THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 209106. March 5, 2014.]
SPS. REX J. AGGABAO AND CONCEPCION S. AGGABAO, petitioners, vs. DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR., respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated March 5, 2014, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 209106 (Sps. Rex J. Aggabao and Conception S. Aggabao vs. Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr.). — Before this court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 6, 2013. 1
This petition stemmed from a complaint filed by respondent Dionisio against petitioners Spouses Aggabao and respondent Dionisio's wife, Elena Parulan. 2 The complaint was for the declaration of nullity of the deed of absolute sale dated March 18, 1991 involving two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 63376 and 63377 in the name of respondent Dionisio and his wife, Elena. The complaint also prayed for the cancellation of the title subsequently issued to petitioners Spouses Aggabao. Meanwhile, the petitioners filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against respondent Dionisio. The two cases were consolidated before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 136. 3
On July 26, 2000, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision 4 declaring the deed of absolute sale as null and void, to wit:
WHEREFORE, and in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Dionisio A. Parulan, Jr. and against defendants Ma. Elena Parulan and the Sps. Rex and Conception Aggabao, without prejudice to any action that may be filed by the Sps. Aggabao against co-defendant Ma. Elena Parulan for the amounts they paid her for the purchase of the subject lots, as follows:
1. The Deed of Absolute [Sale] dated March 18, 1991 covering the sale of [the] lot located at No. 49 M. Cuaderno St., Executive Village, BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro Manila, and covered by TCT Nos. 63376 and 6377 is declared null and void.
2. Defendant Mrs. Elena Parulan is directed to pay litigation expenses amounting to P50,000.00 and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 5 HADTEC
The Court of Appeals and this court affirmed the trial court's decision. 6 This court affirmed the declaration of nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed between petitioners Spouses Aggabao and respondent Dionisio's wife, Elena, for having been made without respondent Dionisio's consent. 7 This court subsequently issued an entry of judgment on April 4, 2011. 8
Respondent Dionisio filed a motion for execution on the July 26, 2000 decision. The trial court granted the motion in its resolution dated February 21, 2012, and a writ of execution was issued on February 27, 2012. 9
Petitioners Spouses Aggabao filed a motion for reconsideration on the February 21, 2012 resolution. 10 On the other hand, respondent Dionisio filed an omnibus motion, 11 which prayed for the following reliefs:
• Clarification as to whether the writ of execution dated February 27, 2012 included the authority of the Sheriff to retake possession of the property and place it under respondent Dionisio's possession;
• Cancellation of TCT No. 51693 in the name of petitioners Spouses Aggabao and restoration of TCT No. 63377 in the name of respondent Dionisio and his wife, Elena, by the Register of Deeds of Parañaque; and
• Cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on TCT Nos. 63376 and 63377 (as restored).
On March 23, 2012, the trial court issued a resolution denying both the motion for reconsideration of petitioners Spouses Aggabao and the omnibus motion of respondent Dionisio. 12 The motion for reconsideration of respondent Dionisio was denied on May 2, 2012. 13 On June 15, 2012, respondent Dionisio filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals questioning the resolutions of the trial court. 14
The Court of Appeals partially granted respondent Dionisio's petition and held that the trial court "committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction but only in so far as the [trial court's] failure to order the cancellation of the TCT in the name of spouses Aggabao, which TCT was issued pursuant to the subject Deed of Absolute Sale that was declared void." 15 The Court of Appeals also held that the trial court failed to adhere to the standing rule that "when the dispositive portion of a judgment, which has become final and executory, contains an ambiguity by reason of an inadvertent omission, such ambiguity may be clarified by reference to the body of the decision itself." 16
The appellate court also held that there was no requirement for the Regional Trial Court to specifically order the cancellation of the said notice of lis pendens. 17 It reasoned that after the final judgment, the notice of lis pendens was deemed cancelled upon respondent Dionisio's registration of a "certificate of the Clerk of Court in which the action was pending of the fact of its disposal." 18
The Court of Appeals, however, said that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the Sheriff to take possession of the property and place it in the hands of respondent Dionisio. 19 The trial court decision relied upon did not rule or did not make definitive "findings on the issue of recovery of possession of the . . . property . . . ." 20
Petitioners Spouses Aggabao in their petition for review before this court argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the fact that respondent Dionisio should have made a timely clarification of the trial court decision "through a motion for reconsideration, motion for clarificatory judgment or whatever means he deemed appropriate, to the RTC Decision dated July 26, 2000 when he noticed that the Dispositive Portion thereof failed to include some of the material and pertinent parts of the body of the Decision." 21 Thus, in failing to timely act upon his receipt of the trial court decision, respondent Dionisio made use of an erroneous remedy and forum. 22
In addition, petitioners Spouses Aggabao argued that it is already a settled rule that "a writ of execution should strictly conform to every essential particular of the promulgated judgment — as indicated in the dispositive portion . . . thereof — since it is that portion of the decision that actually constitutes the resolution of the court." 23 They said that:
. . . Consequently, even if there is a conflict between the dispositive portion and opinion of a court contained in the body of the decision, it would be the dispositive portion that would be controlling, regardless of what was stated in the opinion. 24
Lastly, petitioners Spouses Aggabao argued that the Court of Appeals erred in partially granting respondent Dionisio's petition for mandamus. 25 In this case, the judge already completed his ministerial duty of issuing the writ of execution; thus, mandamus did not lie. 26
The main issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it held that the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title in favor of petitioners Spouses Aggabao was necessarily included in the original decision of the lower court. TcEDHa
This petition should be DENIED.
The arguments of petitioners Spouses Aggabao do not sway this court. Contrary to petitioners Spouses Aggabao's arguments, there is no "conflict" between the dispositive portion and the body of the July 26, 2000 decision of the trial court. What is at issue here is whether the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title under petitioners Spouses Aggabao's names is warranted by virtue of the declaration of nullity of the deed of absolute sale by this court.
It is true that the general rule is:
. . . that the writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to be executed, and that the execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original judgment or award, for it is a settled general principle that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. Where the judgment of an appellate court has become final and executory and has been returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the decision and issuing the writ of execution. In addition, a final and executory judgment can no longer be amended by adding thereto a relief not originally included. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
However, in Tumibay v. Soro, 28 this court categorically held that:
Nonetheless, we have held that a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but extends as well to those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. Thus, in Perez v. Evite, where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in the judgment, the delivery of possession of the land was considered included in the decision where the defeated party's claim to possession was based solely on his claim of ownership.
In Baluyut v. Guiao, we stressed that this rule fully conforms with Rule 39, Section 47, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court that provides:
SECTION 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
xxx xxx xxx
We remind the petitioners that we do not allow the piecemeal interpretation of our Decision as a means to advance one's case. To get the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and read in this context; the decision must be considered in its entirety. Read in this manner, the respondents' right to possession of the subject property fully follows. 29 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is clear from the Rules and this court's pronouncements that the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in partially granting respondent Dionisio's petition for certiorari and ordering the trial court to include in the writ of execution the following: 1) cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51693 in the name of petitioners Spouses Aggabao; and 2) reinstatement of the Transfer Certificate of Title No. (63377) 30726 in the name of respondent Dionisio Parulan, Jr. and Elena Parulan. EcDTIH
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for failing to show reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 6, 2013 and its resolution dated September 10, 2013 are AFFIRMED. The manifestation and motion dated November 11, 2013 filed by petitioners is NOTED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 34-43, Court of Appeals Manila, 17th Division, per J. Florito S. Macalino, JJ. Sesinando E. Villon and Pedro B. Corales, concurring.
2. Id. at 15.
3. Id. at 16. Civil Case Nos. 91-1005 and 91-1940 for "Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale and Certificate of Title" and "Specific Performance with Damages".
4. Id. at 56-60.
5. Id. at 16 and 60.
6. Id. at 16-17 and 36. See also rollo, pp. 73-89, G.R. No. 165803, September 1, 2010 [Per J. Bersamin, Third Division].
7. Aggabao v. Parulan, Jr., G.R. No. 165803, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 562 [Per J. Bersamin, Third Division].
8. Rollo, p. 90.
9. Id. at 17.
10. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 106-110.
12. Id. at 37.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 19.
15. Id. at 39.
16. Id., citing Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. The Court of Appeals, et al., 593 Phil. 367, 373 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
17. Id. at 41.
18. Id., citing Sec. 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, Property Registration Decree.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 41-42.
21. Id. at 22.
22. Id. at 23.
23. Id. at 24, citing Philippine Health Insurance Corporation v. The Court of Appeals, et al., 593 Phil. 367 [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
24. Id.
25. Id. at 26.
26. Id. at 26-27.
27. Mahinay v. Asis, G.R. No. 170349, February 12, 2009, 578 SCRA 562, 574-575 [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
28. G.R. No. 152016, April 13, 2010, 618 SCRA 169 [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
29. Id. at 176-177.