FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 193103. September 21, 2016.]
VIRGILIO M. SAULOG, petitioner, vs. EMILIA PINEDA CRUZ, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated September 21, 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 193103 (Virgilio M. Saulog v. Emilia Pineda Cruz) — In this Petition for Review, 1 Virgilio M. Saulog seeks to absolve himself from the adverse effects of the supposed gross negligence of his lawyers. He alleges that the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101043 became final and executory, because his counsel had failed to promptly inform him of the adverse CA ruling. This lapse resulted in the belated filing, and ultimately in the denial, 3 of his Motion for Reconsideration. 4
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The dispute in this case involves a parcel of land located in Salitran, Dasmariñas, Cavite. Respondent Emilia Pineda Cruz allegedly purchased the lot from its original owner, Eliseo S. Jumanan, on 6 September 1964. She later discovered that Eliseo's daughter, Elisa J. Fortes, had sold the property to Emelita B. Sosa without respondent's knowledge and consent. 5 This discovery prompted respondent to file a Complaint 6 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, for the annulment of sale, declaration of nullity of title, reconveyance and damages against Emelita. 7
Petitioner filed a Motion for Intervention 8 with the RTC seeking permission to join the suit. He asserted that (a) the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) held by respondent and Emelita were fraudulent; and (b) he was the rightful owner of the disputed lot. The RTC granted the motion 9 and allowed petitioner to file his Complaint-in-Intervention. 10 This complaint was later amended. 11
Respondent filed an Omnibus Motion 12 seeking, among others, the dismissal of the Amended Complaint-in-Intervention. She alleged that the complaint was barred by the final judgment in Civil Case No. 1873-99, 13 a case for Declaration of Nullity of Title filed by petitioner against respondent and the heirs of Eliseo Jumanan in relation to the same parcel of land. The complaint was eventually dismissed by the RTC after petitioner failed to (a) file his pre-trial brief and amended complaint; and (b) present his evidence despite repeated warnings. The dismissal was affirmed by the CA and this Court. 14
THE RTC RULING
The RTC denied respondent's Omnibus Motion 15 by refusing to dismiss the Complaint-in-Intervention. The trial court said that the Omnibus Motion had been filed out of time, and that it had already recognized the legal standing of petitioner to act as intervenor.
Believing that a motion for reconsideration would be futile, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA to challenge the foregoing ruling. She asserted that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it refused to dismiss the Complaint-in-Intervention despite the final judgment issued by this Court in Civil Case No. 1873-99. That earlier case was between the same parties for the recovery of the same parcel of land. 16
THE CA RULING
On 29 June 2009, the CA granted the Petition for Certiorari. 17 In the assailed Decision, it ordered the dismissal of the Complaint-in-Intervention filed by petitioner with the RTC. The appellate court agreed with respondent's contention that the complaint was barred under the principle of res judicata in view of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 1873-99. 18 It further explained that the dismissal of that earlier case due to the failure of petitioner to prosecute the action operated as an adjudication on the merits and barred the filing of the Complaint-in-Intervention. 19
Because there was no motion for reconsideration or appeal filed, the CA Decision became final and executory. 20 An Entry of Judgment was issued on 20 July 2009. HEITAD
On 4 January 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 21 of the CA Decision. To explain his belated filing of the motion, he alleged that he personally received the Decision only on 16 December 2009, since his counsel had failed to provide him with a copy. Supposedly, one of his lawyers, Atty. Samuel Baldado, suffered a serious heart attack while the other, Atty. Gaudioso de Lunas, went to the United States. Petitioner likewise insisted that Civil Case No. 1873-99 was not identical to the present action; and that in any case, the judgment therein was not a dismissal on the merits. 22 He also pointed out that respondent had filed a Petition for Certiorari with the appellate court without first seeking a reconsideration of the RTC Order. 23
In a Resolution 24 dated 29 June 2010, the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It noted that its Decision had already become final and executory in view of petitioner's failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal. 25 It likewise rejected the justification he offered for the belated filing of the motion:
On January 4, 2010, Private Respondent Virgilio M. Saulog filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration claiming that his counsel, Atty. Samuel Baldado suffered a serious heart attack, while his other counsel, Atty. Gaudioso De Lunas, went to the United States of America without furnishing him a copy of Our June 20, 2009 Decision. Hence, he theorizes that his filing of the present motion is still timely, as he came to know of and personally received the same only on December 16, 2009.
We do not agree.
xxx xxx xxx
At bench, the delay in the filing of the instant motion was not due to gross negligence, as it could have been prevented by the Private Respondent's counsel if he only acted with ordinary diligence and prudence in handling the case. In fact, blame may also be imputed on the Private Respondent because he failed to take a more active role in his case and, instead, merely relied on his counsels (sic). Verily, to give in to the Private Respondent's plea would enable any defeated party to render inutile any judgment through the simple expedient of alleging gross negligence of counsel in filing a timely motion for reconsideration.
Our June 29, 2009 Decision having attained finality and an Entry of Judgment having been issued relative thereto, the instant motion has, most certainly been rendered moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Private Respondent's motion is NOTEDwithout action. (Emphasis in the original)
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
On 16 September 2010, Saulog filed a Petition before this Court seeking the reversal of the Decision and the Resolution of the CA. He contends that he was unable to contact or locate his previous counsel despite diligent efforts. 26 Petitioner then insists that his failure to timely file a motion for reconsideration with the CA was the result of the gross negligence of his lawyers; hence, their oversight should not bind him. 27
In her Comment, 28 respondent argues that it was the negligence of petitioner himself that caused the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration. She points out that petitioner failed to engage another counsel's services to protect his rights, despite his knowledge that his former counsel had already abandoned him. 29
ISSUE
The sole issue presented in this case is whether petitioner may be considered bound by the negligent acts of his lawyers.
OUR RULING
We DENY the Petition.
This Court agrees with the CA that petitioner is bound by his counsel's actions. Consequently, the belated filing of his Motion for Reconsideration cannot be excused. In any event, the CA correctly ruled that the Complaint-in-Intervention was barred by res judicata. ATICcS
Petitioner is bound by the actions of
The Court has consistently applied the principle that the negligence of counsel binds the client, 30 particularly when the client has been as careless and inattentive as the lawyer. 31 This general rule is subject to only a few exceptions. This Court explained in Multi-Trans Agency Phils., Inc. v. Oriental Assurance Corp.:
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against the client. We have, however, carved out exceptions to this rule; as where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; or where the application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property; or where the interests of justice so requires and relief ought to be accorded to the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer's gross or palpable mistake or negligence. In order to apply the exceptions rather than the rule, the circumstances obtaining in each case must be looked into. In cases where one of the exceptions is present, the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby. 32
In this case, petitioner implores the Court to apply the above-mentioned exceptions and excuse him from the alleged gross negligence of his previous lawyers. He claims that they had abandoned him, 33 and that their negligence resulted in the belated filing of his Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision. 34 Their alleged negligence supposedly prevented him from presenting a case before the courts and deprived him of due process. 35
We are not persuaded.
The Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA that petitioner should be deemed bound by his counsel's negligence, in view of his own failure to exercise due diligence in the monitoring of his case. It is settled that litigants cannot just passively await the outcome of their cases. 36 They are likewise expected to make the proper inquiries by consulting both their counsel and the courts about the progress of the proceedings. 37 Litigants who rely solely on their lawyers for the handling of their cases cannot later excuse themselves for their supposed gross negligence. To rule otherwise would be to tolerate endless litigation, for there "would be no end to a suit, so long as a new counsel could be employed who would allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned." 38
In Air Philippines Corp. v. International Business Aviation Services Phils., 39 this Court stated:
For petitioner to feign and repeatedly insist upon a lack of awareness of the progress of an important litigation is to unmask a penchant for the ludicrous. Although it expects counsel to amply protect its interest, it cannot just sit back, relax and await the outcome of its case. In keeping with the normal course of events, it should have taken the initiative of "making the proper inquiries from its counsel and the trial court as to the status of its case" — and of extending to him the "necessary assistance." For its failure to do so, it has only itself to blame. Indeed, from lethargy is misfortune born. (citations omitted)
Likewise, this Court cannot grant the plea of petitioner to be excused from procedural rules. We find no "exceptional, special or meritorious circumstances" 40 that will excuse the belated filing of his Motion for Reconsideration with the CA. As explained above, the supposed negligence of his counsel is not a sufficient reason to excuse this error. For that reason, the rules must be strictly enforced in this case.
We remind litigants that the provisions of the Rules of Court prescribing definite periods for the performance of certain acts, such as the institution of proceedings, must be strictly complied with. 41 These periods are "considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial businesses." 42 TIADCc
The CA correctly ruled that the Complaint-res judicata.
In any event, the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the CA in ordering the dismissal of petitioner's Complaint-in-Intervention. The latter court correctly noted that the complaint was barred by res judicata in view of the judgment of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1873-99. In that case, the complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Title, which pertained to the same property and involved the same parties, was dismissed for his failure to prosecute. The dismissal was ultimately affirmed by this Court.
The Complaint-for-Intervention was but an attempt to open and litigate Civil Case No. 1873-99 all over again. We emphasize that this maneuver cannot be permitted considering that the case has already been dismissed with finality through a judgment that operated as one on the merits. 43 This Court cannot countenance this clear contravention of the principle of res judicata.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 29 June 2009 and Resolution dated 29 June 2010 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED." PERLAS-BERNABE, J., took no part; PERALTA, J., designated additional member per raffle dated August 15, 2016.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Id. at 12-24.
2. Dated 29 June 2009 and penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Martin S. Villarama (now a retired Associate Justice of this Court) concurring; rollo, pp. 130-140.
3. Dated 29 June 2010 and penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro, with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now an Associate Justice of this Court) concurring; id. at 142-144.
4. Id. at 117-125.
5. Id. at 62.
6. The civil action was docketed as Civil Case No. 0299-04 and raffled to the RTC, Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.
7. Amended Complaint, id. at 60-68.
8. Id. at 44-45.
9. Id. at 52.
10. Id. at 48-51.
11. Id. at 54-58.
12. Id. at 69-74.
13. Id. at 70.
14. See the Resolution dated 23 November 2005 in G.R. No. 169981.
15. Dated 20 September 2007; CA Rollo, pp. 74-76.
16. Rollo, p. 82.
17. Id. at 35.
18. Id. at 32-35.
19. Id. at 33.
20. Id. at 142.
21. Id. at 117-129.
22. Id. at 120.
23. Id. at 123.
24. Id. at 142-144.
25. Id. at 142-143.
26. Id. at 18.
27. Id. at 19-20.
28. Id. at 99-100.
29. Id. at 100.
30. Bonsubre, Jr. v. Yerro, G.R. No. 205952, 11 February 2015, 750 SCRA 490; Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191972, 26 January 2015, 748 SCRA 198; Ramirez v. People, 718 Phil. 653 (2013).
31. Mapagay v. People, 613 Phil. 91 (2009).
32. 608 Phil. 478, 493-494 (2009).
33. Rollo, p. 18.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Air Philippines Corp. v. International Business Aviation Services Phils., 481 Phil. 366 (2004).
37. Id. See also Ramirez v. People, 718 Phil. 653 (2013).
38. Mapagay v. People, supra note 31 at 98-99.
39. Supra note 36 at 384.
40. Ramirez v. People, supra note 37 at 658.
41. Motorola Philippines, Inc. v. Ambrocio, 601 Phil. 496, 507 (2009).
42. Id.
43. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.