THIRD DIVISION
[OCA-IPI No. 16-2872-MTJ. March 21, 2018.]
WALLACE SINACA, complainant,vs. HON. WENIFREDO C. CUATON, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, PASTRANA, LEYTE, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedMarch 21, 2018, which reads as follows: cHDAIS
"OCA-IPI No. 16-2872-MTJ (Wallace Sinaca v. Hon. Wenifredo C. Cuaton, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Pastrana, Leyte) — Before this Court is a Verified Complaint 1 filed by Wallace Sinaca (complainant) charging Judge Wenifredo C. Cuaton (respondent), Municipal Trial Court, Pastrana, Leyte (MTC), with gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for the alleged partiality/bias in deciding Criminal Case No. 2012-04-CR-22 and for violation of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC known as the Resolution Providing Guidelines in the Inventory and Adjudication of Cases Assigned to Judges who are Promoted or Transferred to other Branches in the same Court Level of the Judiciary Hierarchy.
The Complaint
Complainant alleged that he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2012-04-CR-22 for serious physical injuries, which was raffled to Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tacloban City, Branch 2 (MTCC-Branch 2), then presided by Judge Wenceslao H. Vanilla (Judge Vanilla), who conducted the arraignment and pre-trial of the case. After his retirement, respondent was designated as Acting Presiding Judge of said branch.
Complainant averred that during the trial on May 3, 2013, respondent disclosed that he was a former lawyer of the father of the private complainant Kristoffer Filemon M. Obejas (Obejas). 2 Believing in good faith that respondent would be fair to the parties in the conduct of the trial, complainant did not move for his recusal in the case. However, over the course of the proceedings, respondent showed bias in favor of Obejas. First, in a Resolution 3 dated September 29, 2014, where respondent denied complainant's motion to present additional witness and documentary evidence because according to respondent, the witnesses and pieces of evidence were limited to those discussed during the pre-trial. Complainant claimed that the Pre-Trial Order 4 dated October 19, 2012, did not contain any stipulation as to said limitation in the number of witnesses. 5 Second, when respondent issued an Order 6 dated November 5, 2014 denying complainant's motion for reconsideration to present additional witnesses and submit judicial affidavit and directed him to formally offer his documentary exhibits with warning that failure to do so would be construed as waiver and the defense shall be deemed to have rested its case. Third, when respondent issued an Order 7 dated December 10, 2014, declaring complainant to have rested his case for failure or refusal to formally offer documentary exhibits, hence, he was only able to present two (2) witnesses. Complainant averred that he was not allowed to testify because of the purported limit in the number of witnesses to be presented. HTcADC
Complainant asserted that on January 13, 2015, Judge Manasseh S. Bastes (Judge Bastes) was appointed and assumed office as Presiding Judge of MTCC-Branch 2. Complainant alleged that despite the appointment of Judge Bastes, respondent still penned the Judgment 8 dated March 30, 2015 finding him guilty of serious physical injuries and Judge Bastes merely promulgated the decision. Complainant claimed that respondent's act of drafting the judgment without requiring the parties to manifest whether or not he should decide the case was in violation of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC 9 and pre-empted the authority of Judge Bastes.
Complainant then filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial prompting Judge Bastes to issue an Order 10 directing the parties to manifest as to whether they wanted respondent to hear and decide the pending incidents, and in the event that there would be a request from either party, the matter would be endorsed to the Court for proper disposition. On July 28, 2015, complainant filed a Compliance 11 praying that Judge Bastes decide the case. Consequently, Judge Bastes wrote a Letter 12 dated August 11, 2015, addressed to Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez, seeking guidance as to who between him and respondent should decide the pending incidents relative to Criminal Case No. 2012-04-CR-22.
Pursuant to the Memorandum 13 issued by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through then Deputy Court Administrator Thelma C. Bahia (DCA Bahia), respondent acted on the pending incidents relative to the criminal case. Complainant claimed that when respondent resolved the pending incidents relative to Criminal Case No. 2012-04-CR-22, he brought the records of the case to the MTC which was in violation of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC. 14
Complainant further related that he secured the services of a new counsel who filed an Entry of Appearance and Motion for Inhibition of Respondent. 15 On the January 15, 2016 hearing of the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial, and the motion for inhibition, complainant averred that respondent directed him to terminate the services of his counsel. Complainant alleged that the statement made by respondent during the January 15, 2016 trial was contrary to those indicated in the April 24, 2016 omnibus order, 16 where respondent stated: "In their separate but similarly worded notices of withdrawal as counsels, Atty. Octa, Atty. Didulo and Atty. Manibay lied that it was the undersigned Judge who ordered them to withdraw as counsels for the accused which is not a valid reason for the withdrawal. . ." 17 In the same order, respondent denied the motion for inhibition explaining that he was directed by DCA Bahia to decide the case, and held that the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was submitted for resolution.
Complainant alleged that the OCA was not apprised that the parties were not told to manifest on record the judge they prefer to decide the case prior to the judgment, 18 was not informed that respondent was a former counsel of the victim's father and that complainant had requested that the case be tried by the newly-appointed judge, Judge Bastes. He maintained that if only respondent observed the guidelines in A.M. No. 04-5-14-SC, there would have been no need to refer the matter to the OCA because the objection of complainant or his manifestation that he wanted Judge Bastes to decide the case was already sufficient to divest him of the authority to decide the pending incidents.
Lastly, complainant contended that when respondent denied the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial and modified the award for damages in a Resolution 19 dated July 4, 2016, respondent's actuations resulted to a violation of his right to due process because he was not able to testify and his case was not tried and decided by an impartial judge. Complainant insisted that respondent had no more authority to decide the case after Judge Bastes had assumed office as the new presiding judge.
Respondent's Comment
On the charges of impropriety and partiality, respondent explained that the trial in Criminal Case No. 2012-14-CR-22 resumed on May 3, 2013 for the continuation of the presentation of prosecution's evidence. On the same date, respondent disclosed in open court that he once acted as a counsel of Mr. Felimon Obejas (Felimon), the father of private complainant in the criminal case, before he was appointed as an MTC judge in June 2016 but after the termination of Felimon's case, there was no more contact between him and Felimon; and that the disclosure was made to allow complainant to raise at the earliest opportunity the issue and move for the voluntary inhibition of respondent should complainant feel the need to do so. Complainant, however, had no issue against respondent's conduct of the trial which lasted for more than two (2) years. 20
Respondent emphasized that there was no manifestation on the part of complainant that he would testify as an accused because his counsel failed to include him in the list of additional witnesses. There was also no judicial affidavit submitted under the New Judicial Affidavit Rule. Thus, complainant's counsels were the ones responsible for his not being able to testify.
With respect to the Pre-Trial Order, 21 respondent countered that there were neither documentary exhibits marked for the accused nor was complainant listed or identified as among the defense witnesses. To respondent, the pre-trial order was made in accordance with A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC or the Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition and Discovery Measures. The same requires that all evidence must be identified during pre-trial, and no evidence shall be presented without being marked and identified during the pre-trial unless allowed by the court for good cause shown. Further, since the same pre-trial order reminded the prosecution and defense that effective January 1, 2013, the use of judicial affidavit will be mandatory for cases within the jurisdiction of the municipal and city courts, the accused was given the opportunity to be heard with the granting of the motion for admission of the judicial affidavits of two (2) of the accused's witnesses.
Respondent averred that the verified complaint was bereft of merit and should be dismissed as it was not supported by sufficient evidence and that it was complainant's counsels who caused all the mishaps relating to the case. After his counsels filed two (2) judicial affidavits, one of the counsels never again appeared in subsequent hearings and the other counsels failed to substantiate the motion for presentation of additional witnesses when he filed the motion for reconsideration on the denial of his earlier motion. Moreover, the resolution denying the motion for presentation of additional witnesses was elevated on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which was denied in an Order 22 dated May 15, 2015 issued by Judge Alphinor C. Serrano, Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 6 (RTC).
Respondent acknowledged that he penned the March 30, 2015 judgment finding complainant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for serious physical injuries. According to him, the decision was made in good faith and it was rendered in the honest belief that he still had the duty to finish the case within the required ninety (90)-day period since there was no formal notice of appointment of a regular judge as of said date. It was only on July 2, 2015, that respondent was apprised of the promulgation of the judgment by Judge Bastes, after receiving the October 13, 2015 Memorandum 23 of DCA Bahia, directing him to resolve the motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. aScITE
Further, respondent stated that complainant previously moved to hold in abeyance the promulgation of the judgment but it was denied by Judge Bastes for violating the three (3)-day notice rule. There was also no temporary restraining order (TRO) issued by RTC which took cognizance of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 involving the case.
Respondent reiterated that Judge Bastes issued an order asking the parties to submit their respective manifestations whether or not to require him, as the previously assigned acting presiding judge of MTCC Branch 2, to decide the motion for reconsideration of the decision.
On the alleged violation of the prohibition to bring case records outside of court, respondent admitted that he borrowed the records of Criminal Case No. 2012-14-CR-22 from the Clerk of Court and brought the records with him to the MTC, his permanent station, which he deemed necessary and justified to enable him to comply with the memorandum of DCA Bahia. Moreover, he emphasized that MTCC Branch 2 was then temporarily stationed in a rented classroom-type building, with limited space to work, since their old building was damaged by super typhoon "Yolanda."
Lastly, on the alleged violation of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, respondent claimed that he penned the decision in Criminal Case No. 2012-14-CR-22 because he only learned of the appointment of a regular judge for MTCC Branch 2 sometime in February 2015 by word of mouth. Since then, respondent desisted from conducting all proceedings pertaining to said court. However, he admitted that he was not aware of item no. 5 of the same administrative matter when he continued to decide the case in an honest belief that it was still his duty, being the presiding judge who heard the case in its entirety. Respondent laid emphasis that he had no knowledge that Judge Bastes had already assumed his post and started to perform judicial functions. He also asserted that the instant complaint was mere harassment or revenge on the part of complainant who regards himself as an aggrieved accused.
The OCA Recommendation
In its Report 24 dated January 8, 2018, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint as it was baseless, malicious and unmeritorious.
It stated that judges are allowed reasonable latitude in the disposition of a case, allowing him to decide based on his appreciation of facts and understanding of the applicable law on the matter. If any error is committed, it is an error of judgment for which a judge may not be held administratively liable in the absence of any showing of bad faith, malice, or corrupt practice.
The OCA further found that complainant failed to prove any ill motive on the part of respondent. It noted the failure of complainant to fully substantiate his allegation against respondent, as the court records in the criminal case do not indicate grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Moreover, the OCA emphasized that complainant's arguments are better threshed out in a judicial process such as appeal or certiorari.
The Court's Ruling
The Court adopts and accepts the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment and must also have a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of the public officer's official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to discharge the duties of the office. 25 On the other hand, acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office. 26
A judge must be allowed reasonable latitude for the operation of his own individual view of the case, his appreciation of the facts, and his understanding of the applicable law on the matter. 27 In this case, respondent's act of rendering judgment against complainant in Criminal Case No. 2012-04-CR-22 was not tainted with partiality or bias. Thus, respondent cannot be held guilty of gross misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service without supporting evidence.
In De la Cruz v. Concepcion, 28 the Court held that no one, called upon to try facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice, can be infallible in his judgment. All that is expected of him is that he follow the rules prescribed to ensure a fair and impartial hearing, assess the different factors that emerge therefrom and bear on the issues presented, and on the basis of the conclusions he finds established, with only his conscience and knowledge of the law to guide him, adjudicate the case accordingly. 29
In the case at bench, complainant failed to substantiate his allegations against respondent. No bad faith can be attributed to respondent's act of rendering the judgment in the criminal case. It must be emphasized that respondent made an open court disclosure that he was the counsel in a civil suit of the father's victim several years ago. However, the complainant together with his defense counsel did not manifest or file a motion for inhibition and allowed respondent to continue the conduct of trial. Complainant had no issue against the conduct of the trial by respondent, which lasted for more than two (2) years.
Moreover, the alleged partiality of the respondent has not been proven because of the following reasons:
First, complainant had been given sufficient opportunity to be heard but his counsel only presented the judicial affidavits of his two (2) witnesses. Glaringly, complainant's counsel never manifested or reserved the submission of additional affidavits. Respondent's denial of complainant's motion to present additional witnesses and judicial affidavits is valid because no evidence shall be allowed and offered during trial other than those identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial. As correctly held by respondent, the pre-trial order binds the parties and controls the course of the action during trial, 30 and matters not taken up should have been raised by the parties concerned and their objections should have been interposed as soon as the pre-trial order was issued.
The OCA added that complainant's counsel did not even substantiate his motion to present additional witness even though such motion was belatedly raised. Thus, respondent is correct in ruling that complainant could no longer present additional witnesses who are not named or identified in the pre-trial order. The resolution denying the motion for presentation of additional witnesses was even elevated on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which was denied in an Order 31 dated May 15, 2015 issued by the RTC.
Second, respondent's denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration in the November 5, 2014 Order was also proper because it was filed out of time. Notably, complainant's counsel personally received a copy of the resolution on October 14, 2014 but said motion was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period.
Third, complainant failed to file a formal offer of evidence even though he was given a period of five (5) days to comply from the hearing on November 19, 2014. As a result, respondent issued the December 10, 2014 order wherein complainant was held to have waived his right to formally offer documentary exhibits and the case submitted for decision. 32 These circumstances do not exhibit partiality on the part of the respondent as he merely exercised his judicial discretion in accordance with the rules. HEITAD
Lastly, anent the issue on the violation of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Del Castillo, 33 it was held:
We take this opportunity to remind trial judges that once they act as presiding judges or otherwise designated as acting/assisting judges in branches other than their own, cases substantially heard by them and submitted to them for decision, unless they are promoted to higher positions in the judicial ladder, may be decided by them wherever they may be if so requested by any of the parties and endorsed by the incumbent Presiding Judges through the Office of the Court Administrator. The following procedure may be followed: First, the Judge who takes over the branch must immediately make an inventory of the cases submitted for decision left behind by the previous judge (unless the latter has in the meantime been promoted to a higher court). Second, the succeeding judge must then inform the parties that the previous judge who heard the case, at least substantially, and before whom it was submitted for decision, may be required to decide the case. In this event, and upon request of any of the parties, the succeeding judge may request the Court Administrator to formally endorse the case for decision to the judge before whom it was previously submitted for decision. Third, after the judge who previously heard the case is through with his decision, he should send back the records together with his decision to the branch to which the case properly belongs, by registered mail or by personal delivery, whichever is more feasible, for recording and promulgation, with notice of such fact to the Court Administrator. 34
In this case, no formal notice was given to respondent regarding the appointment of the new Presiding Judge Bastes, and no inventory of the cases was made. To emphasize, the parties were also not directed to manifest their choice of judge who should decide the criminal case prior to the March 30, 2015 judgment. Respondent penned the said judgment in good faith and with the honest belief that he still had the duty to finish the case within the required ninety (90)-day period since there was no formal notice of appointment of a regular judge as of said date. It was only on July 2, 2015, that respondent was apprised of the promulgation of the judgment by Judge Bastes, only after receiving the October 13, 2015 Memorandum 35 of DCA Bahia. Respondent's act was in accordance with the pertinent provisions of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC 36viz.:
1. All judges are enjoined to exercise judicial functions and responsibilities in accordance with the constitutional mandate of speedy disposition of cases, the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the need to prevent clogging of court dockets, always keeping in mind that, in the event of their transfer, detail or assignment to other branches of the same court within or outside the judicial region to which they have been appointed, or of other promotion to a higher court, they shall have decided all cases raffled to the them that are submitted for decision.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Should any case be left undecided by the transferred/detailed/assigned judge, the judge conducting the inventory shall cause the issuance to the parties of a notice of transfer/detail/assignment of the judge to which the case has been assigned, with a directive for the plaintiff/s to manifest, within five (5) days from receipt of such notice, whether or not he/she desires that the transferred judge should decide the case. The desire of the plaintiff, who may opt to have the case decided by the new judge, shall be respected. However, should the defendant oppose the manifestation of the plaintiff, the new judge shall resolve the matter in accordance with these Guidelines. Should the plaintiff fail to submit such manifestation within the said 5-day period, the presumption is that he/she desires that the case be decided by the transferred judge.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Should a motion for reconsideration of the decision or for new trial be filed by any party, the transferred judge shall resolve the same. However, if a motion for new trial is granted by the transferred judge, the new judge shall preside over the same, resolve the motion, and see to its final disposition. x x x (emphases and underscoring supplied)
The foregoing guidelines indicate that in case of transfer/detail/assignment, the transferred judge should decide the cases submitted for decision. The case had already been submitted for decision on December 10, 2014. Accordingly, respondent had the authority to render the judgment, notwithstanding Judge Bastes' appointment on January 13, 2015 because he was not notified of the said appointment. Also, as held in Chua v. People37 to wit:
Undoubtedly, the judge of the paired court serves as acting judge only until the appointment and assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge. Clearly, the acting judge may no longer promulgate decisions when the regular judge has already assumed the position. Circular No. 5-98[,38] however, provides an exception, i.e., the acting judge, despite the assumption to duty of the regular judge or the designation of an acting presiding judge, shall decide cases which are already submitted for decision at the time of the latter's assumption or designation. 39 (emphases supplied)
Complainants' allegation that — respondents' act of bringing the records of the criminal case outside of court was considered another violation of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC — is misplaced. Section 7 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC specifically provides that it is the transferred judge, or respondent, who should resolve the motion for reconsideration or new trial filed by the party. Also, a Memorandum 40 dated October 13, 2015 was issued by DCA Bahia, directing respondent to resolve the motion for reconsideration of the judgment in the criminal case. Thus, respondent properly acted on the pending incident, bringing with him the records of the criminal case as shown in the January 11, 2016 Certification 41 issued by the Branch Clerk of Court of MTCC Branch 2. Verily, there was no violation on the part of the respondent as he merely acted in accordance with the memorandum in order to decide on complainant's motion for reconsideration.
From the foregoing, it has been established that respondent acted with regularity and good faith in the performance of his judicial functions, rendering the administrative complaint groundless. To emphasize, a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering an unjust judgment will not prosper against a judge acting in good faith. Absent the element of bad faith, an erroneous judgment cannot be the basis of a charge for any said offenses, mere error of judgment not being a ground for disciplinary proceedings. 42
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent Hon. Wenifredo C. Cuaton, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court of Pastrana, Leyte is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. (Leonen, J.,on official leave.) ATICcS
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 3-10.
2.Id. at 132.
3.Id. at 14-15.
4.Id. at 16.
5.Id. at 4.
6.Id. at 17.
7.Id. at 18.
8.Id. at 19-30.
9.Resolution Providing Guidelines in the Inventory and Adjudication of Cases Assigned to Judges who are Promoted or Transferred to other Branches in the same Court Level of the Judiciary Hierarchy.
10.Rollo, p. 31.
11.Id. at 32.
12.Id. at 102.
13.Id. at 101.
14. 5. Should any case be left undecided by the transferred/detailed/assigned judge, the judge conducting the inventory shall cause the issuance to the parties of a notice of transfer/detail/assignment of the judge to which the case had been assigned, with a directive for the plaintiff/s to manifest, within five (5) days from receipt of such notice, whether or not he/she desires that the transferred judge should decide the case. The desire of the plaintiff, who may opt to have the case decided by the new judge, shall be respected. However, should the defendant oppose the manifestation of the plaintiff, the new judge shall resolve the matter in accordance with these Guidelines. Should the plaintiff fail to submit such manifestation within the said 5-day period, the presumption is that he/she desires that the case be decided by the transferred judge.
15.Rollo, pp. 36-38.
16.Id. at 70-75.
17.Id. at 72.
18.Id. at 19-30.
19.Id. at 76-82.
20. Comment, pp. 86-94.
21.Id. at 96.
22.Id. at 99-100.
23.Supra note 13.
24.Rollo, pp. 148-153.
25.Judge Lagado, et al. v. Leonido, 741 Phil. 102, 106 (2014).
26.Avenido v. Civil Service Commission, 576 Phil. 654-662 (2008).
27.De la Cruz v. Judge Concepcion, 305 Phil. 649, 661 (1994).
28.Id.
29.Id. at 661; citing Vda. De Zabala v. Pamaran, 148-A Phil. 371, 373 (1971).
30. Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
31.Rollo, pp. 99-100.
32.Id. at 18.
33. 601 Phil. 325 (2009).
34.Id. at 333.
35.Supra note 13.
36.Supra note 9.
37. G.R. No. 195248, November 22, 2017.
38. 2. However, cases submitted for decision and those that passed the trial stage, i.e., where all the parties have finished presenting their evidence before such Acting/Assisting Judge at the time of the assumption of the Presiding Judge or the designated Acting Presiding Judge shall be decided by the former. This authority shall include resolutions of motions for reconsideration and motions for new trial thereafter filed. But if a new trial is granted, the Presiding Judge thereafter appointed or designated shall preside over the new trial until it is terminated and shall decide the same.
39.Supra note 37.
40. Supra note 13.
41. Rollo, p. 35.
42. Padilla v. Asuncion, 547 Phil. 418, 439 (2007), citing Guerrero v. Villamor, 357 Phil. 90, 100 (1998).