Simon Apparel, Inc. v. Republic

G.R. No. 190433 (Notice)

This is a civil case, Simon Apparel, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, concerning the application for original registration of title over a parcel of land. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner's application. The Court held that petitioner failed to prove that the land is alienable and disposable, as the certifications from DENR-CENRO are insufficient. Moreover, petitioner failed to establish that petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, as required by law. The Court noted that the testimonies of the witnesses and the tax declarations presented were not sufficient to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the land.

ADVERTISEMENT

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 190433. June 6, 2019.]

SIMON APPAREL, INC., petitioner, vs.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated June 6, 2019which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 190433 (Simon Apparel, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines). — We AFFIRM the Decision 1 dated November 20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 91884 denying petitioner's application for original registration of title over a parcel of land.

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tanauan City, Batangas an application for registration of title 2 over a 10,181-square meter parcel of land 3 located at Barangay San Vicente, Santo Tomas, Batangas. Petitioner alleged that it acquired the property through a deed of absolute sale it executed with the heirs of Reynaldo Torres, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Winston Gabriel M. Torres. 4

On October 1, 2001, the RTC remanded the case to the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Santo Tomas, Batangas, which has delegated jurisdiction to hear and decide cadastral and land registration cases. 5

During trial, petitioner offered the testimonies of Winston Gabriel M. Torres (Reynaldo Torres' nephew), Quiterio Quiatchon (caretaker of the property), Evangeline M. Torres (Artemio Torres' daughter), and Rosita Torres Caldo (a resident of Barangay San Vicente) to prove that Artemio Torres was the owner of the property since 1945 and that, afterwards, Reynaldo Torres, Artemio Torres' son, came into possession of the property through succession upon his father's death. The heirs of Reynaldo Torres, in turn, sold the property to petitioner. 6

On May 27, 2008, the MTC of Santo Tomas, Batangas in its Decision 7 granted petitioner's application for registration of title. It found that the petitioner has shown a clear registrable title over the property, having sufficiently complied with the requisites for filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree 8 (P.D. 1529).

The dispositive portion of the MTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General Default, the Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 1 of the consolidation/subdivision plan Ccs-04-001872-D, being a portion of the consolidation of Lots 3493, 3494 and 12189, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, containing an area of Ten Thousand One Hundred Eighty One (10,181) square meters, situated in the Barangay of San Vicente, Municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas, in favor of and in the name of Simon Apparel, Inc. with business address at Barangay San Vicente, Sto. Tomas, Batangas. CAIHTE

Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be issued.

SO ORDERED. 9

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed to the CA on the ground that Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 should be read in conjunction with Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease. 10

On November 20, 2009, the CA rendered a Decision 11 granting the appeal. For the CA, the trial court erred in granting the application for original registration, not on the basis of the constitutional proscription against private corporations' ownership of lands but for petitioner's failure to prove that its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

In this petition, 12 petitioner argues that it has sufficiently proven that petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the property since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

We DENY the petition.

Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529 states:

Sec. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxx xxx xxx

For registration under Section 14 (1) to prosper, the applicant for original registration of title to land must establish the following: (1) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof; and (3) that the possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 13

On the first requisite, that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, petitioner presented certifications 14 from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO), Region IV, Batangas, stating that the land has been verified to be within the alienable and disposable zone and that the land is not covered by any kind of public land application or patent.

These certifications are insufficient to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 15 we held that it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:

x x x The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the application for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. x x x 16

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by: (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. 17

In the absence of a copy of the original land classification covering the land, petitioner failed to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land. This is true even if the Republic failed to refute the contents of the certifications during the trial or raise as an error the absence of the original land classification in its appeal. In land registration proceedings, it is the applicant who bears the burden of proving that the land applied for registration is alienable and disposable. 18

On the second and third requirements, the CA correctly held that petitioner failed to establish that petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

It is explicit under Section 14 (1) that the possession and occupation required over the land must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious. The intent behind the use of "possession" in conjunction with "occupation" is to emphasize the need for actual and not just constructive or fictional possession. 19 DETACa

We agree with the CA that the testimonies of Winston Gabriel M. Torres and Quiterio Quiatchon cannot be used to prove possession of the land in the concept of an owner as early as 1945 because they only knew of the property in 1946 and 1952, respectively.

The testimony of Evangeline M. Torres likewise fails to prove the required possession under the law. While Evangeline was already 15 years old in 1945, her testimony reflected that it was Artemio Torres and Company, Incorporated which owned the land and not Artemio Torres. She could not recall when the property was transferred from her father, Artemio Torres, to the family corporation. Evangeline also could not recall how the land was allegedly transferred from her father to her brother, Reynaldo Torres, and what happened to the property afterwards. 20

Rosita Torres Caldo's testimony also does not prove that Artemio Torres' possession over the property was open, continuous, exclusive and notorious. While she claimed that Artemio Torres' possession started prior to 1945, her testimony failed to show that it was Artemio Torres who solely exercised possession and not the family corporation. More, the existence of plants and fruit-bearing trees on the property, without any evidence that it was Artemio Torres who planted them, that actual cultivation or harvesting was made and that other acts of occupation and ownership were undertaken, does not constitute well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of actual possession and occupation. 21

Similarly, the tax declarations are insufficient to prove possession. Despite a claim of possession and occupation for more than 61 years, petitioner submitted tax declarations covering the land (and portions thereof) for only 21 years: 1955, 1957-1961, 1965, 1968, 1969, 1973, 1974, 1976, 1981, 1990, 1991, 1995-1997, 2000, 2005 and 2006. 22 This type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation. In any event, in the absence of other competent evidence, tax declarations do not conclusively establish either possession or declarant's right to registration of title. 23

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91884 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." Carandang, J., on official leave.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 25-35; penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon (now retired) concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (now a member of the Court) and Ricardo R. Rosario (Special Third Division).

2. Records, pp. 1-2, 38-41.

3.Id. at 7.

4.Id. at 1, 5-6, 39.

5.Id. at 23.

6.Rollo, p. 27.

7.Id. at 37-40.

8. Amending and Codifying the Laws Relative to Registration of Property and for Other Purposes.

9.Id. at 40.

10. CA rollo, pp. 27-39.

11.Supra note 1.

12.Rollo, pp. 8-23.

13.Espiritu, Jr. v. Republic, G.R. No. 219070, June 21, 2017, 828 SCRA 77, 88.

14. Records, pp. 173-174.

15. G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477.

16.Id. at 489.

17.Republic v. Bautista, G.R. No. 211664, November 12, 2018.

18.Id.

19.Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, G.R. No. 186961, February 20, 2012, 666 SCRA 401, 419, citing Republic v. Alconaba, G.R. No. 155012, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 611.

20. Transcript of the Stenographic Notes, September 8, 2004, pp. 5-8.

21. See Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, supra note 19. See also Republic v. Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 198585, July 2, 2012, 675 SCRA 439.

22. Records, pp. 178-212.

23.Wee v. Republic, G.R. No. 177384, December 8, 2009, 608 SCRA 72, 83.

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