SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 220694. November 29, 2017.]
SHOP MORE DEPARTMENT STORE, INC. AND CARMELITA CRUZ, petitioners,vs. ARLENE L. BISLUMBRE, MARIDEL M. ABELITA, GENEPHINE M. VICTORIA AND ALDRINA R. DE LEON, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Second Division, issued a Resolution dated 29 November 2017 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 220694 (Shop More Department Store, Inc. and Carmelita Cruz v. Arlene L. Bislumbre, Maridel M. Abelita, Genephine M. Victoria and Aldrina R. De Leon). — Petitioner Shop More Department Store, Inc., represented by its President, Carmelita Cruz, employed respondents as department heads and supervisors of its department store. On January 10, 2010, however, their services were terminated. 1 On the one hand, petitioner claims that due to the continuous deterioration of its business, it made an offer to respondents that by reason of their separation from the corporation, they would be paid severance pay. The amounts of said pay, however, were rejected by respondents, who, without any notice or letter of resignation, suddenly no longer reported for work. 2 Cruz was later surprised to learn that on April 8, 2010, respondents had already filed complaints for illegal dismissal. 3 On the other hand, respondents claim that Cruz ordered them to stop reporting to work because of some unfounded belief that they have been peddling lies and rumours behind her back. 4
On April 29, 2011, the Labor Arbiter (LA) found petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered the payment of respondents' backwages, separation pay, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. 5 It gave credence to respondents' allegations that they were told not to work anymore as they have already been terminated and would be paid their separation pay should they only file their resignation papers. Moreover, petitioner failed to show that it served respondents the written notices of termination required by law. 6 In its Resolutions dated January 16, 2012 and February 29, 2012, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the ruling of the LA.
Petitioner appealed the case before the Court of Appeals (CA) in its Petition for Certiorari dated May 16, 2012. Meanwhile, respondents filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, which was granted by the NLRC on June 22, 2012. Consequently, a Writ of Execution was issued on July 9, 2012. Thereafter, on August 23, 2012, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order before the CA praying that the LA and the NLRC be ordered to cease and desist from implementing their decisions granting the awards to respondents. Nevertheless, the LA, acting upon the Sheriff's progress report and respondents' motion to release, issued an Order dated September 11, 2012, ordering the Manager/Cashier of the CAP General Insurance Corporation to release to respondents the garnished amount. On February 5, 2013, the Sheriff issued a Notice of Garnishment to the Manager/Cashier of PBCOM, Imus Branch, Cavite. Thereafter, on April 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Notice of Garnishment and Writ of Execution. 7 CAacTH
Acting on petitioner's petition for certiorari, the CA rendered its Decision dated May 29, 2013 affirming the findings of the LA and the NLRC. It further denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated September 27, 2013. Subsequently, on January 15, 2014, the Court issued a Resolution affirming the appellate court's ruling for failure to show that the CA committed any reversible error. 8 On even date, the LA denied petitioner's Motion to Quash and granted respondents' Motion to Release, ruling that the execution of a final and executory decision of the NLRC shall proceed despite the pendency of a petition for certiorari, unless it is restrained by the proper court. Thus, since there is no Temporary Restraining Order or Permanent Injunction from the CA or the Court, the release of the garnished amount is in order. 9
On January 28, 2014, petitioner appealed to the NLRC on the ground that the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment are premature having been issued despite the fact that the case has not yet attained finality. 10 On April 4, 2014, however, the Court issued an Entry of Judgment certifying that its January 15, 2014 Resolution has become final and executory and is recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment. 11 Thereafter, the NLRC, in its Decision dated April 16, 2014, denied petitioner's appeal finding no legal basis to grant the prayer for issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction. On appeal, the CA dismissed petitioner's action under the principle of res judicata due to the fact that the issue sought to be resolved, particularly whether the NLRC erred in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash and granting respondents' Motion to Release, has already been final and executory as evidenced by the Court's Entry of Judgment. 12
On November 23, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that there was an erroneous implementation of the Writ of Garnishment and that petitioner Carmelita Cruz should not be held liable in her personal capacity as officer of the corporation. According to petitioner, the Sheriff acted in excess of his authority in adamantly serving the Notice of Garnishment upon petitioner's accounts in PBCom, Marikina Branch, when said notice was clearly addressed to the branch manager of PBCom, Imus Branch. Hence, there is no legal directive for said branch to follow said order. Moreover, petitioner maintains that the Sheriff should first demand payment in cash from the losing party, and in the event of his failure or refusal, from the surety bond or cash deposit. Only when the cash or surety is found insufficient or the surety cannot be proceeded against for any reason may the Sheriff proceed against the bank deposits of petitioner. 13 Furthermore, petitioner asserts that Cruz, as president of the corporation, should not be held personally liable for the monetary claims against the corporation in view of established jurisprudence mandating that in the absence of any showing that the corporate officer acted with evident malice and bad faith in terminating the employee's service, there is no personal liability incurred. 14
The petition is partly meritorious.
In alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sheriff in his execution of the Writ of Garnishment, petitioner failed to present any proof whatsoever that would support its claims. A review of the petition clearly reveals that petitioner merely asserts that "judging from the evident lack of documents presented or filed by the Sheriff to show that he complied with the rules of procedure, it is apparent that the Sheriff did not faithfully follow and observe the directive stated in the Writ of Execution and the NLRC Rules of Procedure." 15 The Court, however, finds that this can hardly suffice as sufficient evidence. It is settled in law and jurisprudence that mere allegation and speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to proof. 16 Unfortunately for petitioner, while it went to great lengths at discussing the legal basis for its accusations, it failed to sufficiently provide the necessary proof that the Sheriff was guilty of the same. Lest it not be forgotten that the sheriff enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of the functions of his office. 17 In the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, said presumption prevails and cannot simply be overcome by bare and self-serving allegations. 18
Cruz, however, as president of the corporation, must not be held personally liable for the claims against Shop More Department Store, Inc. As a general rule, corporate officers are not held solidarily liable with the corporation for separation pay because the corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. 19 Obligations incurred as a result of the acts of the directors and officers as the corporate agents are not their personal liability but the direct responsibility of the corporation they represent. To hold a director or officer personally liable for corporate obligations, the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must allege that the director or officer assented to the patently unlawful acts of the corporation, or that the director or officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith; and (2) there must be proof that the director or officer acted in bad faith. 20 In the instant case, respondents failed to allege in their complaint that Cruz assented to the patently unlawful acts of the Shop More Department Store, Inc. or that she was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith. Neither did they present sufficient proof of the same. She cannot, therefore, be held personally liable for the monetary claims against Shop More Department Store, Inc.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner Shop More Department Store, Inc. shall be solely liable to respondents Arlene L. Bislumbre, Maridel M. Abelita, Genephine M. Victoria and Aldrina R. De Leon for the total monetary awards and their corresponding interests.
SO ORDERED." IAETDc
Very truly yours,
MA. LOURDES C. PERFECTODivision Clerk of Court
By:
(SGD.) TERESITA AQUINO TUAZONDeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, p. 329.
2.Id. at 16-17.
3.Id. at 18.
4.Id. at 211.
5.Id. at 211-212.
6.Id. at 211.
7.Id. at 37.
8.Id. at 38.
9.Id. at 129.
10.Id. at 38.
11.Id. at 39.
12.Id. at 40.
13.Id. at 21-25.
14.Id. at 26.
15.Id. at 25.
16.Miro v. Vda. de Erederos, 721 Phil. 773, 785 (2013).
17.Spouses Tagle v. Court of Appeals, 609 Phil. 741, 749 (2009).
18.Id.
19.Lozada v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 196134, October 12, 2016.
20.Id.