FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 219599. October 6, 2021.]
SKK STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated October 6, 2021which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 219599 (SKK Steel Corporation, petitioner v. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines, respondent).
The case at hand pertains to a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by SKK Steel Corporation (petitioner) seeking to reverse and set aside the November 27, 2014 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 129772. In its decision, the CA granted the petition for review of the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (respondent) and reversed the January 9, 2013 and April 17, 2013 Orders of the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) which, in turn, directed respondent to refund to petitioner the amount of P8,024,319.70, instead of P18,587,598.09, representing the ancillary charges for the year 2009.
Antecedents
The facts, as gathered from the available records, are as follows: CAIHTE
On January 9, 2009, respondent took over the business of the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9511 3 pertaining to the transmission of electricity through high voltage back-bone systems of interconnected transmission lines, substations and related facilities. 4
On May 29, 2009, petitioner filed a petition before the ERC claiming that respondent and TRANSCO could not unilaterally change the "billing determinant" in the computation of its transmission charges from "coincident peak demand" to "non-coincident peak demand" without violating their August 15, 2005 Memorandum Agreement. 5
On December 7, 2009, the ERC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and ordered respondent and TRANSCO to: (a) calculate the "ancillary service charge" based on its "actual demand coincident with the system peak demand"; and (b) refund to petitioner the overpayment. 6 The same case was elevated by respondent to the CA and, ultimately, to the Court. 7
On December 5, 2011, the Court resolved to deny respondent's petition for review on certiorari for: (a) filing the same petition beyond the extended period; (b) failure to state the material date when the notice of the assailed CA decision was received; and (c) submitting a defective verification for being based on "personal knowledge and belief and based on authentic records" in violation of Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. 8
On March 12, 2012, the ERC issued a Writ of Execution on its December 7, 2009 Decision which contained a directive on all parties to submit their respective proposed computation on the adjusted charges using the "coincident peak demand" as its "billing determinant." 9
On April 23, 2012, the Court denied with finality respondent's pursuit to set aside the CA and the ERC's decisions. 10
On June 20, 2012, the ERC promulgated an Order directing respondent and TRANSCO to implement its December 7, 2009 Decision. 11
Thereafter, both petitioner and TRANSCO submitted their respective computations of the adjusted charges which were then due to the modification of the former's "billing determinant" from "non-coincident peak demand" to "coincident peak demand." 12 In computing for the amount of refund, petitioner arrived at the amount of P18,587,598.09 while TRANSCO arrived at the amount of P12,671,638.86. 13
On January 9, 2013, the ERC promulgated an Order finding petitioner's computation to be consistent with its December 7, 2009 Decision and March 12, 2012 Writ of Execution. 14 In response, respondent moved for reconsideration claiming that the computation for refund was incorrect. 15
On April 17, 2013, the ERC promulgated an Order denying respondent's motion for reconsideration. 16
Such denial prompted respondent to file a petition for review and a supplemental petition with the CA seeking to have ERC's January 9, 2013 and April 17, 2013 Orders reversed. 17
On November 27, 2014, the CA rendered a Decision, 18 the dispositive portion of which reads: DETACa
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated 09 January 2013 and 17 April 2013 of the Energy Regulatory Commission are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and NGCP is DIRECTED TO REFUND SKK the amount of P8,024,319.70 representing ancillary charges for CY 2009.
SO ORDERED. 19
In its decision, the CA held that: (a) TRANSCO's duties and liabilities in the year 2008 "were not automatically assumed" by respondent because any assumption of liability must be specifically and categorically agreed upon; 20 (b) it is incumbent upon petitioner to adduce proof that respondent assumed TRANSCO's liabilities when it was given the congressional franchise and started to operate on January 15, 2009; 21 (c) respondent cannot be liable for the entire amount of the obligation to refund because "[t]here is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states or when the obligation requires solidarity" and that there is absence of any contract providing for such solidarity in liability; 22 (d) petitioner did not illustrate the methods or procedures it used in coming up with its computational adjustments which starkly contrasted with that of respondent, who gave "a very detailed computation"; 23 (e) respondent's computation has more weight because it appears to have been prepared by persons who are knowledgeable in the transmission industry for using the parameters, data and formulas used in the energy industry; 24 and (f) respondent cannot rely on "motherhood" statements that respondent's computations are not correct without showing the latter's inaccuracies in arriving at their computation and in applying their formulas. 25
On August 25, 2015, petitioner elevated the case before the Court for review. 26
Parties' Positions
Petitioner, in seeking to reverse and set aside the CA's November 27, 2014 Decision and July 22, 2015 Resolution, argues that:
(1) Its computation of over-recoveries of ancillary service charges was correctly adopted by the ERC because it [petitioner] was not furnished with the Concessional Agreement between TRANSCO and [respondent] which would have been utilized as basis for this case's resolution; 27
(2) Findings and rulings of the ERC should be given great respect by the appellate courts due to its area of expertise in the field of energy law; 28
(3) Its own computation of ancillary service charges for the months of April, May, June, and September of 2008 are correct because it used the "original non-coincident peak" to compute for the correct rates or rate adjustment to the billing and because it was aware of the correct consumption during the coincident time and date of consumption; 29 and
(4) Its own computations for the "power factor adjustment" and VAT are correct, detailed and supported by documentary annexes. 30
Respondent, for its part, counters with the following arguments:
(1) It cannot be held liable for any of TRANSCO's liabilities incurred in the year 2008 because it only assumed the latter's transmission business only on January 15, 2009;·31
(2) The downward adjustment of "as charges" consequently decreased the "power factor adjustment award" to petitioner which means that the latter had already been billed for lower charges and that the "power factor adjustment rate" should also decrease when considered in the refund computation; 32 aDSIHc
(3) The revised VAT calculated by [petitioner] is grossly overstated; 33
(4) The CA correctly gave weight to its own computation because: (a) it was testified to by a witness; (b) it was supported by "actual figures"; and (c) it was done in accordance with "approved methodologies"; 34
(5) It is "absolutely not solidar[ily] liable" with TRANSCO because, aside from Article 1207 of the Civil Code, its obligation under Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 9511 is merely limited to operating, maintaining, managing, improving and expanding the transmission system previously done by the latter; 35
(6) It did not, contrary to [petitioner's] allegations, violate any rule against forum-shopping; 36 and
(7) [Petitioner] "miserably failed to comply with significant procedural requirements" because it failed to attach a duplicate original or certified true copy of the subject CA Decision. 37
ISSUES
I.
Whether or not the petition complied with the requirements under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
II.
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in taking cognizance of and in reversing the ERC's January 9, 2013 and April 17, 2013 Orders.
The Court's Ruling
The Court denies the instant petition.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. 38 Such policy is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of the Court's docket. 39 More importantly, findings of fact are the province of the trial courts. 40 The reason for this is because the trial court is in a much better position to determine which party was able to present evidence with greater weight. 41 Although jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to these rules, exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties so this court may fully evaluate and review the facts of the case. 42
Concomitantly, a question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of fact; while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. 43 For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. 44 Therefore, once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. 45
In this case, petitioner invites the attention of the Court to make sense of the tables of figures which it claims to be its computation for the supposedly proper amount of adjusted refunds. However, figures arranged in several tables mean nothing if no formula is given to explain how these amounts were arrived at. Moreover, the petition is also barren of any explanation as to why the amounts stated in these tables were correctly computed or why the CA committed an error in its own factual assessments. More importantly, even if petitioner revealed the underlying formula of the figures that it is presenting before the Court for analysis, there is still a need to provide the legal basis of such formula for purposes of having the same reviewed under Rule 45. Logically, the Court is being led to conclude that the issues raised by petitioner for review are technical matters which are rightly within the purview of the ERC — an administrative body statutorily established and duly specialized in determining and regulating energy rates. Verily, factual findings of administrative officials and agencies that have acquired expertise in the performance of their official duties and the exercise of their primary jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, even finality, if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 46 Being a court of last resort, this Court's jurisdiction is mainly focused on questions of law. As such, the matters sought by petitioner to be reviewed are not within the purview of Rule 45. ETHIDa
Nevertheless, even if the Court assumes that the CA grossly misappreciated the facts of the case in reversing the ERC's January 9, 2013 Order, petitioner still failed to allege, substantiate, and prove the exceptions to Rule 45 which allows only for the review of pure questions of law. The review of appeals filed before the Court is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion." 47 In other words, petitioner is duty-bound to demonstrate or substantiate all allegations in its petition, or at the very least, point out in the records with specificity which facts were erroneously appreciated by the CA in the context of specific provisions of law and/or evidentiary rules — not present a whole numerical table with apparently meaningless and unprocessed data. Thus, sound discretion dictates that petitioner's failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 45 is sufficient to justify the dismissal of its petition for review on certiorari.
As to the propriety of the assailed November 27, 2014 Decision, the Court holds that the CA is still empowered to make its own factual evaluations even if factual findings of administrative agencies are accorded great respect and are sometimes regarded as binding. Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides for a uniform procedure for appeals from a long list of quasi-judicial agencies to the CA, is a loud testament to the power of Congress to vest myriad agencies with the preliminary jurisdiction to resolve controversies within their particular areas of expertise and experience. 48 Such adjudicative power that administrative bodies may exercise comes with the corresponding power of the CA to review on appeal their decisions in view of Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Besides, in evaluating the decisions of the CA in reviewing decisions or final orders of specialized administrative agencies, a distinction should be made between the act of applying general laws which is properly exercised by regular courts and the act of using technical expertise which is rightly exercised by administrative tribunals. 49 In this regard, the CA may validly pass upon questions involving application of laws on disputes involving specialized and highly technical matters.
Here, the CA reviewed the ERC's January 9, 2013 and April 17, 2013 Orders in the light of R.A. No. 9511 on respondent's obligations under its legislative franchise of Art. 1207 of the Civil Code on concurrence of plural debtors of a single collective obligation. 50 It used these legal principles to evaluate the ERC's findings of fact consistent with its statutory power to resolve both legal and factual questions. As such, the CA cannot be considered to have erred in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES SKK Steel Corporation's Petition for Review on Certiorari for being substantially factual and for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals' November 27, 2014 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 129772.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-15.
2.Id. at 37-45; penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybañez, with Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao (now a member of this Court) and Carmelita S. Manahan, concurring.
3. An Act Granting the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines a Franchise to Engage in the Business of Conveying or Transmitting Electricity Through High Voltage Back-Bone System of Interconnected Transmission Lines, Substations and Related Facilities, and for Other Purposes (December 1, 2008).
4.Rollo, p. 38.
5.Id.
6.Id.; see also: http://liaerc.node1347.speedyrails.net/documents/88 (last visited: September 22, 2021).
7.Id.
8.National Grid Corporation of the Philippines v. SKK Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 198282, December 5, 2011.
9.Rollo, p. 38.
10.National Grid Corporation of the Philippines v. SKK Steel Corporation, G.R. No. 198282, April 23, 2012.
11.Rollo, p. 38.
12.Id. at 39.
13.Id.
14.Id.
15.Id.
16.Id.
17.Id. at 40.
18.Id. at 37-46.
19.Id. at 45.
20.Id. at 40-41, citing Barayoga v. Asset Privatization Trust, 510 Phil. 452, 461 (2005).
21.Rollo, p. 41.
22.Id. at 41-42, citing Hi-Cement Corporation v. Insular Bank of Asia and America, 560 Phil. 535, 547 (2007), also citing Article 1207 of the Civil Code.
23.Id. at 42.
24.Id.
25.Id. at 44.
26.Id. at 3-15.
27.Id. at 6-8.
28.Id. at 8-9.
29.Id. at 10-12.
30.Id. at 12-15.
31.Id. at 95-98.
32.Id. at 98-99.
33.Id. at 99-100.
34.Id. at 101-102.
35.Id. at 103-105.
36.Id. at 105.
37.Id. at 106-110.
38.Bugaoisan v. Owi Group Manila, 825 Phil. 764, 773 (2018).
39.Candelaria v. Regional Trial Court, 739 Phil. 1, 10-11 (2014).
40.Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., 809 Phil. 453, 530 (2017).
41.Heirs of Teresita Villanueva v. Heirs of Petronila Syquia Mendoza, 810 Phil. 172, 184 (2017).
42.Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 169 (2016).
43.Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. v. People, 721 Phil. 760, 767 (2013).
44.Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation v. Atty. Escaño, Jr., 672 Phil. 747, 756 (2011).
45.Republic v. Malabanan, 646 Phil. 631, 638 (2010).
46.Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Costo, 700 Phil. 290, 299 (2012).
47.Spouses Miano v. MERALCO, 800 Phil. 118, 119 (2016), citing Sec. 6, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
48.Alfonso v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 801 Phil. 217, 294 (2016).
49. See Imperial v. Armes, 804 Phil. 439, 469 (2017).
50.Rollo, p. 41.