SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 222445. November 29, 2021.]
HENRY A. SOJOR, petitioner,vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND ROSE MARIE A. PALOMAR, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated29 November 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 222445 (Henry A. Sojor v. Civil Service Commission and Rose Marie A. Palomar). — Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Rule 45) dated February 27, 2016, seeking a reversal of the Decision2 dated August 3, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA). In both its Decision and Resolution, the CA affirmed 4Decision No. 11-0048 dated February 1, 2011 issued by the Civil Service Commission (respondent CSC).
FACTS
Petitioner Dr. Henry A. Sojor (Sojor) was the President of Negros Oriental State University (NORSU), which was previously known as the Central Visayas Polytechnic College. Sometime in 2002, an Administrative Complaint dated October 15, 2002 (Complaint) was lodged against Sojor by private respondent Rose Marie A. Palomar (Palomar) for nepotism in public respondent Civil Service Commission's (CSC Proper) Regional Office No. VII in Cebu (CSCRO-VII). 5 The complaint was docketed as ADM DC No. 02-21, 6 and entitled Sojor, Henry A. re. Nepotism. 7
After Sojor timely filed an Answer to the Complaint, he also caused the filing of a Motion to Dismiss to challenge the jurisdiction of the CSCRO-VII. In his Motion to Dismiss, Sojor argued that it was the NORSU Board of Regents not the CSC or the CSCRO-VII, which has jurisdiction over his administrative case. The CSCRO-VII and the CSC Proper denied Sojor's Motion to Dismiss but was reversed by the CA. 8 The matter of jurisdiction eventually reached the Court En Banc, and in a Decision dated May 22, 2008 in the Civil Service Commission v. Henry A. Sojor (Sojor), 9 this Court held that the "CSC validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints directly filed before the regional office, concerning violations of civil service rules against respondent." 10 Thus, in the said case, this Court affirmed Resolution No. 040321 dated March 30, 2004 11 by the CSC Proper, which held:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Henry A. Sojor, President of Central Visayas Polytechnic College, is hereby DISMISSED. The Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, is authorized to proceed with the formal investigation of the cases against Sojor and submit the investigation reports to the Commission within one hundred five (105) days from receipt hereof. Finally, Sojor is preventively suspended for ninety (90) days. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
Armed with the favorable judgment by this Court in Sojor, which became final and executory, 13 and six (6) years after the filing of the Complaint, 14 the CSCRO-VII was set to proceed with its formal investigation of Sojor in ADM DC No. 02-21 for nepotism, among others. However, Sojor felt that an investigation conducted by CSCRO-VII would be prejudicial to his interest in view the potential enmity by the latter to the former. According to Sojor, this animosity is rooted in him bringing CSCRO-VII to court in the Sojor case. 15 Thus, filed a Motion to Transfer Venue dated February 13, 2009 (Motion to Transfer), praying that the investigation be instead conducted by the CSC Proper instead of the CSCRO-VII. The Motion to Transfer was filed with the CSC Proper. 16
Notwithstanding the Motion to Transfer, and without being directed otherwise by the CSC Proper nor enjoined by any court of law, the CSCRO-VII continued with its formal investigation and, in the process, necessarily received evidence in support of the allegations in the Complaint in ADM DC No. 02-21. 17 During the course of the investigation, Sojor, through counsel, and as set forth in his Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Proceedings Before the CSC Regional Office dated March 11, 2009 filed with the CSC Proper, refused to participate in the investigation in view of the pendency of the resolution by the CSC Proper of its Motion to Transfer. 18 Notwithstanding such refusal, the CSCRO-VII gave Sojor numerous opportunities to participate in the proceedings and cross-examine the witnesses presented against him. 19
On September 8, 2009, Sojor filed a Motion of even date praying that he be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against him. The CSCRO-VII partly granted Sojor's Motion and permitted him to cross-examine one Socrates Diputado (Diputado), the only witness not discharged in ADM DC No. 02-21, on October 2, 2009. 20 Nevertheless, Sojor failed to attend the scheduled hearing, 21 instead Sojor filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking that he be allowed to cross-examine all witnesses, including those already discharged. The CSCRO-VII denied Sojor's Motion for Reconsideration but still allowed him to cross-examine Diputado on February 3, 2010. Sojor, again, failed to attend. 22 Eventually, the presentation of evidence of the then complainant Palomar was concluded. 23 Thus, it was not time for Sojor to submit evidence for his defense. CAIHTE
Sojor was set to present his evidence on March 24, 2010 and April 8, 2010. In both instances, neither Sojor nor his counsel-of-record attended. Instead, Sojor filed a Petition for Mandamus with the CA arguing that he had been "unlawfully deprived of his right to cross-examine and confront the witnesses against him." 24 The case was entitled Dr. Henry A. Sojor v. Civil Service Commission, Regional Office No. 7, represented by Judith Chicano, Director IV, Carolina Fe Santos, Jocelyn Juanon, Jose Rene Cepe, Narciso Ragay, Jr., and Rosemarie Palomar and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 04966 (CA Mandamus Case). In a Decision dated October 22, 2012, 25 the Eighteenth (18th) Division of the CA denied the Petition for Mandamus and found:
It is the contention of petitioner that respondents unlawfully deprived him his right to cross-examine and confront the witnesses against him, which constitutes as a violation of his right to due process. He maintains that public respondent has no jurisdiction to deny his motion/request to cross examine all the witnesses in his absence which is but reasonable and logical and is not even prejudicial to the rights of private respondents.
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Clearly, the right to cross-examine a witness, although a fundamental right of a party, may be waived. In the case at bar, petitioner had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses during the hearings before the [CSCRO-VII] but is deemed to have waived such right in view of his absences during several scheduled hearings. Having had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him, petitioner was NOT denied the right to due process.
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WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 26 (Emphasis supplied)
The CA Mandamus Case attained finality. 27 Notably, since no injunction was issued to suspend the conduct of investigation by the CSCRO-VII, it proceeded with the same. On October 18, 2010, the CSCRO-VII submitted its Investigation Report and the records of the case to the CSC Proper. 28
Decision of the CSC Proper.
On February 1, 2011, nearly a decade since the filing of the Complaint, the CSC Proper, issued a Decision of even date 29 which found Sojor guilty of Nepotism:
WHEREFORE, Henry A. Sojor is hereby found GUILTY of Nepotism. Accordingly, he is imposed the penalty of dismissal from service with all accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, disqualification from reemployment in the government service, cancellation of eligibility and bar from taking any Civil Service Examination. 30
Decision of the CA.
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration of the Decision of the CSC Proper, 31 Sojor sought recourse with the CA. However, as previously mentioned, the CA denied the appeal of Sojor; thus:
WHEREFORE, we resolve to DENY this petition for review for lack of merit. The Decision No. 11-00048 promulgated by the Civil Service Commission on February 1, 2011 against Dr. Henry A. Sojor dismissing him from government service on ground of nepotism is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 32
In denying Sojor's Petition for Review, the CA found that the CSC Proper had jurisdiction. The CA likewise found that the issue as to the supposed deprivation of his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him has already been decided with finality by the CA in the CA Mandamus Case, which has already attained finality. Unperturbed, Sojor sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in one-page Resolution. 33
DISCUSSION
Before this Court, Sojor maintains that the CSC Proper did not have authority over the case. According to Sojor, jurisdiction lies with the Board of Regents of NORSU which assumed jurisdiction over the case before the CSC Proper. Sojor likewise maintained that his right to due process was violated during the investigation conducted by the CSCRO-VII inasmuch as he was not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses presented against him, and to present evidence for his defense. DETACa
This Court finds the petition without merit.
At the outset, this Court takes note that Sojor, in his Assignments of Error, made no mention of the propriety of the CSC Proper's finding of nepotism. 34 Basic is the rule that "only those errors assigned will be considered." 35 Concededly, there are exceptions, 36 but this Court finds none that are applicable in this case. As such, this Court is constrained to confine its review on the Assignments of Error as indicated by petitioner Sojor in his Petition.
The doctrine of res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case by what has been done in another case. 37 It has two (2) concepts: "(1) [t]he judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2) [a]ny right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same or not." 38
The distinction between the two (2) conceptions of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 (b) and (c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (Rules) which reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
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(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
In Spouses Ocampo v. Heirs of Bernardino U. Dionisio, 39 this Court held that Section 47 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules pertain to the concept of res judicata as a "bar by prior judgment," while Section 47 (c), Rule 39 of the Rules refers to the concept of "conclusiveness of judgment." In the said case, this Court distinguished between the two (2) as follows, to wit:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. 40
From the foregoing, the two (2) concepts of res judicata are clearly distinguishable. In Ley Construction & Development Corp., et al. v. Philippine Commercial and International Bank, et al., 41 this Court had the opportunity to distinguish the requisites between "bar by prior judgment" and "conclusiveness of judgment"; thus:
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The bar by prior judgment requires the following elements to be present for it to operate:
(1) A former final judgment that was rendered on the merits;
(2) The court in the former judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and,
(3) Identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions.
In contrast, the elements of conclusiveness of judgment are:
(1) Identity of parties; and
(2) Subject matter in the first and second cases. 42
In this case, the issues raised by Sojor in his Petition before this Court are "essentially connected" with the issues passed upon in Sojor case (as to the issue on the jurisdiction of the CSC Proper over ADM DC No. 02-21) and the CA Mandamus Case (with respect to the issue on due process rights of Sojor), 43 albeit the main issue in this case should have been the propriety of the finding of nepotism by the CSC Proper, as affirmed by the CA (however, Sojor did not raise the issue of the correctness of the finding of Nepotism before this Court). It would also not be amiss to point out that both the Sojor case and the CA MandamusCase were incidents that arose out of the same ADM DC No. 02-21 case before the CSC Proper. Ineluctably, therefore, the instant case calls for the application of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment. aDSIHc
On this point, it bears recalling that in Sojor case this Court affirmed the Resolution dated March 30, 2004 by the CSC Proper. Accordingly, in affirming the aforesaid Resolution, this Court sustained the findings of the CSC Proper in the said Resolution and the acts it pursued thereunder. Differently stated, this Court gave its imprimatur to the two (2) acts of the CSC Proper as stated in Resolution: first, in taking cognizance of the administrative complaints, 44 and second, in authorizing the CSCRO-VII to proceed with the formal investigation of the cases. 45 This case has already attained finality and can no longer be disturbed in the instant appeal. Ironically, it would appear that even Sojor recognized the jurisdiction of the CSC Proper in ADM DC No. 02-21, despite his protestations now, as he himself sought affirmative relief from the CSC Proper in at least two (2) occasions. 46
On the other hand, in the CA Mandamus Case, the CA found that the due process rights of Sojor were not violated insofar as he was given numerous opportunities to participate therein. However, despite the several chances given, Sojor chose to not participate. 47 Much like the Sojor case, the CA Mandamus Case has already attained finality and cannot likewise be disturbed.
The only question that remains in order to complete the application of the doctrine of Conclusiveness of Judgment is whether between the Sojor case, the CA Mandamus Case, and the instant case there exists an identity of parties. In this regard, suffice it to state that the requirement of "identity of parties" does not require absolute identity. It would suffice that there is "substantial identity of parties premised on a common interest between them, to such an extent that a favorable decision to one would also favorably affect the other." 48 Here, the identity of the parties in the Sojor case, the CA Mandamus Case, and instant case could not be clearer. In these three (3) cases, Sojor argued that the proceedings before the CSC Proper and the CSCRO-VII are illegal. The only difference is that in the Sojor case, only the CSC Proper is impleaded; in the CA Mandamus case only Palomar is impleaded, along with a few others; and in the instant case both the CSC Proper and Palomar are impleaded.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition dated February 27, 2016 is DENIED. The Decision dated August 3, 2015 and the Resolution dated December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed Decision No. 11-0048 dated February 1, 2011 dismissing petitioner Dr. Henry A. Sojor, from service for nepotism are AFFIRMEDin toto.
SO ORDERED." (Hernando, J., on official leave.)
By authority of the Court:
TERESITA AQUINO TUAZON
Division Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) MA. CONSOLACION GAMINDE-CRUZADA
Deputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 12-35.
2.Id. at 277-285; penned by Associate Justice Germano Francisco D. Legaspi, with Associate Justices Edward B. Contreras and Jhosep Y. Lopez (now, a Member of this court), concurring.
3.Id. at 288.
4.Id. at 284.
5.Id. at 277-278.
6.Id. at 14.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 278.
9. 577 Phil. 52, 71 (2008).
10.Id.
11.Rollo, pp. 165-169.
12.Id. at 169.
13.Id. at 15.
14.Id. at 156.
15.Id.
16.Id. at 75-83.
17.Id. at 280.
18.Id. at 15, 88-89.
19.Id. at 127-131, 428-446.
20.Id. at 157-158.
21.Id. at 158.
22.Id.
23.Id.
24.Id. at 159.
25.Id. at 151-164.
26.Id. at 159, 162, 164.
27.Id. at 16, 144.
28.Id. at 56.
29.Id. at 52-59; penned by Francisco T. Duque III, Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, with Commissioner Maryann Z. Fernandez Mendoza, concurring. Commissioner Cesar D. Buenaflor was on official business.
30.Id. at 59.
31.Id. at 60-63.
32.Id. at 284.
33.Id. at 288.
34.Id. at 18-19.
35.Spouses Campos v. Republic, 728 Phil. 450, 456 (2014).
36. See Hi-Tone Marketing Corp. v. Baikal Realty Corp., 480 Phil. 545, 561-562 (2004), where the Court enumerated the following instances where it has allowed the consideration of other grounds not raised or assigned as errors: 1) grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within the contemplation of the law; 3) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice; 4) matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored; 5) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and 6) matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.
37.Spouses Sy v. Young, 711 Phil. 444, 450 (2013).
38.Prudential Bank v. Antonio S.A. Mauricio, 679 Phil. 369, 388 (2012).
39. 744 Phil. 716, 726-727, citing Judge Avelita III v. P/Supt. Doria, et al., 612 Phil. 1127, 1137-1138 (2009).
40.Id. at 726-727.
41. 635 Phil. 503, 511-512 (2010).
42.Id. at 511-512.
43.Republic of the Phils. v. Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc., et al., 788 Phil. 160, 224 (2016).
44.Supra note 7.
45.Supra note 9.
46.Supra notes 13 and 15.
47.Supra note 23.
48.Wycoco v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 237874 & 239036, February 16, 2021.