Santos y Bautista v. People

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 233633. June 30, 2021.]

MARVIN SANTOS y BAUTISTA, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated June 30, 2021, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 233633 (MARVIN SANTOS y BAUTISTA, petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent). — This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision 2 and Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court's Decision 4 convicting Marvin Santos y Bautista (Santos) of carnapping.

Santos was charged with carnapping under Section 2, in relation to Section 14, of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended by Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659. The Information against him, dated September 15, 2014, reads:

That on or about the 10th day of September 2014, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above[-]named accused, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation while armed with scissor[s], and against the consent of the owner as well as its lawful possessor thereof (sic), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and drive away one (1) unit motorcycle described as RUSI MOTORCYCLE, color green, with plate [n]o. 7321WY and registered under the name of Mark Xirxes A. Batoon and under the custody and control of private complainant ARNOLD BARRIOS y MAGBANUA to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Santos pleaded not guilty to the charge during his arraignment. Trial on the merits then ensued. 6 The prosecution presented private complainant 7 Arnold Barrios (Arnold) and Police Officer 3 Santos Espalgo (PO3 Espalgo) as its witnesses. 8

Arnold testified that at 7:40 p.m. on September 10, 2014, he and his wife, Juliet Barrios (Juliet), were riding a green RUSI motorcycle with plate number 7321WY, which was owned by their friend, Madilyn Quisto. 9 While traversing E. Dela Paz Street, Barangay Sto. Niño, Marikina City, 10 their path was suddenly blocked by a man whom they would later learn was Santos. Santos pointed a gun at Juliet and instructed her to alight from the motorcycle. 11

Santos then boarded the backseat of the motorcycle and instructed Arnold to start the engine or he would be shot. When Arnold did not comply, 12 the two grappled for the handlebar of the motorcycle until Arnold was pushed out of the motorcycle. 13 Arnold and Juliet held on to the back of the motorcycle, causing the motorcycle and Santos to fall to the ground. This caught the attention of the townspeople, who came to the spouses' aid and mauled Santos. 14

Meanwhile, PO3 Espalgo, who was then the officer on duty assigned at the Marikina City Police Station, responded to the radio call from their Tactical Operation Center. He arrived at the scene of the incident with members of the barangay tanod, Reowel Jocson and Richard Adamos. 15 There, they saw Santos bloodied and unconscious. PO3 Espalgo instructed the barangay tanod to bring Santos to Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center. 16 He also confiscated a cellphone and a pair of scissors from the suspect. 17

Only Santos testified for the defense. He testified that at around 6:00 p.m. on September 10, 2014, he was at the online track betting outlet in J.P. Rizal Street, Barangay Sto. Niño, Marikina City. After he placed his bets, he decided to go home and waited for a passenger jeepney. Suddenly, three men approached him, one of whom asked if Santos still recognized him. 18 Before he could answer, the man punched him in the face, causing him to fall to the ground. 19 He hurriedly stood and ran away from his attackers who went after him. As he was running, he heard people shout, "Tulong, tulong, magnanakaw!" 20 When Santos reached E. Dela Paz Street, he stopped a motorcycle and asked for help from its riders, whom he would later learn were Arnold and Juliet, but the two ignored his plea. His chasers soon caught him, and they mauled him until he lost consciousness. He woke up in a hospital and was later charged with carnapping. 21

On March 28, 2016, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision 22 convicting Santos of carnapping. However, it imposed a lower penalty after finding that the prosecution failed to prove that Santos employed violence or intimidation or force upon things in stealing the motorcycle. 23 The dispositive portion of its Decision reads: ACcaET

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused MARVIN SANTOS y BAUTISTA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Carnapping under R.A. 6539. Accused is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS, as minimum, to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS, as maximum.

In the service of his sentence, accused shall be fully credited with the period of his preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED. 24

Santos appealed. 25

In its May 17, 2017 Decision, 26 the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision, but increased the penalty imposed on Santos. Disagreeing with the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals held that the fourth element — that the taking was committed by means of violence against and intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things — was proven. 27 It further held that the variance between the witness's affidavit and his testimony in court on the kind of weapon used by Santos was a minor detail that did not affect his credibility. 28 It held that whether the weapon used was a knife or a gun, it instilled fear or intimidation in Arnold's and Juliet's minds. 29 The Court of Appeals disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 28 March 2016 of Marikina City Regional Trial Court, Branch 156 in Criminal Case No. 2014-16081-MK is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant Santos is imprisonment for not less than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months and not more than thirty (30) years.

SO ORDERED. 30

Santos moved for reconsideration, but was denied in the Court of Appeals' August 15, 2017 Resolution. 31

Hence, Santos filed a Petition for Review 32 before this Court. The Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent People of the Philippines, manifested that it would be adopting its Brief filed before the Court of Appeals instead of filing a comment. 33

Petitioner contends that the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in heavily relying on Arnold's lone testimony, which petitioner claims was "significantly incredible and inconsistent" with the Sinumpaang Salaysay he had executed. 34 Petitioner points to Arnold's indecisiveness as to the kind of weapon allegedly used: if it was a gun or a knife. 35 Petitioner says Arnold's inconsistent statements as to the kind of weapon used discredit his testimony. 36 He also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in imposing the higher penalty since the element of violence or intimidation was not proven.

For this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner Marvin Santos y Bautista is guilty of carnapping. Subsumed under this is the determination of the lone witness's credibility and the propriety of the Court of Appeals' finding of the presence of intimidation.

The Petition is denied.

I

The evaluation of a witness's credibility is fundamentally a factual issue, which cannot be entertained in a Rule 45 petition. 37 As a rule, only questions of law, not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. 38 This Court is not a trier of facts. 39 Furthermore, it is well settled that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is respected, "due to its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of the witness while testifying, unless some fact or circumstance which could affect the result of the case may have been overlooked." 40

Here, we do not find any cogent reason to reject the Regional Trial Court's findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. SaIEcA

The elements of carnapping, as defined under Section 2, paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, are: (1) there is taking of the vehicle; (2) the vehicle belongs to another; (3) the taking is without the consent of the owner or was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (4) the taking is with intent to gain. 41

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found that all these elements were established in this case. Arnold identified petitioner as the person who forcibly took their motorcycle. The Regional Trial Court found that Arnold was consistent in both his direct and cross-examinations in pinpointing petitioner as the person who blocked their path and forcibly took the motorcycle. 42

Intent to gain is presumed from petitioner's unlawful taking of the motorcycle even if he had no opportunity to dispose it. 43 Carnapping was consummated when he exclusively gained possession of the motorcycle even for a brief moment.

The lower courts agree on petitioner's criminal culpability for carnapping and the credibility of Arnold's testimony. The conflict in their findings centers only on the presence of violence or intimidation, which affects the penalty to be imposed.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that Arnold's inconsistency as to the kind of weapon petitioner used in the taking of the motorcycle does not detract from the credibility of his testimony in its totality. The occurrence was sudden and unexpected for Arnold and his wife. It was not improbable for Arnold to be confused as to not notice or observe closely the kind of weapon petitioner was holding in his hand, given his threat to shoot and the incident having occurred at night. What is vital in Arnold's testimony is not his knowledge of the exact weapon used, but his positive identification of petitioner as the man who forcibly took the motorcycle from them.

This Court has held:

It is a truism that the most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair his intrinsic credibility. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking occurrence. Testimonial discrepancies could be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, which even tend to strengthen rather than weaken credibility as they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 44 (Citations omitted)

A few discrepancies or inconsistencies in a witness's testimony, when referring to minor details or collateral matters, do not impair their credibility. 45 A witness is not expected to be perfectly and completely accurate in narrating every single detail of an incident. 46 "Even if [they] may have erred in some aspects of [their] testimony, the same does not necessarily impair [their] testimony nor corrode [their] credibility." 47 What is controlling is the consistency of the witness in relating the principal occurrence 48 and in positively identifying the perpetrator. 49

The trial court judge, who had the opportunity to observe Arnold's demeanor and conduct on the witness stand, gave full credence to his testimony. The judge found Arnold's testimony on the events to be "straightforward, categorical and rang with truth." 50 This Court will not rule otherwise. Petitioner has failed to point out any circumstance that was overlooked or misconstrued which could affect the result of the case.

II

As stated earlier, the lower courts differed in their appreciation of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of "violence against or intimidation of persons" in the taking of the motorcycle. The Regional Trial Court found insufficient evidence to prove that violence or intimidation was employed to steal the motorcycle:

However, the prosecution failed to prove that the accused employed violence or intimidation or force upon things in stealing the motor vehicle. Complainant was uncertain whether it was a knife or a gun that was pointed to him by the accused. Even the testimony of PO3 Espalgo failed to establish the existence of the weapon used during the carnapping, since what was allegedly recovered from the accused was a pair of scissors which was not identified to have been used during the carnapping. Moreover, regardless of the kind of weapon used, the Court is not convinced that the same instilled fear or intimidation in the mind of the complainant, who admittedly grappled with the accused for the possession of the motorcycle. 51

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals found that regardless of the kind of weapon used — whether it was a knife or a gun — the same instilled fear or intimidation in the mind of Arnold and his wife.

We agree with the Court of Appeals.

Intimidation is present in the taking when "acts are performed which, in their own nature or by reason of the circumstances under which they are executed, restrict or hinder the free exercise of the will of the victim or inspire [them] with fear." 52

In Sazon v. Sandiganbayan: 53 DEIHAa

[I]ntimidation consists in causing or creating fear in the mind of a person or in bringing in a sense of mental distress in view of a risk or evil that may be impending, real or imagined. Such fear of injury to person or property must continue to operate in the mind of the victim at the time of the [taking]. 54 (Citation omitted)

In his testimony, Arnold narrated how Santos took the motorcycle, as follows:

Q: While you were on board a motorcycle together with your wife, what happened?

A: There was a man who suddenly approached us, sir.

Q: What happened next after that, Mr. witness?

A: He blocked us, sir, he positioned himself in front of my "manibela," sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How about this man who blocked your way, what did he do to you after that?

A: He "tinutukan nya po ang asawa ko" and asked her to alight from the motorcycle, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: What did this man point at your wife at that time?

A: A gun, sir.

Q: After this man pointed a gun to your wife and asked her to come down from your motorcycle, what was the reaction of your wife at that time, if any?

A: Because of fear, sir, she alighted from the motorcycle, sir.

Q: And then, what happened after, Mr. witness?

A: That's the time he boarded at the back of my motorcycle and he pointed to me, sir.

Q: What did he point to you?

A: A knife, sir.

Q: What happened to the gun? What did he point to you?

A: A gun, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: How did you come to know that what was pointed to you at that time was a gun?

A: I saw it "sa tagiliran ko po," sir.

Q: And then, what did he tell you any (sic) after that?

A: He said "paandarin mo ang motor kung hindi babarilin kita."

Q: And after telling you those words what did you do next?

A: So what I did was I did not follow his instructions and then he grabbed the steering wheel from me and he was the one who drove the motorcycle, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And what did you do after the accused took possession of the handlebar of the motorcycle?

A: We struggled, sir. "Nagpambuno po kami, sir"[.]

Q: And then?

A: And then I alighted from the motorcycle, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And then you said you went down from the vehicle, how did you go down from the motorcycle?

A: He pushed me out of the motorcycle, sir.55 (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, which was taken on September 11, 2011, Arnold narrated:

T: Sa ikaliliwanag ng pagsisiyasat na ito, maaari mo bang isalaysay ang buong pangyayari?

S: Ganito po yon, kasama ko ang aking asawa na si Juliet Barrios sakay kami sa isang motor na Rusi at habang binabagtas namin ang E. Dela Paz nang bigla mayroong sumalubong sa amin na isang lalaki at paglapit niya sa amin ay tinutukun kami ng patalim at sabi sa aking asawa na "Bumaba ka kung hindi babarilin kita"sa takot ng aking asawa ay bumaba ito ngunit pagbaba nito ay sumampa siya sa aking likuran at tinutukan ako ng patalim sa tagiliran at sinasabi na itakbo ko ang motor. 56 (Emphasis supplied)

This Court is convinced that petitioner applied sufficient intimidation on Arnold and Juliet. While pointing a weapon at the spouses, he threatened to shoot them unless they did what he asked. Given the suddenness of his attack and the incident happening at night, the spouses would have had no time to determine the weapon that petitioner held in his hand. Whether they perceived it as a "patalim" or a gun (because of petitioner's threat to shoot), both weapons, by their nature and due to the circumstances of the incident, were sufficient to induce fear of bodily harm in the spouses' minds.

That Arnold eventually grappled with petitioner for the handlebar of the motorcycle does not negate this fear or intimidation, since it is a natural instinct for one to defend the possession of their property. Besides, the workings of the human mind under emotional stress are unpredictable. People may react differently to startling situations. 57 "While it is true that people faced with danger usually become passive and submissive, it is equally true that there are some people who are emboldened in sudden or impulsive reaction to a frightening experience." 58

Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the carnapping was accompanied by intimidation of persons. Violence against persons was also present when petitioner succeeded in pushing Arnold from the motorcycle.

Under Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, as amended, the penalty for carnapping committed with violence against or intimidation of persons is imprisonment for not less than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months and not more than thirty (30) years. Furthermore, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall impose an indeterminate sentence with a maximum term not exceeding the maximum fixed by the special law and a minimum term not less than the minimum term prescribed by the same law. 59 Therefore, the Court of Appeals imposed the proper penalty. DcHSEa

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 17, 2017 Decision and August 15, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38700 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Marvin Santos y Bautista is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping. He is sentenced to imprisonment of not less than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months and not more than thirty (30) years.

SO ORDERED." (Rosario, J., designated additional Member per Special Order No. 2833.)

By authority of the Court:

MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDivision Clerk of Court

By:

(SGD.) RUMAR D. PASIONDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 10-27.

2.Id. at 29-42. The May 17, 2017 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 38700 was penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Renato C. Francisco of the Special Fourteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3.Id. at 44-45. The August 15, 2017 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 38700 was penned by Associate Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba and concurred in by Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Renato C. Francisco of the Former Special Fourteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4.Id. at 64-70. The March 28, 2016 Decision was penned by Judge Anjanette N. De Leon-Ortile of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 156.

5.Id. at 30.

6.Id. at 30.

7.Id. at 65.

8.Id. at 30.

9.Id.

10.Id. at 65.

11.Id. at 30.

12.Id. at 30-31.

13.Id. at 31.

14.Id.

15.Id.

16.Id. at 65.

17.Id. at 31.

18.Id.

19.Id.

20.Id. at 32.

21.Id.

22.Id. at 64-70.

23.Id. at 68.

24.Id. at 69-70.

25.Id. at 32.

26.Id. at 29-42.

27.Id. at 35.

28.Id. at 39.

29.Id.

30.Id. at 41-42.

31.Id. at 44-45.

32.Id. at 10-27.

33.Id. at 86.

34.Id. at 17.

35.Id. at 19.

36.Id. at 20.

37.Mendoza v. People, G.R. No. 234196, November 21, 2018, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/64823> [Per J. A.B. Reyes, Jr., Second Division].

38.Briones v. People, 606 Phil. 354 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

39.Id.

40.People v. Custodio, 274 Phil. 829, 836 (1991) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].

41.People v. Macaranas, 811 Phil. 610 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division]; People v. Fieldad, 744 Phil. 790 (2014) [Per Acting C.J. Carpio, Second Division].

42.Rollo, p. 68.

43. In Sazon v. Sandiganbayan, 598 Phil. 35 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], this Court said that taking is completed from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if they had no opportunity to dispose of it. See alsoPeople v. Bustinera, 475 Phil. 190 (2004) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division].

44.People v. Custodio, 274 Phil. 829, 835 (1991) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].

45.Id. See also People v. Toledo, 333 Phil. 261 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division], where the variance in the testimonies of two witnesses concerning the type of weapon used by the accused in threatening them was considered a minor detail.

46.See People v. Fernandez, 434 Phil. 224 (2002) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division]; People v. Bihison, 367 Phil. 778 (1999) [Per J. Vitug, Third Division].

47.Ferrer v. People, 518 Phil. 196, 211 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].

48.People v. Custodio, 274 Phil. 829, 835 (1991) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].

49.People v. Fernandez, 434 Phil. 224, 231 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

50.Rollo, p. 68.

51.Id. at 68-69.

52.People v. Sequiño, 332 Phil. 90, 118 (1996) [Per J. Davide, Jr., Third Division].

53. 598 Phil. 35 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].

54.Id. at 47.

55.Rollo, pp. 35-37.

56.Id. at 58-59.

57.People v. Pedroso, 391 Phil. 43, 54 (2000) [Per J. Melo, En Banc].

58.People v. Toledo, 333 Phil. 261, 271 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].

59. Act No. 4103 (1933), as amended, Sec. 1. See also Andres v. People, 606 Phil. 839 (2009) [Per J. Brion, Second Division]; Barredo v. Vinarao, 555 Phil. 823 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].