Siroy v. Rudolf Lietz, Inc.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 204013. January 7, 2019.]

IMELDA M. SIROY, petitioner, vs.RUDOLF LIETZ, INC. AND RUDOLF J.H. LIETZ, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated January 7, 2019which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 204013 (Imelda M. Siroy v. Rudolf Lietz, Inc. and Rudolf J.H. Lietz). — This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 and Resolution 3 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 116614 dated May 25, 2012 and October 19, 2012, respectively. The CA Decision reversed and set aside the July 16, 2010 4 and September 29, 2010 5 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR 01-00455-09, and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner Imelda M. Siroy (Siroy). The CA Resolution denied Siroy's motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision.

Respondent Rudolf Lietz, Inc. (RLI) is an importer, seller, distributor, and supplier of pharmaceutical and similar products. It is owned by its President, respondent Rudolf J.H. Lietz (Lietz). 6

On March 15, 1985, Siroy was employed by RLI as Technical Sales Engineer. She later became Sales Supervisor with a monthly salary of P28,000.00, plus commissions. 7

On November 21, 2008, RLI issued a communication to Siroy informing her of her suspension for 30 days, from December 8, 2008 to January 7, 2009, in view of her violations of company standard operating procedures, insubordination, and fraud. 8

On January 8, 2009, upon her return and during the conference meeting with RLI officials, Siroy submitted two letters. 9 In her first letter, 10 she informed RLI that she is not physically fit to work and was advised by her doctors to avoid stressful activities. In her second letter, 11 Siroy expressed her desire to avail of early retirement after having served the company for 24 years, effective immediately due to her circumstances. When informed by respondent Lietz that the company's retirement plan qualifications are either 65 years of age or 25 years of service with the company, whichever comes first, Siroy insinuated that there was a retirement plan she read when she was hired in 1985 stating the minimum age of 50 years old as basis for availment. Lietz refuted this, saying that such benefit never existed in RLI since it was established. 12 CAIHTE

Siroy went on a 14-day sick leave from January 8, 2009. On January 22, 2009, RLI issued a notice to report for work, stating that her sick leave has ended and that she should have reported back to work on January 21, 2009. Her continuous unauthorized absences affected business operations considering the numerous problems in her account which she needed to settle with clients or customers. Siroy was thus directed to report back to work immediately. 13

In a letter 14 dated January 23, 2009, Siroy explained that during the conference on January 8, 2009, she has expressed her desire to avail of early retirement effective immediately. After she was informed by Lietz that RLI does not provide for early retirement, she filed a complaint on January 12, 2009 with the NLRC for constructive dismissal and non-payment of early retirement benefit, among others. She also stated that she sent an e-mail to RLI management, informing it that she was forced not to go back to work by her circumstances. Finally, as far as she is concerned, she has no more pending business with RLI after she was previously required to make a turnover.

On February 2, 2009, RLI sent Siroy a show cause letter requiring her to explain why her employment should not be terminated for continued unauthorized absence and inviting her to attend a conference on February 9, 2009 to present her side. Siroy neither attended the conference nor provided any written explanation for her continued absence. Thus, in a letter 15 dated February 10, 2009, RLI dismissed her from service in accordance with the company policy on attendance and the Labor Code.

Consequently, on May 12, 2009, Siroy amended the complaint she filed with the NLRC. From constructive dismissal, she alleged actual illegal dismissal and prayed for payment of earned commission and commutation of sick leave as additional causes of action. 16

On October 27, 2009, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, 17 the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents to pay jointly and severally complainant Imelda Siroy, the following:

a.) Retirement Benefits

 

(3/5/1985-12/8/2008)
P28,000 x 23 years	=	P644,000.00
P28,000 x 4 years	=	112,000.00 ––––––––––
Total		P756,000.00
		––––––––––

 

b.) Unpaid Commission = P802,372.28

c.) Refund of Cash Bond deposit

P28,000 ÷ 26 days x 5 days = P5,384.61

All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit and/or factual basis.

SO ORDERED. 18 DETACa

The Labor Arbiter held that the principal issue to be resolved is whether Siroy is entitled to retirement benefits, to which it ruled in the affirmative. RLI and Lietz submitted a retirement plan that refers to the "First Revision dated 12.93" which, according to the Labor Arbiter, indicates that there was an earlier retirement plan. However, despite Siroy's insistence for RLI and Lietz to submit the same, they failed to do so. This led the Labor Arbiter to infer that said policy is unfavorable to RLI. He thus awarded retirement benefits to Siroy on the basis of the retirement plan of Solex Tools Corporation (Solex) which provides early retirement benefits to its employees. The Labor Arbiter held that the retirement plan submitted by RLI also mentioned "current Solex employees," giving him reason to believe that RLI and Solex, which are sister companies, use the same retirement plan. Moreover, the present retirement plan of RLI has no binding effect on Siroy because it amounts to diminution of benefits, in violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter likewise found that RLI had previously extended the benefits of the old retirement plan to one Marietta N. Partillo by offsetting her share in availing the company's car plan. 19 As regards Siroy's monetary claims, the Labor Arbiter ordered RLI and Lietz to jointly and severally pay her unpaid commissions amounting to P802,372.28 and refund her 5 days salary deposit bond. However, he held that Siroy's claim for 13th month pay for the year 2009 cannot be granted as she did not render services during that year. The Labor Arbiter likewise did not grant Siroy's claim for commutation of sick leave for lack of basis. Finally, the Labor Arbiter held that Siroy's claim of illegal dismissal is rendered moot considering that she is found entitled to retirement benefits. Her complaint for illegal suspension must also fail as the record is replete with evidence of the infractions she committed that warranted her suspension for 30 days. 20

RLI and Lietz appealed the Decision to the NLRC, alleging error on the part of the Labor Arbiter when: 1) he declared Siroy to be qualified and entitled to retirement benefits based on the retirement plan of another company; 2) he overlooked Siroy's deceit in presenting the articles of incorporation of RLI Gallery Systems, Inc. to create the wrong impression that the retirement policy of RLI cannot apply to her; 3) he failed to see that Siroy tried to mislead his office when she presented the retirement plan of Solex and articles of incorporation of RLI Gallery Systems, Inc.; 4) he considered the company car plan of Marietta N. Portillo as another basis for the retirement claims of Siroy; 5) he failed to consider the several official documents that establish Siroy's unpaid commission to amount only to P110,995.01; 6) he failed to see that the commissions of Siroy should be based on profit, not the amount of sales; and 7) he declared that RLI and Lietz should be jointly and severally liable after he ruled that all other claims of Siroy are dismissed for lack of merit or factual basis, which means that there was no bad faith or malice on the part of RLI and Lietz. 21

Siroy also submitted a partial appeal on the ground that the Labor Arbiter seriously erred in not awarding her moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. 22

The NLRC disposed of the appeal in its Resolution 23 dated July 16, 2010, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Labor Arbiter is hereby MODIFIED, in that complainant is also entitled to attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total judgment award.

The rest of the decision STANDS.

SO ORDERED. 24

Pertinently, the NLRC held that RLI did not dispute the existence of the original retirement plan but failed to produce it despite its being under the company's custody and absolute control. Hence, Siroy's argument that this constitutes plain suppression or withholding of evidence must be given credence. 25 aDSIHc

The NLRC also did not find any deceit on the part of Siroy in presenting the documents of RLI's sister companies to support her prayer to be awarded retirement benefits, as she did not have a copy of RLI's retirement plan and she believed that Solex's retirement plan applies to the three sister companies. 26 As regards the amount of commissions, the NLRC held that the summary of monthly commissions for the year 2008 submitted by RLI and Lietz is unsigned. Thus, it is self-serving and has no evidentiary value. The invoices they submitted, however, prove only the amount of sales and not commissions. 27 The NLRC gave credence to Siroy's computation of her commissions, which it found to be "meticulously detailed," and held that if they were not due to Siroy, RLI and Lietz should have specifically disproved them by substantial evidence. Finally, the NLRC awarded attorney's fees to Siroy, holding that she was compelled to engage the services of counsel to protect and enforce her rights. 28

Respondents moved for the reconsideration of the NLRC Resolution, but it was denied. 29 Consequently, they filed a petition for certiorari 30 with the CA. On May 25, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision, 31 the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed NLRC Resolutions are SET ASIDE and a NEW ONE is entered DISMISSING the complaint. Petitioners are ordered to pay private respondent her unpaid commissions amounting to Php110,995.00 (plus an override of Php10,007.88).

SO ORDERED.32

The CA held that Siroy is not entitled to the claimed early retirement benefits because she is not yet eligible to retire under the law nor pursuant to RLI's retirement plan. The burden of proving that Siroy may retire at age 50 after 10 years of service falls on Siroy herself, as he who asserts has the burden of proof. The NLRC is not justified in insisting on referring to RLI's old retirement plan of 1990 since it is not disputed that the present plan was revised in 1993 and took effect in 1994, way before Siroy's employment was terminated in 2009. 33 The CA also ruled that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it held that the retirement plan of Solex applies to RLI, for it is a fundamental principle of corporation law that a corporation is an artificial being invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it may be connected. While Solex and RLI are sister companies, it does not necessarily follow that they have to enforce the same company rules and policies, or in this case, retirement plans. Two corporations may be merged and considered as one, but only when the corporate legal entity is used as a cloak for fraud or illegality. This is the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Here, Siroy failed to allege that there is a need to pierce the corporate veil of RLI and Solex. Hence, the two companies must be treated as separate entities which are distinct from each other. 34

As regards commissions, the CA ruled that contrary to the NLRC's finding, an examination of the summary of Siroy's monthly commissions which RLI submitted in evidence reveals that it was signed by accounting supervisor Fidela B. Aoay. The summary, accompanied by official invoices, shows that the remaining commissions to be paid by RLI amount only to P110,995.01, with RLI admitting an override amounting to P10,007.88. On the other hand, it is Siroy's claim that she is entitled to P802,372.28 in unpaid commissions which appears to be self-serving as the supporting documents she attached were all prepared by her. 35

Siroy filed a motion for reconsideration, 36 but it was denied by the CA in its October 19, 2012 Resolution. 37 Hence, she filed the present petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in reversing the Decisions of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC because evidence and jurisprudence allegedly prove that:

1. Siroy had rightly and correctly retired under RLI's optional retirement plan; ETHIDa

2. The commissions awarded by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC were correct and should not have been reversed based on the inconclusive and self-serving computation of RLI; and

3. Even assuming that Siroy cannot retire under RLI's retirement plan, she should have been declared to be illegally dismissed from employment. 38

We partially grant the petition.

I.

The Court takes judicial notice of two conflicting decisions rendered by two different divisions of the CA on essentially the same facts but involving two different employees of RLI. The first is the instant assailed Decision rendered by the CA Thirteenth Division, while the other is the Decision 39 in the case of Leni T. Conge v. National Labor Relations Commission, Rudolf Lietz, Inc. and Rudolf J.H. Lietz, CA-G.R. SP No. 118905, rendered by the CA Ninth Division. In the latter case, therein petitioner Conge similarly signified her intention to avail of early retirement under the old retirement plan of RLI, for having reached the age of 56 and allegedly rendered 21 years of service to the company. RLI denied her retirement application on the ground that the old retirement plan was revised to reflect the stipulation of the prevailing RLI Policy of January 1, 1994. 40 It also explained that unlike in the old plan which provided for one-month salary for every year of service, the current plan provides for half-month salary for every year of service but retains all the other provisions of the old retirement plan with regard to length of service and retirement age, i.e., 25 years and 65 years, respectively. The current plan likewise does not provide for an early retirement benefit. 41 As with Siroy, Conge also failed to produce RLI's old retirement plan but presented a copy of the retirement plan of RLI's sister company, Solex. 42

The CA Ninth Division, however, ruled in favor of Conge on two grounds. First, unlike in this case where the CA Thirteenth Division held that the burden of producing and proving RLI's old retirement plan fell on Siroy, the CA Ninth Division held that it was incumbent upon RLI to produce its old retirement plan. Its failure to do so implies that the old retirement plan is the same as the one being implemented by its sister company, Solex. Thus:

If private respondent was disputing the old Retirement Plan relied upon by petitioner, it becomes incumbent upon private respondent to produce the said old version of the retirement plan designed for RLI employees which it claimed to be entirely different from the retirement plan of RLI's sister Company, Solex x x x. Regrettably, private respondent failed to produce this document that could have strengthened its case. Hence, by its very own admission and for failure of private respondent to produce the copy of the old retirement plan of RLI, We are inclined to rule that the old retirement plan referred to by the parties is the same as the Retirement plan implemented by RLI's sister company, SOLEX x x x. 43

Second, the CA Ninth Division held that RLI's new retirement plan was unilaterally formulated by the employer without evidence that it was accepted by the employees. Hence, it cannot be given binding effect, especially where the old retirement plan appears to be more beneficial to the employees than the current one. The non-diminution rule under Article 100 of the Labor Code mandates that benefits given to employees cannot be taken back or reduced unilaterally by the employer because the benefit has become part of the employment contract. The new retirement plan expressly deleted and eradicated the optional/early retirement benefit which was previously enjoyed by the RLI employees under the old plan. To unilaterally withdraw this benefit without the acquiescence of the employees is clearly violative of the principle of non-diminution of benefits as mandated by the New Labor Code. 44 cSEDTC

RLI elevated the Decision of the CA Ninth Division to this Court via a petition for review 45 after its motion for reconsideration was denied. The petition, entitled Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Conge and docketed as G.R. No. 206318, prayed for the setting aside of the August 28, 2012 Decision of the CA Ninth Division and reinstatement of the NLRC Decision which found Conge not entitled to optional retirement pay. 46 However, RLI subsequently filed a motion to withdraw petition on the ground that it has "decided to settle and pay the claim of [Conge] in accordance with the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 28, 2012." 47 The Court granted the motion in a Resolution dated July 3, 2013, and considered the case "closed and terminated." 48 The Resolution became final and executory on September 2, 2013, and was accordingly recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. 49

We have held that when a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by this Court. This doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. 50

Consequently, the Court is bound by the Decision of the CA Ninth Division. Notably, not only has this Decision attained finality, it also reflects RLI's acquiescence to its pronouncements and waiver of its defenses to the claims filed by therein petitioner against it. By withdrawing the petition it filed before this Court and manifesting that it will settle and pay the claim of therein petitioner Conge "in accordance with the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 28, 2012," RLI has thus accepted the CA Ninth Division ruling that the burden of proof lies upon it to produce its old retirement plan. It has also accepted the ruling that the removal of the provision on optional or early retirement from its revised retirement plan violated the principle of non-diminution of benefits provided by the Labor Code.

RLI and Lietz filed their comment 51 on the present petition on April 26, 2013, almost eight months from the date of the CA Ninth Division Decision in Conge. 52 They alleged that jurisprudence has not laid down a rule which sets the minimum period for a benefit to be considered company practice. In fact, Siroy was only able to cite one specific instance of early retirement allegedly allowed by RLI. To be considered company practice, a benefit should be granted to employees at least more than once. Siroy thus cannot claim that RLI violated the principle of non-diminution of benefits given that there is no evidence to show that it was RLI's practice to actually, regularly, and consistently grant the benefit of early retirement to its employees. 53

However, RLI and Lietz cannot now deny or evade the adverse effect on their case and conclusiveness of the Decision in Conge, which has become final and executory by their own acts. Significantly, they did not merely offer or propose a compromise, but instead bound themselves to settle their obligation "in accordance with" the CA Decision. They are now estopped from taking an inconsistent stance in this case.

Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." We have held that estoppel precludes a person who has admitted or made a representation about something as true from denying or disproving it against anyone else relying on his admission or representation. 54

In Vital-Gozon v. Court of Appeals, 55 we held that the general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review, satisfaction being the last act and end of the proceedings, and payment or satisfaction of the obligation thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable discharge; hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces in, and voluntarily complies with, the judgment is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom. 56

We apply the foregoing ruling by analogy and hold that RLI and Lietz, judgment debtors with respect to Conge's retirement benefits, and who acquiesced in and voluntarily expressed willingness to comply with the judgment of the CA Ninth Division, are estopped from raising in this case defenses which have been denied by the said court with finality and which they have waived when they withdrew their appeal for the correction of that judgment.

The consequences of the finality of the Decision of the CA Ninth Division must be upheld. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice. The reason for the rule is that if, on the application of one party, the court could change its judgment to the prejudice of the other, it could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the judgment and continue this practice indefinitely. The equity of a particular case must yield to the overmastering need of certainty and inalterability of judicial pronouncements. 57 SDAaTC

In sum, we uphold the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC, that Siroy is entitled to early retirement benefits.

Siroy agreed to the amount of retirement benefits computed by the Labor Arbiter and invokes the Court to uphold it, even if it is different from her computation. It appearing that the Labor Arbiter's computation is supported by evidence, we uphold the same, subject to the modification that the amount should be adjusted to the percentage provided in the retirement plan of Solex, to wit:

Section 3. Early Retirement Benefit. —

Upon the attainment of at least age 50 with at least 10 years of service, a Participant may retire and shall be entitled to one month's pay per year of service plus one month's salary for every five years of service but reduced in accordance with the following schedule of percentage below:

Years of Service	Percentage of Benefit
xxx                    xxx                    xxx
21	86.66%
22	90.00%
23	93.33%
24	96.66%
25	100.00% 58

 

 

Accordingly, Siroy is entitled to receive the following retirement benefits:

Years of service: March 15, 1985 to December 8, 2008 59 = 23 years

 

Last monthly salary	=	P28,000.00
P28,000 x 23 years	=	P644,000.00
P28,000 x 4 years	=	P112,000.00
		–––––––––––
		P756,000.00
		x 93.33%
		–––––––––––
		P705,574.80

 

We do not agree, however, that RLI and Lietz should be held jointly and severally liable. Unless they have exceeded their authority, corporate officers are, as a general rule, not personally liable for their official acts because a corporation, by legal fiction, has a personality separate and distinct from its officers, stockholders, and members. However, this fictional veil may be pierced whenever the corporate personality is used as a means of perpetuating a fraud or an illegal act, evading an existing obligation, or confusing a legitimate issue. 60 No such circumstances were shown to be present in this case.

II.

On the issue of unpaid commissions, Siroy claims that she is entitled to P802,372.28, 61 while respondents claim that she is only entitled to P110,995.01, plus an override amounting to P10,007.88. 62 We agree with the CA's finding that respondents' computation should be upheld.

An examination of the summary 63 of Siroy's monthly commissions submitted by respondents for the period December 2008 to April 2009 reveals that it was signed by RLI's accounting supervisor, Fidela B. Aoay, over her initials "FBA." 64 The summary was accompanied by official invoices. 65 On the other hand, Siroy's computation of unpaid commissions appears to be self-serving as the supporting documents she attached 66 were all prepared by her. Inasmuch as her computation can easily be concocted or fabricated to suit her personal interest and purpose, Siroy's bare claim that she is entitled to unpaid commissions by simply presenting unsubstantiated documents will not win her judicial approval. 67

Finally, the Labor Arbiter awarded Siroy P5,384.61 representing "refund of cash bond deposit." The CA did not award this claim in its assailed Decision and neither did petitioner raise it in the present petition. There is thus no basis to reinstate this award.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed May 25, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 116614 is PARTIALLY MODIFIED. Rudolf Lietz, Inc. is ORDERED to pay petitioner, Imelda M. Siroy, the following: acEHCD

1. Retirement benefit in the amount of P705,574.80 which shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until full payment;

2. Unpaid commissions in the amount of P110,995.01; and

3. Override in the amount of P10,007.88.

The amounts in nos. 2 and 3 shall earn legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 12, 2009, the date of judicial demand, until June 30, 2013; and 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment.

SO ORDERED." Bersamin, C.J., on official business; Del Castillo, J., designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2632 dated December 28, 2018.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo (G.R. No. 204013), pp. 9-39.

2.Id. at 41-62. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, with Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez, concurring.

3.Id. at 64.

4.Id. at 201-213.

5.Id. at 215-216.

6.Id. at 190.

7.Id.

8.Rollo (G.R. No. 204013), pp. 106-110.

9.Id. at 119.

10.Id. at 111-116.

11.Id. at 118.

12.Id. at 119.

13.Id. at 121.

14.Id. at 122.

15.Id. at 123.

16.Id. at 190.

17.Id. at 190-199.

18.Id. at 198-199.

19.Id. at 196-197.

20.Id. at 197-199.

21.Id. at 202-203.

22.Id. at 203.

23.Supra note 4.

24.Rollo (G.R. No. 204013), p. 212.

25.Id. at 206-207.

26.Id. at 208-210.

27.Id. at 210-211.

28.Id. at 212.

29.Supra note 5.

30.Rollo (G.R. No. 204013), pp. 217-248

31.Supra note 2.

32.Rollo (G.R. No. 204013), p. 62.

33.Id. at 59.

34.Id. at 59-60.

35. Id. at 60-61.

36. Id. at 65-76.

37. Supra note 3.

38. Rollo (G.R. No. 204013), p. 23.

39. Id. at 271A-284.

40. Id. at 272.

41. Id. at 279-280.

42. Id. at 281.

43. Id.

44. Rollo (G.R. No. 204013), pp. 281-282.

45. Rollo (G.R. No. 206318), pp. 9-20.

46. Id. at 191.

47. Id. at 279.

48. Id. at 281.

49. Id. at 286-287.

50. Pinewood Marine (Phils.), Inc. v. EMCO Plywood Corporation, G.R. No. 179789, June 17, 2015, 759 SCRA 22, 40.

51. Rollo (G.R No. 204013), pp. 289-301.

52. The CA Ninth Division promulgated its Decision in Conge on August 28, 2012. Id. at 271A.

53. Id. at 292.

54. Pinausukan Seafood House, Roxas Boulevard, Inc. v. Far East Bank & Trust Company, now Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014, 714 SCRA 226, 246.

55. G.R. No. 101428, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 235.

56. Id. at 256.

57. Tomas v. Criminal Investigation and Detection Group-Anti-Organized Crime Division (CIDG-AOCD), G.R. No. 208090, November 9, 2016, 808 SCRA 334, 351-352.

58. Rollo (G.R. No. 204013), p. 143.

59. Id. at 199. The Labor Arbiter considered the beginning date of Siroy's suspension as the last day of her employment with RLI. However, it appears that Siroy has served RLI until February 10, 2009, the date she was dismissed. The discrepancy in the dates, however, does not affect her years of service for purposes of computing her retirement benefit.

60. SME Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 184517, October 8, 2013, 707 SCRA 35, 60, citing Bogo-Medellin Sugarcane Planters Association, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 97846, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 108, 126.

61. Rollo (G.R. No. 204013), p. 149.

62. Id. at 196.

63. CA rollo, p. 374.

64. Id. at 27.

65. Id. at 375-434.

66. Rollo (G.R. No. 204013), pp. 149-156.

67. See Ropali Trading Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122409, September 25, 1998, 296 SCRA 309, 316.