Santos v. Pacheco
This is a civil case involving unlawful detainer. The main issue is whether the petitioner was able to prove her better or superior right of possession over the property, where the respondents' possession was by the petitioner's mere tolerance. The Supreme Court of the Philippines affirmed the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the petitioner failed to prove her superior right of possession. The Supreme Court emphasized that in unlawful detainer cases, both allegations and proof regarding the grant of permission are required, and possession de facto must be proven. The Court reiterated that it is limited to reviewing errors of law, and it defers to the factual findings of trial courts.
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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 232852. July 4, 2018.]
NORMA P. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. TARCILA L. PACHECO AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING UNDER HER, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution datedJuly 4, 2018which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 232852 (Norma P. Santos v. Tarcila L. Pacheco and all persons claiming under her). — The Court resolves to DENY petitioner's motion for reconsideration dated February 27, 2018 of our Resolution dated December 13, 2017 which denied her petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner asserts in her motion that the pivotal question in this case is whether she was able to present evidence before the trial court showing that she merely tolerated the physical possession of respondents over the property, and not whether she was able to adduce evidence of prior possession as against respondents. While we agree with petitioner that the issue or fact of prior possession is not indispensable in an unlawful detainer case, we maintain our earlier affirmance of the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals (CA) that petitioner failed to prove by preponderant evidence her better or superior right of possession over the property, and that respondents' possession over the same was by her mere tolerance. Petitioner's testimonial and documentary evidence may have shown that she spent for the construction of the property over the untitled land of her parents, but as correctly held by the CA, there is dearth of corroborating material evidence which would categorically affirm petitioner's tolerated possession over the property. AIDSTE
In Jose v. Alfuerto, 1 we emphasized anew the requirement for both allegations and proof regarding the grant of permission in a case for unlawful detainer. Citing Padre v. Malabanan, 2 we noted the dismissal of the case despite allegations of the existence of tolerance, because the evidence was "totally wanting as to when and under what circumstances x x x the alleged tolerance came about." We then concluded that complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply anchor their claims on the validity of the owner's title. Possession de facto must also be proved. 3
Similarly, in Quijano v. Amante, 4 we held that a requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession must then be established. With the averment that a defendant's possession was by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance does not suffice. At least, the plaintiff should show the overt acts indicative of her permission for the defendant to occupy the disputed property. 5
All told, there remains no compelling reason to overturn our previous denial of the petition. We also reiterate at this juncture the well-settled rule that the function of the Court in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. As a matter of sound practice and procedure, the Court defers and accords finality to the factual findings of trial courts. To do otherwise would defeat the very essence of Rule 45 and would convert the Court into a trier of facts, which is not its intended purpose under the law. 6 SDAaTC
WHEREFORE, petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
The petitioner's manifestation, stating that the Resolution dated December 13, 2017 was received by her counsel on February 12, 2018 and she filed a motion for reconsideration by registered mail on February 27, 2018; and the respondents' comment on the motion for reconsideration, praying that the motion for reconsideration be denied for lack of merit, are both NOTED.
SO ORDERED." Leonardo-de Castro, J., on official leave; Del Castillo, J., designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2562 dated June 20, 2018, Gesmundo, J., designated as acting member per Special Order No. 2560 dated May 11, 2018.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENAActing Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. G.R. No. 169380, November 26, 2012, 686 SCRA 323.
2. G.R. No. 165620, September 8, 2006, 501 SCRA 278.
3.Jose v. Alfuerto, supra at 338-339.
4. G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2014, 737 SCRA 552.
5.Id. at 564-565.
6.Heirs of Teresita Villanueva v. Heirs of Petronila Syquia Mendoza, G.R. No. 209132, June 5, 2017, 825 SCRA 513.
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