Sarmiento, Sr. v. Salac

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 226524. October 7, 2020.]

PABLO SARMIENTO, SR. and PABLO SARMIENTO, JR., petitioners,vs. PO1 MARCELINO SALAC and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedOctober 7, 2020, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 226524 (PABLO SARMIENTO, SR. and PABLO SARMIENTO, JR., petitioners, v. PO1 MARCELINO SALAC and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents). — Procedural rules are designed to aid the courts and litigants alike in resolving cases with haste and efficiency. Thus, they "must be faithfully followed and dutifully enforced." 1 However, their application "should not amount to 'placing the administration of justice in a straightjacket.'" 2 The rigid application of rules of procedure "which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed." 3

This resolves a Petition for Certiorari4 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, praying for the reversal of the Court of Appeals' Decision 5 and Resolution 6 for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On May 5, 2005, 7 two Informations for Frustrated Homicide were filed with the Regional Trial Court against Police Officer 1 Marcelino Salac (Salac) and Police Officer 3 Imelda Salva (Salva). The Informations read:

For Criminal Case No. Q-05-136190

"INFORMATION"

The undersigned accused PO1 MARCELINO SALAC and PO3 IMELDA SALVA of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, committed as follows:

That on or about the 13th day of May 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one PABLO SARMIENTO, SR. by then and there shooting him with the use of a gun of an unknown caliber at the right side of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds, thus performing all acts of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some causes independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is the timely medical assistance extended to said Pablo Sarmiento, Sr., to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Quezon City, Philippines, 13 May 2005. 8 (Emphasis in the original)

For Criminal Case No. Q-05-136191

"INFORMATION"

The undersigned accused PO1 MARCELINO SALAC and PO3 IMELDA SALVA of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE, committed as follows: CAIHTE

That on or about the 13th day of May 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one PABLO SARMIENTO, JR. by then and there shooting him with the use of a gun of an unknown caliber at the right side of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds, thus performing all acts of execution which would produce the crime of homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some causes independent of the will of the perpetrators, that is the timely medical assistance extended to said Pablo Sarmiento, Sr., to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Quezon City, Philippines, 13 May 2005. 9 (Emphasis in the original)

Upon arraignment, Salac and Salva pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. 10

On May 17, 2006, the first prosecution witness, Pablo Sarmiento, Sr., testified. Thereafter, on various dates, all the other prosecution witnesses also testified. On November 16, 2009, the Regional Trial Court ordered the prosecution to formally offer its evidence within 15 days but the prosecution was only able to comply on January 27, 2010. On June 22, 2010, PO1 Salac through his counsel filed Comments/Objections to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence. On July 19, 2010, the Regional Trial Court ordered the admission of the prosecution's exhibits and noted PO1 Salac's Comments/Objections. 11

On October 24, 2011, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the case against Salva due to her death on June 3, 2011. 12

The defense presented its first witness on November 22, 2010 and concluded with the testimony of its last witness on February 3, 2014.

On March 24, 2014, the Regional Trial Court ordered the counsel for the defense to formally offer its evidence which it complied with on April 7, 2014. A Notice of Promulgation was set on July 29, 2014 but was moved to August 4, 2014. PO1 Salac's counsel filed a manifestation that he will not be able to appear on August 4, 2014 due to a conflict of schedule. Thus, a New Notice of Promulgation was issued on September 1, 2014. 13

The Regional Trial Court promulgated its Decision 14 on September 1, 2014 finding Salac guilty of the crimes charged. It found that intent to kill was established through the gun used by the accused, the manner and method of attack, and the location of the gunshot wounds. 15 It ruled that Salac's defense of alibi and bare denial were weak and cannot prevail against the positive identification of the accused. 16

The promulgation was made by entering the Decision on the criminal docket of the case because of Salac's non-appearance. The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Decision read:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, this Court finds accused PO1 MARCELINO SALAC "GUILTY," in both criminal cases, beyond reasonable doubt of committing two (2) counts of frustrated homicide. He is therefore sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor in its medium period.

Further, accused Salac is likewise ordered to indemnify the private complainants, Pablo Sarmiento, Sr. and Pablo Sarmiento, Jr. to wit: (1) the total amount of Fifty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Six Pesos (Php57,986.20) as actual damages; (2) Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00) as moral damages; (3) exemplary damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00), as corrective measure; and (4) attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000.00) plus Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (Php2,500.00) per court appearance.

Moreover, the cash bond posted by accused Salac is hereby ordered cancelled.

SO ORDERED. 17 (Emphasis in the original)

Upon receipt of a copy of the Decision on even date, Salac's counsel orally moved for the reconsideration of the order of arrest and the cancellation of the bond favorably granted by the Regional Trial Court. 18

On September 10, 2014, Salac filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Regional Trial Court Decision for lack of notice and hearing. 19 This was denied by the Regional Trial Court in its September 17, 2014 Order. 20

This resolves accused'[s] Motion for Reconsideration dated 10 September 2014.

It has been held that, a motion which does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing is a useless piece of paper and of no legal effect. Likewise, any motion that does not comply with Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is a mere scrap of paper, should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial cognizance and, likewise does not affect any reglementary period involved for the filing of the requisite pleading. Thus, where the motion is (a) directed to the clerk of court, not to the parties, and (b) merely states that the same is submitted "for the resolution of the court upon receipt thereof," said motion is fatally defective. This rule has been applied to motions for new trial or reconsideration where no date for hearing the motion is indicated.

After judicious evaluation, this Court finds the instant motion for reconsideration a mere scrap of paper and thus, not entitled to any judicial cognizance. Hence, the same is DENIED.

Furthermore, let warrant of arrest issue against accused Marcelino Salac.

Furnish all law enforcement agencies a copy of the warrant of arrest.

SO ORDERED. 21 (Emphasis in original, citations omitted)

On October 2, 2014, Salac's counsel received the Regional Trial Court Order denying his Motion for Reconsideration. Thereafter, Salac filed a Notice of Appeal on October 3, 2014. However, the Regional Trial Court held that the Motion for Reconsideration did not interrupt the period for filing an appeal, because it was a mere scrap of paper. Thus, it resolved to deny due course to the appeal in an Order: 22

As gleaned from the records, the reglementary period to file an appeal has already expired. Hence the Notice of Appeal filed by accused, through counsel, dated 03 October 2014 is hereby DENIED due course.

SO ORDERED. 23 (Emphasis in the original)

Salac's Motion for Reconsideration 24 was also denied by the Regional Trial Court. 25

Consequently, Salac filed a Petition for Certiorari26 before the Court of Appeals claiming that the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying his Notice of Appeal for being filed beyond the reglementary period. He argued that the filing of the Notice of Appeal was well within the reglementary period as the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration tolled the prescriptive period. Invoking Neypes v. Court of Appeals, he further argued that he has a fresh period of 15 days to file his Notice of Appeal.

On the other hand, victims Pablo Sarmiento Sr. (Sarmiento Sr.) and Pablo Sarmiento Jr. (Sarmiento Jr.) argued that the Motion for Reconsideration did not toll the prescriptive period to file an appeal because the motion lacked the requisite Notice of Hearing. 27

The Court of Appeals granted the petition. 28 While it acknowledged that a motion for reconsideration without a notice of hearing does not toll the period to appeal, resulting to the decision attaining finality within the lapse of 15 days, 29 it recognized that jurisprudence has relaxed the stringent application of technical rules of procedure to serve the ends of justice. 30 The Court of Appeals' Decision 31 read:

And thus, while there is truth to the contention of private respondents that petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal because of the absence of a notice of hearing, jurisprudence however is replete with cases that compelled Us to relax technical rules so as to serve the ends of justice.

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the bottomline is that if a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter (Basco v. Court of Appeals, 337 SCRA 472 [2000]). As in this case, what is at stake is petitioner's life and liberty. As records would disclose, he was found guilty of two (2) counts of frustrated murder and was sentenced to an imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor. It would be a height of injustice if We will deprive him of the remedy of appeal only because he failed to indicate in his Motion for Reconsideration the required time and place usually put in the notice of hearing. The right to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent application of rules of procedure especially where the interests of substantial justice would be served by permitting the appeal. . . . As he admitted in his memorandum, this inadvertent omission on his part is brought about by his diabetes which slowed down his reflexes and his reading ability. It is but just, therefore, that petitioner he given the opportunity to defend himself and pursue his appeal. . . . To do otherwise would be tantamount to grave injustice. Technicalities may thus be disregarded in order to resolve the case. After all, no party can ever claim a vested right in technicalities[.] 32

The Court of Appeals held that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where his liberty is at stake. 33 The dispositive portion of the Decision stated:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the October 3, 2014 and September 17, 2014 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, in Criminal Case Nos. Q-05-136190 and Q-05-136191 are SET ASIDE. The Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner PO1 Marcelino Salac is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Accordingly, let the records of the case be elevated by the RTC to this Court for the review of petitioner's appeal with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED. 34 (Emphasis in the original)

Sarmiento Sr. and Sarmiento Jr. filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 7, 2015. 35 The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, 36 denied their motion.

Thus, this Petition was filed.

For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the Notice of Appeal filed by respondent PO1 Marcelino Salac should be given due course. aDSIHc

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting respondent's petition to give due course to his Notice of Appeal. They claim that the Notice of Appeal should not have been granted because it was filed beyond the reglementary period. 37

Respondent, for his part, counters that the Court of Appeals properly granted his petition and rightfully ordered that his Notice of Appeal be given due course. 38

The Court dismisses the Petition.

I

Procedural rules are tools to "ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes." 39 They are designed to "facilitate the adjudication of cases so courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules." 40 They should not be disdained at will to serve the interests of a party. 41

Nevertheless, this Court has recognized that litigants must be afforded the widest opportunity to argue their case free from the constraints of technicalities. 42 Accordingly, Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides for the liberal construction of procedural rules:

SECTION 6. Construction. — These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

The rigid application of procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons so as to serve the ends of justice and equity. With this, litigants are given "the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of [their] complaint or defense rather than for [them] to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities." 43

II

Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court requires that every motion be set for hearing except for those which the court may act upon without prejudicing the right of the adverse party. Meanwhile, Section 5 states that the notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties concerned, specifying the time and date of the hearing.

SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the right of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

Failure to comply with these requirements renders the motion defective 44 or pro forma — a worthless piece of paper. 45 The requirement of a notice of hearing, specifying the time and date of the hearing, equally applies to a motion for reconsideration. 46

Nonetheless, notice of hearing may be dispensed with when there has been a substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the adverse party had the opportunity to be heard as explained in Preysler, Jr. v. Manila Southcoast Development Corp.: 47

Rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

In Somera Vda. De Navarro v. Navarro, the Court held that there was substantial compliance of the rule on notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion was not considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified.

Likewise, in Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, the Court held that despite the lack of notice of hearing in a Motion for Reconsideration, there was substantial compliance with the requirements of due process where the adverse party actually had the opportunity to be heard and had filed pleadings in opposition to the motion[.] 48 (Citations omitted)

III

With regard to the nature of the remedy of appeal, Cortal v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises49 discusses:

Appeal is the remedy available to a litigant seeking to reverse or modify a judgment on the merits or a case. The right to appeal is not constitutional or natural, and is not part of due process but is a mere statutory privilege. Thus, it must be availed in keeping with the manner set by law and is lost by a litigant who does not comply with the rules.

Nevertheless, appeal has been recognized as an important part of our judicial system and courts have been advised by the Supreme Court to cautiously proceed to avoid inordinately denying litigants this right. 50 (Citations omitted)

This Court has stressed that a party litigant must be given the fullest opportunity to ventilate his or her case. 51 One of the remedies available to a litigant is the remedy of appeal. As it is an instrumental part of the judicial system, courts must be cautious in denying the right to appeal. ETHIDa

IV

Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides for the period of ordinary appeal.

SECTION 3. Period of ordinary appeal. — The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Based on said rule, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for courts to do with respect to it. 52

Jurisprudence conceptualized the fresh period rule in Neypes v. Court of Appeals. 53 There, this Court found it necessary to systematize the rules on periods within which to file a notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allow extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 25 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 54

This Court explains that a litigant is given a fresh period of 15 days to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

V

Here, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent lacked the notice of hearing required under Rule 15, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. Additionally, no notice of hearing was furnished to the concerned parties, specifying the time and date of the hearing. This rendered the motion defective and prevented it from tolling the prescriptive period for an appeal.

Nevertheless, to serve the ends of justice and so as not to unduly deprive respondent of his liberty, this Court holds that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by him on September 10, 2014 effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for purposes of filing an appeal. Therefore, when respondent, through his counsel, received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration on October 2, 2014, he had a fresh period of 15 days to file a notice of appeal from the day of receipt of such order. The Notice of Appeal filed the day after the receipt of the order was well within the reglementary period contrary to petitioners' assertion.

For certiorari to prosper, abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 55

Ultimately, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to the Notice of Appeal. Litigants should not be constrained with procedural technicalities which may defeat and frustrate the objective of substantial justice. They must be able to fully ventilate and establish the merits of their case in order to serve the ends of justice and equity.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The assailed November 5, 2015 Decision and the June 29, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138251 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED."

By authority of the Court:

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Cortal v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises,817 Phil. 464, 470 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

2.Id.

3.Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 36, 51 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].

4.Rollo, pp. 3-28.

5.Id. at 33-39. The November 5, 2015 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 138251 was penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (Chairperson) and concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Ramon Paul L. Hernando of the Fifth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

6.Id. at 30-31. The June 29, 2016 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (Chairperson) and concurred in by Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Ramon Paul L. Hernando of the Fifth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

7.Id. at 8.

8.Id.

9.Id. at 9.

10.Id. at 10.

11.Id.

12.Id.

13.Id. at 11.

14.Id. at 67-78. The July 7, 2014 Decision in criminal case numbers Q-05-136190 and Q-05-136191 was penned by Judge Afable E. Cajigal of Branch 96, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.

15.Id. at 71.

16.Id. at 77.

17.Id. at 78.

18.Id. at 79.

19.Id. at 80-90.

20.Id. at 91-92. The September 17, 2014 Order in criminal case numbers Q-05-136190 and Q-05-136191 was penned by Judge Afable E. Cajigal of Branch 96, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.

21.Id.

22.Id. at 93. The October 3, 2014 Order in criminal case numbers Q-05-136190 and Q-05-136191 was penned by Judge Afable E. Cajigal of Branch 96, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City.

23.Id.

24.Id. at 13.

25.Id.

26.Id. at 94-108.

27.Id. at 98-106.

28.Id. at 39.

29.Id. at 36.

30.Id. at 36-37.

31.Id. at 33-39.

32.Id. at 36-37.

33.Id. at 37.

34.Id. at 39.

35.Id. at 145-154.

36.Id. at 30-31.

37.Id. at 18-21.

38.Id. at 344-345.

39.Sebastian v. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 605 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Third Division].

40.Cortal v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, 817 Phil. 464, 475 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

41.Sebastian v. Morales, 445 Phil. 595, 605-606 (2003) [Per J. Quisumbing, Third Division].

42.Cortal v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises, 817 Phil. 464, 476-477 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

43.Obut v. Court of Appeals, 162 Phil. 731, 744 (1976) [Per J. Muñoz-Palma, First Division].

44.Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, 514 Phil. 166, 173 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

45.Jehan Shipping Corporation v. National Food Authority, 514 Phil. 166, 173 (2005) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

46.Sembrano v. Judge Ramirez, 248 Phil. 260, 266-267 (1988) [Per J. Sarmiento, Second Division].

47. 635 Phil. 598 (2010) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].

48.Id. at 604-605.

49. 817 Phil. 464 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

50.Id. at 474-475.

51.Id. at 476.

52.Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 506 Phil. 613, 628 (2005) [Per J. Corona, En Banc].

53.Id.

54.Id. at 626.

55.Butuan Bay Wood Export Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 Phil. 174 [Per J. Guerrero, First Division].