FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 197719. July 13, 2016.]
GORDON T. SANTOS, petitioner,vs. ATTY. J. OSWALD B. LORENZO, respondent.
[G.R. No. 197876. July 13, 2016.]
ATTY. J. OSWALD B. LORENZO, petitioner,vs. GORDON T. SANTOS, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution dated July 13, 2016 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 197719 (Gordon T. Santos v. Atty. J. Oswald B. Lorenzo); G.R. No. 197876 (Atty. J. Oswald B. Lorenzo v. Gordon T. Santos). — These are consolidated Petitions 1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision 2 and Resolution 3 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA), Fourteenth Division, in CA-G.R. CV No. 90476.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
The facts as summarized by the CA are as follows:
Gordon T. Santos (Santos) was employed as a mason by DM Consunji, Inc. until April 6, 1999 when he was dismissed from service. As a consequence of his dismissal, Gordon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-04-04551-99. During this time, Gordon was represented by Atty. Leo G. Lee (Atty. Lee), a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office.
On December 15, 1999, Labor Arbiter Potenciano S. Canizares, Jr. dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Unsatisfied, Gordon appealed the December 15, 1999 Decision to the NLRC. Considering that during this time, he could no longer get the services of Atty. Lee, he signed the Appeal Memorandum himself. CAIHTE
In a Resolution dated August 29, 2000, the Third Division of the NLRC dismissed the appeal.
After receiving a copy of the August 29, 2000 Resolution on October 23, 2000, Gordon came across a flyer bearing the name of Atty. Oswaldo B. Lorenzo (Atty. Lorenzo). Gordon went to the office of Atty. Lorenzo and after stating his case, Atty. Lorenzo accepted the case pro bono.
On November 6, 2000, Atty. Lorenzo filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 29, 2000 Resolution.
On February 5, 2001, the NLRC issued a Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration for failure to file the same within the reglementary period. It ratiocinated as follows:
Records disclose that during the proceeding before the Labor Arbiter and until promulgation of Our Resolution sought to be reconsidered, complainant herein was represented by the Public Attorney's Office. And as a Withdrawal of Appearance has yet to be filed by said counsel in accordance with the Rules of Court (see Section 7, Rule III, NLRC New Rules of Procedure), the timeliness of any appeal or motion filed in this case must still be reckoned from receipt of such counsel. This being the case, as the record shows that the Public Attorney's Office received a copy of Our August 29, 2000 Resolution on October 4, 2000 (Records p. 273), the instant motion, filed only on November 6, 2000, was filed beyond the ten (10) day reglementary period contrary to what is provided for under Section 14, Rule VII, NLRC New Rules of Procedure. Consequently, the instant motion can no longer be entertained.
Aggrieved, Gordon filed a disbarment case against Atty. Lorenzo on October 14, 2001. On September 30, 2003, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) submitted its Investigation Report recommending that Atty. Lorenzo be reprimanded for his failure to observe the required diligence for the cause of his client.
On October 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-34 adopting and approving the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline reprimanding Atty. Lorenzo.
On July 21, 2004, the Supreme Court noted Resolution No. XVI-2004-34 and considered the matter closed and terminated. 4
Santos thereafter filed a complaint 5 for damages against Atty. Lorenzo before the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 258 where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0401. Santos prayed that the court order Atty. Lorenzo to pay P1,000,000 for the damage caused by his negligence. 6
Atty. Lorenzo filed his Answer 7 with Compulsory Counterclaim. He claimed that while the NLRC pointed out that PAO through Atty. Leo G. Lee received the assailed resolution on 4 October 2000, Santos represented to Atty. Lorenzo that the latter personally received the NLRC Resolution on 23 October 2000 which was Atty. Lorenzo's basis for filing the motion for reconsideration on 6 November 2000. 8 Atty. Lorenzo likewise claimed that Santos's actions have seriously compromised the former's legal and business standing and reputation and have constrained the former to engage the services of counsel for which Santos must be liable for P250,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as attorney's fees. 9
THE RTC RULING
Based on the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled that Atty. Lorenzo was liable for damages. He "failed to make the proper verification as to the date of receipt of the Resolution before accepting the case which is equivalent to lack of diligence." 10 However, the trial court qualified that such negligence is not gross. 11
The RTC rendered its Decision 12 dated 20 December 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiff having been able to prove his case against defendant by preponderance of evidence, defendant Atty. Oswaldo B. Lorenzo is hereby directed to pay the plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as DAMAGES.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.13
THE CA RULING
Santos filed a Notice of Appeal, 14 arguing that the amount of damages awarded was disproportionate to the damage caused to him. He specifically asked that the RTC ruling be modified by increasing the amount for moral damages and awarding temperate and exemplary damages as warranted by the case. 15
Upon the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration 16 by the trial court, 17 Atty. Lorenzo also filed his appeal asking that the decision be reversed and that the award of damages be deleted. 18
After the submission of the parties' respective briefs, 19 the appellate court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Parañaque, Branch 258 in Civil Case No. 04-0401 dated December 20, 2007 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that defendant-appellant Atty. Oswaldo B. Lorenzo is directed to pay the plaintiff-appellant Gordon T. Santos the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. DETACa
SO ORDERED. 20
Santos filed his Motion for Partial Reconsideration 21 while Atty. Lorenzo filed his Motion for Reconsideration, 22 both of which, however, were denied by the CA.
Santos and Atty. Lorenzo separately filed their petitions for review on certiorari before this Court which were eventually consolidated. 23 In compliance with the directive of this Court, both parties thereafter filed their Comments. 24
THE ISSUE
The sole issue to be resolved by this Court is whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming with modification the RTC ruling that Atty. Lorenzo failed to exercise diligence as counsel for Santos which led to the latter's suffering, for which the former should be held liable for damages.
THIS COURT'S RULING
We GRANT the petition.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review before this Court. 25 This Rule, however, is not absolute and does admit of exceptions, such as: (1) when the findings of a trial court are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court's inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on record. 26
We find the circumstances of the present case within the ambit of the fifth and sixth exceptions for reasons discussed hereunder.
The Civil Code indeed offers relief to any person who has suffered damage or injury through an abuse in the exercise of a right or in the performance of a duty of another. 27 We have had the occasion to pronounce that:
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human conduct. 28
Enunciated in the Civil Code are the following provisions:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Complementing these provisions in relation to the present case are Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which are quoted successively as follows:
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 — A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 — A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. aDSIHc
Atty. Lorenzo failed to exercise diligence and the records bear this out. We quote in full and with approval the findings of the trial court, which were later affirmed by the appellate court, as follows:
. . . it appears that defendant fully knew that Atty. Leo P. Lee, counsel of record for the plaintiff, has not withdrawn his appearance, hence, prudence dictates that defendant should have exerted efforts to verify from the record of the NLRC Third Division when Atty. Leo G. Lee received the copy of the questioned Resolution to know for himself as to whether or not he would still accept the case of plaintiff. This is elemental in the practice of law especially so since the Court knows defendant was himself a former Labor Arbiter. In this regard, had defendant gone to the Office of the Third Division of the NLRC, or sent any of his staff, it would have been found out that the actual receipt of the Resolution on the Appeal which affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter was received by Atty. Leo G. Lee, plaintiff's counsel of record on October 4, 2000. However, the Court noted that defendant failed to undertake such extra effort to check the record and instead merely relied on the representation of plaintiff as to the alleged date he received the decision. It cannot be gainsaid and is quite elementary that it is the receipt of the decision of counsel that is controlling and not receipt of the client.
xxx xxx xxx
Since defendant failed to make the proper verification as to the date of the receipt of the Resolution before accepting the case which is equivalent to lack of diligence, he has no one to blame except himself. Had he done so, he would not have accepted plaintiff's case and his reputation as a former Labor Arbiter, Professor and Labor Law Reviewer should have remained unsullied.
We also take judicial notice of this Court's Resolution 29 dated 21 July 2004 relative to Administrative Case No. 5541 entitled Gordon T. Santos v. Atty. Oswaldo B. Lorenzo. The resolution noted the IBP Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVI-2004-34 reprimanding Atty. Lorenzo with warning that a similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely and considered the case closed and terminated. 30
The finding of fact of the lower court and ruling in the administrative case notwithstanding, We fail to see how this negligence could have led to the suffering of Santos for which Atty. Lorenzo should be held liable for damages.
It is crystal clear that when Santos approached Atty. Lorenzo to be his counsel, the right to appeal the NLRC Decision dated 29 August 2000 denying the appeal and affirming the Labor Arbiter ruling which dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint for lack of merit, had already prescribed. The former counsel of Santos, Atty. Leo G. Lee, who had not filed a motion for withdrawal as counsel, received the Decision on 4 October 2000. The receipt of Atty. Lee of the Decision fixed the period to file the motion for reconsideration on or before 14 October 2000. Nine days had lapsed from such period when Santos received the notice on 23 October 2000 as he himself had represented to Atty. Lorenzo. The violation of Santos's right to appeal or to fully vindicate his cause cannot be unduly shifted to Atty. Lorenzo. We cannot also find fault nor penalize Atty. Lorenzo who had merely relied in good faith on his pro bono client's representation.
The trial court, and subsequently the appellate court, failed to appreciate this crucial fact, for which reason We cannot agree with the conclusion that Atty. Lorenzo should be held liable. We therefore find that the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC ruling that Atty. Lorenzo failed to exercise diligence as counsel for Santos and in imposing the increased amount of P50,000 to be paid by the former for the latter's suffering.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. 31 Absent any showing that the failure of Atty. Lorenzo to verify the reglementary period for filing the motion for reconsideration could have resulted in an injury or harm on Santos, We are constrained to reverse the assailed rulings.
We reiterate that "lawyers are not demi-gods or magicians who can always win their cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause." 32 While they are duty-bound to serve clients with competence and diligence, they are nevertheless neither insurers of success in each and every case nor are they liable for every losing client's inevitable losses or damages.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed rulings in CA-G.R. CV No. 90476 are hereby SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. 04-0401 before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 258, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETADivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 16-33 (G.R. No. 197719); dated 2 September 2011; rollo, pp. 11-24 (G.R. No. 197876); dated 15 September 2011.
2. Id. at 170-182 (G.R. No. 197719); dated 14 March 2011, penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla and concurred in by Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Jane Aurora C. Lantion.
3. Id. at 204-205; dated 21 July 2011.
4. Id. at 171-172.
5. Id. at 37-38; dated 13 October 2004.
6. Id. at 38.
7. Id. at 54-61; dated 26 November 2004.
8. Id. at 59.
9. Id. at 60-61.
10. Id. at 139.
11. Id. at 140.
12. Id. at 133-141; penned by Judge Raul E. De Leon.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 76-77.
15. Id. at 166.
16. Id. at 83-85.
17. Id. at 87; In the Order 17 dated 27 February 2008.
18. Id. at 131.
19. Id. at 151-167; Brief for the Appellee; Rollo, pp. 120-132 (G.R. No. 197719); Brief for the Appellant.
20. Id. at 181.
21. Id. at 183-189.
22. Id. at 190-194.
23. Rollo, p. 61 (G.R. No. 197876); in a Resolution dated 12 December 2011.
24. Santos filed his Comment dated 8 March 2012 (id. at 74-88) while Atty. Lorenzo filed his Comment dated 9 February 2012 (id. at 68-72).
25. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, 491 Phil. 249, 255 (2005).
26. Ilao-Quianay v. Mapile, 510 Phil. 736, 743 (2005).
27. California Clothing v. Quiñones, 720 Phil. 373 (2013).
28. Carpio v. Valmonte, 481 Phil. 352 (2004) citing Globe Mackay v. CA, 257 Phil. 783 (1989).
29. Rollo, p. 52 (G.R. No. 197719).
30. Id.
31. Section 1, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
32. Yu v. Bondal, A.C. No. 5534, 17 January 2005; Curimatmat v. Gojar, A.C. No. 4411, 308 SCRA 123 (1999).