the answer or in a motion to dismiss, otherwise, it is deemed waived. 25 Petitioners claimed that the mere invocation of such ground to dismiss in Agustino's memorandum does not suffice. 26
In his Comment, 27 Agustino stressed that the RTC's dismissal of the complaint against him was proper because petitioners were accorded due process. Agustino noted that during the summary hearing for the application of a TRO, the parties appeared, and documentary evidence were presented in support of their respective cases. The said pieces of evidence were admitted and considered by the trial court in resolving the issue of dismissal. Hence, the RTC cannot be faulted in dismissing the case based on petitioners' evidence and memorandum. 28 Agustino also emphasized the importance of adherence to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts, as in this case. 29
In their Reply to Comment, 30 petitioners reiterated the same arguments presented in their petition.
Issue
The issue in this case is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the case against Agustino on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Ruling of the Court
After a perusal of the records of the case, this Court resolves to deny the Petition for Review on Certiorari for failure of petitioners to show that the CA rendered a reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the RTC.
For a petition for certiorari to prosper, the petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 31Yu v. Reyes-Carpio32 defined grave abuse of discretion as:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. 33
This is not the case here.
Petitioners insist that the RTC's dismissal of the case against Agustino, motu proprio, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, is imbued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Motu proprio is a Latin term which literally means "on his own impulse." Applying to court proceedings, the term gives the court, discretion, to undertake an action even without a proper motion from the parties and mainly on its own initiative. However, in this case, the RTC did not dismiss the case motu proprio. Records disclose that the issue on prematurity of the judicial action was raised by Agustino as early as the summary hearing to determine the propriety of the issuance of a TRO. This defense was reiterated by Agustino in his memorandum submitted to the RTC for resolution of the application for TRO. It can hardly be deduced from the foregoing that the RTC dismissed the case solely on its own initiative and discretion.
Further, both parties were given the opportunity to be heard on their defenses and arguments. Hence, the constitutional requirement of due process was sufficiently accorded to petitioners.
As explained by the RTC, the appeal to the DPWH questioning the directive of Agustino, in creating a delineation survey team to investigate the activities on petitioners' property, would necessarily dwell on issues of legal easement, jurisdiction of the DPWH, and the authority of Agustino as the regional director of the DPWH. These are the very same questions to be determined by the RTC in deciding the complaint. A premature filing of the complaint to the RTC goes against the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies which requires that resort must first be made to the administrative authorities in cases falling under their jurisdiction to allow them to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their competence. This is because the administrative agency concerned is in the best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum. 34 Lack of RTC's jurisdiction to proceed with the case because of prematurity is clearly ascertainable.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Resolutions dated August 10, 2011 and January 16, 2013, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00501 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 16-35.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Pampio A. Abarintos and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela; id. at 8-11.
3. Penned by Executive Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos (former Member of this Court) and Pedro B. Corales; id. at 116-117.
4.Id. at 57.
5.Id. at 37-51.
6.Id. at 38.
7.Id. at 53-54.
8.Id. at 54.
9.Id. at 49-50.
10.Id. at 19-20.
11.Id. at 58-68.
12.Id. at 67.
13.Id. at 53-57.
14.Id. at 54-55.
15.Id. at 69-70.
16.Id. at 69.
17.Id. at 71-87.
18.Supra note 2.
19.Rollo, p. 10.
20.Id. at 11.
21.Supra note 3.
22.Rollo, pp. 16-35.
23.Id. at 21.
24.Id. at 22.
25.Id. at 23.
26.Id. at 22-24.
27.Id. at 179-187.
28.Id. at 184-185.
29.Id. at 183.
30.Id. at 191-193.
31.Chua v. People of the Philippines, 821 Phil. 271, 279 (2017).
32. 667 Phil. 474 (2011).
33.Id. at 481-482.
34.Morcal v. Lavina, 512 Phil. 864 (2005).