THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 214305. February 19, 2018.]
JONATHAN SERRANO AND JEANETTE ANGKICO, petitioners, vs. SEE ENG HUY, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated February 19, 2018, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 214305(Jonathan Serrano and Jeanette Angkico v. See Eng Huy) — This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to reverse and set aside the June 19, 2014 Decision 2 and September 11, 2014 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132921. The CA affirmed the July 1, 2013 4 and September 23, 2013 5 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC Branch 152) dismissing petitioner's motion to dismiss and to quash the information.
The Antecedents
Spouses Angelico and Arleen Jocelyn Maskariño (spouses Maskariño) obtained a loan in the amount of Seven Million Pesos (P7,000,000.00) from respondent See Eng Huy (respondent). Allegedly, spouses Maskariño misrepresented that they owned the condominium unit they offered as security for the said loan; and the misrepresentation was made with the assistance of several corporate officers, namely: Andrew Tan (Tan), the President; Jonathan Serrano (Serrano), the Assistant Manager; and Jeanette Angkico (Angkico), the Chief Accountant of Megaworld Globus Asis, Inc. (Megaworld), the owner-developer of the condominium building. Respondent averred that he was given assurance, both verbal and written, that spouses Maskariño were the owners of said condominium unit, without divulging that said ownership was predicated upon a Deed of Assignment dated September 6, 2001 executed by the real owner of the condominium unit, Amerop Philippines, Inc. (Amerop) in favor of spouses Maskariño. aICcHA
In August 2001, the parties had a meeting wherein spouses Maskariño explained to respondent that, although the condominium unit had been fully paid, the certificate of title was still in the name of Megaworld for its non-payment of capital gains tax and transfer tax due to lack of funds.
On October 12, 2001, respondent released the money to spouses Maskariño after the latter's execution of a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over said condominium unit and upon issuance of post-dated checks. The said checks were, however, dishonored by the drawee bank upon presentment for payment. The checks were then replaced by Angelico Maskariño, but the same were also dishonored, either for reason "account closed" or "insufficient funds." Respondent sent letters of demand but were left unheeded; hence, he filed a complaint for estafa against spouses Maskariño, Tan, Serrano, and Angkico, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City (OCP).
In a Resolution 6 dated February 10, 2003, the OCP found probable cause to indict spouses Maskariño, Tan, Serrano, and Angkico with the crime of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). On March 10, 2003, Tan, Serrano, and Angkico moved for reconsideration 7 of the said resolution with motion to suspend proceedings. They likewise filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings with Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or Suspend their Implementation 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 68 (RTC Branch 68) considering that an information had already been filed against them docketed as Criminal Case No. 125230.
In its Order 9 dated April 2, 2003, the RTC Branch 68 granted the motion and suspended the proceedings pending the OCP's resolution of the motion for reconsideration.
On July 4, 2003, the OCP issued a Resolution 10 denying the motion for reconsideration. Consequently, Tan, Serrano, and Angkico filed a petition for review 11 before the Department of Justice (DOJ) praying for the setting aside of the July 4, 2003 resolution of the OCP and the dismissal of the complaint against them.
In view thereof, the RTC Branch 68 issued an Order 12 dated August 12, 2003 suspending the proceedings for sixty (60) days to give the DOJ opportunity to resolve the petition. On February 17, 2004, the RTC Branch 68 issued an Order 13 extending the suspension for sixty (60) days, which was again extended for another forty-five (45) days, in its Order 14 dated April 16, 2004. EHaASD
On May 14, 2004, the DOJ issued a Resolution 15 modifying the resolution of the OCP and directing the withdrawal of the Information against Tan for insufficiency of evidence. A Motion for Reconsideration 16 was then filed by respondent but it was denied by the DOJ in its Resolution 17 dated September 7, 2005. In the meantime, the motion to withdraw the information against Tan was granted by the RTC Branch 68 in its Order 18 dated September 9, 2004.
Parenthetically, on July 25, 2005, Criminal Case No. 125230 was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 152. 19
Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari 20 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 91712, assailing the DOJ resolution dated September 7, 2005, which directed the City Prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the Information against Tan for insufficiency of evidence. The petition, however, was dismissed in a Decision 21 dated November 4, 2008. The decision became final and executory on June 25, 2009 and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment. 22
After four (4) years from the finality of the CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 91712, the RTC Branch 152 issued a Notice/Subpoena 23 dated February 13, 2013, setting the arraignment and pre-trial of petitioners Serrano and Angkico (petitioners) on April 29, 2013. Upon Motion, 24 warrants of arrest were issued against them, but these were recalled following the posting of bail. 25 Petitioners then filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Information 26 based on the following grounds: (1) the inordinate delay resulted in the violation of their constitutional right to speedy trial; (2) the facts stated in the information were insufficient to constitute an offense; and (3) that the court does not have jurisdiction over the offense charged.
The RTC Branch 152 Orders
In its Order 27 dated July 1, 2013, the RTC Branch 152 denied the motion and explained that the delay was not intentional as the case was inadvertently archived when the court transferred to its new office in Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Pasig City. It further stated that the factual circumstances surrounding the case do not demonstrate that there was any violation of their right to a speedy disposition of their case as the proceeding was not attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. 28
The RTC Branch 152 also stated that the essential elements of the offense charged are sufficiently alleged. It held that it is not proper to resolve the charges at the very outset without the benefit of a full-blown trial as the issues require a deeper examination. 29 DaIAcC
The RTC Branch 152 likewise held that the filing of the complaint or information in court initiates a criminal action which vested the trial court jurisdiction over the case. It explained that after the filing of the complaint or information, the court issues a warrant for the arrest of the accused and the latter may either voluntarily submit himself to the court or be duly arrested, and the court thereby acquired jurisdiction over his person. 30 As petitioners were arrested, the trial court had jurisdiction over them. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Information is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 31
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC Branch 152 in an order 32 dated September 23, 2013.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that the RTC Branch 152 gravely abused its discretion in denying their motion to dismiss and to quash the information.
The CA Ruling
In its decision dated June 19, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the delay of four (4) years from the finality of the earlier CA decision in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 91712 had been reasonably explained by the RTC Branch 152. On the misfiling of the records of Crim. Case No. 125230, the CA ruled that though it was certainly looked upon with disfavor, the RTC Branch 152 nonetheless acted on it when it discovered its inadvertence and immediately issued a Notice/Subpoena 33 setting the arraignment and pre-trial of the accused. 34
The CA likewise found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it denied the motion to quash. It held that when a motion to quash was denied, the remedy was not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.
The CA further held that the information duly charged a specific offense and sufficiently alleged its elements, as well as the details on how the offense was committed.
With regard to the jurisdiction of the RTC Branch 152, the CA cited the case of Lateo v. People, 35 where the accused therein was similarly charged under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC for falsely representing themselves as true and lawful owners of a piece of land in the Province of Cavite. In said case, the accused were tried for estafa under this provision but were pronounced guilty only of attempted estafa in view of the timely intervention made by the entrapment operatives. Based on the said case, the CA found no merit in petitioners' contention that it had no jurisdiction over the offense and agreed with respondent that should the prosecution establish an offense as defined by Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC, the RTC Branch 152 can very well impose the penalty provided therein. The dispositive portion reads: TAacHE
In light of the foregoing, it is this Court's considered view that petitioners failed to establish the grave abuse of discretion they ascribe upon the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari filed by Jonathan Serrano and Jeanette Angkico is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 36
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its resolution dated September 11, 2014.
Hence, this petition raising the following:
Arguments:
I. The Court of Appeals gravely erred when it held that Petitioners' Constitutional rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases were not violated.
A. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that Petitioners failed to timely assert their Constitutional rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases considering that 1) established law and jurisprudence provide that it is the duty of the court and the prosecution to cause the arraignment of the accused, and bring Petitioners to trial; and 2) petitioners actually asserted their rights when they filed their Motion to Dismiss prior to arraignment.
B. The Court of Appeals ignored established jurisprudence stating that mere inaction of the trial court for an extended length of time already constitutes a violation of Constitutional rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of cases.
II. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the offense charged in the Information when even a plain reading of the relevant provisions (sic) would clearly show that the Information charges an offense properly cognizable by lower courts.
III. The Court of Appeals ignored the fact that the Information, and its supporting affidavits and evidence readily show that the facts therein do not charge an offense, and that the petitioners are not actually involved in the commission of the purported crime. 37
Petitioners aver that there was inordinate delay in the criminal case considering that more than ten (10) years passed from the time the information was filed in court before they were actually arraigned, and that this was unjustified, oppressive and prejudicial to them. HDICSa
Petitioners argue that the CA ignored the inaction and negligence of the court to calendar the criminal case for trial. 38 Citing Lumanlaw v. Peralta, 39 petitioners contend that the arraignment is not a mere formality but a vital stage in criminal proceedings which implements the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them; hence, it must be conducted with minimal delay. 40 The petitioners emphasized that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8493 or the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, mandates that the arraignment should be made within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs, and if the accused is not brought to trial within the said limit, the information shall be dismissed on motion of the accused. 41
Petitioners also reiterate that the information did not state the ultimate facts of how or in what way their alleged representations were false or fraudulent. It was also evident from the information that there was no false pretense or fraudulent act committed prior to or simultaneous with the delivery of the thing. The information likewise did not state that the alleged representation was the only motive or cause which induced respondent to part with his money. 42 IDaEHC
In his Comment 43 dated June 16, 2015, respondent argued that there was no violation of petitioners' right to speedy trial. He highlighted that in the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Respondent asserted that the delay in the proceedings of this case was not vexatious, capricious nor oppressive. As properly explained by RTC Branch 152, the four (4)-year delay was brought by the unfortunate archiving of the case, when it moved to its new office. 44
Respondent contends that the facts stated in the Information were sufficient to constitute an offense. The Information 45 showed that petitioners were charged as co-conspirators of the spouses Maskariño on account of the certification they issued in support of the spouses' claim that they owned the condominium unit, despite knowledge that it was owned by Amerop Philippines, Inc. 46
The Court's Ruling
The Court affirms the ruling of the CA.
There is no violation of
The delay of four (4) years from the finality of the CA's Decision in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 91712 has been reasonably explained by the RTC Branch 152. The inadvertent inclusion of the records of Criminal Case No. 125230 with the archived cases was due to the court's transfer from its old office in Capitol Compound, Shaw Boulevard, Pasig City to its present location in Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Pasig City Hall. In addition; when it discovered that the case was inadvertently archived, the court calendared the case at once and issued a Notice/Subpoena setting the arraignment and pre-trial of the petitioners. As held in the case of Jacob v. Sandiganbayan: 47
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent. (emphases supplied) 48 DTCSHA
Ergo, a mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, and particular regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 49
It must be stressed that the right to the speedy trial, is a flexible, concept. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. The right to speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 50
The RTC Branch 152 has
With regard to the issue of jurisdiction, the Court is not unmindful of the rule that "the real nature of the criminal charge is determined, not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the law alleged to have been violated — these being conclusions of law — but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information." 51 In Canceran v. People, 52 the Court explained that:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mereconclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. 53 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the well-settled rule is that jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. 54 The averment of the petitioner that the RTC Branch 152 has no jurisdiction over the case is without merit. The allegations contained in the information determine the jurisdiction of the Court over the issues. CScTED
The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC are as follows: 1) that there must be false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; 2) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; 3) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; and 4) that as a result, the offended party suffered damage. 55
In the instant case, the information sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense as enumerated above. It was averred that petitioners, in conspiracy with spouses Maskariño, swindled money from respondent. The specific act by which deceit was allegedly committed by petitioners is that they issued a certification that supported the purported misrepresentation made by spouses Maskariño of being the owners of the condominium unit. It was further stated in the information that petitioners knew that the certification was false. Respondent, on the other hand, relied on the truthfulness of the certification, and parted with his money. 56
Petitioners' argument that the information and its supporting documents do not constitute an offense — is bereft of merit. RTC Branch 152 found that based on the information, there is probable cause that petitioners committed the offense charged. "Probable cause does not mean actual or positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge." 57
Moreover, as discussed earlier, all the elements of Article 315 (2) (a) were properly alleged in the information; hence, it charges an offense against petitioners.
Likewise, in Clay & Feather International, Inc., Raul O. Arambulo, and Adam E. Jimenez III v. Alexander T. Lichaytoo and Clifford T. Lichaytoo, it was held:
The counter-allegations of respondents essentially delve on evidentiary matters that are best passed upon in a full-blown trial. The issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that cannot be threshed out conclusively during the preliminary stage of the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation of prosecution's evidence in support of the charge. The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits. The validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level. 58
The liability of petitioners for the purported crime is a matter better ventilated during the trial proper of the case. 59 cDCEIA
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The June 19, 2014 Decision and September 11, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 132921 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 9-41.
2. Penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, with Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba concurring; id. at 44-55.
3.Id. at 56.
4.Id. at 291-299.
5.Id. at 327-328.
6.Id. at 98-103.
7.Id. at 104-123.
8.Id. at 126-130.
9.Id. at 131.
10.Id. at 132-134.
11.Id. at 136-168.
12.Id. at 190.
13.Id. at 191.
14.Id. at 192.
15.Id. at 193-201.
16.Id. at 202-213.
17.Id. at 214-215.
18.Id. at 219.
19.Id. at 47.
20.Id. at 220-241.
21. Id. at 242-253.
22. Id. at 261.
23. Id. at 262.
24. Id. at 263-264.
25. Id. at 266.
26. Id. at 267-281.
27. Id. at 291-299.
28. Id. at 297.
29. Id. at 298.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 299.
32. Id. at 327-328.
33. Supra note 23.
34. Id. at 50-51.
35. Id. at 54.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 20.
38. Id. at 441.
39. G.R. No. 164953, 517 Phil. 588 (2006).
40. Rollo, p. 24.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 448.
43. Id. at 417-429.
44. Id. at 424-425.
45. Id. at 427.
46. Id.
47. 649 Phil. 374, 388 (2010), citing Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, 484 Phil. 917 (2004).
48. Id.
49. Tan v. People, 604 Phil. 68, 81 (2009), citing Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
50. Ombudsman v. Jurado, 583 Phil. 132, 145 (2008), citing Yulo v. People, 493 Phil. 54, 60 (3005).
51. Canceran v. People, 762 Phil. 558, 568 (2015) citing People v. Resayaga, 242 Phil. 869, 874 (1988).
52. Id.
53. Id.; citing Domingo v. Rayala, 569 Phil. 423, 454 (2008).
54. Treñas v. People, 680 Phil. 368, 380 (2012), citing Isip v. People, 552 Phil. 786, 801 (2007).
55. Mandriak v. Secretary of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 174766, August 17, 2016.
56. Id.
57. Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan, 725 Phil. 486, 498 (2014).
58. 664 Phil. 764,773 (2011).
59. Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan, supra note 57.