Segovia v. Sandiganbayan

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 233946-53. March 13, 2019.]

LT. GEN. JORGE SEGOVIA [RET.], MAJ. GEN. AURELIO BALADAD [RET.], MAJ. GEN. JOSELITO REYES, ET AL., petitioners, vs.THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated March 13, 2019, which reads as follows:

"G.R. Nos. 233946-53 (Lt. Gen. Jorge Segovia [Ret.], Maj. Gen. Aurelio Baladad [Ret.], Maj. Gen. Joselito Reyes, et al. vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, the People of the Philippines, and the Office of the Ombudsman). — This treats of the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus 1 filed by Lt. Gen. Jorge Segovia (Ret.) (Segovia), Major General Aurelio Baladad (Ret.) (Baladad), Maj. Gen. Joselito Reyes (Reyes), Brig. Gen. Cristobal Zaragoza (Zaragoza), PS/Supt. Marion Balonglong, PS/Supt. Allan Nobleza, and Maj. Jovily Cabading (Cabading) (collectively, the petitioners), seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions dated June 7, 2017 2 and July 25, 2017, 3 both issued by the Sandiganbayan, denying the Motion to Quash and the Motion for Reconsideration, respectively, filed by the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) against them.

The right of an accused to the speedy disposition of cases is a sacrosanct right that must not only be respected by courts and tribunals, but must also be invoked only in clear instances of vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The determination of a violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases shall not be subject to a mechanical mathematical reckoning of time, but must be scrutinized and analyzed according to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.4

The Antecedents

The petitioners were then active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police (PNP). 5

The PNP of Rizal Province (Rizal PNP) received intelligence reports stating that a certain Mario Condes was brandishing firearms and terrorizing the people at Sitio Mahangin, Barangay Maybangcal, Morong, Rizal. Further reports revealed that the members of the New People's Army were gathering at the said site. Consequently, the PNP applied for a Search Warrant to search a farmhouse located along E. Dela Paz Street, Sitio Mahangin, Barangay Maybangcal. 6 HCaDIS

At around 6:00 a.m. of February 6, 2010, a team composed of officers of the Rizal PNP, accompanied by members of the 16th Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army, implemented the Search Warrant. This resulted to the arrest of 43 people (Morong 43) for illegal possession of firearms and of various improvised explosive devices and components (IEDS). The IEDS were discovered inside one of the buildings at the search site, where a large group of people was gathered in what appeared to be a bomb making lesson. 7

On February 7, 2010, State Prosecutor II Romeo B. Senson (SP Senson) conducted inquest proceedings against the Morong 43. 8

Thereafter, on February 8, 2010, SP Senson issued the inquest resolution recommending the filing of criminal informations against the Morong 43 for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, 9 P.D. No. 1877, 10 and the Election Code. SP Senson likewise recommended that the Morong 43 be temporarily detained at Camp Capinpin, pending the issuance of a final Department of Justice (DOJ) resolution approving his recommendation. 11

Meanwhile, on May 3, 2012, eight of the Morong 43 members, namely, Dr. Merry Mia Clamor, Dr. Alexis Montes, Gary Liberal, Ma. Teresa Quinawayan, Reynaldo Macabenta, Mercy Castro, Jane Beltran Balleta, and Samson Castillo, filed a Joint Complaint Affidavit against the petitioners, accusing them of violating Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9745 or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009, Sections 2 and 4 of R.A. No. 7438, 12 and Robbery under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 13

On October 26, 2015, the OMB issued a Resolution 14 (First OMB Resolution) finding probable cause to indict the petitioners for violation of Section 2 (a) and (b), and Section 4 of R.A. No. 7438.

Former Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales (Carpio-Morales) approved the First OMB Resolution on December 21, 2015. The petitioners received the notice of the First OMB Resolution on January 26, 2016, and filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration against the same. 15

On March 23, 2016, the OMB issued a Resolution 16 denying the petitioners' Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

Consequently, the OMB filed criminal informations against the petitioners before the Sandiganbayan on October 25, 2016.

On March 20, 2017, the petitioners, finding the Informations to be duplicitous in character, filed a Motion to Quash the said Informations. They claimed in their Motion to Quash that the recital of facts in the Informations alleged the violation of both Section 4 (a) and 4 (b) of R.A. No. 7438, which were two separate and distinct criminal offenses. 17

Then, on April 20, 2017, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash, praying for the dismissal of the Informations on the ground of the OMB's inordinate delay in the resolution of the preliminary investigation of their case. According to them, the unreasonable delay by the OMB constituted a violation of their right to the speedy disposition of their case. 18

On May 3, 2017, the OMB filed its opposition to the Supplemental Motion to Quash. In its Opposition, the OMB countered that there was no inordinate delay in the resolution of the petitioners' case. 19

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On June 7, 2017, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution 20 denying the petitioners' Motion to Quash. The Sandiganbayan held that there was no inordinate delay in the resolution of the petitioners' case. The Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that the concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible, and a mere mathematical reckoning of time is not sufficient. Rather, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. The Sandiganbayan found that the petitioners' case moved with reasonable continuity during the preliminary investigation, and became idle only for two years and five months, following the filing of the last affidavit up to the resolution of the complaint. It noted that the delay was reasonable considering that the investigating prosecutor had to study 10 separate counter-affidavits, a reply and rejoinder affidavits; the offenses charged were complex; and the Resolution had to go through the review and approval of the Bureau Director, Assistant Ombudsman and the Ombudsman herself. AHCETa

The dispositive portion of the assailed resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused's Motion to Quash is DENIED for lack of merit.

Let the arraignment of the accused on June 29, 2017 at 8:30 a.m. proceed, as scheduled.

SO ORDERED. 21

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution 22 dated July 25, 2017.

Undeterred, the petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The Issue

The main issue raised for the Court's resolution rests on whether or not the petitioners' right to the speedy disposition of their case was violated.

The petitioners maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that there was no violation of their constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases. 23 The petitioners point out that the right to the speedy disposition of cases must be examined according to the balancing of interest test, with due regard given to the length of the delay, reason for the delay, assertion by the accused and the prejudice caused to the accused. According to the petitioners, the OMB failed to present any valid justification for the delay. 24

Moreover, the petitioners contend that the length with which their cases lagged was similar to the periods of delay in the cases of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 25Duterte v. Sandiganbayan 26and People v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 27 where the Court dismissed the Informations on account of the violation of therein accused's right to the speedy disposition of their cases. 28

Furthermore, the petitioners lament that they suffered prejudice due to the delay in the resolution of their case. 29

Finally, the petitioners maintain that they never waived their right to the speedy disposition of cases, contrary to the Sandiganbayan's finding. 30

On the other hand, the People, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, counters that the petitioners miserably failed to show that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions. The petitioners' right to the speedy disposition of cases was not violated because the delay that may have taken place in the resolution of their case was justified under the circumstances. Besides, the petitioners failed to assert their right at the earliest opportunity. Moreover, the petitioners did not suffer any prejudice. 31

Ruling of the Court

The instant petition is bereft of merit.

The Determination of Delay in the

No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees to all persons accused of crimes the right to a speedy disposition of their case. Article III, Section 16 in no uncertain terms mandates that "[a]ll persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." 32

Significantly, in determining whether there was a violation of the accused's constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases, the Court stressed in the recent en banc case of Cesar Matas Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, Quezon City; Office of the Ombudsman; and People of the Philippines 33 that "[a] mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient" to rule that there was inordinate delay. 34 Furthermore, the Court laid down the following guidelines in determining whether the delay in the disposition of the case constitutes a violation of the accused's right to the speedy disposition of cases, to wit:

i. The right to a speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to a speedy trial; ScHADI

ii. A case shall be deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to the conduct of a preliminary investigation. The doctrine in Sandiganbayan35 which states that the fact-finding investigation should not be deemed separate from the preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining whether there was a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of cases has been abandoned.

Accordingly, the period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall no longer be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.

Likewise, the OMB shall set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond the periods set by the OMB shall be taken against the prosecution;

iii. Courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the case was resolved within the time periods contained in the law, Supreme Court resolutions, and circulars, then the burden falls on the defense to prove that the accused's right to a speedy disposition of cases was indeed violated. Specifically, the defense must show that the case is motivated by malice, or is politically motivated and attended by utter lack of evidence; and that it did not contribute to the delay.

Otherwise, if the case drags beyond the reasonable periods, and the accused invokes his right to a speedy disposition of cases, then the prosecution must justify the delay. The prosecution must prove that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; the issues in the case were complex, and that the volume of the evidence made the delay inevitable; and that the accused did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the delay;

iv. "Determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised." This rule holds true unless it is shown that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, or if the accused himself/herself waived his/her right to a speedy disposition of cases or the right to a speedy trial. In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court; and

v. The right to a speedy disposition of cases or the right to a speedy trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Failure to do so, constitutes a waiver of such right. 36

Applying the foregoing tenets to the case at bar, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that there was no inordinate delay in the investigation of the case against the petitioners.

The Investigation Conducted by the

The records reveal that the offenses were alleged to have been committed by the petitioners sometime in February 2010. The Joint Complaint Affidavit was filed two years thereafter, or on May 3, 2012. Following Cagang, 37 it is the filing of this Joint Complaint Affidavit that started the prosecution machinery against the petitioners. Thus, the two-year gap from the purported commission of the offense up to the filing of the complaint against the petitioners shall not be considered in determining the period in which the investigation proceeded. Thus, the reckoning point for determining whether the OMB was guilty of inordinate delay in investigating the petitioners' case shall be May 3, 2012.

It must be noted that after the filing of the Joint Complaint Affidavit, the DOJ endorsed the said affidavit to the OMB on August 31, 2012. This means that the Joint Complaint Affidavit landed on the hands of the OMB on August 31, 2012. Over the course of one year, the parties submitted their respective pleadings. Such that, the last pleading necessary to resolve the complaint, or the Joint Rejoinder Affidavit, was received by the OMB on June 3, 2013. After this, the OMB reviewed the case, and the investigating prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable cause to indict the petitioners on October 26, 2015. The same was, thereafter, forwarded to the Ombudsman, who approved the same Resolution on December 21, 2015.

A perusal of this timeline would show that the case proceeded at a continuous pace. Added to this, the petitioners do not refute that they themselves filed several motions 38 during the pendency of the investigation, which likewise contributed to the delay in the resolution of their case. 39 aICcHA

This notwithstanding, the petitioners staunchly maintain that a "lull" in the proceedings took place from the filing of the last pleading, or the Joint Rejoinder Affidavit, on June 3, 2013, until the OMB rendered a Resolution on October 26, 2015. According to the petitioners, this "lull" of around two years and five months was unjustified, and, thus, constituted a violation of their right to the speedy disposition of their case.

The Court is not persuaded.

Suffice to say, the delay in the disposition of the case shall not be subject to a mere mathematical reckoning. Rather, the Court will consider the peculiar facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Contrary to the petitioners' claim that there was a lull in the investigation of their case, the records show that numerous proceedings actually took place during the said two-year period. During this time, the OMB had to exert efforts to obtain the middle name of accused Manuel Tabion (Tabion). In fact, various Subpoena Duces Tecum were issued to the PNP requesting for the Personal Data Sheet of the said accused. The OMB had to await the response of the PNP, as the former office needed to determine Tabion's middle name. 40

Likewise, during the questioned period, the OMB's investigating prosecutor had to study the case and evaluate the charges. It is worth mentioning that aside from having numerous complainants, the case also involved 10 respondents, including former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Each of the respondents submitted various pleadings, ranging from their Counter-Affidavit with attached documents, a Joint Reply Affidavit and a Joint Rejoinder Affidavit. The investigating prosecutor had to consider all the pleadings and documents in the resolution of the case. Moreover, according to the OMB, the same pleadings and documents were studied by the Bureau Director, Assistant Ombudsman, and the Ombudsman in their review and approval of the Resolution.

Furthermore, the OMB explained that the case was complex, such that the preliminary investigation involved three offenses, namely, violation of R.A. No. 9745, R.A. No. 7438, and Article 294 of the RPC.

Added to all these, the resolution of the OMB's investigating prosecutor underwent a series of reviews and considerations by the OMB. The same resolution was forwarded to the Bureau Director, Assistant Ombudsman, and, thereafter, to Ombudsman Carpio-Morales.

Undoubtedly, the aforementioned timeline and justifications would show that there was no inordinate delay in the investigation of the case. It is also clear from the records that the OMB followed the established procedure in prosecuting the petitioners' case. This proves that there were no vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays in the investigation of the case.

The Petitioners Failed to Show Any

In determining whether the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his/her case was violated, it is likewise essential for the accused to show that he/she suffered prejudice due to the delay.

The petitioners claim that due to the length of time that the preliminary investigation lagged, they suffered prejudice consisting of difficulties in traveling which, in turn, prevented them from competently fulfilling their duties.

The Court notes the observation of the Sandiganbayan that contrary to their averment, the petitioners did not actually suffer any setbacks in their career brought about by the investigations against them. On the contrary, the petitioners (save for those who have already retired) were even promoted during the pendency of the investigation, despite the complaint lodged against them. The records show that Segovia was promoted as Lieutenant General; Baladad to Major General; Reyes to Brigadier General; Zaragoza to Colonel; and Cabading to Major. Plainly, their accusation that they were denied the promotion they deserved is clearly false. 41 Despite the purported difficulties and inconveniences they allegedly experienced in fulfilling their duties, they were all still promoted to higher ranks.

Needless to say, such minor inconvenience experienced by the petitioners is a burden that is attached to every criminal prosecution. Other than the above-mentioned inconveniences, and the anxiety they may have experienced, the petitioners have not shown that they suffered any more prejudice than is attributable to the nature of preliminary investigation. 42 Simply stated, the petitioners suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay attributed to the normal processes of justice. EHaASD

It also bears noting that the records are bereft of any showing that there was a deliberate attempt on the part of the OMB to delay the case, or gain some tactical advantage over the accused, or to harass or prejudice them. In fact, neither did the petitioners allege any bad faith or ill-motive on the part of the OMB to deliberately delay the case. Neither did they allege that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, nor that they were victims of political persecution.

Finally, the allegation of a delay in the disposition of the case seems to be a mere afterthought. The records show that the petitioners initially filed a Motion to Quash, solely on the ground that the Information was flawed, as it charged two offenses. A month thereafter, 43 the petitioners changed their tune and belatedly claimed that their right to a speedy disposition of cases was violated. It must be remembered that the invocation of one's right to a speedy disposition of cases must be timely raised. The accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of such right. 44

The Cases of Tatad, Duterte and

The petitioners cannot harp on the cases of Tatad, 45Duterte46 and Sandiganbayan, 47 and conveniently assert that the Court should order the dismissal of the cases filed against them, simply because the periods of delay in the aforementioned cases are similar to the instant case.

It cannot be gainsaid that the Court stressed that in determining the fact of inordinate delay, particular regard must be given to the peculiar facts and circumstances surrounding each case. 48 This said, the perceived similarities between the aforementioned cases and the case at bar are shallow and superficial, to say the least. A closer scrutiny of the facts in each case would reveal a stark disparity with the instant case.

In the case of Tatad, the Court found that aside from the length of the delay, the proceedings against therein accused — Tatad were attended by political motivations, and that there was a deviation from the established procedures in conducting the preliminary investigation. Added to this, the Court stated that the delay was not justified considering that the case was not at all complex, involving as it did, a violation of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth law, which did not necessitate a gruelling examination of the evidence.

Similarly, in the case of Duterte, the Court found that there was an irregular conduct of the preliminary investigation. Here, the accused were completely unaware that the preliminary investigation against them was actually ongoing.

Finally, in Sandiganbayan, the Court, in determining whether the delay that attended the case was vexatious and inordinate, took into account the time of the supposed commission of the offense to the filing of the Information. It bears stressing that this rule has already been abandoned. 49

All too clearly, the petitioners cannot seek refuge from the ruling in Tatad, Duterte and Sandiganbayan. They were not victims of political persecution, nor was the investigation against them irregular. On the contrary, the OMB strictly followed the proper procedures in conducting the investigation against them, sans any bad faith or ill-motive.

In fine, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioners' Motion to Quash the Information. To emphasize, a simple mathematical reckoning of time shall never suffice. Rather, each case shall be scrutinized according to the facts and circumstances peculiar thereto. Considering that the perceived delays in the instant case were justified, the case against the petitioners shall not be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. DaIAcC

SO ORDERED." (Carandang, J., designated as additional Member per Special Order No. 2624 dated November 28, 2018.)

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 3-52.

2. Rendered by Sandiganbayan Seventh Division Associate Justices Alexander G. Gesmundo (now a Member of this Court), Chairperson, Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez-Estoesta and Zaldy V. Trespeses, Members; id. at 62-67.

3.Id. at 68-74-A.

4.Cesar Matas Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, Quezon City; Office of the Ombudsman; and People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018.

5.Rollo, pp. 4-5.

6.Id. at 5-6.

7.Id.

8.Id.

9. CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, OR INSTRUMENTS USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES, AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES. Approved on June 29, 1983.

10. PROVIDING FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PREVENTIVE DETENTION ACTION AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on July 21, 1983.

11.Rollo, p. 6.

12. AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF. Approved on April 27, 1992.

13.Rollo, p. 7.

14.Id. at 154-171.

15.Id. at 8.

16.Id.

17.Id. at 9.

18.Id.

19.Id.

20. Id. at 62-67.

21. Id. at 66.

22. Id. at 68-74-A.

23. Id. at 66.

24. Id.

25. 242 Phil. 563 (1988).

26. 352 Phil. 557 (1998).

27. 723 Phil. 444 (2013).

28. Rollo, p. 18.

29. Id. at 36.

30. Id. at 14-15.

31. Id. at 312.

32. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 16.

33. G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458, July 31, 2018.

34. Id.

35. Supra note 27.

36. Supra note 33.

37. Id.

38. Motion to Resolve Pending Incident with Motion to Suspend the Period within Which to File Counter-Affidavits with Reservation to file in the Event of Denial; Motion for Extension of Time to File Counter-Affidavit; and Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Submission of Respondents' Counter-Affidavits.

39. Rollo, pp. 241-242.

40. Id. at 30.

41. Id. at 74.

42. Id. at 66.

43. Id. at 9.

44. Cesar Matas Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, Quezon City; Office of the Ombudsman; and People of the Philippines,supra note 33.

45. Supra note 25.

46. Supra note 26.

47. Supra note 27.

48. Cesar Matas Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, Quezon City; Office of the Ombudsman; and People of the Philippines, supra.

49. Id.